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INTRODUCTION
The cultures that collide and converse in this book range temporally 
from antiquity to the present and geographically from Israel to Europe 
to the United States. As Jews embarked on a physical trajectory that they 
defined as exile, they simultaneously set forth on a rich and complex 
intellectual voyage that required them to confront the worldviews of their 
neighbors along with internal differences of doctrine and philosophical 
orientation that were themselves often born—at least in part—out of 
engagement with the external environment. Thus, the culture of a small 
and sometimes insular people took on an almost global character.
The first section of this volume addresses Jewish approaches to the 
proper parameters of interaction with the values, beliefs, and intellectual 
life of the larger society. The longest of the essays is an almost book-
length endeavor to provide an analytical overview of the range of 
positions on this question in all the centers of Jewish life from the dawn 
of the Middle Ages to the eve of the Enlightenment. In its most intense 
form, the struggle over this issue erupted in a fierce controversy centered 
on the works of Maimonides. Despite the passions engendered by these 
debates, the orientations of the major protagonists were often far from 
one-dimensional, and two of the essays in this section attempt to capture 
the nuanced position of Nahmanides, one of the central figures of the 
Jewish Middle Ages, and to assess the impact of the philosophical milieu 
on one of his seminal doctrines. If the stance of an individual thinker can 
defy easy classification, characterizing entire subcommunities is all the 
more challenging. In the larger study, I set forth the evolving scholarly 
position that no longer sees medieval Ashkenazic Jewry as isolated from 
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its environment, but the essay on Ashkenazic modes of thought cautions 
against allowing the pendulum to swing too far.
With the rise of the Jewish Enlightenment or haskalah, resistance 
to significant acculturation came to be restricted to the segment of 
Jewry labeled “Orthodox”—perhaps even to the smaller subdivision 
assigned the particularly problematic label “ultra-Orthodox.” With 
some hesitation, I have incorporated a youthful essay published in a 
student journal assessing the complex position on haskalah and secular 
learning of a rabbi and biblical commentator of considerable influence 
who clearly belongs in the company of uncompromising traditionalists 
but was nonetheless sufficiently cognizant of contemporary intellectual 
currents that some adherents of the Enlightenment saw him as a model 
whom the traditionalist community should strive to emulate. While 
the classical Maimonidean controversy has long faded into the distant 
past, Maimonides himself remains acutely relevant to any discussion of 
Judaism’s embrace of “external” culture; in an essay based on an address 
to a non-academic audience, I attempt to limn and assess the multiple 
images of his persona proffered by contemporary Jews often seeking 
themselves in the great medieval legist and philosopher.
Academic Jewish Studies are a quintessentially modern development 
with an ambivalent relationship to movements of acculturation in the 
medieval and modern past. If I am not entirely comfortable in describing 
this field in its fullness as my ideological home, it is surely my professional 
home. The first section of the book begins and ends with ideologically 
charged essays with deeply personal elements addressing the challenges 
and significance of an enterprise that thoughtful Jews ignore at their 
intellectual and even spiritual peril. 
The second, briefest section deals with the interpretation of the 
Bible, but it decidedly reflects the theme of cultural interaction. The 
understanding of the wisdom of Solomon among medieval commentators 
varied in intriguing ways that mirror the philosophical—or non-
philosophical— orientation of the exegetes in question, and in the case 
of Isaac Abravanel may even reveal traces of his experience in the royal 
courts of Portugal and Spain. As to the charged question of the morality 
of biblical heroes, I argue that Jewish perceptions were profoundly 
affected by the nature of external challenges in both medieval and 
modern times.
And then there is the End of Days. While the beliefs and movements 
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analyzed in this section are almost bewildering in their thematic and 
chronological variety, they all reflect the impact or at least relevance of 
ideas and forces in the larger society: Rome as the paradigmatic enemy 
of Israel in late antiquity; the effect of medieval rationalism on portraits 
of the messianic scenario; the plausibility or implausibility of ascribing 
differences in messianic activism to rationalism and non-rationalism; 
the degree to which the modern redemptive movement called Zionism 
could color academic analysis of the distant past; and the factors—both 
sociological and religious—that have enabled a contemporary messianic 
movement espousing doctrines once excluded from authentic Judaism 
to achieve legitimation in the bosom of the Orthodox community.
The introduction to a collection of this sort would normally 
incorporate ruminations about the personal factors that triggered the 
author’s interest in the field as well as the evolution of his or her work 
over a period of decades. In this case, however, I am excused from this 
task because I have already fulfilled it. A companion volume published 
by Academic Studies Press last year (Persecution, Polemic, and Dialogue: 
Essays in Jewish-Christian Relations) begins with an introduction that—
at least in part— engages precisely these questions. More important, 
the opening chapter of this book provides considerable detail about 
the unfolding of my scholarly work and its connection to my deepest 
commitments. Finally, the epilogue about my father reveals the 
wellsprings of my eventual career in a way that a routine introduction 
could never convey. At this point, I will only add that the atmosphere 
and ideology that suffuse Yeshiva University, where I was educated and 
currently teach, place many of the issues addressed in this book at the 
center of their universe of discourse, and I cannot fail to underscore 
the effect of this unique institution on my approach to scholarship, to 
religion, and to life.
This volume, like the earlier one, is not an exhaustive collection 
of what I have written about its theme. First of all, several articles in 
the volume on Jewish-Christian relations qualify as discussions of the 
intellectual history of the Jews, and they are naturally not included 
here. Many short pieces are not of a sufficiently scholarly nature even 
though they touch upon relevant themes.1 A case could have been made 
1 “Missing Milton Himmelfarb,” Commentary 123:4 (April, 2007): 54-58; “Introducing 
Michael Wyschogrod,” Modern Theology 22 (2006): 673-675; “On Marriageability, Jewish 
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for the inclusion of three review essays and several fairly substantive 
reviews, but I decided to leave out material that does not stand on its 
own.2 One full-fledged article whose genesis is described in the opening 
chapter does not appear here despite its decidedly scholarly content and 
direct relevance to the issues addressed in the first section of the book 
because it is predominantly religious rather than academic in character 
and motivation.3
For the same reason, I hesitated before deciding to include the 
article about Lubavitch messianism. During the last fifteen years, I have 
devoted much time and energy with what can generously be described 
as mixed results to a religiously motivated effort to deny religious 
authority within Orthodoxy to believers in the Messiahship of the 
Lubavitcher Rebbe. Religious polemic of this sort does not belong in 
this volume. However, the article that I incorporated proffers a relatively 
irenic, primarily sociological analysis of the reasons for a phenomenon 
that at first glance appears difficult to understand. Including it in this 
volume provides the reader with a window into an important dimension 
Identity, and the Unity of American Jewry,” in Conflict or Cooperation? Papers on Jewish 
Unity (New York, 1989), pp. 69-77; “Response” in J. Gutmann et al., What Can Jewish 
History Learn From Jewish Art? (New York, 1989), pp. 29-38 (a scholarly piece, but one 
that cannot really stand without the article to which it responds).
 The following symposia: “What Do American Jews Believe?” Commentary (August, 
1996): 19-21; “Reflections on the State of Religious Zionism,” Jewish Action 60:1 (Fall, 
1999), pp. 12-15; “Reflections on the Six-Day War After a Quarter-Century,” Tradition 
26:4 (1992): 7-10; “Divided and Distinguished Worlds,” Tradition 26:2 (1992): 6-10 
(criticism and response, Tradition 27:2 [1993]: 91-94); “The State of Orthodoxy,” 
Tradition 20:1 (1982): 9-12.
2 The full review essays are “The Study of the Early Ashkenazic Rabbinate” (in Hebrew) [a 
review of Avraham Grossman, Hakhmei Ashkenaz ha-Rishonim], Tarbiz 53 (1984): 479-487; 
“Modern Orthodoxy in the United States: A Review Essay” [of Samuel C. Heilman and 
Steven M. Cohen, Cosmopolitans and Parochials: Modern Orthodox Jews in America], Modern 
Judaism 11 (1991): 261-272; “Must a Jew Believe Anything? [by Menachem Kellner]: A 
Review Essay,” Tradition 33:4 (1999): 81-89. (I note for the record that Kellner’s response 
to my review in the afterword to the second edition of his book leaves me thoroughly 
unpersuaded.) I did publish one review essay in the earlier volume, but that was because it 
contains an argument for the general reliability of Nahmanides’ version of the Barcelona 
disputation that should in my view have a significant, even decisive, impact on this long-
debated scholarly crux. I am of course not holding my breath in the expectation that this 
will actually happen.
3 “On Freedom of Inquiry in the Rambam—and Today” (with Lawrence Kaplan), The 
Torah U-Madda Journal 2 (1990): 37-50. I would have of course needed Prof. Kaplan’s 
permission to reprint the article in this volume, but I believe that he would have allowed 
me to do so.
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of my recent work without, I hope, undue violation of the bounds of 
appropriate scholarly detachment.
I have thus far been careful not to repeat material that appeared in 
the introduction to the earlier volume, but there is no point in avoiding 
repetition when I need to express sentiments that I have already 
formulated to the best of my ability. Here then are the final paragraphs 
of that introduction with the joyful addition of a single word announcing 
Shira’s arrival into the world and the family:
I am grateful to Simcha Fishbane for inviting me to publish this 
collection of essays and to Meira Mintz, whose preparation of the index 
served as a salutary reminder of the thoughtfulness and creativity 
demanded by a task that casual observers often misperceive as routine 
and mechanical. Menachem Butler was good enough to produce pdf files 
of the original articles that served as the basis for the production of the 
volume. I can only hope that the final product is not entirely unworthy of 
their efforts as well as those of the efficient, helpful leadership and staff of 
Academic Studies Press among whom I must single out Kira Nemirovsky 
for her diligent and meticulous care in overseeing the production of the 
final version.
I am also grateful to the original publishers of these essays for 
granting permission to reprint them in this volume.
Finally, when publishing a book that represents work done over the 
course of a lifetime, an author’s expression of gratitude to wife and family 
embraces far more than the period needed to write a single volume. 
Without Pearl, whose human qualities and intellectual and practical 
talents beggar description, whatever I might have achieved would have 
been set in a life largely bereft of meaning. And then there are Miriam 
and Elie—and Shai, Aryeh and Sarah; Yitzhak and Ditza—and Racheli, 
Sara, Tehilla, Baruch Meir, Breindy, Tova, and Batsheva; Gedalyah and 
Miriam—and Shoshana, Racheli, Sheindl, Baruch Meir, and Shira. Each 
of these names evokes emotions for which I am immeasurably grateful 
and which I cannot even begin to express.

THE CULTURAL 
ENVIRONMENT:
CHALLENGE AND 
RESPONSE

— 3 —
IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY AND FAITH: 
Some Personal Reflections on the Social, Cultural 
and Spiritual Value of the Academic Study of 
Judaism
From: Study and Knowledge in Jewish Thought, ed. by Howard Kreisel 
(Beer Sheva, 2006), pp. 11-29. Delivered as the English keynote address 
at a conference at Ben Gurion University of the Negev in Beer Sheva. (The 
Hebrew keynote was presented by Eliezer Schweid.) The topic and essential 
title (“Personal Reflections on the Social, Cultural and Spiritual Value of the 
Academic Study of Judaism”) were chosen by the organizers of the conference.
Academic Jewish Studies are a pivotal anchor of Jewish identity. It hardly 
needs to be said that most identifying Jews are not practitioners of 
Jewish studies, while many, if not most, are not active consumers either. 
But even in a democratic age, the sort of identity that we mean when 
we speak of Jewishness is molded in large measure by the minority who 
seriously engage the traditions and texts of an ancient and challenging 
culture. 
It is commonly stated that Judaism is an unusual and perhaps 
unique amalgam of peoplehood and religion and, as I once wrote in 
a different context, one advantage of commonplaces is that they are 
usually true. While secular Jews might want to replace the religious 
component with culture or civilization, it remains clear, or it should, 
that reading novels with Jewish themes, playing klezmer music, 
and even living in the land of Israel and speaking Hebrew do not 
in themselves confer a sense of Jewishness that provides sufficient 
continuity with the historic Jewish people. Moreover, the national 
component of Jewish identity is rooted not only in the reality and 
centrality of a millennial tradition focused on religion, but also in 
the very fact that Jews lived without a land for so many generations 
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and had no choice but to define themselves through extraordinarily 
powerful cultural-religious norms. To shed those norms entirely or 
to understand them as altogether secondary is to denude Jewishness 
of the meaning that it has accumulated over all those generations. It 
follows, then, that even the most basic affirmation of Jewish identity 
requires some interaction with the historic culture of the Jewish 
people in its classical forms, though these forms might be transmuted 
to accord with the sensibilities of contemporary secular Jews. 
That the connectedness to the Jewish cultural past has been severely 
attenuated or lost among massive sectors of Diaspora Jewry hardly needs 
to be said, but it is only slightly more necessary to note that the same is 
largely true of the Jews of Israel. After an unbalanced religious soldier 
sprayed gunfire in a church in Jaffa, he was asked why he had done this. 
According to the Jerusalem Post, he “said it was a shame that he had to 
explain in court his motive for the shooting, which, he said, was self 
explanatory and written in the Torah. His motive, he said, was to destroy 
all idols, and anything which represented ‘foreign labor’ and did not relate 
to Judaism.”1 Thus, avodah zarah, literally “foreign worship,” one of the 
foundational conceptions in Judaism, evoked no resonance whatever for 
an Israeli journalist, who thoroughly misunderstood the soldier’s intent. 
Moving to somewhat more esoteric knowledge, a Hebrew reference to the 
classic work of R. Saadya Gaon made use of the standard abbreviation 
for the author’s name, so that the citation read “Rasag, Emunot ve-De‘ot.” 
A scholar who studies medieval Jewish philosophy informs me that an 
Israeli translator understood the abbreviation as a number and rendered 
the reference into English as “263 Beliefs and Opinions.” 
These anecdotes can be multiplied and, in the face of the depressing 
reality that they illustrate, questions of more than a straightforward 
educational sort arise. We must, of course, ask about what pedagogical 
reforms are needed to convey knowledge of Jewish culture and history, 
a question that lies outside the parameters of my assignment and of 
my competence. But we must also ask how the content of that history 
and that culture is to be preserved, recovered, and understood. The 
elementary reply is that one consults with experts and, in the modern 
world, expertise generally rests with people who have been trained, and 
1 “Soldier who shot up church sent for psychiatric evaluation. Suspect says he was 
destroying idols,” Jerusalem Post, May 25, 1995, p. 12. 
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who often remain, in an academic environment. Thus, academic experts 
in Jewish studies should, it would appear, serve as the highest authorities 
in determining the parameters of Jewish identity, the content of Jewish 
culture, perhaps even the policies of the Jewish State. 
This last sentence followed ineluctably, or so it seemed, from a chain 
of premises and reasoning so simple that affirming them appeared 
superfluous to the point of embarrassment. Yet the real embarrassment 
is the sentence itself, which cannot but elicit smiles, or worse, at the 
self-importance of what the late Governor George Wallace of Alabama 
described as pointy-headed intellectuals. Popular attitudes toward the 
role of academics, whose disciplines cannot easily be separated from their 
persons, are in fact marked by deep ambivalence. People consult experts, 
but they embrace those whose views accord with their own, and often, 
sometimes with good reason, direct withering contempt toward those 
whose positions they reject. 
We would do well, then, to approach the question before us with 
due humility. Academics often disagree regarding the most fundamental 
realities at the heart of their scholarly discourse. The questions of objective 
meaning, of the interaction between the observer and the evidence, of 
the elusiveness of truth, have become so pervasive that many important 
scholars have essentially thrown in the towel, despairing of achieving 
certain knowledge and embracing a multivalent reality dependant upon 
the perspective of the observer. In extreme form, ideology determines 
reactions to the point where respected figures inform us that in light 
of the distortions in all autobiographies, Rigoberta Menchu’s wholesale 
fabrications and Edward Said’s repeated misrepresentations of his 
childhood are of no moment, that they are examples of the seamless 
web entangling subjective and external reality. 
This approach aside, even unchallenged scholarly conclusions can 
be applied in very different ways in the arena of public policy, culture, 
or the life of the spirit. There are lessons to be learned from history, but 
they are filtered through values that are themselves rarely generated by 
academic investigation. Thus, the Holocaust has been seen as evidence 
that Jews must distrust, even despise, Gentiles, relying only on their 
own strength and resolve, and at the same time as evidence that Jews 
must treat others all the more sensitively in light of the unspeakable 
suffering caused by mindless bigotry. These differing conclusions 
are based on the examination of an unassailable historical reality 
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recognized by both parties; it is other values that determine how that 
reality will be used. 
Moreover, the broad range of the term “study of Judaism” 
complicates our discussion further, including as it does every discipline 
in the humanities and social sciences, every chronological period, every 
methodological approach. The social, cultural, and spiritual value of 
investigating the evolution of halakhah is not the same as that of studying 
the development of the Yiddish theater, though the latter is certainly 
understood by many Jews as a manifestation of Judaism; midrashic 
approaches to women and the nature of Israeli treatment of Arabs in 
1948 both raise moral questions, but they can hardly be addressed within 
the same framework. 
This consideration, too, does not exhaust the complexities of our 
inquiry, since the value of the academic study of Judaism demands 
assessment in contrast to alternatives that differ from one another 
profoundly. One is the abandonment of Jewish study, an option whose 
consequences we have already encountered. Another is the pursuit of 
such study in a traditional mode. Thus, animated debates swirl in the 
Modern Orthodox, or dati-leumi, community about studying Talmud with 
a critical approach that points to layers of composition and development. 
A distinguished rabbi who advocates a traditional approach once 
reported a remark regarding this matter in the name of Jacob Katz. The 
Talmud asserts that for every forbidden food, God has provided a kosher 
alternative with a similar taste (“Kol mai de-asar lan rahamana shara lan ke-
vateh”). Katz, after emerging from a lecture by an Orthodox scholar that 
was suffused with the critical approach to Talmudic study, remarked, “Kol 
mai de-asar lan rahamana shara lan ke-vateh. Asar lan biqqoret ha-Miqra: 
shara lan biqqoret ha-Talmud.” (“Whatever God has forbidden to us, he has 
permitted to us something similar to it. He has forbidden to us biblical 
criticism; he has permitted to us talmudic criticism.”) 
A final alternative is attachment to Judaism and its past neither 
through a critical study of the tradition nor through an intense examination 
of its texts in the manner of the yeshivot, but through instinct and 
memory. This last word looms especially large in contemporary discourse 
as the alternative to history; it is understood roughly as the construction 
of a past filtered through the accumulated experience of a people, its 
rituals, its beliefs, and its psychic needs, with little or no attention to the 
findings of critical historians. 
Identity, Ideology and Faith: 
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In his seminal Zakhor, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi concluded with a 
pessimistic peroration about the near irrelevance of academic history 
to Jewish life even in a modern age in which tradition has lost much 
of its force.2 But Yerushalmi’s lament, for all its rhetorical power and 
large element of truth, underestimates the degree to which historical 
study in an academic mode, working in tense but symbiotic concert with 
mythopoeic memory, has influenced and even transformed the ideology 
of Jews in the course of the last century. Jewish nationalism rested on 
nostalgic memories, transmuted messianic longings, and driving social 
realities, but it drew upon historical scholarship to a degree that should 
not be dismissed. I have never forgotten a striking formulation that I 
heard long ago from Arnold Band, whose field is not Jewish history but 
Hebrew literature. The Hebrew translation of Graetz’s History, he said, 
was the most influential novel in the annals of the Zionist movement. 
One can, of course, argue that this is the case precisely because that 
monumental study is suffused by ideology, but for all its manifold and 
evident biases, it is surely a work of critical scholarship. If Graetz’s blatant 
ideological Tendenz excludes him from the ranks of genuine, even great, 
historians, no less is true of Gibbon. 
As the Zionist movement unfolded, it defined itself through a 
selective, creative reading of history. Some of this was no doubt dubious, 
but precisely because Zionism saw itself as a secular movement, and 
most of its leaders were in fact skeptical of beliefs held on faith, it relied 
on academic historians to validate its claims. David Myers, himself a 
student of Yerushalmi, has written much about the interaction between 
Zionism and historiography,3 and a coterie of scholars have examined 
the interplay between academic history and nationalist myth in the 
Zionist understanding of the Maccabees, Massada, Bar Kokhba, and Tel 
Hai.4 The nationalist moment is most blatant in the works of Joseph 
Klausner, so blatant that some uncharitable observers would deny 
him the status of academic historian at all.5 However that may be, the 
2 Y. H. Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle, 1982), pp. 94-103.
3 D. N. Myers, Reinventing the Jewish Past: European Jewish Intellectuals and the Zionist 
Return to History (New York and Oxford, 1995).
4 See, for example, Y. Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of 
Israeli National Tradition (Chicago and London, 1994).
5 See my “Maccabees, Zealots, and Josephus: The Impact of Zionism on Joseph Klausner’s 
History of the Second Temple,” in the Louis H. Feldman Jubilee Volume. [Reprinted in this 
volume.]
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role of the academic enterprise in the evolution of Zionist ideology is 
beyond question. 
In recent years, the historians’ debate about the behavior of Israelis 
in 1948 provides a contemporary window into the interplay between the 
pursuit of academic history and the ideological needs of a nation, or of 
its critics. As in the case of cold-war revisionism in the United States and 
the German controversy about the uniqueness of the Holocaust and its 
relationship to the Gulag, one does not have to be a professional historian 
to grasp the critical importance of the academy to the deepest interests 
and most fundamental self-image of a society. While one might argue that 
debates about the historical behavior of Jews are not the study of Judaism, 
the line in instances like this is indistinct to the point of irrelevance. 
The relationship between academic study and the establishment of a 
Jewish state is not a one-way street. If the former affects perceptions of the 
latter, the latter can affect the practice of the former. The establishment 
of the state has allegedly provided some Israeli historians with a sense 
of freedom to examine what they see as problematic Jewish behavior 
with less concern for consequences than that of Diaspora scholars. Thus, 
we periodically hear that unapologetic history, such as Yisrael Yuval’s 
famous and controversial article arguing for a connection between the 
killing of crusade-era Jewish children by their parents and the birth of 
the ritual murder accusation, could only have been written in the Jewish 
State.6 Whether this is true remains uncertain, and whether the era of 
possible consequences has ended is regrettably even less certain, but 
the perception itself testifies to the complexity and significance of the 
interaction, in a new sense, between town and gown. 
The value of the academic study of Judaism is not limited to the 
national dimension. Since I was asked to provide personal reflections, 
let me turn now to another arena reflecting my deepest personal 
commitments and concerns: the intersection between the academic 
study of Judaism and the living religion itself. I did not go to graduate 
school in Jewish history because of an interest in history per se. I 
studied the economic history of the Jews ke-illu kefa’anni shed — as if the 
metaphorical demon was compelling me. The diplomatic moves of court 
Jews, the battles of Judah Maccabee, the vagaries of Jewish legal standing 
in the innumerable principalities of the Holy Roman Empire interested 
6 See Y. Yuval, “Ha-Naqam ve-ha-Qelalah, ha-Dam ve-ha-‘Alilah,” Zion 58 (1992): 33-90.
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me little if at all. Learning about them was an unfortunate price that 
needed to be paid to gain the necessary credential, although I have since 
learned to tolerate such study and sometimes even to experience more 
or less fleeting moments of mild interest. What I wanted to understand 
was my religion — its texts, its thinkers, its responses to challenge from 
within and without, and the parameters of its openness and resistance to 
change, although fascination with the relationship between Judaism and 
Christianity awakened an abiding interest in the interaction between the 
bearers of those faiths that extended beyond the realm of religion alone 
and into the often bloody streets of medieval Europe. 
My own trajectory and motivations are surely not unique or even 
unusual. It is no accident that the greatest interest in the study of 
Judaism within the Israeli academy comes from the religious sector. One 
might assume that secular Israelis would want to pursue the academic 
study of their people and its culture no less than the religious; outside 
the area of Hebrew literature and some of the social sciences, however, 
this does not appear to be the case. 
What, then, is the impact of academic Jewish studies on Judaism 
today? In the non-Orthodox religious movements on the contemporary 
Jewish landscape, the academic study of Judaism carries more weight and 
authority than in any other setting. I vividly recall a remark by Gerson 
Cohen at a public event held in the Jewish Theological Seminary when he 
was its chancellor. Jewish historiography in an academic mode, he said, 
is Torah as we understand it. Similarly, in response to initiatives within 
the Reform movement that advocated a turn toward traditionalism in 
a number of controversial respects, Robert Seltzer and Lance Sussman 
vigorously affirmed that a critical analysis of historical development 
stands at the core of Reform Judaism.7 Here again, we need to correct 
7 “Just as our predecessors reconsidered their Judaism as a result of political 
emancipation, Reform Judaism should continue to acknowledge the implications of 
historical scholarship and the comparative study of religion, which have transformed 
our understanding of the nature of religion as such. Doing so is not measuring Judaism 
by an external and alien standard; it is a matter of courageous truthfulness in facing 
up to the intellectual breakthroughs of the modern world that have occurred since the 
Enlightenment. Modern historical consciousness requires that one always consider the 
setting and context of every classical work and phase of Judaism from the emergence 
of ancient Israel to the present.” (R. M. Seltzer and L. J. Sussman, “What are the Basic 
Principles of Reform Judaism?” in: J. S. Lewis ed., Thinking Ahead: Toward the Next 
Generation of Judaism: Essays in Honor of Oskar Brecher (Binghamton, New York, 2001), 
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Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi’s poignant assertion that history, as distinct 
from memory, has little resonance in Judaism even today. At least for 
the intellectual leadership of Conservative and Reform Judaism, history 
takes center stage. 
The social, even spiritual impact of this orientation became especially 
striking when the Conservative movement needed to decide whether 
or not to ordain women. Here was a decision of monumental religious 
significance, one that would presumably limn the contours of the 
movement for generations to come. Conservative Judaism’s rabbinic arm 
has a Halakhah Committee presumably empowered to decide matters 
of Jewish law. Yet, despite a largely successful effort to inject an ad hoc, 
non-academic body at a preliminary stage, this issue was ultimately to 
be decided by a vote of the faculty of the Jewish Theological Seminary, 
a faculty chosen almost exclusively by academic criteria and containing 
individuals whose adherence to the Conservative movement was dubious 
at best. Thus, a far-reaching decision determining the trajectory and 
ideology of a religious movement was to be made by academics. Now, 
I do not deceive myself into thinking that Conservative Judaism would 
not now be ordaining women had the Seminary faculty voted against this 
step several decades ago. Larger forces would surely have reversed such a 
decision by now. Nonetheless, this process is illustrative of the authority 
that academic training can confer in a movement that places it near the 
center of its values. 
The impact of the academic study of history on a core religious 
experience of Judaism exploded into public controversy a few years ago 
when a prominent Conservative rabbi in the United States, speaking and 
writing around the time of Passover, publicly questioned the historicity 
of the exodus. His assertion surely reflected the views of a majority of 
academicians in the field, but Conservative rabbis, even those who may 
have agreed with the substance of his position, felt acutely uncomfortable 
in the wake of such an open declaration. Generally speaking, the 
Conservative rabbinate is religiously more traditional than its flock — 
we recall Marshall Sklare’s famous bon mot in an earlier time that the 
p. 10). “Historical Consciousness has been a primary force in shaping Reform Judaism 
since the emergence of Wissenschaft des Judentums.” (L. J. Sussman and R. M. Seltzer, 
“A Crisis of Confidence in the Reform Rabbinate?” Issues and Dilemmas in Israeli and 
American Jewish Identities. Occasional Papers in Jewish History and Thought, No. 18 [New 
York, 2002], p. 28).
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movement has an Orthodox seminary, a Conservative rabbinate, and a 
Reform laity — but in this case many rabbis (though certainly not all) 
were more skeptical of tradition than a constituency unfamiliar with the 
iconoclasm of contemporary archaeologists. The struggle to navigate the 
tensions spawned by the interaction of academic history with religious 
faith, with a critically important ritual of great social significance, with 
a biblical story of the highest visibility that is evoked in innumerable 
ceremonial contexts, and with a resistant laity provided a case study of 
the complexity of such interaction in a movement deeply concerned with 
both history and memory. 
In the community of Orthodox Jews that is my primary home, the 
role of academic Jewish Studies is uniquely problematic. In certain 
circles, the entire academic enterprise is prohibited or suspect, and in 
no realm more so than Jewish Studies, where spiritual dangers lurk in 
every nook and cranny. Even in circles that permit and even value higher 
academic learning, including Jewish learning, it is not professors but 
rabbis who, if I may quote the most problematic Jew of all, sit on the seat 
of Moses. Yet, it is precisely in such a community that the social, cultural, 
and spiritual dynamics of the interaction with academic Jewish studies 
are most intriguing and perhaps most fruitful. 
In a recent talk at Yeshiva University, I observed that the most 
arcane fields of academic Jewish studies can pulse with life in the eyes 
of a committed Jew. Inter alia, I had in mind the distinguished Semitic 
linguist specializing in the history of Hebrew who told me that his field 
was “relevant” only at Yeshiva. Yeshiva University was, he said, a place 
where he was besieged with practical questions motivated by religious 
concerns, where the problem of whether a particular sheva was na‘ or nah 
could actually matter, could even, for a Torah reader about to begin his 
assignment, constitute an emergency. But, with all the genuine respect, 
and even awe, that I feel for the knowledge and insight of my linguist 
friend, his expertise is not my primary area of concern, nor do I suppose 
that it is yours. 
Several of the most sensitive questions in contemporary Jewish life, 
questions about which the position of Orthodox Jewry matters well 
beyond the inner confines of the group itself, intersect with the academic 
study of Judaism and its history. These include attitudes toward secular 
learning, rabbinic authority, halakhic change, and more. While some of 
the ensuing discussion reflects an inner-Orthodox discourse, the briefest 
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reflection will remind us how different Israeli society would look if haredi 
Jews affirmed the permissibility of higher secular education, or if the 
authority of a few rabbis in matters of politics and government policy 
were not seen as absolutely determinative by large segments of the 
religious community. 
From a non-Orthodox perspective, the question of the permissibility 
and value of pursuing secular learning appears bizarre, yet within the 
Orthodox community the stance affirming the desirability of that pursuit 
is almost beleaguered. It is certainly possible, even without recourse 
to an academic approach to classical sources, for a traditional rabbi to 
conclude that secular education is desirable; a combination of ideological 
propensities and a concentration on a limited array of sources is likely, 
however, at least in the current environment, to inspire a position 
hostile to such pursuits. An academic approach, which looks at a broader 
spectrum of texts, will often point in a different direction. 
To illustrate, a rabbi at Yeshiva University wrote an article more 
than a decade ago arguing that a Maimonidean ruling in the section of 
the Mishneh Torah dealing with idolatry forbids the study of any area 
of knowledge that contains the potential of raising doubts regarding 
fundamentals of the faith. Of course, the rabbi was well aware that 
Maimonides was also the author of the Guide of the Perplexed, but he 
dismissed this point with a generic argument about a special exception 
that governed this work. In a response that I co-authored with Lawrence 
Kaplan, we incorporated the content of the Guide, not merely the fact 
of its existence, into a broader analysis of the issue, and noted a letter 
of Maimonides in which he exhorted others to study the works of 
philosophers whose heretical tendencies could not be denied.8 
I must note immediately that the somewhat smug tone of these 
remarks requires qualification. If certain traditionalists approach the 
relevant texts with propensities to find a restrictive position, Orthodox 
academics approach them with the desire to confirm their own prior 
inclinations. Since the basic ethos of the academy requires openness 
to unwanted conclusions, such academics cannot be certain that these 
inclinations will always be confirmed. A case in point struck me quite 
8 See Y. Parnes, “Torah u-Madda and Freedom of Inquiry,” The Torah u-Madda Journal 1 
(1989): 68-71; L. Kaplan and D. Berger, “On Freedom of Inquiry in the Rambam — and 
Today,” The Torah u-Madda Journal 2 (1990): 37-50.
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some time ago, when I was intrigued by the convergence of two analyses 
of Mendelssohn, one by Yehezkel Kaufmann in Golah ve-Nekhar and the 
other by a contemporary traditionalist rabbi. 
The Jewish Observer, the journal of Agudath Israel of America, 
had published an article about Mendelssohn that was, at first glance, 
surprisingly positive. This positive assessment, however, was designed 
to serve an ideological purpose central to the Agudah: the affirmation 
of the supreme importance of relying on religious authority. How is it, 
the author asked, that this essentially good Jew spawned a movement 
of rebellion against the Torah? The answer, he argued, is that for all his 
adherence to the Torah, Mendelssohn did not submit to the judgment of 
the great rabbis of his day.9 
Despite this “kosher” objective, the article’s favorable assessment 
of Mendelssohn aroused a storm of protest in a community where the 
purported founder of the Haskalah is seen as a quintessential villain. 
The journal consequently published a brief piece by the Novominsker 
Rebbe, Rabbi Yaakov Perlow, then the youngest member of the Moezet 
Gedolei ha-Torah, who argued that Mendelssohn’s world view was, in fact, 
a radical one. 
Admittedly, [Mendelssohn] was an observant Jew, but culturally he was a 
thoroughbred German. He may have technically discharged his obligations 
to Jewish law; this, however, was but a circumscribed aspect of his being. 
His social and intellectual impact lay elsewhere — in the Enlightenment … 
and in the cultural assimilation that he and his friends and family embraced 
with such fervor.10 
I doubt that Rabbi Perlow has read Golah ve-Nekhar, but his argument 
was almost precisely that of Kaufmann, who made it at greater length 
and no less vigorously. 
Mendelssohn observed all the commandments in practice and…was 
thus loyal in a dogmatic sense to the tradition of Judaism. And yet, in 
Mendelssohn’s views, life, and work, there exists a profound “transformation 
of values” … The old ideal of Judaism — a culture which is all religion, all 
“Torah” — is no longer the ideal of Mendelssohn … His cultural ideal is far 
9 See A. Shafran, “The Enigma of Moses Mendelssohn,” The Jewish Observer 19:9 
(December, 1986): 12-18.
10 The Jewish Observer 19:10 (January, 1987): 13.
— 14 —
The Cultural Environment: Challenge and Response
broader … In this cultural conception, “the Torah” could be assigned only 
a modest place.11 
Even if Rabbi Perlow did read Golah ve-Nekhar, the point about 
convergence remains the same. In sum, an academic orientation, which 
attempts to read the sources in all their variety and in their historical 
context, can yield conclusions congenial to traditionalists as well as 
modernists, though the very variety of its findings affords choices often 
precluded by practitioners of a prescriptive and more narrowly focused 
approach. 
Elsewhere, addressing essentially the same issue, the Novominsker 
made an observation far more problematic for a historian. “The 
attempts that were made in past Jewish history, in medieval Spain and 
in nineteenth-century Germany, to accommodate Torah life with the 
culture of the times, were aimed at precisely that: accommodation, not 
sanctification. Madda and the pursuit of secular wisdom is never, in any 
Torah viewpoint, accorded the status of even a quasi-Torah obligation.”12 
When reading this, I thought immediately of the title of an article by 
Herbert Davidson addressing precisely the thinkers of medieval Spain 
published twenty years before Rabbi Perlow’s remark: “The Study of 
Philosophy as a Religious Obligation.”13 Several years later, when my 
own book-length essay on “Judaism and General Culture in Medieval 
and Early Modern Times” appeared,14 I sent it to Rabbi Perlow, without 
any reference to his earlier remarks, and received a gracious response 
defending his overall position on other grounds. Here, academic study 
led to conclusions antithetical to assertions made out of a non-academic, 
traditionalist orientation, and this raises an issue that had a brief run 
several years ago as a cause célèbre: traditionalist attitudes toward the 
non-ideological study of history itself. 
To my mind, this controversy highlighted the inextricable link 
between academic study and the most basic values affirmed by anyone 
who feels a connectedness to tradition. Rabbi Simon Schwab, the late 
11 Y. Kaufmann, Golah ve-Nekhar (Tel Aviv, 1928), vol. 2, pp. 28-29.
12 The Jewish Observer 27:3 (April, 1994): 13.
13 See S. D. Goitein ed., Religion in a Religious Age (Cambridge, MA, 1974), pp. 53-68.
14 See G. J. Blidstein, D. Berger, S. Z. Leiman, and A. Lichtenstein, Judaism’s Encounter 
with Other Cultures: Rejection or Integration?, J. J. Schacter ed. (Northvale, N.J. and 
Jerusalem, 1997), pp. 57-141.
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rabbinic leader of the German community in New York, published an 
essay arguing that objective historical research may be appropriate in 
studying non-Jews, but it is inadmissible to publish findings ascribing 
flaws to rabbinic figures.15 There may indeed have been such flaws, but 
writing about them will only undermine the image of such rabbis, who 
need to serve as models of proper behavior. Much can, and has, been 
written in response to this position, most notably a lengthy article 
by Rabbi Jacob J. Schacter,16 but to me the most interesting point is 
an irony, almost a paradox, that reveals the critical significance of the 
historical enterprise. 
All arguments in traditional Judaism regarding normative positions 
are, in an important sense, historical. We are not accustomed to think 
of them in such terms; on the contrary, non-academic rabbinic decisors 
are thought to argue, at least in their own self-perception, on the basis 
of texts perceived to be divorced from history. To an important degree, 
this is correct. But intellectual history is also history, and every rabbinic 
decisor who cites precedent is affirming something about the views of 
earlier authorities. Those views are captured in written works, but they 
are also reflected in actions and in oral observations preserved in the 
works or memories of others. When those who endorse Rabbi Schwab’s 
position say that one should suppress the flaws of rabbis, and when 
they actively do so, they refer not only to peccadilloes that all would 
consider improper but to behaviors and positions that the rabbi in 
question may have considered correct but contemporary traditionalists 
consider wrong. Thus, one should not report that a particular rabbi said 
positive things about maskilim, or that he admired Rav Kook, or that he 
read secular books and newspapers. In other words, the observer, who 
affirms untrammeled respect for the rabbinic figure, substitutes his own 
judgment for that of the rabbi, and then appeals to that rabbi’s sanitized 
image as a model for the posture of which he approves. 
In his article, Rabbi Schacter made this point in the wake of a 
conversation with me, and noted my citation in this context of a passage 
by Yehezkel Kaufmann in an essay on a biblical theme. Bible critics, wrote 
Kaufmann, create and compose verses with their own hands, and proceed 
15 Rabbi Simon Schwab, Collected Writings (Lakewood, 1988), p. 234.
16 J. J. Schacter, “Facing the Truths of History,” The Torah u-Madda Journal 9 (1998-1999): 
200-273.
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to discover in them everything that they have inserted into them.17 In 
our case, the objects of this tendentious intervention are people rather 
than texts, but the essential process is the same.18 The very impulse to 
distort history is testimony to its centrality. 
Rabbinic authority itself, especially in its contemporary formulation 
as da‘at Torah, evokes controversy in which historical inquiry plays a 
particularly salient role. There are, of course, normative texts in play 
from the Talmud to Maimonides to Nahmanides to the Sefer ha-Hinnukh 
to Mikhtav me-Eliyyahu of Rabbi Eliyyahu Dessler. But the essential claim 
being made, at least in its strongest form, requires the assertion that 
absolute rabbinic authority in all areas of life was always recognized in 
normative Judaism. In principle, at least, this assertion can be tested. 
This is, of course, not the forum to perform that test, but I will say that 
my overall impression is that the evidence militates against the most 
extreme version of da‘at Torah in vogue in certain haredi circles, but it 
also points in the direction of a greater degree of deference to rabbinic 
authority than some of the more liberal elements of Modern Orthodoxy 
are prepared to acknowledge. 
A similar assessment seems appropriate with respect to the closely 
related issue of change in Jewish law. While the most traditionalist 
circles maintain that change is, and has always been, out of the question, 
non-Orthodox figures, and even some in the most liberal sectors of 
Orthodoxy, assert that rabbis have always succeeded in finding ways to 
permit what they feel must be permitted. Blu Greenberg’s bon, or mal, 
mot, “Where there is a rabbinic will, there is a halakhic way,” was provided 
with a telling Hebrew translation by my distinguished brother in-law 
David Shatz: “Im tirzu, ein zo halakhah.” This question has been subjected 
to scholarly scrutiny by Jacob Katz, Haym Soloveitchik, Yisrael Ta-Shma, 
and Daniel Sperber among others, and my sense, guided no doubt by 
my own predilections, is that social, humanitarian, and ideological 
factors — what I call competing religious values — have surely affected 
the willingness to rethink the plain meaning of texts, but in the final 
analysis the texts still matter. Here, again, the academic enterprise can 
impinge, for those who allow it, on the understanding of crucial areas of 
17 Y. Kaufmann, Mi-Kivshonah shel ha-Yezirah ha-Miqra’it (Tel Aviv, 1966), p. 253.
18 See “Facing the Truths of History,” p. 232, and the note there. (I am responsible for 
the fundamental point, though the acknowledgment in the note, which mentions my 
providing the citation from Kaufmann, can be construed in a more limited fashion.) 
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halakhah, but its application depends very much on the original values 
of the rabbinic consumer of scholarly research. 
In the realm of concrete decision-making in specific instances, it is 
once again the case that the impact of academic scholarship does not 
always point in a liberal direction. In other words, the instincts and 
values usually held by academics are not necessarily upheld by the 
results of their scholarly inquiry, and if they are religiously committed, 
they must sometimes struggle with conclusions that they wish they 
had not reached. Thus, the decision that the members of the Ethiopian 
Beta Israel are Jewish was issued precisely by rabbis with the least 
connection with academic scholars. The latter, however much they may 
applaud the consequences of this decision, cannot honestly affirm that 
the origins of the Beta Israel are to be found in the tribe of Dan; here, 
liberally oriented scholars silently, and sometimes audibly, applaud the 
fact that traditionalist rabbis have completely ignored the findings of 
contemporary scholarship. Some academics do not hesitate to criticize 
and even mock such rabbis for their insularity and their affirmation 
of propositions inconsistent with scholarly findings, but on occasions 
like this the very same people are capable of deriding other rabbis for 
their intolerant refusal to ignore modern scholarship. One wonders, for 
example, what position will be taken by such academics with respect to 
the lawsuit filed by an Ethiopian cook who was fired from a Sephardi 
restaurant because what she cooks would not qualify as food cooked by 
a Jew (bishul Yisrael) by the standards of Sephardic pesaq even if a Jew 
were to kindle the oven. 
In my own case, awareness of the relevance of the academic study 
of Judaism to the social, cultural and spiritual issues confronting 
contemporary Jewry emerged out of largely unanticipated developments. 
I am essentially a medievalist who wrote a dissertation consisting of a 
critical edition with introduction, translation, and analysis of an obscure 
thirteenth-century Hebrew polemic against Christianity. The number of 
people worldwide who had ever heard of the Sefer Nizzahon Yashan when 
I was in graduate school probably fell short of triple digits. My Master’s 
thesis, on Nahmanides’ attitude toward secular learning and his stance 
during the Maimonidean controversy, did deal with a central figure, but 
it hardly seemed like the harbinger of a career that would address urgent 
issues dividing contemporary Jews. 
And yet, that Master’s thesis reflected and honed interests that turned 
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me into an advocate of the Modern Orthodox position favoring a broad 
curriculum, expressed not only in the aforementioned article defending 
the permissibility of reading heretical works but implicit in a book-length 
study of Jewish attitudes toward general culture in medieval and modern 
times to which I have also already alluded. While this was essentially 
a work of scholarship, it appeared in a book commissioned by Yeshiva 
University that ended with a frankly religious essay by Rabbi Aharon 
Lichtenstein. In current terminology, this was “engaged scholarship” 
whose larger objective was not disguised. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, my work on medieval Jewish-Christian 
polemic as well as the history of what is usually called anti-Semitism 
propelled me into a series of contemporary controversies. The first was 
deeply medieval in character, although it concerned a new movement. 
The Jewish Community Relations Council of New York asked me to write 
a booklet with Michael Wyschogrod, a philosopher deeply interested in 
Christianity, to persuade Jews to resist the blandishments of Jews for 
Jesus. What emerged was one of the most polite Jewish polemics against 
Christianity ever composed, one which I know had its desired effect in 
at least a few instances, including the return to Judaism of a man who is 
now an important figure in Jews for Judaism, a major anti-missionary 
organization. In short, academic expertise was mobilized for spiritual 
self-defense.
19 
More broadly, I was gradually drawn into the growing and delicate 
arena of Jewish-Christian dialogue, where academic expertise in earlier 
encounters turns out to be critically important. Serious Christians do 
not want to hold discussions solely with dilettantes whose primary 
qualifications emerge out of their communal positions. Once involved, I 
found myself dealing not only with directly religious questions but with 
the role of the Church in historic anti-Semitism, the status of recent 
efforts to shed that past, and the very practical and highly contentious 
issue of the position of Christian groups regarding the State of Israel and 
its confrontation with terror.20 Most recently, qafaz alai rogzo shel Mel 
19 See Jews and ‘Jewish Christianity’, (New York, 1978) [reprinted by Jews for Judaism, 
(Toronto 2002)].
20 “Jewish-Christian Relations: A Jewish Perspective,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 
20 (1983): 5-32 [reprinted in: N. W. Cohen ed., Essential Papers on Jewish-Christian 
Relations in the United States (New York, 1990), pp. 328-361]; “Dominus Iesus and 
the Jews,” America 185:7 (September 17, 2001):7-12 [reprinted in S. J. Pope and C. 
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Gibson — the controversy over Mel Gibson’s film overtook me. Academic 
expertise in the New Testament, Christianity, Jewish-Christian polemic, 
anti-Semitism, and contemporary dialogue turned out to be a particularly 
relevant matrix of interests, and my effort to assess the debates over 
“The Passion” in the May 2004 issue of Commentary reflects but one of a 
multitude of requests and communal obligations thrust upon me by this 
unfortunate affair. 
Finally, I turn to the strangest and most unexpected development 
of all. At a sheva berakhot celebration in Jerusalem, the father of the 
groom introduced me to an acquaintance as follows: “This is a person who 
specialized in Jewish-Christian polemics in the Middle Ages and suddenly 
discovered that most of the major Jewish arguments against Christianity 
now apply to Lubavitch hasidim.” We have witnessed in the last decade a 
phenomenon that no Jew, academic or otherwise, could have imagined 
a generation ago. A belief in classic, posthumous messianism evoking 
the most obvious echoes of Christianity and Sabbatianism was born 
and has become entrenched in a movement seen by virtually all Jews as 
standing well within the confines of Orthodox Judaism. Its practitioners 
remain accepted not merely as Orthodox Jews but as qualified Orthodox 
rabbis in every respect. In this case, my academic interest in Jewish-
Christian polemic and the related field of Jewish messianism interacted 
with my Orthodox beliefs to inspire an idiosyncratic campaign for the 
de-legitimization of those believers, a campaign that stands in tension 
with the openness and tolerance usually seen as the hallmark of the 
academic personality. “I have spent much of my professional life,” I wrote, 
“with the martyrs of the crusade of 1096. It is not surprising that I react 
strongly when Orthodox Jewry effectively declares that on a point of 
fundamental importance our martyred ancestors were wrong and their 
Christian murderers were right.”21 
I cannot, of course, discuss the merits of the debate on this occasion, 
C. Hefling eds., Sic Et Non: Encountering Dominus Iesus (New York, 2002)]; “Dabru 
Emet: Some Reservations about a Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity,” 
www.bc.edu/cjlearning; “The Holocaust, the State of Israel, and the Catholic Church: 
Reflections on Jewish–Catholic Relations at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century” 
(in Hebrew), Hadoar 82:2 (January, 2003): 51-55; “Revisiting ‘Confrontation’ After 
Forty Years: A Response to Rabbi Eugene Korn,” www.bc.edu/cjlearning.
21 The Rebbe, the Messiah, and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference (London and Portland, Oregon 
2001), p. 74. An updated Hebrew version, Ha-Rebbe Melekh ha-Mashiah, Sha‘aruriyyat ha-
Adishut, ve-ha-Iyyum ‘al Emunat Yisrael (Jerusalem 2005), recently appeared.
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but I will say that one of the most gratifying reactions to my book was 
that of Leon Wieseltier, who wrote that rarely has the academic study 
of Judaism so interacted with living Judaism. I must caution you that 
the book has also been described in print as Mein Kampf and its author 
as Osama bin Laden.22 For our purposes, the point is not who is right 
and who is wrong, but the degree to which scholarly pursuits, and of the 
Middle Ages no less, can transform themselves into matters of burning 
relevance to the core of the Jewish religion. 
For Jews living in Israel, this assertion is by no means surprising. 
A biblical scholar like Uriel Simon and an expert in medieval Jewish 
philosophy like Aviezer Ravitzky, not to speak of academically based 
philosophers like Yeshayahu Leibowitz and, yibbadel le-hayyim tovim va-
arukim, Eliezer Schweid have long played important roles in the social, 
cultural, and spiritual discourse of the Jewish State. As we have seen, 
however superficially, this role is essential, but it is also complex and 
problematic. To construct the cultural and religious profile of a Jewish 
society in blithe disregard of the academy is an intellectual and spiritual 
failure of the first order; at the same time, the academic study of Judaism 
should, in most cases, serve as the handmaiden, rather than the mistress, 
of the deepest values that it helps to mold and inform. 
22 See Y. Dubrowski, “Chutzpah without a Limit” (in Yiddish), Algemeiner Journal, Jan. 
18, 2002. The author proudly declares that he has not read the book; he has, however, 
heard about it, and this is “more than enough.”
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PREFATORY NOTE
The attempt to provide an analytical overview of Jewish attitudes toward the 
pursuit of general culture in the millennium from the Geonic Middle East 
to the eve of the European Jewish Enlightenment is more than a daunting 
task: it flirts with the sin of hubris. The limitations of both space and the 
author required a narrowing and sharpening of the focus; consequently, this 
essay will concentrate on high culture, on disciplines which many medieval 
and early modern Jews regarded as central to their intellectual profile and 
which they often saw as crucial or problematic (and sometimes both) for 
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the understanding of Judaism itself. Such disciplines usually included 
philosophy and the sciences, sometimes extended to poetry, and on at least 
one occasion embraced history as well. The net remains very widely cast, 
but it does not take all of culture as its province.
Not only does this approach limit the scope of the pursuits to be 
examined; it also excludes large segments of the medieval and early 
modern Jewish populace from consideration. Thus, I have not addressed 
the difficult and very important question of the cultural profile of women, 
who very rarely received the education needed for full participation in 
elite culture, nor have I dealt with the authors of popular literature or 
the bearers of folk beliefs.
Paradoxically, however, the narrower focus also has the effect of 
enlarging the scope of the analysis. The issue before us is not merely 
whether or not a particular individual or community affirmed the value 
of a broad curriculum. The profounder question is how the pursuit of 
philosophy and other disciplines affected the understanding of Judaism 
and its sacred texts. Few questions cut deeper in the intellectual history 
of medieval and early modern Jewry, and while our central focus must 
remain the affirmation or rejection of an inclusive cultural agenda, the 
critical implications of that choice will inevitably permeate every facet 
of the discussion. 
THE DYNAMICS OF A DILEMMA
The medieval Jewish pursuit of philosophy and the sciences was marked 
by a creative tension strikingly illustrated in a revealing paradox. The 
justifications, even the genuine motivations, for this pursuit invoked 
considerations of piety that lie at the heart of Judaism, and yet Jews 
engaged in such study only in the presence of the external stimulus of a 
vibrant non-Jewish culture. Although major sectors of medieval Jewry 
believed that a divine imperative required the cultivation of learning in 
the broadest sense, an enterprise shared with humanity at large could 
not be perceived as quintessentially Jewish. Thus, even Jews profoundly 
committed to a comprehensive intellectual agenda confronted the 
unshakable instinct that it was the Torah that constituted Torah, 
while they simultaneously affirmed their conviction, often confidently, 
sometimes stridently, occasionally with acknowledged ambivalence, 
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that Jewish learning can be enriched by wider pursuits and that in the 
final analysis these pursuits are themselves Torah. On the other side of 
the divide stood those who saw “external wisdom” as a diversion from 
Torah study at best and a road to heresy at worst, and yet the religious 
arguments that such wisdom is not at all external often made their mark 
even among advocates of the insular approach. The dynamic interplay of 
these forces across a broad spectrum of Jewish communities makes the 
conflict over the issue of general culture a central and intriguing leitmotif 
of Jewish history in medieval and early modern times.
THE ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST AND THE GEONIM
The first cultural centers of the Jewish Middle Ages were those of Middle 
Eastern Jewry under Islam, and the Islamic experience was crucial in 
molding the Jewish response to the challenge of philosophical study. In 
the seventh century, nascent Islam erupted out of the Arabian peninsula 
into a world of highly developed cultures. Had this been the typical 
conquest of an advanced society by a relatively backward people, we 
might have expected the usual result of victi victoribus leges dederunt: 
as in the case of the barbarian conquerors of the Roman Empire or the 
ninth- and tenth-century invaders of Christian Europe, the vanquished 
would have ultimately imposed their cultural patterns, in however 
attenuated a form, upon the victors. The Islamic invasion, however, was 
fundamentally different. The Muslim armies fought in the name of an 
idea, and a supine adoption of advanced cultures would have robbed the 
conquest of its very meaning. At the same time, a blithe disregard of 
those cultures bordered on the impossible. Consequently, Islam, which 
was still in an inchoate state in the early stages of its contact with the 
Persian, Byzantine, and Jewish worlds, and whose founder had already 
absorbed a variety of influences, embarked upon a creative confrontation 
that helped to mold its distinctive religious culture.
The legacy of classical antiquity was transmitted to the Muslims by 
a Christian society that had grappled for centuries with the tensions 
between the values and doctrines of biblical revelation and those of 
Greek philosophy and culture. For the Fathers of the Church, there was 
no avoiding this difficult and stimulating challenge. As intellectuals 
living in the heart of Greco-Roman civilization, they were by definition 
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immersed in its culture. The very tools with which patristic thinkers 
approached the understanding of their faith were forged in the crucible 
of the classical tradition, so that the men who molded and defined the 
central doctrines of Christianity were driven by that tradition even as 
they strove to transcend it. This was true even of those Fathers who 
maintained a theoretical attitude of unrelieved hostility toward the legacy 
of Athens, and it was surely the case for patristic figures who accepted 
and sometimes even encouraged the cultivation of philosophy and the 
literary arts provided that those pursuits knew their place.1
As Muslims began to struggle with this cultural challenge, a broad 
spectrum of opinion developed regarding the desirability of philosophical 
speculation. To suspicious conservatives, “reason” was a seductress; to 
traditionalist theologians, she was a dependable handmaiden, loyally 
demonstrating the validity of the faith; to the more radical philosophers, she 
was the mistress and queen whose critical scrutiny was the final determinant 
of all truth and falsehood.2 Jews in the Islamic world confronted a similar 
1 Despite—or precisely because of—its excessively enthusiastic description of patristic 
humanism, the rather old discussion in E. K. Rand, Founders of the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1941), provides the most stimulating reminder of the importance 
of this issue to the Fathers of the Church.
2 For an account of the Muslim absorption of “the legacy of Greece, Alexandria, and 
the Orient,” which began with the sciences and turned toward philosophy by the third 
quarter of the eighth century, see Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New 
York and London, 1983), pp. 1-36. Note especially p. xix, where Fakhry observes that 
“the most radical division caused by the introduction of Greek thought was between 
the progressive element, which sought earnestly to subject the data of revelation to the 
scrutiny of philosophical thought, and the conservative element, which disassociated 
itself altogether from philosophy on the ground that it was either impious or 
suspiciously foreign. This division continued to reappear throughout Islamic history 
as a kind of geological fault, sundering the whole of Islam.”
 In describing the manifestations of this rough division in a Jewish context, I have 
succumbed to the widespread convention of utilizing the admittedly imperfect 
term rationalist to describe one of these groups. As my good friend Professor Mark 
Steiner has pointed out, philosophers use this term in a far more precise, technical 
sense in an altogether different context. Intellectual historians, he argues, have not 
only misappropriated it but often use it in a way that casts implicit aspersions on 
traditionalists who are presumably resistant to reason. Let me indicate, then, that 
by rationalist I mean someone who values the philosophical works of non-Jews or 
of Jews influenced by them, who is relatively open to the prospect of modifying 
the straightforward understanding (and in rare cases rejecting the authority) of 
accepted Jewish texts and doctrines in light of such works, and who gravitates toward 
naturalistic rather than miraculous explanation. As the remainder of this essay will 
make abundantly clear, I do not regard this as a rigid, impermeable classification.
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range of choices, but what was perhaps most important was that they 
faced those choices in partnership with the dominant society. In ancient 
times, the philosophical culture was part of a pagan world that stood in 
stark opposition to Jewish beliefs. Under such circumstances, committed 
Jews faced the alternatives of unqualified rejection of that civilization or 
a lonely struggle to come to grips with the issues that it raised. Although 
the philosophical culture of antiquity retained its dangers for medieval 
Jews under Islam, the culture with which they were in immediate contact 
confronted the legacy of the past in a fashion that joined Muslims and 
Jews in a common philosophic quest.
Needless to say, there were fundamental, substantive reasons for 
addressing these issues, but it is likely that the very commonality of 
the enterprise served as an additional attraction for Jews. Members 
of a subjected minority might well have embraced the opportunity 
to join the dominant society in an intellectual quest that was held in 
the highest esteem. This consideration operated with respect to many 
religiously neutral facets of culture from poetry to linguistics to the 
sciences. It was especially true of philosophy, which succeeded in 
attaining supreme religious significance while retaining its religious 
neutrality. Among the multiplicity of arguments that one hears from 
Jews opposed to philosophical study, the assertion that it involves 
the imitation of a specifically Muslim practice played no role precisely 
because the problems addressed were undeniably as central to Judaism 
as they were to Islam.
The existence of a religiously neutral or semi-neutral cultural sphere 
is critically important for Jewish participation in the larger culture. The 
virtual absence of such a sphere in Northern Europe before the high 
Middle Ages—and to a certain degree even then—ruled out extensive 
Ashkenazic involvement in the elite culture of Christendom and may 
well have been the critical factor in charting the divergent courses of 
Ashkenazim and Sephardim. The issue, of course, is not religious neutrality 
alone. During the formative period of Middle Eastern and Iberian Jewry, 
the surrounding civilization was dazzling, vibrant, endlessly stimulating. 
During the formative years of Ashkenazic Jewry, the Christian society of 
the North was primitive, culturally unproductive, and stimulated little 
more than the instinct for self-preservation.3
3 Historians of the Carolingian Renaissance and other scholars who have rendered the 
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These central considerations were reinforced by a linguistic factor. In 
the Muslim orbit, the language of culture and the language of the street 
were sufficiently similar that access to one provided access to the other. 
By the end of the first millennium, Arabic had become the language of 
most Jews living under Islam, and mastery of the alphabet was sufficient 
to open the doors to an advanced literary culture. In Northern Europe 
this was not the case. Knowledge of German or even of early French did 
not provide access to Latin texts, and the study of such texts had to be 
preceded by a conscious decision to learn a new language.
The Jewish intellectual and mercantile class under Islam did not 
merely know the rudiments of the language. The letters of Jewish 
merchants that have survived in the Cairo Genizah are written in a good 
Arabic style, which must reflect familiarity with some Arabic literature.4 
The stylistic evidence is reinforced by the use of expressions from the 
Quran and hadith. In tenth-century Mosul, a group of Jewish merchants 
convened regularly to study the Bible from a philosophical perspective.5 
This level of knowledge underscores an additional, crucial point about 
the relationship between the cultural level of a dominant civilization 
and the degree to which Jews will be integrated into their environment. 
In a relatively backward society, any outsider can achieve economic 
success without attaining more than a superficial familiarity with alien 
modes of thought. In an advanced culture, maintaining ignorance while 
achieving success requires enormous dedication to both objectives; it 
may be possible, as some contemporary examples indicate, but it is 
extraordinarily difficult. The upper echelons of medieval Muslim society 
term Dark Ages obsolete will no doubt take umbrage at this description, but even on a 
generous reading of the evidence, cultural activity took place within such narrow circles 
that I do not think apologies are necessary. For an overview and reassessment of the 
current status of research on early medieval Europe, see the discussion and extensive 
bibliography in Richard E. Sullivan, “The Carolingian Age: Reflections on its Place in 
the History of the Middle Ages,” Speculum 64 (1989): 267-306.
 For some observations on the importance of a neutral cultural sphere under Islam, see 
Joseph M. Davis, “R. Yom Tov Lipman Heller, Joseph b. Isaac Ha-Levi, and Rationalism 
in Ashkenazic Jewish Culture 1550-1650” (Harvard University dissertation, 1990), pp. 
26-27. (Davis’s dissertation, which I shall have occasion to cite again in the section on 
Ashkenazic Jewry, was submitted after this essay was substantially completed.)
4 See S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society 2 (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 180-181. This is not 
to say that every Jewish merchant could read Arabic (cf. p. 179).
5 See Haggai ben Shammai, “Hug le-‘Iyyun Pilosofi ba-Miqra be-Mosul ba-Me’ah ha- 
‘Asirit,” Pe‘amim 41 (Autumn, 1989): 21-31.
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valued cultural sophistication, and a Jew who wanted access to the 
movers and shakers of that society even for purely pragmatic reasons 
could not allow himself to remain unfamiliar with its language, its 
literature, and its thought. This is true not only for merchants; communal 
leaders who wanted to lobby for essential Jewish interests also required a 
sophisticated command of the surrounding culture, and the phenomenon 
of the acculturated Jewish courtier, which reached maturity in Spain, was 
born in this environment.
Familiarity with Arabic language and literature exercised a significant 
influence on the development of a new phase in the history of Hebrew 
poetry and prose. Here too the primary locus of this achievement was 
Muslim Spain, where Hebrew literature attained dazzling heights, but 
the beginnings were clearly rooted in the Geonic Middle East. Not 
surprisingly, the most significant figure in this development was R. 
Saadya Gaon, whose works often follow Arabic models and who explicitly 
expressed admiration for the accomplishments of the dominant culture, 
and there is reason to believe that the Gaon refined and embellished a 
new literary trend that had already begun in the Jewish communities in 
Egypt and Israel.6
Another pursuit which combined intellectual sophistication, prestige, 
integration into the larger society, and economic success was medicine. 
Medical education could be obtained privately and was part of any 
advanced curriculum, and so no significant impediment limited minority 
access to the field. Moreover, the service provided by a physician is so 
crucial that any tendency to discriminate will be brushed aside by the all-
powerful will to live; it is no accident that those who wished to discourage 
the use of Jewish doctors in Christian Europe could do so only by instilling 
the fear of death by poison. It is consequently perfectly natural that both 
religious minorities in the Muslim world entered the medical profession 
to a degree that was entirely disproportionate to their numbers; by 
the thirteenth century, this phenomenon was sufficiently striking to 
impel a Muslim visitor to observe that most of the prominent Jews and 
Christians in Egypt were either government officials or physicians.7
6 See the eloquent remarks of Ezra Fleisher in his “Hirhurim bi-Devar Ofyah shel Shirat 
Yisrael bi-Sefarad,” Pe‘amim 2 (Summer, 1979): 15-20, and especially in his “Tarbut Yehudei 
Sefarad ve-Shiratam le-Or Mimze’ei ha-Genizah,” Pe‘amim 41 (Autumn, 1989): 5-20.
7 Goitein, A Mediterranean Society 2, pp. 242-243, 247-250. See also Goitein’s “The 
Medical Profession in the Light of the Cairo Genizah Documents,” Hebrew Union College 
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The flexible character of the educational system was not confined 
to medicine. The absence of governmental or communal control as 
the Islamic world was formulating its approach to the philosophical 
enterprise meant that no societal decision had to be made about proper 
curriculum, and diverse approaches could therefore coexist without 
formalized pressure for homogenization. In twelfth- and thirteenth-
century Northern Europe, when medieval Christians first confronted the 
issue of philosophical study seriously, the situation was quite different. 
Ecclesiastical control of cathedral schools and the nascent universities 
created a more homogeneous position, which both legitimated and 
limited the philosophic quest. Thus, despite the persistence of diversity 
even in the Christian West, one can speak of a quasi-official, religiously 
domesticated philosophical approach, while Muslims and Jews faced an 
array of possibilities in which virtually no option was foreclosed.
It is hardly surprising, then, that the atmosphere of tenth-century 
Baghdad, which was the intellectual as well as political capital of the 
newly matured Muslim civilization, resonated with a bewildering variety 
of fiercely argued philosophical and religious doctrines. Two scholars 
attempting to convey a sense of the environment in which R. Saadya 
Gaon worked have reproduced a striking description which is well worth 
citing once again. A Muslim theologian who visited Baghdad explained 
why he stopped attending mass meetings for theological debate:
At the first meeting there were present not only people of various [Islamic] 
sects, but also unbelievers, Magians, materialists, atheists, Jews and 
Christians, in short, unbelievers of all kinds. Each group had its own leader, 
whose task it was to defend its views, and every time one of the leaders 
entered the room, his followers rose to their feet and remained standing 
until he took his seat. In the meanwhile, the hall had become overcrowded 
with people. One of the unbelievers rose and said to the assembly: we are 
meeting here for a discussion. Its conditions are known to all. You, Muslims, 
are not allowed to argue from your books and prophetic traditions since we 
deny both. Everybody, therefore, has to limit himself to rational arguments. 
The whole assembly applauded these words. So you can imagine… that after 
these words I decided to withdraw. They proposed to me that I should attend 
another meeting in a different hall, but I found the same calamity there.8
Annual 34 (1963): 177-194.
8 Cited from Journal Asiatique, ser. 5, vol. 2 (1853): 93 by M. Ventura, Rab Saadya Gaon 
(Paris, 1934), pp. 63-64, and by Alexander Altmann in Three Jewish Philosophers (New 
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Both the vigor of the intellectual debate and the opposition to its 
excesses left their mark on contemporary Jewish texts. In R. Saadya’s 
Book of Beliefs and Opinions, we find the first major philosopher of the 
Jewish Middle Ages arguing for the legitimacy of philosophical speculation 
against explicit criticism of the entire enterprise. Any attempt to assess 
the size and standing of the various parties to this dispute during the 
Geonic period faces serious obstacles. Saadya himself cited the argument 
that philosophical study bore the seeds of heresy and maintained that this 
position is proffered only by the uneducated.9 Salo Baron has dismissed 
Saadya’s assertion as “whistling in the dark.”10 Even if the Gaon’s 
assessment does not result from wishful thinking alone, we cannot easily 
use it to determine the extent and character of the opposition since it 
may reflect Saadya’s conviction that anyone making this argument is 
uneducated virtually by definition. At the same time, the passage is not 
historically useless. For all of Saadya’s confidence, polemical aggressiveness, 
and exalted communal standing, I doubt that he could have written this 
sentence if recent Geonim or highly influential figures in the yeshivot had 
maintained a vehement, public stand against philosophical study. On the 
level of public policy in Saadya’s Baghdad, philosophical speculation was 
either encouraged or treated with salutary neglect.
The introduction to The Book of Beliefs and Opinions vigorously sets 
forth some of the basic arguments for this pursuit:
[The reader] who strives for certainty will gain in certitude, and doubt will 
be lifted from the doubter, and he that believes by sheer authority will 
come to believe out of insight and understanding. By the same token the 
gratuitous opponent will come to a halt, and the conceited adversary will 
feel ashamed.
The conviction that philosophical certainty is attainable and that 
reasoned faith is superior to faith based on tradition alone underlies 
York and Philadelphia, 1960), part II, pp. 13-14. At the same time, the authorities did 
have a sort of inquisitorial mechanism for the enforcement of correct belief.
9 Saadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, translated by Samuel Rosenblatt (New 
Haven, 1948), Introductory Treatise, p. 26.
10 A Social and Religious History of the Jews 8 (New York, 1958), p. 69. Baron (pp. 67-
68) also cites a ninth-century Muslim who maintained that Jews were uninvolved in 
scientific pursuits because they considered “philosophical speculation to be unbelief.”
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this argument and reflects the views of the Muslim mutakallimun 
whose approach Saadya shared. Indeed, he anticipated the assertions 
of later Jewish thinkers by maintaining that the Bible itself requires 
such investigation. Isaiah, after all, proclaimed, “Do you not know? 
Do you not hear?… Have you not understood the foundations of the 
earth?” (40:21). And the Book of Job records the admonition, “Let us 
know among ourselves what is good” (34:4). Not only does Saadya take 
the term know as a reference to the understanding that results from 
philosophical speculation; he is so convinced of this that he regards these 
verses as decisive evidence that the talmudic rabbis could not possibly 
have intended to ban such speculation when they forbade investigation 
into “what is above and what is below, what is before and what is behind” 
(M. Hagigah 2:1).11
Saadya’s confidence that reason can yield certainty is strikingly 
illustrated by his application to philosophy of a talmudic statement whose 
primary context was clearly that of Jewish law. The Rabbis inform us that 
legal questions used to be settled through an appeals process leading up 
to the high court in Jerusalem, but “ever since the number of disciples 
of Hillel and Shammai increased who did not attend scholars sufficiently, 
many disagreements have arisen in lsrael”(Tosefta Sanhedrin 7:1). “This 
utterance of theirs,” says Saadya, speaking of the benefits of philosophical 
speculation, “indicates to us that when pupils do complete their course 
of study, no controversy or discord arises among them.”12 It is difficult to 
argue against the sort of inquiry that is sure to lead to piety and truth.
Nonetheless, not everyone shared Saadya’s certainty. The greatest of 
the Geonim other than Saadya was undoubtedly R. Hai, who flourished 
in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries. In some respects, his views 
on these issues paralleled those of Saadya. He permitted Jewish teachers 
to instruct children in mathematics and the art of writing Arabic, and 
in the same ruling he agreed to allow non-Jewish children to study in 
the synagogue (presumably with Jewish students) if there is no way 
to prevent this without jeopardizing peaceful neighborly relations. As 
Shlomo Dov Goitein has pointed out, it would appear to follow that 
considerable time might be devoted to subjects other than Torah.13
11 Beliefs and Opinions, pp. 9, 27.
12 Beliefs and Opinions, p. 13.
13 Goitein, A Mediterranean Society 2, p. 177. At the same time Goitein notes that genizah 
evidence does not indicate much formal study of arithmetic on the elementary level 
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A famous report informs us that R. Hai sent a student to consult the 
Christian catholikos for assistance in understanding a biblical verse, and 
while this does not bear directly on the question of general culture, it 
reflects habits of mind that might well lead to a willingness to explore 
beyond the boundaries of classical Jewish texts.14
At the same time, R. Hai had reservations about the results of 
philosophical study, and our assessment of his reservations depends 
to a critical extent on the authenticity of an important letter that he 
reportedly addressed to R. Samuel ibn Nagrela of Spain. The letter itself 
has come down to us in several versions. In the central passage that 
appears in all the sources, R. Hai admonishes R. Samuel to
know that what improves the body and guides human behavior properly 
is the pursuit of the Mishnah and Talmud; this is what is good for Israel.… 
Anyone who removes his attention from these works and instead pursues 
those other studies will totally remove the yoke of Torah from himself. 
As a consequence of such behavior, a person can so confuse his mind that 
he will have no compunctions about abandoning Torah and prayer. If you 
should see that the people who engage in such study tell you that it is a 
paved highway through which one can attain the knowledge of God, pay no 
attention to them. Know that they are in fact lying to you, for you will not 
find fear of sin, humility, purity, and holiness except in those who study 
Torah, Mishnah, and Talmud.
A longer version of the letter preserved in the thirteenth-century Sefer 
Me’irat ‘Einayim of R. Isaac of Acre places the issue in a concrete historical 
context. R. Hai forbids the study of higgayon, which undoubtedly means 
philosophy in this letter, and urges the constant study of Talmud in 
accordance with the practice of
the beloved residents of Qairuwan and the lands of the Maghreb, may they 
be blessed in the eyes of Heaven. Would that you knew of the confusion, 
disputes, and undisciplined attitudes that entered the hearts of many 
(pp. 177-178). For the text of R. Hai’s responsum, see Simcha Asaf, Meqorot le-Toledot 
ha-Hinnukh be-Yisra’el 2 (Tel Aviv, 1930), pp. 4-5.
14 See Joseph ben Judah ibn Aqnin, Hitgallut ha-Sodot ve-Hofa‘at ha-Meorot: Perush Shir 
ha-Shirim, ed. by A. S. Halkin (Jerusalem, 1964), p. 495.
 Whatever the provenance of the poem Musar Haskel attributed to R. Hai, it is worth 
noting the advice to teach one’s son a craft and to study “wisdom,” mathematics, and 
medicine. See Asaf, Meqorot 2, p. 8.
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people who engaged in those studies in Baghdad in the days of ‘Adud al-
Dawla [977-983] and of the doubts and disagreements that were generated 
among them with respect to the foundations of the Torah to the point that 
they left the boundaries of Judaism.
He goes on to say that “there arose individuals in Baghdad [apparently 
somewhat later] who would have been better off as Gentiles”; indeed, 
they went so far that they aroused the anger of non-Jews who were 
presumably concerned about the spread of philosophical heresy that 
might contaminate Muslims as well. Because of the damage that this 
caused, R. Hai intervened to stop these miscreants in particular and 
Jewish intellectuals in general from engaging in such pursuits. The letter 
goes on to assert that even the Gaon R. Samuel b. Hofni, who had read 
such material, saw the damage that resulted and refrained from doing 
so any longer.
Since the days of Graetz, the authenticity of this document has been 
the subject of scholarly debate. In the most recent discussion, two new, 
conflicting considerations have been raised. On the one hand, the name 
of the ruler in Baghdad is reported with a level of accuracy that might not 
have been available to a late forger; on the other, the section preserved 
in Me’irat ‘Einayim often uses the first person singular, while it was the 
practice of the Geonim, without exception, to write in the first person 
plural. If this letter in its entirety was written by R. Hai, it provides 
fascinating information about extreme rationalism among Jews in late 
tenth-century Baghdad and about a very strong Jewish counterreaction. 
My own inclination, however, is to treat the document with considerable 
skepticism. The unique appearance of the first person singular is surely 
a weighty consideration, and an expert in the history of medieval Islam 
assures me that ‘Adud al-Dawla’s name was not so obscure as to be 
unavailable to a thirteenth-century Iberian forger (not to speak of an earlier 
one) even in its precise form. The unconditional denunciation in the letter 
is considerably stronger than what we would expect from R. Hai’s other 
writings: there were a number of other appropriate opportunities in the 
Gaon’s voluminous correspondence for him to have expressed such views, 
and yet this passage remains unique; the assertion that R. Samuel ben 
Hofni, for whom speculative pursuits were clearly of central importance, 
would have abandoned them because of this incident is both implausible 
in the extreme and reminiscent of other rereadings of history of the 
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sort that produced a document attesting to Maimonides’ late embrace 
of kabbalah; and the specific reference to the abandonment of prayer, 
an issue which is unattested as far as I know in this early period, echoes 
similar charges in the literature of the Maimonidean controversy.
Whatever the authenticity of the original document, there is an 
illuminating aspect to the later textual history of this letter. One of the 
versions contains a brief addition clearly introduced by a reader who 
wanted to soften the antiphilosophical message of the Gaon. Where R. 
Hai criticized those who “pursue those other studies,” our philosophically 
oriented copyist wrote “those other studies alone,” and where R. Hai 
spoke about the purity and holiness of those who study Mishnah and 
Talmud, our copyist wrote that these qualities will be found only in those 
who study “Mishnah, Talmud, and wisdom together, not wisdom alone.” 
These revisions, which were introduced by the interpolater into a letter 
of Nahmanides that quotes R. Hai, have been embraced to our own day 
by scholars who welcome an attenuation of the original message. In the 
event that the letter itself is inauthentic, there is a certain poetic justice 
in the undermining of its central point by yet another creative artist.15
15 R. Hai’s letter is most conveniently available in Ozar ha-Geonim to Hagigah, pp. 65-
66. The most recent discussion of the problem of authenticity, which cites earlier 
studies, is in Amos Goldreich’s dissertation, Sefer Me’irat ‘Einayim le-Rav Yizhaq de-min 
Akko (Jerusalem, 1981; Pirsumei ha-Makhon le-Limmudim Mitqaddemim, 1984), pp. 
405-407. Goldreich notes Shraga Abramson’s observation about the Geonim and the 
first person plural, which was made in a different context; see Abramson, Rav Nissim 
Gaon (Jerusalem, 1965), p. 307. When I raised the issue in a conversation with Prof. 
Abramson, he confirmed that there are no exceptions to this usage; since R. Hai became 
Gaon when Samuel ibn Nagrela was a small child, the possibility that the letter was 
written before the author assumed his position must, of course, be ruled out. (In a 
personal communication, Menahem Ben Sasson has suggested the possibility that a 
shift from plural to singular might have taken place in the course of translation from 
Arabic into Hebrew.) See too Zvi Groner in ‘Alei Sefer 13 (1986): 75, no. 1099. I am 
grateful to Ulrich Haarmann, my colleague at the Annenberg Research Institute when 
this essay was written, for his assessment of the degree of familiarity with ‘Adud al-
Dawla in the thirteenth century.
 For an example of the fortunes of the pro-philosophy version of the letter, see the 
various printings of C. D. Chavel, Kitvei Rabbenu Mosheh ben Nahman (henceforth Kitvei 
Ramban), beginning with Jerusalem, 1963, 1, pp. 349-350. For the initial challenge 
to the letter’s authenticity, see H. Graetz, “Ein pseudoepigraphisches Sendschreiben, 
angeblich von Hai Gaon an Samuel Nagid,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft 
des Judenthums 11 (1862): 37-40. There is no concrete basis for Graetz’s suspicions 
that the citation from R. Hai was inserted into Nahmanides’ letter by a later copyist; 
consequently, if the letter is a forgery, we probably need to assume that it was produced 
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Whatever we make of the highly dubious report that R. Samuel ben 
Hofni stopped perusing philosophical books as a result of a particular 
incident, his study of such works is clearcut and their influence upon 
him was profound. He rejected a literal understanding of the raising 
of Samuel’s spirit by the witch of Endor, and according to R. Hai he 
denied various miracles that the Talmud attributes to the ancient 
rabbis, arguing that such miracles are associated only with prophets 
and that the Talmudic reports are not “halakhah.” The point here, 
if I understand the expression correctly, is not that the content of 
these passages classifies them as aggadic but rather that they are not 
normative in much the same way that a rejected legal position is not 
normative. Here, however, normative seems synonymous with “true,” 
and the utilization of this category to reject the truth of a rabbinic 
narrative is striking, especially in the absence of any apparent effort 
at allegorization. Indeed, the most recent study of R. Samuel’s thought 
argues that his position denying these talmudic miracles stemmed from 
a specifically Mu‘tazilite position on the relationship between miracles 
and prophecy.16
Although various Geonim were favorably inclined toward the study 
of philosophy, it is clear that the curriculum of the advanced yeshivot 
was devoted to the study of Torah alone. I am unpersuaded by Goitein’s 
suggestion that the reason for this was the feeling that only those whose 
no later than the early months of the controversy of the 1230s and that it already 
deceived Nahmanides.
16 See David Sklare, The Religious and Legal Thought of Samuel ben Hofni Gaon: Texts and 
Studies in Cultural History (Harvard University dissertation, 1992), p. 74. Sklare’s 
dissertation, which appeared well after the completion of this study, presents a broad 
characterization of Jewish high culture in Geonic times from “extreme rationalism” to 
traditionalism; see chapter four, pp. 145-210. For attitudes toward aggadah, see pp. 
64-75.
 On the witch of Endor, see Radaq’s discussion on I Samuel 28:25. For R. Hai’s responsum, 
see Ozar ha-Geonim to Hagigah, p. 15. On R. Hai’s own reservations about the authority 
of aggadah, see R. Abraham b. Isaac Av-Beit Din, Sefer ha-Eshkol, ed. by A. Auerbach 
(Halberstadt, 1868), 2, p. 47. There is some confusion about R. Samuel’s views on the 
talking serpent in Genesis and the talking donkey in Numbers; see the discussion in 
Aaron Greenbaum, Perush ha-Torah le-Rav Shmuel ben Hofni Gaon (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 
40-41, n. 17. Whatever R. Samuel’s position may have been, there were Geonic views 
that endorsed a nonliteral understanding of these accounts. For the expectation that 
R. Samuel would facilitate a student’s pursuit of the sciences in addition to Mishnah 
and Talmud, see I. Goldziher, “Mélanges Judéo-Arabes, XXIII,” Revue des Études Juives 
50 (1905): 185, 187.
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professional training would expose them to Greek science needed the 
protection afforded by the proper study of philosophy and theology. The 
private nature of philosophical instruction in the society at large made it 
perfectly natural for Jews to follow the same course; more important, the 
curriculum of these venerable institutions went back to pre-Islamic days, 
and any effort to introduce a curricular revolution into their hallowed 
halls would surely have elicited vigorous opposition. In any case, the 
absence of a philosophical curriculum in the academies has led to the 
recent suggestion that openness to Arabic culture by the later Geonim 
resulted precisely from the weakening of the yeshivot which freed 
someone like R. Samuel ben Hofni from the restraints of the traditional 
framework.17
We are even told in an early Geonic responsum that Bible was not 
taught in the academies. R. Natronai Gaon informs us that because 
of economic pressures which required students to work, the talmudic 
directive (Kiddushin 30a) that one-third of one’s time be devoted to biblical 
study could no longer be observed, and the students relied upon another 
talmudic statement (Sanhedrin 24a) implying that Bible, Mishnah, and 
Midrash are all subsumed under Talmud. One wonders whether this was 
only a result of insufficient time. The all-consuming nature of talmudic 
study led to a very similar conclusion among Ashkenazic Jews; moreover, 
the fact that Judaism shared the Bible with Christianity and, to a degree, 
with Islam may have helped to generate an instinct that this was not 
a quintessentially Jewish pursuit. Only the Talmud was the special 
“mystery” of the Jewish people.18
The assertion that the Jews of Qairuwan studied Torah exclusively 
may well reflect their general orientation accurately. At the same time, 
we have evidence of some broader pursuits. Dunash ben Tamim of tenth-
century Qairuwan wrote several astronomical works, one of which he 
composed to honor the local Muslim ruler, as well as a mathematical 
treatise and a commentary to The Book of Creation (Sefer Yezirah). 
Moreover, the famous question from Qairuwan about the composition 
17 So Sklare, The Religious and Legal Thought of Samuel ben Hofni, pp. 96-99, 139-140. As 
Sklare notes, R. Saadya himself was educated “outside the orbit of the Gaonic yeshivot.” 
For Goitein’s remark, see A Mediterranean Society 2, p. 210.
18 For R. Natronai’s observation, see Asaf, Meqorot, p. 4. Cf. Rabbenu Tam’s remark in 
Tosafot Qiddushin 30a, s.v. la zerikha leyomei. On the oral law as the mystery of Israel, 
see Pesiqta Rabbati 5. On later reservations about biblical study, see below, n. 109.
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of the Talmud that elicited a classic responsum by R. Sherira Gaon 
may have been inspired as much by an interest in history, which is also 
attested in other ways, as by Karaite pressures.19 Needless to say, the 
sort of interest in history that expresses itself as a question about the 
Talmud is itself a manifestation of the study of Torah, but the definition 
of the boundaries between the sacred and the profane is precisely what 
is at issue in much of the medieval discussion of pursuits that transcend 
a narrow definition of Torah.
MUSLIM SPAIN AND MAIMONIDES
The cultural symbiosis between Judaism and Islamic civilization grew 
to maturity in the Middle East during the time of the Geonim, but its 
classic expression and most dazzling achievements emerged from Muslim 
Spain in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries. We have already seen 
that linguistic acculturation is a precondition for such a symbiosis, and 
familiarity with Arabic literature was one of the most important stimuli 
to the development of a distinctive Jewish literary voice. Moses ibn Ezra’s 
treatise on Jewish poetry contains a striking passage which reveals a 
frank recognition of this process by medieval Jews themselves:
When the Arabs conquered the Andalusian peninsula… our exiles living 
in that peninsula learned the various branches of wisdom in the course 
of time. After toil and effort they learned the Arabic language, became 
familiar with Arabic books, and plumbed the depths of their contents; thus, 
the Jews became thoroughly conversant with the branches of their wisdom 
and enjoyed the sweetness of their poetry. After that, God revealed the 
secrets of the Hebrew language and its grammar.20
The relationship between the study of Hebrew grammar, with all that 
it implies for the development of biblical exegesis, and the knowledge of a 
different Semitic language is self-evident. Medieval Jews had always known 
Hebrew and Aramaic, but the addition of Arabic, with its rich vocabulary 
and literature, enabled grammarians to understand the meaning of a host 
19 See Menahem Ben Sasson, Hevrah ve-Hanhagah bi-Qehillot Yisrael be-Afriqah ha-Zefonit 
bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim—Qairuwan, 800-1057 (Hebrew University dissertation, 1983), 
pp. 179, 185-186. R. Sherira’s epistle is now available in N. D. Rabinowitch’s English 
translation, The Iggeres of Rav Sherira Gaon (Jerusalem, 1988).
20 Shirat Yisrael, ed. by B. Z. Halper (Leipzig, 1924), p. 63, cited in Asaf, Meqorot 2, p. 23.
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of difficult Hebrew words and to uncover the mysteries of the Semitic 
root. Unlocking the structure of the language provided a revolutionary 
tool for the indisputably religious enterprise of understanding the Bible. 
There can be no more eloquent testimony to the significance of this 
development than the extensive appeal to grammatical analysis by R. 
Abraham ibn Ezra, easily the greatest biblical exegete produced by the 
Jewry of Muslim Spain. It is consequently both remarkable and revealing 
that the greatest of medieval Jewish grammarians, Jonah ibn Janah, 
alludes to Talmudists who regard the study of language as “superfluous,” 
“useless,” “practically… heretical.”21
The unavoidable connection between grammatical investigations 
and the study of non-Jewish works may well account for this attitude, 
which continued in certain circles through the Middle Ages and persists 
to our own day. It is difficult to think of any other consideration that 
could account for so extreme an assertion as the imputation of virtual 
heresy to grammarians. Considering the undeniable value of this pursuit 
for biblical study, opposition could be expressed only by Jews who 
attached little importance to the systematic study of the Bible itself 
and regarded the Talmud as the only proper subject of intense, regular, 
prolonged scrutiny. The denigration of biblical study, which we have 
already touched upon and which also persists in the same circles to this 
day, may well result not only from the fact that the Bible is shared with 
non-Jews but from the inevitable contact that it fosters with gentile 
scholarship and culture. A further consideration, which is not directly 
related to our theme, may have been the concern that biblical study 
undisciplined by the everpresent restraints of authoritative talmudic 
commentary could itself lead to heretical conclusions in matters of both 
theology and law.
Despite this evidence of opposition, the dominant culture of Andalusian 
Jewry embodied an avid pursuit not only of linguistic sophistication but 
of literary expression in the fullest sense. Ahad Ha-Am long ago coined 
the felicitous term competitive imitation (hiqquy shel hitharut) to describe 
the motivation and character of this culture,22 and later scholars have 
elaborated the point with an accumulation of evidence of which Ahad 
21 Sefer ha-Riqmah, ed. by M. Wilensky (Berlin, 1929), p. v, cited in Asaf, Meqorot, 2, pp. 
19-20.
22 “Hiqquy ve-Hitbolelut,” in ‘Al Parashat Derakhim, 2nd ed., 1 (Berlin, 1902), p. 175.
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Ha-Am was only dimly aware. In the words of a recent study, “Golden 
Age Hebrew poetry… can be viewed as a literary discourse designed to 
mediate cultural ambiguity because it signifies both the acculturation to 
Arabic cultural norms and [emphasis in the original] the resistant national 
consciousness of the Jewish literati who invented it.”23
Far more than ordinary intellectual competitiveness was at stake here. 
The beauty of Arabic was a crucial Muslim argument for the superiority 
of Islam. Since the Quran was the final, perfect revelation, it was also the 
supreme exemplar of aesthetic excellence, and its language must be the 
most exalted vehicle for the realization of literary perfection. When Jews 
compared the richness and flexibility of Arabic vocabulary to the poverty 
of medieval Hebrew, the Muslims’ argument for the manifest superiority 
of their revelation undoubtedly hit home with special force. The quality 
of Arabic was evident not merely from a mechanical word count or even 
an analysis of the Quran; it shone from every piece of contemporary 
poetry and prose.
Consequently, Jews were faced with a dual challenge. First, they had 
to explain the undeniable deficiencies of the vocabulary of medieval 
Hebrew. For all its terrible consequences, the exile has its uses, and 
Andalusian Jews maintained that the untold riches of the Hebrew 
language had gradually been lost due to the travails of the dispersion. The 
numerous words that appear only rarely in the Bible and whose meaning 
we must struggle to decipher are but the tip of the iceberg; they testify 
to a language far more impressive than the one bequeathed to us by our 
immediate ancestors.
Moreover, and far more important, Jews were challenged to 
demonstrate that even the Hebrew at their disposal was at least as beautiful 
as Arabic and that Hebrew literature could achieve every bit as much as 
the literature of medieval Muslims. This created a religious motivation 
to reproduce the full range of genres and subjects in the Arabic literary 
repertoire, which meant that even the composition of poetry describing 
parties devoted to wine, women, men, and song could be enveloped by at 
least the penumbra of sanctity. There can be no question, of course, that 
even if the genre was born out of apologetic roots, it took on a life of its 
23 Ross Brann, “Andalusian Hebrew Poetry and the Hebrew Bible: Cultural Nationalism 
or Cultural Ambiguity?” in Approaches to Judaism in Medieval Times 3, ed. by David 
R. Blumenthal (Atlanta, 1988), p. 103. See also Brann’s book, The Compunctious Poet: 
Cultural Ambiguity and Hebrew Poetry in Muslim Spain (Baltimore, 1991).
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own, and not every medieval wine song was preceded by a le-shem yihud; 
at the same time, every such poem was a conscious expression of Jewish 
pride, which in the Middle Ages had an indisputably religious coloration. 
Furthermore, the power and beauty of the religious poetry of the Jews 
of medieval Spain were surely made possible by the creative encounter 
with Arabic models. Some of the deepest and most moving expressions of 
medieval Jewish piety would have been impossible without the inspiration 
of the secular literature of a competing culture.
Jews could have accomplished their fundamental goal by establishing 
parity between Hebrew and Arabic, but such an achievement is 
psychologically insufficient and polemically tenuous. Consequently, we 
find the glorification of Hebrew over Arabic and the assertion, which we 
shall find in other contexts as well, that Arabic culture, including music, 
poetry, and rhetoric, was ultimately derived from the Jews.24
On a less exalted level, poetry also fulfilled a social function. 
Businessmen had poems written in their honor which served the pragmatic 
purpose of useful publicity as well as the psychological purpose of boosting 
the ego. The ability to write poetry was the mark of an accomplished 
gentleman, and this too encouraged the cultivation of the genre.25 As I 
have already indicated in passing, the existence of the class of Jewish 
courtiers created a firm social base for a Jewish literary and philosophic 
culture. Jewish communities in Muslim Spain became dependent upon 
the representation afforded by courtiers, and that representation was 
impossible without a command of the surrounding culture. Since courtiers 
came to expect poetic flattery, their presence and patronage gave the poet 
both support and standing, although it hardly needs to be said that the 
relationship between patron and poet is never an unmixed blessing.
24 The footnotes in Brann’s article provide a recent bibliography of the substantial work on 
this theme. See especially A. S. Halkin, “The Medieval Jewish Attitude Toward Hebrew,” 
in Biblical and Other Studies, ed. by Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 
233-248, and Nehemiah Allony, “Teguvat R. Moshe ibn Ezra la-‘‘Arabiyya’ be-Sefer ha-
Diyyunim ve-ha-Sihot (Shirat Yisrael),” Tarbiz 42 (1972/73): 97-113 (particularly the 
challenge from the beauty of the Quran on p. 101). Cf. also Norman Roth, “Jewish 
Reactions to the ‘Arabiyya and the Renaissance of Hebrew in Spain,” Journal of Semitic 
Studies 28 (1983): 63-84.
 Le-shem yihud describes a dedicatory prayer recited by later Jews before fulfilling a 
religious obligation. Despite the anachronism and the resort to Hebrew, I cannot think 
of a better way to make the point.
25 See S. D. Goitein, Jews and Arabs (New York, 1955), p. 162.
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Despite all this, disparagement of poetry and opposition to reliance 
on Arabic models were not unknown among the Jews of Muslim Spain. In 
some instances, however, even those who criticized what they perceived 
as an overemphasis on language and rhetoric did not reject the enterprise 
entirely, and there can be little doubt that the dominant social and 
intellectual class regarded literary skill as a fundamental component of a 
proper education. The ideal of adab, which roughly means general culture, 
was embraced by many Jews, and the praises of a great man would point 
to his mastery of the full range of medieval disciplines.26
Samuel ha-Nagid’s description of God’s kindness to him contains the 
central elements to be sought in the well rounded Jewish intellectual: 
“He endowed you [i.e., Samuel] with wisdom of His Scripture and His 
Law, which are classified first among the sciences. He instructed you in 
Greek knowledge and enlightened you in Arabic lore.”27 In this passage we 
find only the most general categories of learning, and the sole hierarchy 
of values places Torah above other pursuits. When the general sciences 
are broken down in greater detail, a more nuanced picture emerges in 
which philosophy takes pride of place while the remaining disciplines are 
necessary both for their own sake and for their usefulness in preparing 
the student for ever higher forms of study. As a result of this concept of 
“propaedeutic studies,” virtually every field can bask in the reflected glory 
of the queen of the sciences.
“It is certainly necessary,” writes Maimonides, “for whoever wishes 
to achieve human perfection to train himself at first in the art of logic, 
then in the mathematical sciences according to the proper order, then 
in the natural sciences, and after that in the divine science.”28 More 
complete lists include logic, mathematics, astronomy, physics, medicine, 
music, building, agriculture, and a variety of studies subsumed under 
26 For references and discussion, see Bezalel Safran, “Bahya ibn Pakuda’s Attitude toward 
the Courtier Class,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature [1], ed. by Isadore 
Twersky (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 154-196. For some tentative reservations 
about the thesis of Safran’s article, see Amos Goldreich, “Ha-Meqorot ha-‘Arviyyim 
ha-Efshariyyim shel ha-Havhanah bein ‘Hovot ha-Evarim’ ve-‘Hovot ha-Levavot’,” in 
Mehqarim be-‘Ivrit u-ba-‘Aravit: Sefer Zikkaron le-Dov Eron, ed. by Aharon Dotan (Tel 
Aviv, 1988), pp. 185, 199, nn. 22, 95.
27 Brann’s translation (p. 108) from Divan Shmuel ha-Nagid, ed. by Dov Yarden, 1 
(Jerusalem, 1966), p. 58.
28 The Guide of the Perplexed, translated by Shlomo Pines (Chicago and London, 1963), 
1:34, p. 75.
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metaphysics. So much significance was attributed to the propaedeutic 
studies that one of the polemicists during the Maimonidean controversy 
maintained that the only people who became heretics as a result of 
reading The Guide of the Perplexed were those who came to it without 
the proper preliminaries. This argument led him to a new application of 
a famous Maimonidean admonition. No one, said Maimonides, should 
approach the study of philosophy without first filling his stomach with 
the “bread and meat” of biblical and talmudic law. In our context, says 
Yosef b. Todros Halevi, that metaphor should be applied not to “the 
written and oral Torah” but to
the other sciences like the sciences of measurement and physics and 
astronomy. These are known as the educational, pedagogic sciences… 
which lead the human intellect to approach the understanding of the 
divine science with a generous spirit, with passion and with affection, 
so that they can be compared to this world in its capacity as a gateway to 
the world to come.29
Not all philosophers assigned such weight to these preparatory 
studies. Thus, Abraham ibn Daud derided excessive preoccupation 
with medicine, with the “still more worthless.… art of grammar and 
rhetoric,” and with “strange, hypothetical” mathematical puzzles, 
when the only valuable aspect of mathematics is the one that leads to 
a knowledge of astronomy. Endless concentration on the means would 
steal time better devoted to the end, which clearly remained the study 
of metaphysics.30
By far the most significant challenge to the prevailing ideal of the 
philosophers came in R. Judah Halevi’s revolt against Andalusian Jewish 
culture, a revolt so far-reaching that it actually serves to underscore 
the centrality of philosophical inquiry for that culture. Halevi’s 
29 Qevuzat Mikhtavim be-‘Inyenei ha-Mahaloqet ‘al Devar Sefer ha-Moreh ve-ha-Madda‘, ed. 
by S. Z. H. Halberstam (Bamberg, 1875), p. 10. See Mishneh Torah, Hil. Yesodei ha-Torah 
4:13. On the propaedeutic studies, see inter alia, Harry A. Wolfson, “The Classification 
of Sciences in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Hebrew Union College Jubilee Volume 
(Cincinnati, 1925), pp. 263-315; A. S. Halkin, “Li-Demuto shel R. Yosef ben Yehudah ibn 
‘Aqnin,” in Sefer ha-Yovel li-kevod Zevi Wolfson, ed. by Saul Lieberman (Jerusalem, 1965), 
99-102; Halkin, “Yedaiah Bedershi’s Apology,” Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 
ed. by Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 170; Halkin, “Ha-Herem ‘al 
Limmud ha-Pilosophiah,” Peraqim 1 (1967-68): 41; Baron, History 8, p. 143.
30 Sefer ha-Emunah ha-Ramah (Frankfurt a. M., 1852), Part 2, Introduction, p. 45.
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accomplishments as a poet and abilities as a thinker made him a sterling 
example of what Jewish adab strove to produce; when he revolted against 
the values of the Jewish elite, he challenged the very underpinnings of 
his society.31 This challenge finds expression in his poetry, in his decision 
to abandon Spain for the land of Israel, and in his antiphilosophical 
philosophical work, the Kuzari.
Halevi substituted a deeply romantic, historically founded, revelation-
centered, strikingly ethnocentric faith for the philosophically oriented 
religion of many of his peers. At the same time, the Kuzari operates within 
the matrix of medieval philosophical conceptions. Halevi could no more 
rid himself of the active intellect than a contemporary religious critic of 
evolution could deny the existence of atoms or DNA. More important, 
the antiphilosophical position of the Kuzari is an integral part of Halevi’s 
revulsion at fawning courtiers, at Jewish groveling disguising itself as 
competitive imitation, at much of what “the exile of Jerusalem that is in 
Spain” stood for. It is no accident that his famous line denouncing Greek 
wisdom for producing flowers but no fruit and for affirming the eternity 
of matter is part of a poem justifying his decision to abandon Spain for 
the land of Israel. To the degree that Halevi’s position developed in stages, 
there can be little doubt that the radical social critique gave birth to the 
philosophical revisionism; he clearly did not decide to leave Spain as a 
consequence of his rethinking of the role of philosophical speculation. 
If he did, however, the point would be even stronger. Nothing could 
demonstrate more clearly the degree to which the philosophic quest had 
become part of the warp and woof of Spanish Jewish civilization.
Halevi’s insistence on the radical superiority not only of Judaism 
but also of the Jewish people has disturbed and perplexed many 
readers, particularly in light of his assertion that even proselytes can 
never hope to attain prophecy. His position can probably be understood 
best if we recognize that the roots of his revolt lay not so much in an 
intellectual reappraisal as in a visceral disgust with the humiliation and 
self-degradation that he saw in the Jewish courtier culture. He describes 
acquaintances who attempted to persuade him to remain in Spain as 
drunk and unworthy of a response. 
31 For a powerful depiction of Halevi’s revolt, see Gerson D. Cohen’s discussion in his 
edition of Abraham ibn Daud, Sefer ha-Qabbalah (The Book of Tradition) (Philadelphia, 
1967), pp. 295-300.
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How can they offer him bliss/through the service of kings,/which in his 
eyes/is like the service of idols?/Is it good that a wholehearted and upright 
man/should be offered the happiness/of a bird tied up in the hands of 
youths,/in the service of Philistines,/of Hagarites and Hittites,/as alien 
gods/seduce his soul/to seek their will/and forsake the will of God,/to 
betray the Creator/and serve creatures instead?
I have already noted the psychological inadequacy of attempting to 
demonstrate that Jews are just as good as non-Jews; in such a case, the 
standard of comparison remains the alien culture which Jews strive to 
match and imitate. Though Halevi was not the only one to assert that 
Jewish culture was not merely equal but superior, he appears to have 
regarded the protestations of others as halfhearted, inadequate, even 
pathetic. There was certainly nothing in the philosophical enterprise in 
its standard form that had the potential to demonstrate the superiority 
of Judaism over Islam. In Christian societies, philosophical arguments 
offered the opportunity of establishing the implausibility, even the 
impossibility, of distinctive Christian dogmas; in a society with a 
dominant religion which Maimonides himself described as impeccably 
monotheistic, this option was precluded. The only way to overcome the 
status of “despised people,” a characterization which appears in the 
very title of the Kuzari, was to cut the Gordian knot and declare one’s 
emancipation from the usual rules of the philosophical game. Judaism 
rests on a unique revelation, not a common philosophic consensus; Jews 
are set apart and above, their status ingrained and unapproachable even 
through conversion. Only such a position could speak to the psychic 
impulses that lay at the very roots of Halevi’s revolt.32
32 For the poetic passage quoted, see Hayyim Schirmann, Ha-Shirah ha-‘Ivrit bi-Sefarad 
u-bi-Provence 1 (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 498. For the passage about Greek wisdom, see pp. 
493-494.
 Several very recent studies have grappled with Halevi’s position on the second class 
status of converts. Daniel J. Lasker’s “Proselyte Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in 
the Thought of Judah Halevi,” Jewish Quarterly Review 81 (1990): 75-91, addresses 
the issue without any effort to mitigate the sharpness of Halevi’s assertion. Attempts 
to provide such mitigation appear in Lippman Bodoff, “Was Yehudah Halevi Racist?,” 
Judaism 38 (1989): 174-184, and in Steven Schwartzschild, “Proselytism and Ethnicism 
in R. Yehudah HaLevy,” in Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter, ed. by Bernard Lewis and 
Friedrich Niewöhner (Wiesbaden, 1992), pp. 27-41.
 There is a talmudic passage which could have served as a source for Halevi’s position 
about the denial of prophecy to proselytes. See Kiddushin 71b for the assertion that 
God rests his presence (shekhinah) only on families of unimpeachable Jewish lineage.
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Halevi’s assertion that one who accepts Judaism because of faith in 
the revelation is better than one who tries to approach it through the 
clever application of reason did not prevent him from maintaining, along 
with many other medieval Jews, that much of the wisdom of ancient 
Greece and Rome was derived from Jewish sources. Since the travails of 
exile have led to the loss not only of much of the Hebrew language but 
also of ancient Jewish wisdom, that wisdom has come to be associated 
with the Greeks and Romans. In the hands of rationalists, this argument 
served not only as an assertion of Jewish pride but as a legitimation of 
philosophical study. The wisdom of Solomon had to be redeemed from 
gentile hands. To a later figure like Nahmanides, whose attitude toward 
speculation was complex and ambivalent, the fact that gentiles have 
been influenced by ancient Jewish learning was unassailable, but the 
lessons to be drawn were less clear. Since the crucial Jewish wisdom 
had been preserved within the fold, and the material embedded in 
the books of the Greeks could be recovered only through explorations 
fraught with spiritual peril, the decision to embark on such exploration 
required careful, even agonizing deliberation. Despite this ambivalence, 
the dominant message of the conviction that philosophy was purloined 
from the Jews was undoubtedly to establish its Jewish legitimacy and 
perhaps even its standing as a component of Torah itself.33
The position of medieval rationalists concerning the relationship 
between philosophy and Torah is crucial to our entire discussion, and 
it explains my scrupulous avoidance of the tempting and common term 
“secular studies.” There was nothing secular about metaphysics, and 
because of the preparatory character of many other disciplines, they 
too assumed religious value. We have already seen Saadya’s arguments 
for the existence of a religious obligation to engage in philosophical 
speculation, and similar arguments recur throughout the Jewish Middle 
Ages. Abraham, we are told repeatedly, attained his knowledge of God 
through philosophical proofs. We are commanded to “know this day… 
that the Lord is God” (Deut. 4:39). David instructed Solomon, “Know 
the God of your father, and serve him with a whole heart and a willing 
soul” (I Chron. 28:9). Jeremiah wrote, “Let him that glories glory in 
33 Kuzari 2:26; 66. Cf., inter multa alia, Guide 1:71. Many of the relevant references have 
been summarized in Norman Roth, “The ‘Theft of Philosophy’ by the Greeks from the 
Jews,” Classical Folia 22 (1978): 53-67. For Nahmanides, see Kitvei Ramban 1, p. 339, 
and see below for his overall stance.
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this, that he understands and knows me. . . , says the Lord” (Jer. 9:23).34 
These proof-texts, of course, were not unassailable, and antirationalists 
argued that there are superior ways of reaching God. Halevi, for example, 
cleverly reversed the rationalists’ argument that Abraham had attained 
philosophical knowledge of God. The patriarch had indeed pursued 
philosophical understanding, but the Rabbis tell us that when God told 
him to go outdoors (Gen. 15:5), he was really telling him to abandon 
astrology and listen to the divine promise. In this context, astrology is 
merely an example of “all forms of syllogistic wisdom,” which are to be 
left behind once direct revelation has been attained.35
The argument for speculation, however, was not wholly dependent 
upon proof-texts. If love of God, clearly a quintessential religious value, 
was to have any real meaning, it could flow only from a knowledge of 
the Creator’s handiwork, and this required a pursuit of the sciences. 
Moreover, the knowledge of God that comes from tradition alone 
is inherently insufficient and is in any event secondary rather than 
primary knowledge. Only those intellectually unfit for speculation 
can be excused from this obligation; others who neglect their duty are 
guilty of what R. Bahya ibn Paqudah called “laziness and contempt for 
the word of God and his Law” and will be called to account for their 
dereliction.36
A secondary argument pointed to the desirability, even the obligation, 
of impressing the gentiles with the wisdom and understanding of the 
Jewish people (cf. Deut. 4:6; Shabbat 75a). Bahya made this point with 
exceptional vigor by maintaining that gentile recognition of Jewish 
wisdom can come only if Jews prove the truth of their faith 
by logical arguments and by reasonable testimony. For God has promised 
to unveil the minds of the nations of their ignorance and to show His 
bright light to prove the truth of our religion, as it is said, “And many 
peoples shall go and say, Come yet and let us go up to the mountain of 
the Lord, to the House of the God of Jacob, and He will teach us of His 
ways, and we will walk in His paths. For out of Zion shall go forth the Law, 
34 On these and other arguments, see Herbert A. Davidson, “The Study of Philosophy as 
a Religious Obligation,” in Religion in a Religious Age, ed. by S. D. Goitein (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1974), pp. 53-68.
35 Kuzari 4:17, 27.
36 The Book of Direction to the Duties of the Heart, trans. by Menahem Mansour (London, 
1973), Introduction, p. 94.
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and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem” (Isaiah 2:3). Thus it becomes 
a certainty to us, through logic, Scripture, and tradition, that we are 
obligated to speculate upon every matter the truth of which is conceivable 
to our minds.37
This is a remarkable formulation. The object to Bahya is not merely to 
cause gentiles to admire Jewish wisdom. Jewish philosophical expertise 
is the medium of an eschatological missionary endeavor. Non-Jews 
will accept the truth of Judaism at the end of days not because of a 
supernatural deus ex machina but because of the persuasive powers, 
aided no doubt by God, of Jewish philosophical arguments. Maimonides’ 
well-known view that gentile recognition of the truth at the end of days 
will come through gradual preparation mediated by Christianity and 
Islam rather than through a sudden, miraculous upheaval may well be 
adumbrated in this strikingly naturalistic position in The Duties of the 
Heart. In any event, Bahya has assigned philosophy nothing less than a 
messianic function.
In a famous and controversial extended metaphor, Maimonides 
graphically illustrated his conviction that philosophy alone affords the 
highest level of religious insight. Near the end of his Guide, he tells us 
that the varying levels of people’s apprehension of God can be classified 
by analogy with the inhabitants of a city who seek the palace of the king. 
People who have no doctrinal belief are like individuals who have not 
entered the city at all. Those who have engaged in speculation but have 
reached erroneous conclusions can be compared with people within the 
city who have turned their backs on the palace. Then there are those 
who seek the palace but never see it: “the multitude of the adherents of 
the Law,… the ignoramuses who observe the commandments.” We then 
come to those who reach the palace but do not enter it: “the jurists who 
believe true opinions on the basis of traditional authority and study 
the law concerning the practices of divine service, but do not engage in 
speculation concerning the fundamental principles of religion.” At long 
last we come to those who have “plunged into speculation.” Only one 
“who has achieved demonstration, to the extent that that is possible, of 
everything that may be demonstrated… has come to be with the ruler 
in the inner part of the habitation.”38
37 The Duties of the Heart, ch. I., p. 115.
38 Guide 3:51, pp. 618-619.
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The supreme value that Maimonides attributed to philosophical 
speculation does not in itself demonstrate that he classified it as Torah. 
Several passages in the first book of his code, however, establish this clearly 
and reinforce the pride of place that he assigned to such speculation in his 
hierarchy of values. The first two chapters of the code deal in summary 
fashion with metaphysical questions which Maimonides then tells us 
represent what the Rabbis called the “account of the chariot.” The next 
two chapters set forth the essentials of astronomy and physics which, says 
Maimonides, are “the account of creation.” In combination, these chapters 
constitute what the Talmud calls pardes, which is clearly a term for the 
secrets of the Torah. Later he informs us explicitly that “the subjects called 
pardes are subsumed under the rubric gemara,” and in the Guide he describes 
the philosophical discussion of divine attributes, creation, providence, and 
the nature of prophecy as the mysteries and secrets of the Torah.
This, however, is not the end of it. Alone among medieval Talmudists, 
Maimonides took literally a rabbinic statement that the talmudic 
discussions between Abbaye and Rava are considered “a small matter” 
compared with the account of the chariot, which is “a great matter.” Since 
the account of the chariot means metaphysical speculation, the value 
judgment expressed here is wholly consistent with the palace metaphor 
in the Guide and, to many medieval observers, no less disturbing.39
What renders Maimonides’ position all the more striking is its potential 
implications for talmudic study. The introduction to his code contains 
a famous observation that it will now be possible to study the written 
39 See Hil. Yesodei ha-Torah 2:11-12; 4:10, 13; Hil. Talmud Torah 1:11-12; Guide 1:35. 
Isadore Twersky has devoted a number of important studies to Maimonides’ views 
on these questions. See especially his Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishneh 
Torah) (New Haven, 1980), pp. 356-514, esp. pp. 488-507; “Some Non-Halakhic Aspects 
of the Mishneh Torah,” in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, pp. 95-118; “Religion 
and Law,” in Religion in a Religious Age, pp. 69-82. That Bahya regarded metaphysics 
as Torah may be reflected in his admonition that one must study metaphysics, but 
it is forbidden to do so (as in the case of Torah itself) for worldly benefit. See Safran, 
“Bahya ibn Pakuda’s Attitude” (above, n. 26), p. 160. For a halakhic analysis of 
Maimonides’ position on the status of philosophical inquiry as a technical fulfillment 
of the commandment to study Torah, see Aharon Kahn, “Li-Qevi‘at ha-Hefza shel 
Talmud Torah,” Beit Yosef Shaul: Qovez Hiddushei Torah 3 (1989): 373-374, 386-403. In 
Kahn’s view, even Maimonides believed that only philosophical discussions centered 
on sacred texts qualify for the status of Torah. While Kahn’s interesting argument is 
based on instincts that are (and should be) difficult to overcome, the hard evidence for 
the conclusion remains rather thin.
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Torah, followed by “this [book],” from which the reader will know the oral 
Torah, so that it will be unnecessary to read any other book in between. 
The possibility that Maimonides meant to render the Talmud obsolete was 
raised in his own time, and he vigorously denied any such intention in a 
letter to R. Pinhas ha-Dayyan of Alexandria. Nonetheless, the tone of even 
this letter reveals an attitude not wholly typical of medieval Talmudists, 
and some of Maimonides’ epistles to his student Joseph ben Judah express 
relatively sharp reservations about extreme preoccupation with details of 
talmudic discussions at the expense of other pursuits.
In the letter to R. Pinhas he testifies that he has not taught the Mishneh 
Torah for a year and a half because most of his students wanted to study 
R. Isaac Alfasi’s legally oriented abridgment of the Talmud; as for the 
two students who wanted to study the Talmud itself, Maimonides taught 
them the tractates that they requested. Although he goes on to insist 
that he wrote the code only for people who are incapable of plumbing the 
depths of the Talmud, this description of his students certainly does not 
convey single-minded devotion to teaching the talmudic text.
Far more striking are the letters to Joseph ben Judah. In one section 
of this collection, Maimonides predicts that the time will come when 
all Israel will study the Mishneh Torah alone with the exception of those 
who are looking for something on which to spend their entire lives even 
though it achieves no end. Elsewhere he permits Joseph to open a school 
but urges him to pursue trade and study medicine along with his learning 
of Torah; moreover, he says,
Teach only the code of R. Isaac Alfasi and compare it with the Composition 
[i.e., the Mishneh Torah]. If you find a disagreement, know that careful 
study of the Talmud brought it about, and study the relevant passage. If 
you fritter away your time with commentaries and explanations of talmudic 
discussions and those matters from which we have excused people, time 
will be wasted and useful results will be diminished.
Finally, a slightly later citation quotes Maimonides to the effect 
that talmudic scholars waste their time on the detailed discussions of 
the Talmud as if those discussions were an end in themselves; in fact 
their only purpose was to make the determinations necessary for proper 
observance of the commandments.40
40 Iggerot le-Rabbenu Moshe ben Maimon, ed. and trans. by Yosef Kafih (Jerusalem, 1972), 
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These passages do not make explicit reference to what it is that one 
should do with the time saved by the study of the Mishneh Torah. It is 
perfectly clear, however, that Maimonides had in mind more than the 
study of medicine and the merchant’s trade. One of the functions of his 
great halakhic work was to expand the opportunities for the pursuit of 
philosophical speculation.
Despite the frequency, clarity, vigor, and certainty with which 
Maimonides affirmed the supreme value of speculation and its standing at 
the pinnacle of Torah, the poetry and pathos of a single powerful passage 
reveal how all this can sometimes be overshadowed by the unshakable 
instinct of which I spoke at the outset: the instinct that it is the Torah 
that constitutes Torah. In his correspondence with R. Jonathan ha-Kohen 
of Lunel, Maimonides addressed various questions about specific rulings 
in his code. He was clearly moved by the informed reverence toward his 
magnum opus that he found among the rabbis of Provence and looked 
back with nostalgia on the years that he devoted to its composition. His 
formulation is both striking and problematic:
I, Moses, inform the glorious Rabbi R. Jonathan ha-Kohen and the other 
scholars reading my work: Before I was formed in the stomach the Torah 
knew me, and before I came forth from the womb she dedicated me to 
her study [cf. Jer. 1:5] and appointed me to have her fountains erupt 
outward. She is my beloved, the wife of my youth, in whose love I have 
been immersed since early years. Yet many foreign women have become 
her rivals, Moabites, Ammonites, Edomites, Sidonians, and Hittites. The 
Lord knows that they were not taken at the outset except to serve her as 
perfumers and cooks and bakers. Nonetheless, the time allotted to her has 
now been reduced, for my heart has been divided into many parts through 
the pursuit of all sorts of wisdom.41
There are no doubt ways to mitigate the incongruity of this passage. 
First, the allusion may well be to ancillary, propaedeutic studies whose 
status as “handmaidens of theology” was well established; neither 
metaphysics nor, arguably, even physics are necessarily included. 
Moreover, just a few lines later the letter concludes, “May the Lord, 
blessed be He, help us and you study His Torah and understand His unity 
so that we may not stumble, and let the verse be fulfilled in our own time, 
pp. 126, 134, 136.
41 Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. by Jehoshua Blau, 2nd ed., 3 (Jerusalem, 1986), p. 57.
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‘I will put my Torah in their inward parts and write it on their hearts’” 
(Jer. 31:33). Nonetheless, the passionate wistfulness of Maimonides’ 
tone leaves me resistant to efforts at integrating this outburst of religious 
nostalgia seamlessly into the web of his thought.42 One almost suspects 
that as Maimonides recovered from the surge of emotion that overcame 
him, he purposely inserted the crucial phrase into his final sentence so 
that no one should suspect that he had renounced some of his central 
commitments. We are witness here to a fascinating and revealing 
glimpse of the capacity of an unphilosophical, almost atavistic love for 
old-fashioned Torah to overwhelm, if only for a moment, the intellectual 
convictions of the very paradigm of philosophical rationalism.
Aside from the special case of Halevi, we have little direct evidence 
of principled opposition to philosophy in Muslim Spain. Some of the 
polemical remarks in the works of Bahya, Maimonides, and others 
reveal the unsurprising information that there existed Talmudists 
who looked upon the enterprise with a jaundiced eye and resisted 
efforts to reread rabbinic texts in the light of philosophical doctrines. 
Nonetheless, there was no concerted opposition whose work has 
come down to us, and Samuel ibn Nagrella is a striking, early example 
of a figure of some stature in talmudic studies who represented the 
full range of adab. Moreover, we can probably be confident that the 
greatest Spanish Talmudist of the twelfth century did not maintain 
a vigorous antiphilosophical stance. R. Joseph ibn Migash, who 
taught Maimonides’ father, did not, as far as we know, produce any 
philosophical work. At the same time, given Maimonides’ oft-expressed 
contempt for Talmudists who opposed speculation, the great reverence 
with which he described his illustrious predecessor would be difficult 
to understand if ibn Migash was counted among them, and R. Abraham 
Maimonides listed him among the luminaries who “strengthened 
the faith that they inherited from their fathers… to know with the 
42 See the attempt in Yosef Kafih, “Limmudei ‘Ноl’ be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Ketavim 
2 (Jerusalem, 1989), p. 594, where the author nevertheless expresses doubts about 
Maimondes’ authorship of these remarks. See too Rashba’s comment in Abba Mari b. 
Joseph, Sefer Minhat Qenaot (Pressburg, 1838), p. 40=Teshuvot ha-Rashba, ed. by Haim 
Z. Dimitrovsky 1 (Jerusalem, 1990), pp. 342-343; Profiat Duran, Ma‘aseh Efod (Vienna, 
1865), pp. 15-16. The immense religious value that Maimonides attached to philosophy 
as well as his ongoing philosophical scrutiny of Jewish religious texts would render this 
passage problematic even if we were to accept Kahn’s conclusion that philosophical 
inquiry must be based on Jewish sources in order to qualify as Torah. See above, n. 39.
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eye of their intellect and the understanding of their mind” that God 
cannot be conceived in corporeal terms.43 As in the case of Saadya’s 
Baghdad, many Spanish Talmudists probably treated philosophy with 
salutary neglect while others, probably including ibn Migash, looked 
upon it with some favor even though it was not their particular field 
of expertise. With few significant exceptions, Spanish Jewry under 
Islam was unambiguously hospitable to the pursuit of philosophy, the 
sciences, and the literary arts.
THE GREAT STRUGGLE: PROVENCE AND
NORTHERN SPAIN FROM THE LATE TWELFTH
TO THE EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY
The great religious value of philosophy was inextricably intertwined 
with its great religious danger. Since reason and revelation were rooted 
in the same source, they could not conflict with one another;44 at the 
same time, the study of philosophic texts generated a host of problems 
for traditional conceptions, particularly as Aristotelianism launched its 
triumphant march across the medieval intellectual landscape. To most 
believers, God had created the world out of nothing; to Aristotelians, a 
form of primeval matter had always existed. To the traditional believer, 
God’s knowledge extended to the most minute details affecting the lowest 
of creatures, and his loving providence was over “all his handiwork” 
(Psalms 145:9); to the Aristotelian, he did not know particulars at all. 
To the person of faith, celestial reward awaited each righteous individual 
as a separate entity; to the Aristotelian philosopher, the soul’s survival 
depended upon intellectual attainments and took a collective rather 
43 See Abraham Maimonides, Milhamot Hashem, ed. by Reuven Margaliyot (Jerusalem, 
1953), pp. 49-50. With respect to direct evidence, however, note Israel Ta-Shema’s 
remark that “we do not have a scintilla of information on his pursuit of philosophy, 
grammar, or science”; see “Yezirato ha-Sifrutit shel Rabbenu Yosef ha-Levi ibn 
Migash,” Kiryat Sefer 46 (1971): 137. In light of Abraham Maimonides’ statement, this 
formulation may be a shade too vigorous.
44 For a sharp formulation of this point, see Norman Roth, Maimonides: Essays and Texts, 
850th Anniversary (Madison, 1985), p. 94. He argues that from the point of view 
of medieval Jewish and Muslim rationalists there can be no conflict because “what 
prophetic revelation brings in the way of flashes of light to the masses, the philosopher 
sees in the full blaze of rational illumination.”
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than an individual form. One is tempted to paraphrase Maimonides’ 
exalted assessment of metaphysics by observing that these are indeed 
not small matters.
Medieval thinkers had a wide range of options in dealing with such 
issues. At one end of the spectrum were those who rejected philosophical 
inquiry on principle. On the other were those who accepted virtually 
the full corpus of Aristotelian conclusions and maintained that revealed 
religion, which should not be consulted for the answers to ultimate 
questions, was intended as a political instrument for ordering the life 
of the masses. Ranged between these extremes were the large majority 
of thinkers with greater or lesser inclinations toward the preservation 
of traditional beliefs. In any given instance, one could argue that the 
philosophical position was unproven and unpersuasive or that the 
standard religious conception was not essential or had been misconstrued. 
The last approach was both controversial and fruitful because it required 
not only a rethinking of doctrine but a reinterpretation of classic texts. 
The allegorical understanding of both biblical and Talmudic material is 
consequently an integral and significant part of our story. The attitudes of 
Jews toward general culture had a profound impact on their conceptions 
of Judaism itself.
The battle over philosophical study became a major theme in medieval 
Jewish history as a result of a watershed event: the migration of many 
Spanish Jews to Southern France in the wake of the Almohade conquest 
of the late 1140s. This conquest brought the history of Andalusian Jewry 
to a tragic end and opened a new chapter in the relationship between 
Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews. A number of the exiles moved only as far 
north as Christian Spain, where some of them translated scientific and 
philosophical works that helped to transfer the advanced culture of the 
Muslim world into the ever more curious Christian Europe of the twelfth 
century. While this dimension of cultural activity did not play a central 
role within the Jewish community itself, it was a development of major 
importance in the evolution of European civilization.45
45 See M. Steinschneider’s classic Die Hebraeischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters und die 
Juden als Dolmetscher (Berlin, 1893). For a readable survey of medieval translations 
and the Jews, see section II of Charles Singer’s “The Jewish Factor in Medieval 
Thought,” in The Legacy of Israel, ed. by Edwyn R. Bevan and Charles Singer (Oxford, 
1927), pp. 202-245. On earlier contacts between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, see the 
important reassessment by Avraham Grossman, “Bein Sefarad le-Zarfat: ha-Qesharim 
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From an internal Jewish perspective, the major acts in this drama 
were to be played out in the south of France.46 For the first time, 
substantial numbers of Ashkenazim and Sephardim confronted one 
another in the same community, and the immigrants resisted any 
assimilation into the cultural patterns of the native Ashkenazim. On 
the contrary, one senses a degree of self-confident assertiveness that 
borders on cultural imperialism. The Provençal Jews needed to defend 
even their halakhic traditions against a Sephardic effort to impose the 
rulings of R. Isaac Alfasi, and the Spanish Jews brought with them a 
feeling of almost contemptuous superiority toward those who were 
untrained in the broader culture of the Andalusian elite. What made 
this challenge particularly effective was the inability of the Jews of 
Provence to point to their own unambiguous superiority in Torah 
narrowly construed. Although the immigrants themselves could offer 
no Talmudists to compete with R. Abraham b. David of Posquières or 
R. Zerahiah HaLevi of Lunel, they could point to a substantial cohort 
of distinguished rabbis produced by their native culture along with its 
philosophical achievements.
Under such circumstances, the argument that pursuit of philosophy 
enhanced religion by providing insight into the nature of God was 
difficult to resist. At the same time, the deviations from traditional 
religious conceptions that philosophy brought in its wake could not but 
cause concern in a society that was being exposed to such ideas for the 
first time, and the argument from the dangers of philosophical heresy 
loomed large. It may well be that this dialectic was responsible for one 
of the most important developments in the history of Judaism: the rise 
of mysticism as a highly visible factor in the intellectual constellation of 
medieval Jewry.
The central component of Jewish mysticism in the Middle Ages was its 
theosophic doctrine. Without detracting from the significance of ecstatic 
kabbalah, there can be little doubt that one seeking to understand the 
bein Qehillot Yisra’el she-bi-Sefarad ha-Muslemit u-bein Qehillot Zarfat,” in Galut 
Ahar Golah: Mehqarim be-Toledot ‘Am Yisrael Muggashim li-Professor Haim Beinart, ed. 
by A. Mirsky, A. Grossman, and Y. Kaplan (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 75-101. See now 
his Hakhmei Zarfat ha-Rishonim (Jerusalem, 1995), pp. 554-571.
46 For a characterization of Provençal Jewish culture in this period, see Isadore Twersky, 
“Aspects of the Social and Cultural History of Provençal Jewry,” in Jewish Society through 
the Ages, ed. by H. H. Ben Sasson and S. Ettinger (New York, 1971), pp. 185-207.
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attraction of esoteric lore in the initial stages of its popularity must look 
at its doctrinal rather than its experiential aspects. Such an examination 
reveals that kabbalah provided the perfect solution, at least to people 
with a receptive religious personality, to the critical intellectual issue 
that confronted Jews at precisely the time and place in which mysticism 
began to spread.
The essential claim made by kabbalists was that God had revealed 
an esoteric teaching to Moses in addition to the exoteric Torah. This 
secret lore uncovered the deeper meaning of the Torah, and it also taught 
initiates the true nature of God and creation; it is here, not in Aristotelian 
physics and metaphysics, that one must seek the meaning of the accounts 
of creation and of the chariot. Indeed, a recent study has argued that 
longstanding mystical doctrines were now at least partially publicized 
because the bearers of these doctrines could not suffer in silence the 
Maimonidean-style claim that the rabbis had referred to gentile 
disciplines as the secrets of the Torah. However that may be, kabbalah 
offered a revealed key to precisely the knowledge that philosophers 
sought. By locating that key in an inner Jewish tradition, kabbalists 
could argue that philosophy with all its dangers was superfluous, and 
even though Rabbinic tradition had attributed spiritual peril to the study 
of mystical secrets, one could hardly compare the potential for heresy 
in the pursuit of revealed truth to the dangers of studying Aristotle. 
Even without reference to the problem of heresy, kabbalah promised the 
late twelfth-century Provençal Jew all that philosophy offered and more, 
since human reason is fallible while the word of God is not. Small wonder 
that Jewish thinkers began to respond, and mysticism embarked on a 
path that would lead it toward a pre-eminent position in Jewish piety 
and religious thought by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.47
The penetration of Sephardic philosophical culture into Southern 
France in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries produced the 
47 I made the essential point in “Miracles and the Natural Order in Nahmanides,” in 
Rabbi Moses Nahmanides (Ramban): Explorations in His Religious and Literary Virtuosity, 
ed. by Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1983), p. 111. Cf. 
the citation from A.S. Halkin in note 17 there. On the suggestion that mystics were 
responding to the claim that Aristotelian doctrines are the secrets of the Torah, see 
Moshe Idel, Kabbalah: New Perspectives (New Haven and London, 1988), p. 253, and 
much more fully in sections I and II of his “Maimonides and Kabbalah,” in Studies in 
Maimonides, ed. by Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1990), 
pp. 31-50.
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first great conflict over the propriety of rationalistic speculation. The 
Maimonidean controversy erupted in the early 1230s as a result of the 
perception by R. Solomon ben Abraham of Montpellier that the study 
of certain works of Maimonides was leading people into heresy. Though 
the internal Jewish dynamic that we have been examining could have 
set these events in motion without any external impetus, there can be 
little doubt that the atmosphere of early thirteenth-century Christian 
Languedoc aided and abetted the process. The century had begun with 
the Albigensian Crusade, and the decade of the Jewish controversy was 
also witness to the birth of an inquisition aimed at Christian heresies.
R. Solomon sent his distinguished student R. Jonah to bring the 
writings in question to the attention of his natural allies, the rabbis of 
Northern France. As a result of this initiative, the rabbis of the North 
proclaimed a ban against The Guide of the Perplexed and the first, quasi-
philosophical section of the Mishneh Torah (“The Book of Knowledge”). At 
this point, the defenders of Maimonides in the South proclaimed a ban 
against R. Solomon and his disciples and sent the biblical commentator 
R. David Kimhi (Radak) to their natural allies in what was now Christian 
Spain to obtain support for the second ban.
Radak discovered to his surprise that a mixed reception awaited him. 
While some Spanish communities affirmed the ban enthusiastically, 
the distinguished physician R. Judah Alfakar refused to offer support 
and instead wrote several sharp letters expressing his reservations 
about Maimonides’ Guide. The ambivalence that Radak encountered 
in Spain speaks volumes for the fact that the direction of influence in 
the Sephardi-Ashkenazi confrontation of the previous decades was not 
reflected exclusively in the adoption of a philosophical culture by some 
Ashkenazim. The Ashkenazi impact on many Sephardim was no less 
profound. In some cases, this influence came through Southern France; in 
others, it was direct. Whatever the medium, however, Radak discovered a 
transformed Spanish Jewry whose attitude toward the culture produced 
by its own forebears could no longer be predicted with confidence.
This transformation is also evident in a letter by Nahmanides 
that we shall have to examine later in which he attempted, with some 
success, to bring the controversy to a close. In the meantime, events in 
Montpellier overtook developments in Spain. Zealous anti-Maimonists 
approached local ecclesiastical authorities with what they presented 
as heretical Jewish books, and the churchmen obliged by burning the 
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controversial works of Maimonides. Indignant Maimonists complained 
to lay authorities apparently unhappy with ecclesiastical intervention, 
and the anti-Maimonist delators were promptly punished by having 
a part of their tongues cut off. Contemporary Maimonists evinced no 
dismay at the harshness of the penalty; on the contrary, they regarded 
it as an appropriate divine retribution for an offense whose seriousness 
in the medieval Jewish context could hardly be exaggerated. Though 
the internal Jewish controversy did not end immediately after these 
events, it began to die down, and the works of Maimonides remained 
undisturbed for decades to come.48
The issues raised in the substantial corpus of letters written during 
this controversy reveal the concerns, the tactics, and the deeply held 
convictions of most of the parties to the dispute. Regrettably, we possess 
only one letter from R. Solomon ben Abraham himself. It is of no small 
interest that he denies requesting a ban against the Guide and “The Book 
of Knowledge” and that he makes a point of his careful, sympathetic study 
of Maimonides’ code in his yeshivah. What concerned him, he writes, was 
that some Provençal Jews had affirmed extreme philosophical positions 
that went so far as the allegorization of the story of Cain and Abel and 
even of the commandments themselves. R. Meir HaLevi Abulafia, who 
had questioned Maimonides’ view of resurrection three decades earlier, 
reports that R. Solomon was motivated by a concern about rationalists 
who “wish to break the yoke of the commandments” by denying that God 
really cares for ritual observances. All God wants, they maintained, is that 
people know him philosophically; whether the body is pure or impure, 
hungry or thirsty, is quite irrelevant. R. Meir’s brother Yosef b. Todros 
speaks of Jews who argued that all the words of the Torah and rabbinic 
tradition are allegories, who mocked the belief in miracles, and who 
regarded themselves as exempt from prayer and phylacteries. To what 
48 The clarity of this brief summary obscures the obscurity of the events. For an admirable 
effort to reconstruct the chronology of the controversy, see A. Schochet, “Berurim 
be-Parashat ha-Pulmus ha-Rishon ‘al Sifrei ha-Rambam,” Zion 36 (1971): 27-60, 
which takes account of the important sources in Joseph Shatzmiller, “Li-Temunat 
ha-Mahaloqet ha-Rishonah ‘al Kitvei ha-Rambam,” Zion 34 (1969): 126-144. Cf. the 
earlier works by Joseph Sarachek, Faith and Reason: The Conflict over the Rationalism 
of Maimonides (Williamsport, Penna., 1935), and Daniel Jeremy Silver, Maimonidean 
Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy, 1180-1240 (Leiden, 1965). The best analysis 
of significant aspects of the debates is in Bernard Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in 
Transition (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1982), pp. 61-103.
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degree these assertions reflect reality is far from clear; what is clear is that 
the argument that rationalism has in fact produced heresy was one of the 
most forceful and effective weapons in the arsenal of the opposition.49
In addition to specific charges of disbelief and violations of law, 
rationalists also faced the accusation that they abandon the study of 
Talmud in favor of philosophical speculation. Thus, Radak found it 
necessary to testify that he studies Talmud assiduously and observes 
the commandments meticulously; the only reason that people suspected 
him, he tells us, is that he had indicated that the detailed exchanges in the 
Talmud will be rendered obsolete in the Messianic age when everything 
will become clear. Many Talmudists would surely have disagreed even 
with the assertion to which Radak admits, and Alfakar’s letter to him 
explicitly speaks of the inclination to abolish the discussions of Abbaye 
and Rava in order “to ascend in the chariot.”50
On the most fundamental level, Alfakar, whose letters evince an 
impressive level of philosophical sophistication, denied the controlling 
authority of reason. Any compelling demonstration, he wrote, requires 
investigation of extraordinary intensity because of the possibility of 
hidden sophistry, and an erroneous premise, no matter how far back in 
the chain of reasoning, can undermine the validity of the conclusion. 
Consequently, reliance on reason to reject important religious teachings 
is inadmissible.
Alfakar’s specific examples concentrate on the denial or limitation 
of miracles. Maimonides, he says, regarded Balaam’s talking donkey 
and similar biblical miracles as prophetic visions despite the Mishnah’s 
inclusion of the donkey’s power of speech among the ten things created 
immediately before the first Sabbath. This Maimonidean tendency is 
symptomatic of the deeper problem of attempting to synthesize the 
Torah and Greek wisdom. Radak had explicitly praised Maimonides’ 
unique ability to harmonize “wisdom” and faith. On the contrary, says 
Alfakar, the attempt was a failure. Maimonides, for example, limited the 
number of long-lived antediluvians
because his intention was to leave the ordinary operation of the world intact 
so that he could establish the Torah and Greek wisdom together, “coupling 
49 See R. Solomon’s letter in Qevuzat Mikhtavim, pp. 51-52; R. Meir in Qovez Teshuvot ha-
Rambam (Leipzig, 1859) 3, p. 6a; R. Yosef in Qevuzat Mikhtavim, pp. 6, 21.
50 Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam 3, pp. 3a-4a.
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the tent together so that it may be one” (Exod. 26:11). He imagined that 
the one could stand with the other “like two young roes that are twins” 
(Song of Songs 4:5); instead, there was “mourning and lamentation” (Lam. 
2:5). “The land was not able to bear them, that they might live together” 
(Gen. 13:6) as two sisters, “for the Hebrew women are not like the Egyptian 
women” (Exod. 1:19).
As for lesser figures than Maimonides, they reduce the number of 
miracles because “their soul does not consider it appropriate to believe 
what the Creator considered it appropriate to do.”51
Yosef ben Todros Halevi affirmed the dangers lurking in the Guide by 
arguing that no one in his generation has the capacity to read the work 
without exposing himself to the danger of heresy. Consequently, he can 
justify the action of the Northern French rabbis without forfeiting his 
respect for Maimonides. Both “acted for the sake of heaven, each in his 
place and time.” Moreover, he says, the dangers of speculation have even 
been recognized by the kings of the Arabs, who forbade “Greek wisdom” 
and philosophical study. If Yosef is referring to the Almohade rulers, we 
would have a striking appeal by a Jewish conservative to the judgment 
of persecutors of his people for the sake of validating or at least lending 
support to a decision affecting the internal spiritual life of Judaism.52
The Maimonist party responded with a vigorous defense of the value 
of general culture. Radak succeeded in eliciting a ban against R. Solomon 
and his students from the Jewish community of Saragossa, the text of 
which contains instructive arguments for the rationalist position taken 
from Rabbinic literature.
It is widely known among our people that our sages instructed and warned 
us to learn the wisdom concerning the unity of God as well as external forms 
of wisdom that will enable us to answer heretics and know the matters 
utilized by disbelievers to destroy our Torah. [They] also [instructed us to 
study] astrology and the vanities of idol-worship, [which] one cannot learn 
from the Torah or the Talmud, as well as the measurement of land and 
knowledge of solstices and calculations, as the learned teacher of wisdom 
said, “The pathways of the heavens are as clear to me as the pathways of 
51 Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam 3, pp. la-2a, 3a.
52 Qevuzat Mikhtavim, pp. 21-22, 13-14. The term malkhei ha-‘erev, based on I Kings 
10:15, appears as malkhei ‘arav in the parallel verse in II Chronicles (9:14) and was no 
doubt understood by Joseph as Arab kings despite the ambiguity introduced by the 
juxtaposition of the two phrases in Jeremiah 25:24.
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Nehardea,” and an understanding of the scope with which they measured 
at a distance on both land and sea. Moreover, they ruled that no one can 
be appointed to the Sanhedrin to decide the law unless he knows these 
disciplines and medicine as well.53
A particularly interesting aspect of this text is the distinction 
between “the wisdom concerning the unity of God” (hokhmat ha-yihud) 
and “external forms of wisdom” or “external disciplines” (hokhmot 
hizzoniyyot). The former requires no defense on instrumental grounds; 
it is part of the Torah, and the problem is just that the antirationalists 
do not recognize this. External wisdom, on the other hand, needs to be 
justified in other ways. The document provides Rabbinic authority for 
some of these pursuits, whose purpose is often self-evident, but the only 
concrete argument set forth is the need to respond to heretics. This need, 
which was legitimized by a Rabbinic text, was routinely cited in other 
contexts to defend so religiously dubious an enterprise as the study of 
the New Testament. Its application to our context is attested not only in 
the Saragossa ban but in the counterargument of Yosef ben Todros that 
the rabbis’ intention in urging Jews to learn the appropriate response 
to heretics was manifestly “to reconstruct the ruins of the faith, not to 
destroy it.” Yosef, in other words, regarded the use of this argument 
as the last refuge of scoundrels, a pro forma justification for a pursuit 
motivated by entirely different considerations.54
If the information of the Saragossa authorities was reliable, the text 
of their denunciation contributes to our knowledge of the ban issued by 
the antirationalists.
The earlier ban, we are told, was directed not only against the Guide 
and “The Book of Knowledge” but against “anyone who studies any of 
the external disciplines.” R. Bahya ben Moses, the chief signatory of 
the Saragossa ban, repeats this information in a letter to the Jewish 
communities of Aragon.55 On the one hand, we could be dealing with an 
exaggeration designed to facilitate the eliciting of additional counterbans; 
on the other, the fact that “external books” are denounced in the 
53 Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam 3, p. 5b.
54 Qevuzat Mikhtavim, p. 14. On reading the New Testament to answer a heretic, see 
my comments and references in The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages 
(Philadelphia, 1979; rep., Northvale, N.J. and London, 1996), pp. 309-310.
55 Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam 3, pp. 5b, 6a.
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Mishnah renders it difficult to reject this report out of hand. However 
that may be, rationalists were clearly uncomfortable with the talmudic 
prohibition of “Greek wisdom,” and we find efforts at redefinition that 
limit the meaning of the term to a kind of coded communication that 
has not survived and that therefore poses no limitation whatever to the 
philosopher’s intellectual agenda. One Maimonist argued that however 
one understands the term, the prohibition can certainly not result from a 
concern with heresy since the Rabbis would never have excluded potential 
diplomats from the ban had the reason for it been that weighty.56
Defenses of rationalism and its allied disciplines appealed to other 
considerations as well. The argument that philosophical sophistication was 
necessary to impress gentiles was fairly widespread, and it occasionally 
took an even stronger form: the Jewish loss of Greek wisdom, which was, 
of course, originally Jewish wisdom, makes Jews an object of ridicule in the 
eyes of their educated neighbors.57 During the Maimonidean controversy, 
a more fundamental argument appears in a novel formulation that may 
reflect the influence of a major Christian work. In the twelfth century, 
Peter Abelard wrote his celebrated Sic et Non, which challenged opponents 
of speculation to account for a variety of apparent contradictions in 
authoritative texts. The “authority” which is the presumed alternative to 
reason is simply not usable without its supposed rival. One Maimonist 
letter argues for rationalism by citing contradictions in Rabbinic sources 
that can be resolved only by the sort of speculation that the antirationalists 
eschew.58 Patristic contradictions have become Rabbinic contradictions, 
but the Abelardian argument remains intact.
We have already seen that the anti-Maimonists’ concern that 
rationalism tends to produce heresy constituted one of their most 
powerful arguments against philosophical study. A striking feature of 
56 Samuel Saporta in Qevuzat Mikhtavim, p. 95. On Greek wisdom, see Saul Lieberman, 
Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York, 1962), pp. 100-114, and cf. the references in 
Davidson, “The Study of Philosophy as a Religious Obligation” (above n. 34), pp. 66-67, 
n. 44.
57 Samuel ibn Tibbon, Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayim (Pressburg, 1837), p. 173. On the need 
to impress gentiles, see Twersky, “Provençal Jewry,” pp. 190, 204-205.
58 Joseph Shatzmiller, “Iggarto shel R. Asher be-R. Gershom le-Rabbanei Zarfat,” in 
Mehqarim be-Toledot ‘Am Yisrael ve-Erez Yisrael le-Zekher Zevi Avineri (Haifa, 1970), pp. 
129-140. Shatzmiller was struck by the argument but not by the Abelardian parallel, 
which is, of course, speculative. In a recent lecture, Bernard Septimus has noted that R. 
Asher may well have been making a sharp allusion to the Tosafists’ own use of dialectic.
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the controversy is that the Maimonists argued that precisely the reverse 
was true: it was antirationalism that had produced a heresy more serious 
than the worst philosophical heterodoxy, because many naive believers 
worshipped a corporeal God. The issue of anthropomorphism is therefore 
crucial to an understanding not only of the Maimonidean controversy 
but of the role that philosophy played in defining the parameters of a 
legitimate Jewish conception of God. There can be no higher stakes than 
these and no better evidence of the powerful, almost controlling presence 
of the philosophical enterprise at the very heart of medieval Judaism.
Maimonides listed belief in the incorporeal nature of God as one of 
his thirteen principles constituting the sine qua non of the faith. As he 
indicated both in his discussion of this creed and in his code, failure to 
affirm this belief is rank heresy which excludes one from a portion in 
the world to come. Maimonides has been assigned a highly sophisticated 
motivation for taking this position. Survival after death requires a cleaving 
to God that is possible only through the development of that aspect of 
the soul which perceives certain abstract truths about the Deity; the 
belief in an incorporeal God is consequently the minimum requirement 
for attaining eternal life.59 While Maimonides may well have endorsed 
this view, the immediate motivation for perceiving anthropomorphism 
as heresy was probably simpler and more fundamental: the believer in a 
corporeal God does not really believe in one God at all.
Maimonides drew the connection between unity and incorporeality 
forcefully and explicitly:
There is no profession of unity unless the doctrine of God’s corporeality 
is denied. For a body cannot be one, but is composed of matter and form, 
which by definition are two; it is also divisible, subject to partition.… It is 
not meet that belief in the corporeality of God… should be permitted to 
establish itself in anyone’s mind any more than it is meet that belief should 
be established in the nonexistence of the deity, in the association of other 
gods with Him, or in the worship of other than He.60
Maimonides’ son provided an even sharper formulation. 
Anthropomorphism, he writes, is an impurity like that
59 See Arthur Hyman’s important article, “Maimonides’ ‘Thirteen Principles’,” in Jewish 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, pp. 141-142.
60 Guide 1:35, p. 81. Hyman is, of course, well aware of this passage but argues that the 
belief in incorporeality is what gives the very profession of unity its salvific value.
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of idolatry. Idolaters deny God’s Torah and worship other gods beside 
Him, while one who, in his stupidity, allows it to enter his mind that the 
Creator has a body or an image or a location, which is possible only for a 
body, does not know Him. One who does not know Him denies Him, and 
such a person’s worship and prayer are not to the Creator of the world. 
[Anthropomorphists] do not worship the God of heaven and earth but a 
false image of Him, just like the worshippers of demons about whom the 
Rabbis say that they worship [such] an image, for the entity that they have 
in mind, who is corporeal and has stature or a particular location where 
he sits on a throne, does not exist at all. It was concerning those fools and 
their like that the prophet said, “He has shut their eyes, that they cannot 
see, and their hearts, that they cannot understand.”61
It is especially noteworthy that Maimonides does not appeal to 
tradition to validate his declaration that anthropomorphism is heretical. 
On the contrary, his comments on the motivation for his stand clearly 
reveal the determinative role of philosophy. He tells us in the Guide 
that if he wished to affirm the eternity of the world, he could provide 
a figurative interpretation to biblical texts that imply the contrary just 
as he has interpreted anthropomorphic verses figuratively. One reason 
for distinguishing the case of anthropomorphism from that of eternal 
matter is that the latter has not been proven. On the other hand, “that 
the deity is not a body has been demonstrated; from this it follows 
necessarily that everything that in its external meaning disagrees with 
this demonstration must be interpreted figuratively.” Alfakar, while 
wrestling with the same problem, pointed to the fact that the Bible itself 
contains contradictory verses regarding the corporeality of God and 
argued that this legitimates figurative interpretation. Though Alfakar and 
Maimonides also cited Onkelos’s alleged avoidance of anthropomorphic 
expressions as a precedent, and Nahmanides, Abraham Maimonides, 
and Samuel Saporta provided a list of anti-anthropomorphic authorities 
beginning with the time of the Geonim, there can be little doubt that the 
driving force in the extirpation of a corporeal conception of God was the 
philosophic enterprise.62
61 Milhamot Hashem, p. 52. For a very strong (perhaps just a bit too strong) assertion of 
this understanding of Maimonides’ motivation (without reference to Milhamot Hashem), 
see Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought From Maimonides to Abravanel 
(Oxford, 1986), p. 41: “Maimonides held that. . . one who conscientiously observes the 
halakhah while believing in the corporeality of God is, in effect, performing idolatry.”
62 See Guide 2:25, p. 328; Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam 3, p. lb; Kitvei Ramban, 1, pp. 346-347; 
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The philosophers, in fact, did their job so well that contemporary 
Jews find it very difficult to acknowledge the existence of medieval 
Jewish anthropomorphism despite substantial, credible evidence. By 
far the best known testimony is the assertion by R. Abraham b. David of 
Posquières that greater Jews than Maimonides believed in a corporeal 
God because they were misled by the literal meaning of Rabbinic aggadot. 
Maimonist rhetoric during the controversy is replete with assertions that 
the anti-Maimonists believe in a corporeal God and are consequently 
heretics. Some of these attacks may well be exaggerated, but they play 
too prominent a role in the discussion for them to have been invented 
out of whole cloth. Abraham Maimonides reports that the prominent 
anti-Maimonist David ben Saul vigorously denied that he conceived of 
God in crudely anthropomorphic terms; at the same time, says Abraham, 
David affirmed his belief that God sits in heaven, where his primary 
grandeur is to be found, and that a partition separates the Creator from 
his creatures. In a particularly sharp attack, Abraham comments that 
Christian support for the anti-Maimonist cause is hardly surprising since 
the beliefs of the two groups diverge so little.63
Finally, we have the works of two Ashkenazic writers who explicitly 
express conceptions of God which are corporeal by Maimonidean 
standards. R. Moses Taku is the better known of these figures, and his 
Ketav Tamim is a polemic specifically directed against the Saadyanic 
and Maimonidean insistence on an incorporeal God. Taku, who is cited 
in Tosafot and was not an entirely marginal figure, not only affirmed a 
moderate kind of anthropomorphism but also accused the philosophers of 
heresy in terms strikingly reminiscent of Abraham Maimonides himself. 
In his vigorous reversal of the Maimonidean argument, Taku wrote,
Who knows if the redemption is being delayed because of the fact that they 
do not know who is performing miracles for them. Moreover, if tragedy 
strikes, they cry out and are not answered because they direct their cries to 
something other than the fundamental object of faith; for this new religion 
and new wisdom recently came upon the scene, and its adherents maintain 
Milhamot Hashem, pp. 49-50; Qevuzat Mikhtavim, pp. 85-86, 90-91.
63 Rabad to Hil. Teshuvah 3:7; Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam 3, p. 3b; the letter of the Rabbis 
of Lunel and Narbonne in Zion 34 (1969): 140-141; Milhamot Hashem, pp. 69, 55. 
Note especially Schochet’s vigorous presentation of the Maimonist polemic against 
anthropomorphism, Zion 36 (1971): 54-60. See also the literature cited in Kellner, 
Dogma, p. 233, n. 159.
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that what the prophets saw was the form of created beings, while from the 
day that God spoke to Adam and created the world through His word, we 
have believed it to be the Creator and not a creature.64
In addition to Ketav Tamim, we now know of a late thirteenth-century 
French work which maintains the bizarre belief that the substance 
of God is to be found in the light above the firmament and in the air. 
The sun is nothing more than a moving window in the firmament, and 
what we see when we look at it is therefore the very substance of the 
deity. It is more than a little disconcerting to find a medieval Hebrew 
text that routinely refers to “the air, blessed be it [He?] and blessed be 
its [His?] name,” but in this case at least, the author describes himself 
as the object of persecution, and he was no doubt on the theological 
margins of Ashkenazic Judaism despite the fact that he may have been 
the author of a rabbinic responsum. Nonetheless, in the late fourteenth 
or early fifteenth century, an Ashkenazic rabbi was still asking the basic 
question about the corporeality of God, and there can be little doubt that 
Ashkenaz in the high Middle Ages did not enjoy a consensus on this most 
critical of theological questions.65 Thus, the presence of anthropomorphic 
conceptions among some medieval Jews provided the rationalists with a 
powerful religious argument for philosophical inquiry and even enabled 
them to reverse the accusation of heresy. Ironically, as the philosophers 
won their greatest victory, they destroyed the most effective argument 
for their importance.
For Taku, the major obstacle to the rejection of anthropomorphism 
was not only the plain meaning of biblical expressions; he was concerned 
to at least an equal degree with a multitude of Rabbinic texts which 
he was unwilling to interpret nonliterally. In this and other contexts, 
conclusions drawn from philosophy and the sciences forced medieval 
Jews to confront the question of aggadah on a fundamental level, so 
that these pursuits once again impinged upon the study of Torah even in 
the narrowest sense. We have already seen that Geonim like R. Samuel b. 
Hofni and R. Hai had legitimated rejection of certain aggadot, although 
64 Ozar Nehmad 3 (1860): 82-83.
65 See Israel Ta-Shema, “Sefer ha-Maskil: Hibbur Yehudi Zarfati Bilti-Yadua mi-sof ha-
Me’ah ha-Yod-Gimel,” Mehqerei Yerushalayim be-Mahashevet Yisrael 2:3 (1982-83): 416- 
438; Ephraim Kupfer, “Li-Demutah ha-Tarbutit shel Yahadut Ashkenaz va-Hakhameha 
ba-Me’ot ha-Yod-Dalet-ha-Tet-Vav,” Tarbiz 42 (1972/73): 114.
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R. Hai had insisted on the need to make the most strenuous efforts to 
validate all Rabbinic statements, particularly if they are incorporated in 
the Babylonian Talmud. The need to reinterpret rather than reject outright 
was especially acute with respect to an issue like anthropomorphism, 
where the error was too profound to allow it to stand even as a minority 
view among the Rabbis. Consequently, by the time of Maimonides and 
the Maimonidean controversy, substantial precedent existed for a variety 
of approaches to aggadic texts.66
The issue of aggadah had already been raised by opponents of 
Maimonides in the debate over resurrection just after the turn of the 
thirteenth century, and the Northern French rabbis in the 1230s once 
again expressed concern. They believed that Maimonides had undermined 
the traditional understanding of reward after death and specifically 
criticized his rejection of a literal feast of Leviathan as described in 
Rabbinic aggadot. It is of no small interest that while one defense of 
Maimonides argued that he had not in fact denied that this banquet 
would take place, Abraham Maimonides sardonically observed that the 
Rabbis had proffered this promise so that naïve believers like R. Solomon 
of Montpellier would have something to look forward to. On a more 
significant level, Maimonides’ assertion that the biblical punishment of 
cutting off (karet) signifies the destruction of the soul was attacked as 
a contradiction of the talmudic perception that it refers to premature 
death. Maimonides’ critics proceeded to denounce those who abandon 
“halakhot and aggadot, which are the source of life, to pursue Greek 
wisdom, which the sages forbade.” The point here is not merely the choice 
of one pursuit over another, but the manner in which the study of the 
one distorts the understanding of the other. According to a Maimonist 
report, some of the Ashkenazim went so far as to propose that Rashi’s 
interpretation of aggadot be made dogmatically binding.67
66 On Taku, see his Ketav Tamim: Ketav Yad Paris H711, with an introduction by Joseph Dan 
(Jerusalem, 1984), Introduction, p. 24. On the Geonim, see above, n. 16. For a survey 
of attitudes toward aggadah, see Marc Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis (Cambridge, 
Mass., and London, England, 1980), pp. 1-20, and cf. I. Twersky, “R. Yeda‘yah ha-Penini 
u-Perusho la-Aggadah,” in Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History Presented 
to Alexander Altmann, ed. by S. Stein and R. Loewe (University, Alabama, 1979), Heb. 
sec., pp. 63-82. See also Lester A. Segal, Historical Consciousness and Religious Tradition 
in Azariah de Rossi’s Meor ‘Einayim (Philadelphia, 1989), pp. 89-114.
67 See Saporta, Qevuzat Mikhtavim, p. 94; Milhamot Hashem, pp. 60-61; Joseph Shatzmiller, 
“Li-Temunat… ,” Zion 34 (1969): 139; idem, “Iggarto… ,” in Mehqarim… Avineri, p. 139. 
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The centrality of this issue is illustrated not only by the citations of 
various midrashic passages in the heat of the controversy but by Abraham 
Maimonides’ special treatise on the aggadot, which undoubtedly emerged 
from these debates. This treatise not only proposes reinterpretation but 
recognizes the occasional need for outright rejection as well. “We are 
not obligated… to argue on behalf of the Rabbis and uphold the views 
expressed in all their medical, scientific, and astronomical statements, 
[and to believe] them the way we believe them with respect to the 
interpretation of the Torah, whose consummate wisdom was in their 
hands.”68 The essence of this position had already been expressed in 
the Guide itself. Although Maimonides had argued that respect for 
the wisdom of the Sages requires us to strive to understand even their 
scientific assertions as consonant with the truth, he nonetheless laid 
down the following principle:
Do not ask of me to show that everything they have said concerning 
astronomical matters conforms to the way things really are. For at that time 
mathematics were imperfect. They did not speak about this as transmitters 
of dicta of the prophets, but rather because in those times they were men 
of knowledge in these fields or because they had heard these dicta from the 
men of knowledge who lived in those times.69
Despite the apparent effort to impose Rashi’s presumably literal 
understanding of aggadot, even Ashkenazic Jews were not wholly 
inflexible on this issue. Moses Taku himself indicated that his teachers had 
distinguished between Rabbinic statements that appear in the Talmud and 
those that do not. “If a person sees a strange remark in external [Rabbinic] 
books, he should not be concerned about it since it does not appear in the 
aggadot in our Talmud upon which we rely.” Several disagreements with 
the Rabbis appear in the admittedly atypical Sefer ha-Maskil, and under 
the pressure of polemics with an apostate attacking the Talmud, R. Yehiel 
of Paris observed, if only for the sake of argument, that the aggadah does 
not have the same binding force as talmudic law.70
Note too Charles Touati’s remarks in, “Les Deux Conflits autour de Maimonide et des 
Études Philosophiques,” in Juifs et Judaism de Languedoc, ed. by M. H. Vicaire and B. 
Blumenkranz (Toulouse, 1977), p. 177.
68 Ma’amar ‘al Odot Derashot Hazal, in Milhamot Hashem, p. 84.
69 Guide 3:14.
70 Ketav Tamim, Paris ms., p. 7b; Ozar Nehmad 3, p. 63; Ta-Shema, “Sefer ha-Maskil,” p. 
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The most famous medieval assertion that aggadic statements 
are not binding also emerged out of the crucible of the Jewish-
Christian debate, this time from a figure who played a crucial role in 
the Maimonidean controversy of the 1230s. In 1263, Nahmanides 
faced a different apostate who attempted to utilize Talmudic evidence 
for the purpose of demonstrating the truth of Christianity; in their 
disputation, Nahmanides argued that midrashic statements should be 
treated as sermons which command respect but not unqualified assent. 
The sincerity of that argument has been the subject of controversy to 
our own day, but an analysis of Nahmanides’ commentary to the Torah 
leaves little doubt that he meant what he said.71 Many medieval Jews 
wished to preserve considerable latitude in dealing with aggadah, and 
although a variety of motives were at work, philosophical considerations 
took pride of place.
Nahmanides’ role in the controversy and his stand regarding 
philosophical speculation are especially important both because his 
efforts appear to have effectively ended the Northern French intervention 
and because he represents a crucial transitional type in the evolution of 
medieval Jewish attitudes toward general culture. On the one hand, he was 
hardly typical of the Andalusian-style Jewish philosopher. He expressed 
considerable hostility toward “the accursed Greek” Aristotle, described 
himself as a disciple of the Northern French Tosafists, and fully embraced 
the “hidden wisdom” of the kabbalah. On the other hand, he mastered 
the corpus of Jewish philosophical and scientific literature, practiced 
429; Vikkuah R. Yehiel mi-Paris, ed. by S. Gruenbaum (Thorn, 1873), p. 2. See also the 
citation in Avraham Grossman, Hakhmei Ashkenaz ha-Rishonim (Jerusalem, 1981), p. 
96, for Rabbenu Gershom’s opposition to a deviation from a rabbinic interpretation 
on a nonlegal matter in a liturgical poem by a distinguished colleague. This may be at 
least a faint indication that some Jews in early Ashkenaz considered such deviations 
legitimate. It is, of course, a commonplace that twelfth-century Northern French 
exegetes proposed interpretations that deviated from those of the rabbis even on 
matters of law.
71 See Kitvei Ramban I, p. 308, and Bernard Septimus’s excellent, though preliminary 
discussion in “‘Open Rebuke and Concealed Love’: Nahmanides and the Andalusian 
Tradition,” in Rabbi Moses Nahmanides, pp. 20-22. Marvin Fox, “Nahmanides on the 
Status of Aggadot: Perspectives on the Disputation at Barcelona, 1263,” Journal of 
Jewish Studies 40 (1989): 95-109, reaches a conclusion with which I am in fundamental 
agreement, although I cannot endorse several of his arguments. On one occasion (p. 
101), he perpetuates a blurring of the distinction between rejection of aggadah and its 
allegorization; see my remarks in “Maccoby’s Judaism on Trial,” Jewish Quarterly Review 
76 (1986): 255, n. 2.
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medicine, and pursued a sort of golden mean during the Maimonidean 
controversy. His extraordinary commentary on the Pentateuch, which 
mobilized the full range of his diverse interests, defies neat classification 
into any prior category of Jewish exegesis or thought.
In an oft-quoted passage from his Sha‘ar ha-Gemul, a work that 
addresses the problem of theodicy, he denounces people who oppose any 
inquiry into the nature of divine justice as “fools who despise wisdom. 
For we shall benefit ourselves in the above-mentioned study by becoming 
wise men who know God in the manner in which He acts and in His 
deeds; furthermore, we shall become believers endowed with a stronger 
faith in Him than others.” Despite the vigor of this formulation and its 
similarity to arguments for philosophical study in general, it is important 
to recognize that in Nahmanides’ case it is narrowly focused. Speculation 
about theodicy differs from investigation into the existence or unity of 
God in a way that illuminates Nahmanides’ fundamental approach to 
philosophical pursuits. A good philosopher speculates on the basis of 
empirical data. But the revelation of the Torah is an empirical datum par 
excellence; consequently, there is no more point in constructing proofs 
for doctrines explicitly taught in the revelation than for the proposition 
that the sun rises in the morning. At the same time, philosophical 
reasoning for the purpose of clarifying those doctrines is not only 
sensible but critically important. Although Nahmanides never formulated 
this position explicitly, I think that it emerges from the pattern of his 
work and the issues that he addressed. It surely helps to explain why he 
wrote his magnum opus as a commentary to the revelation and why he 
was attracted to kabbalah, which provided, as we have seen, revealed 
information about key philosophical questions.
This nuanced approach placed Nahmanides in a difficult position 
during the controversy of the 1230s. He opposed both untrammeled 
speculation and “fools who despise wisdom”; he admired both Maimonides 
and the rabbis of Northern France; he felt unreserved enthusiasm for 
“The Book of Knowledge” and mixed emotions about the Guide. His own 
sophisticated synthesis of speculation and revelation, even in its exoteric 
form, could not be mechanically prescribed to the masses or, for that 
matter, to ordinary intellectuals. Consequently, the proposal that he 
made is a combination of tactful diplomacy and an effort to implement 
the values that he considered particularly important under the trying 
circumstances of the dispute.
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His most important letter was directed to the rabbis of Northern 
France. It expresses great admiration for the addressees, defends 
Maimonides’ orthodoxy with respect to key theological issues, explains 
the purpose of the Guide, whose intended audience needs to be appreciated 
by the Ashkenazim, and launches into a vigorous, even impassioned 
encomium to “The Book of Knowledge.” At this point, Nahmanides was 
prepared to offer a concrete proposal: The ban against “The Book of 
Knowledge” should be annulled, and the ban against the Guide should 
be reformulated to include public study only, which Maimonides himself 
had disapproved. In the spirit of R. Hai Gaon’s letter, the pursuit of 
philosophy should be discouraged entirely, but since such a level of piety 
cannot be enforced for all of Israel, no broader ban is advisable.
The distinction between “The Book of Knowledge” and the Guide 
accords well with Nahmanides’ fundamental outlook because the former 
operates within the context of the revelation while the latter raises 
questions that approach the tradition from the outside. The difference, 
then, is as much one of structure as of content. The discouragement of 
any philosophical study even for the elite goes beyond Nahmanides’ 
position as it appears in his other writings, and it is likely that he adopted 
it because of the needs of the moment. Nonetheless, this proposal too 
reflects a genuine uneasiness with speculation and hostility toward the 
dominant form of Aristotelianism. Nahmanides, who sought not so 
much a religious philosophy as a philosophical religion, embodies an 
approach that is reflected to a greater or lesser degree in figures like R. 
Meir Abulafia and R. Judah Alfakar and in some of his great successors 
among the Talmudists of Christian Spain.72
72 For a full exposition of my perception of Nahmanides’ position, see my master’s 
essay, Nahmanides’ Attitude Toward Secular Learning and Its Bearing Upon his Stance 
in the Maimonidean Controversy (Columbia University, 1965). See also my “Miracles 
and the Natural Order in Nahmanides” (above, n. 47), pp. 110-111, and Septimus, 
“’Open Rebuke and Concealed Love’” (above, n. 71). For brief characterizations of 
Nahmanides, see my articles in The Encyclopedia of Religion 10 (New York, 1987), pp. 
295-297, and in Great Figures in Jewish History (in Russian [translated by the editorial 
staff]), ed. by Joseph Dan and Judy Baumel (Tel Aviv, 1991), pp. 77-84. On Abulafia, 
see Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition, which also contains an insightful 
typology of approaches to philosophical study in this period. See also his “Piety and 
Power in Thirteenth-Century Catalonia,” Studies in Jewish History and Literature [1], 
pp. 197-230, for an effort to reconstruct a struggle between rationalists and Talmudists 
of Nahmanides’ type for political control of a Jewish community.
 The interpretation of Nahmanides’ proposal is dependent on the resolution of textual 
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The waning of this phase of the controversy used to be attributed 
primarily to nearly universal revulsion at the burning of Maimonides’ 
works. We now have reason to believe that Nahmanides’ letter played a 
major role by persuading the Northern French rabbis to withdraw from 
the fray.73 In any event, despite an eruption in the 1280s involving a 
relatively minor anti-Maimonist agitator, the dispute about philosophical 
study did not regain its status as a cause célèbre until the first decade of 
the fourteenth century, when the issue was joined again. In many ways, 
the debate was unchanged, but in some respects it had been transformed 
in significant and revealing fashion.
The controversy began when R. Abba Mari of Lunel initiated a 
correspondence with R. Solomon ibn Adret (Rashba) to complain about 
the inroads made by extreme rationalism in Provence, especially in the 
person of Levi b. Abraham of Villefranche, who advocated an allegorical 
understanding of some biblical narratives. The first thing that strikes 
the reader of Abba Mari’s work is the impact of philosophy in general 
and Maimonides in particular on this “antirationalist.” Science and 
metaphysics should be studied only by one
who has filled his stomach with bread and meat, as we have learned from 
the Rabbi, the teacher of righteousness, from whose mouth we live through 
his true statements… built upon the foundation of the Torah in “The Book 
of Knowledge” and Guide of the Perplexed, which illuminate the path of 
those who have been in darkness and cannot adequately be evaluated by 
the greatest of assessors.74
It is true that even in the 1230s, many antirationalists treated 
Maimonides himself with considerable respect. We have already noted R. 
problems in the letter. This is not the place for a detailed discussion. Suffice it to say 
that the emendation of tehazzequ to lo tehazzequ (Kitvei Ramban 1, p. 349), which 
eliminates the ban entirely, is, in my view, insupportable. For details, see chapter 5 
of my master’s essay and my forthcoming article, “How did Nahmanides Propose to 
Resolve the Maimonidean Controversy?” [reprinted in this volume].
73 See the letter of the Maimonists in Lunel and Narbonne, Zion 34 (1969): 142, and the 
discussion by Schochet, Zion 36 (1971): 44.
74 Minhat Qenaot, Preface, p. 4 (unpaginated)=Dimitrovsky, 1, p. 228. For a summary 
of the events and arguments of the early fourteenth-century controversy, see Joseph 
Sarachek, Faith and Reason (Williamsport, Pennsylvania, 1935), pp. 167-264. Despite 
a variety of subsequent studies that will be noted later, Sarachek’s work can still serve 
as a useful orientation to the dispute.
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Solomon b. Abraham’s reference to the study of the Mishneh Torah in his 
yeshivah, and Judah Alfakar had distinguished rather sharply between 
the author of the Guide and those who had made it into a new Torah. 
At the same time, Alfakar had written that he wished that the Guide 
had never seen the light of day, and Abba Mari’s encomium to precisely 
the two works that were at issue in the earlier controversy is striking 
testimony to the status that Maimonides himself had attained among 
all parties to the new dispute.75
Not only did Abba Mari express unqualified admiration for 
Maimonides; he even defended no less a rationalist than Aristotle 
himself. In a passage about the importance of the belief in creation 
out of nothing, where Abba Mari was clearly echoing an argument of 
Nahmanides, he defended his predecessor’s “accursed Greek” by noting 
that in the absence of the information provided by revelation, a gentile 
in antiquity could not have been expected to achieve an adequate level 
of understanding with respect to this issue. On the contrary, Aristotle 
deserves great credit for disseminating an accurate conception of the one 
God to a world rife with paganism. Moreover, Abba Mari’s endorsement 
of Maimonides’ assertion that creation from nothing cannot be proved 
philosophically served him as an explanation for the use of the term hoq 
as a designation of the law of the Sabbath. The term is usually used for 
regulations whose reasons are unfathomable; in this case, the purpose 
of the law, which is to remind us of creation ex nihilo, is clear, but the 
belief itself cannot be demonstrated by human reason. Maimonidean 
philosophy has been integrated by a Provençal conservative into the 
warp and woof of his study of Torah.76
75 For Alfakar, see Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam 3, pp. 2b-3a. On respect for Maimonides 
during the controversy of the early fourteenth century, see the remarks by Charles 
Touati, “La Controverse de 1303-1306 autour des études philosophiques et scientifiques,” 
Revue des Études Juives 127 (1968): 23-24.
76 Minhat Qenaot, Introduction, ch. 13-14, pp. 14-15=Dimitrovsky, pp. 255-258. On Abba 
Mari’s philosophical orientation, see A. S. Halkin, “Yedaiah Bedershi’s Apology,” in 
Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. by Altmann, p. 178; “Ha-Herem ‘al Limmud 
ha-Pilosofiah,” Peraqim 1 (1967-8): 48-49.
 The intriguing transformation of Nahmanides’ argument into a defense of Aristotle 
deserves brief elaboration. The original point was that miracles demonstrate creation 
ex nihilo because God would not have limitless control over matter as primeval as He. 
Since miracles are an empirical datum that became well known throughout the world, 
the affirmation of the eternity of matter by “the accursed Greek” is a denial of his own 
vaunted empiricism. Abba Mari accepts the argument with one small correction: miracles 
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Abba Mari provoked sharp disagreement from Rashba when he 
asserted that gentile philosophical works are not harmful since everyone 
recognizes their provenance. Since the legitimacy of Maimonides’ treatises 
was surely not at issue, Abba Man’s ire was narrowly focused on what 
he perceived as the heretical teachings of the Jewish hyperrationalists. 
As he reports the situation, people like Levi b. Abraham understood 
Abraham and Sarah as matter and form, the twelve tribes as the twelve 
constellations, the alliances of four and five kings in Genesis 14 as the 
four elements and the five senses, and Amalek as the evil inclination.77
Such accusations about rationalist allegorization appear in various 
works during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Even more seriously, 
we find the assertion that certain rationalists regarded verbal prayer as 
superfluous and did not observe various commandments either because 
they allegorized them or thought that they could fulfill their underlying 
purpose in a different manner. Thus, R. Jacob b. Sheshet maintained that 
contemporary heretics, in a fashion strikingly reminiscent of Christian 
polemic against Judaism, argued, “What is the purpose of this particular 
commandment? Reason cannot abide it. It must have been nothing but 
an allegory.” Elsewhere, Jacob is quoted to the effect that in addition 
to heresies regarding primeval matter, divine providence, and reward 
and punishment, these rationalists assert that the purification of one’s 
thoughts is a more than adequate substitute for prayer. Moses de Leon 
alleged that the adherents of “the books of the Greeks” do not observe 
the commandment of taking the four species on the festival of Sukkot 
because, they say, the reason the Torah provides is that this will enhance 
the joy of the holiday; well, they are happier with their gold, silver, and 
clothing than they could possibly be with the four species.78
are attested in a revelation granted to the Jewish people that was not in fact widely 
known in Aristotle’s world. Hence, although Nahmanides is correct that creation ex nihilo 
can be proven, the demonstration depends on the knowledge of miracles, which is, or at 
least was, specifically Jewish knowledge; Maimonides is correct that the doctrine cannot 
be proven in a philosophical system uninformed by revelation. From this perspective, 
Nahmanides’ position is not an indictment of Aristotle but an exculpation. For a similar 
view of Aristotle by a somewhat earlier figure, see Septimus’s citation of Judah ibn 
Matka’s Midrash Hokhmah, in Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition, p. 97.
77 Minhat Qenaot, letter 7, pp. 40-41=Dimitrovsky, ch. 25, pp. 343-344, and elsewhere.
78 For Jacob b. Sheshet, see his Meshiv Devarim Nekhohim, ed. by Georges Vajda (Jerusalem, 
1968), p. 145, and the citation in Isaac of Acre, Sefer Me’irat ‘Einayim, ed. by Goldreich, 
pp. 58-61. For de Leon, see his Book of the Pomegranate, ed. by Elliot Wolfson (Atlanta, 
1988), p. 391.
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During the controversy, we hear occasional references to a refusal 
to wear tefillin because of a philosophically motivated rejection of the 
commandment’s literal meaning and even to wholesale allegorization of 
biblical law. In these extreme cases, however, the indictments appear 
to reflect the behavior of isolated individuals or even what the critic 
perceived as the logical consequence or underlying intention of the 
philosophical position. One allegation about tefillin refers to a single 
person, and Rashba is clearly describing a teaching that was not made 
explicit when he observes that “it is evident that their true intention 
is that the commandments are not to be taken literally, for why should 
God care about the difference between torn and properly slaughtered 
meat? Rather, all is allegory and parable.” Although such claims are not 
entirely unfounded, the statement that the villains in this indictment 
“have regarded the Torah and its commandments as false, and everything 
has become permitted to them” was clearly a deduction. Indeed, Rashba 
explicitly asserts that the hyperrationalists maintain that everything in 
the Torah is allegory from Genesis until—but not beyond—the revelation 
at Sinai; nonetheless, he says, it is evident that they really have no faith 
in the plain meaning of the commandments either.79
As a result of these concerns, Rashba issued a ban which itself reflects 
the changes in this issue since the 1230s. Unlike Nahmanides, Rashba 
was sufficiently concerned by the spread of rationalist extremism that 
he was prepared to go beyond the very narrow ban advocated by his 
79 On tefillin, see Minhat Qenaot, letter 79, p. 152=Dimitrovsky, ch. 88, p. 721, which 
bans anyone who understands the commandments in a purely spiritual sense, and cf. 
letter  p. 153=Dimitrovsky, ch. 101, p. 735, where it is fairly clear that the concern 
was based on a specific statement made by a particular rationalist. Cf. also letter 7, 
p. 41=Dimitrovsky, ch. 25, p. 344. The passage in The Book of the Pomegranate cited in 
the previous note continues with the allegation that these reprobates also fail to wear 
tefillin because they understand the commandment in a spiritual sense. For the more 
general assertions, see Minhat Qenaot, letter 20, p. 60=Dimitrovsky, ch. 38, pp. 411-
412, and letter 10, p. 45=Dimitrovsky, ch. 28, p. 360. The last assertion is in a text 
that was distributed in connection with the ban; see Dimitrovsky, ch. 100, p. 727. On 
neglect of tefillin, see the references in Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquières (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1962), p. 24, n. 20. See also Ephraim Kanarfogel, “Rabbinic Attitudes toward 
Nonobservance in the Medieval Period,” in Jewish Tradition and the Nontraditional Jew, 
ed. by Jacob J. Schacter (Northvale, New Jersey and London, 1992), pp. 3-35, esp. 7-12; 
the issues there, however, are not philosophical. At the eleventh World Congress of 
Jewish Studies in 1993, Aviezer Ravitsky described a hitherto unknown commentary on 
the Guide by a Samuel of Carcassonne, who indicated quite clearly that the philosopher 
need not observe commandments whose purpose he regards as no longer relevant.
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predecessor and to forbid the study of philosophy and some sciences by 
anyone who had not reached the age of twenty-five. On the other hand, 
the works of Maimonides were entirely exempted from the prohibition 
during subsequent discussions clarifying its scope; the only reason this 
remains in some sense a “Maimonidean controversy” is that the targets 
of the ban made what Rashba and Abba Mari considered blatantly 
illegitimate use of Maimonides’ works to justify their heresies. Though 
the distinction between Maimonides and his followers had been made 
earlier, it is now far sharper and more fundamental. Thus, when modern 
scholars who see Maimonides as a philosophical radical tell us that the 
people attacked by Abba Mari were no more dangerous than Maimonides 
himself, they impose a reading of the Maimonidean corpus which the 
proponents of the ban did not share.80
The validity of the conservatives’ perception of Maimonides is, 
of course, only one side of the coin; the other is the validity of their 
perceptions of the Maimonists. We have already seen that even the 
evidence of the antirationalist pronouncements suggests that assertions 
of wholesale rejection of the commandments by more than a handful of 
rationalists may be exaggerated. The vigorous response to the ban provides 
us with a substantial set of arguments for the religious orthodoxy of the 
philosophers and for the value of the maligned philosophical enterprise. 
The most extensive of these polemics that remains extant is the apology 
for philosophy addressed to Rashba himself by R. Yedaiah Bedershi.81
Though the work is written in a tone of extreme reverence for the 
addressee, it concedes virtually nothing to the allegations leveled in the 
ban. A handful of Provençal Jews may deserve censure for publicizing 
philosophical teachings best left to the elite, but the content of these 
teachings is untainted by heresy. The reports of allegorization of biblical 
narratives and commandments are wholly false; at most, one philosopher 
is known to have argued that the correspondence between the number 
of tribes and the number of constellations demonstrates that the Jewish 
people is bound by the stars, but even this deplorable position takes the 
reality of the twelve tribes for granted.
80 Touati, “La Controverse,” pp. 23-24; A. S. Halkin, “Why Was Levi ben Hayyim Hounded?,” 
Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 24 (1966):  65-77.
81 See Halkin’s articles cited in n. 76. The text appears as Ketav Hitnazzelut, She’elot 
u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba (Bnei Braq, 1958), 1:418, pp. 154-174, and was separately edited 
by S. Bloch (Lvov, 1809).
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Moreover, says Yedaiah, the study of philosophy has overwhelming 
religious value. It provides proof of the existence and unity of God; 
demonstrates the falsehood of determinism, magic, and metempsychosis; 
establishes the truth of prophecy and the spiritual character of the 
immortal soul; and distinguishes between impossibilities that can 
be rendered possible through miracles and those which even divine 
omnipotence itself cannot overturn. First and foremost, philosophy 
has extirpated what was once the epidemic of anthropomorphism. Here 
Yedaiah’s formulation is extraordinarily strong:
In the early generations, the corporeal conception of God spread through 
virtually the entire Jewish exile… ; however, in all the generations there 
arose Geonim and wise men in Spain, Babylonia, and the cities of Andalusia, 
who, because of their expertise in the Arabic language, encountered the 
great preparatory knowledge that comes with smelling the scent of the 
various forms of wisdom, whether to a greater or lesser degree, which have 
been translated into that language. Consequently, they began to clarify 
many opinions in their study of Torah, especially with respect to the unity 
of God and the rejection of corporeality, with particular use of philosophical 
proofs taken from the speculative literature.82
The issue of tradition versus philosophical innovation emerges in even 
bolder relief than it did in Maimonides’ discussion of anthropomorphism. 
Although Yedaiah explicitly denies that the ancient Rabbis were 
anthropomorphists, he sees the attaining of a purified conception of 
God in the Middle Ages as an achievement of a philosophical enterprise 
unaided by tradition but crucially dependent upon familiarity with Arabic 
texts. The very essence of the Torah, largely lost through the travails 
of exile, was restored through the discipline which the antirationalists 
would now undermine.
Once again we find the advocates of philosophy referring to non-Jews 
in an effort to legitimate speculation. Jacob ben Makhir pointed to
the most civilized nations who translate learned works from other languages 
into their own… and who revere learning.… Has any nation changed its 
religion because of this?… How much less likely is that to happen to us, 
who possess a rational Torah.83
82 She’elot u-Teshvot ha-Rashba 1, p. 166.
83 Cited in Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain 1 (Philadelphia, 1961), p. 296.
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Jacob’s reference to the rationality of Judaism carries significance 
that goes beyond the specific point in this text. The fact that these 
discussions now take place in a Christian rather than a Muslim context 
means that the conviction that Judaism is more rational than its rival 
can be mobilized to enhance the importance of philosophical study by 
pointing to its value as a polemical tool. When a Jew justified speculation 
on the grounds of its usefulness in replying to heretics, the reference 
was not necessarily to Christians; nonetheless, when Bedershi tells us 
that one advantage of setting criteria for the possibility of miracles is 
that it enables us to rule out God’s ability to make Himself corporeal, 
the implications for anti-Christian polemic are self-evident. R. Israel b. 
Joseph, a fourteenth-century Spanish rabbi who studied with R. Asher 
ben Yehiel, vigorously supported the study of “external disciplines” 
solely on the basis of their value in supplying “answers to those who 
err” and providing the ability “to defeat them in their arguments.” Here 
too, while those who err no doubt included philosophical heretics, it is 
hard to imagine that R. Israel was not also thinking of the utility of 
philosophy for vanquishing the arguments of Christian missionaries. 
Hasdai Crescas’ Bittul ‘Iqqarei ha-Nozerim constitutes eloquent testimony 
to the importance of philosophical sophistication for the late medieval 
Jewish polemicist in Spain, and it can be asserted with full confidence 
that no Jewish reader of that work could have come away from it with the 
slightest doubt that at least some Jews ought to study philosophy.84
In light of the usefulness of philosophy for anti-Christian polemic, it is 
ironic and intriguing that the desire to convert Jews impelled the governor 
of Montpellier to take the side of the rationalists at the height of the 
controversy. The advocates of philosophy had issued a counterban against 
84 For R. Israel b. Joseph ha-Yisre’eli’s remarks, see his commentary to Avot 2:14, cited 
in Israel Ta-Shema, “Shiqqulim Pilosofiyyim be-Hakhra‘at ha-Halakhah bi-Sefarad,” 
Sefunot 18 (1985): 105. R. Israel noted that these external disciplines cannot be 
approached safely before the reader has become a mature Talmudic scholar; hence, 
the rabbis forbade one to teach higgayon or Greek wisdom to one’s son. The thrust of 
his observation, however, is permissive: It is prohibited for the father to teach his son, 
but it is permissible for the father to study on his own. See Saul Lieberman, Hellenism 
in Jewish Palestine (New York, 1962), pp. 102-104. On Crescas, see Bittul ‘Iqqarei ha-
Nozerim, ed. by Daniel J. Lasker (Ramat Gan, 1990), or Lasker’s Jewish Philosophical 
Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages (New York, 1977). On the use of more 
rigorous philosophical arguments for polemical purposes, see also Shalom Rosenberg, 
Logiqah ve-Ontologiah ba-Pilosophiah ha-Yehudit ba-Me’ah ha-Yod-Dalet (Hebrew 
University dissertation, 1974), p. 44. On answering heretics, see also n. 54 above.
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anyone who would refuse to teach the banned disciplines to people under 
the age of twenty-five in obedience to the antirationalists’ proclamation, 
and they sought legal backing from the civil authorities. Abba Mari informs 
us that although the governor did not grant all their requests, he lent some 
support because he was convinced that if Jews were to prohibit anything 
but Talmudic study for a substantial period of a person’s life, this would 
create a situation in which no Jew would ever convert to Christianity.85
There is strong reason to believe that a majority of the Jews in 
Montpellier sided with the rationalists.86 The philosophical culture of 
85 The phrase that I have translated “talmudic study” literally means “the discipline 
(hokhmah) that you call Gamaliel” (Minhat Qenaot, letter 73, p. 142=Dimitrovsky, ch. 
92, p. 701). For the identification of “Gamaliel” with Talmud, see Heinrich Graetz, 
Geschichte der Juden (Leipzig, 1863), 7, p. 276; Ch. Merchavia, Ha-Talmud bi-Re’i ha-
Nazrut (Jerusalem, 1970), p. 211, and Dimitrovsky, ad loc. (“apparently this refers to 
the Talmud”). For the view that “Gamaliel” means medicine, see David Kaufmann, Die 
Sinne (Budapest, 1884), p. 7, n. 12; D. Margalit, “’Al Galenus ve-Gilgulo ha-‘Ivri Gamliel,” 
Sinai 33 (1953) : 75-77; Judah Rosenthal’s review of Merchavia, Kiryat Sefer 47 (1972): 
29; Joseph Shatzmiller, “Bein Abba Mari la-Rashba: ha-Massa ve-ha-Mattan she-qadam 
la-Herem be-Barcelona,” Mehqarim be-Toledot ‘Am Yisrael ve-Erez Yisrael 3 (Haifa, 1974), 
p. 127. I cannot see why a Christian would find it necessary to describe medicine by its 
presumed Jewish name, especially since the ban does not call it Gamaliel, or even why 
the exclusion of medicine would need to be mentioned at all in this context. The fact 
that this would constitute the only attested use of Gamaliel in so broad a sense also 
militates against the identification. It is true that Talmud was not normally called a 
hokhmah, but in the context of this ban, I can easily see a Christian using the equivalent 
term, presumably scientia. Moreover, the Christian argument that the study of rabbinic 
literature is an impediment to conversion is attested as far back as Justinian’s Novella 
146 and was reiterated in the 1240s by Odo of Chateauroux. For Justinian, see the text 
and translation in Amnon Linder, The Jews in Roman Imperial Legislation (Jerusalem, 
1987), pp. 405-410; for Odo, see the text in Merchavia, p. 450 (“. . . hanc esse causam 
precipuam que iudeos in sua perfidia retinet obstinatos”). Because the motive assigned 
by Abba Mari is so congenial to his own position in the controversy, we must read it 
with some skepticism; note Kaufmann’s remark (loc. cit.) that the antirationalist Yosef 
Yavetz would have given a great deal to have known this quotation. In light of Odo’s 
assertion, however, the report is entirely plausible.
 Note too Kaufmann’s argument that philosophical allegory may have been influenced 
by Christian allegory and that this connection led to the hope for conversion through 
philosophical study; see his “Simeon b. Josefs Sendschreiben an Menachem b. Salomo,” 
in Jubelschrift zum Neunzigsten Geburtstag des Dr. L. Zunz (Berlin, 1884), German section, 
p. 147. I doubt that Christian influence on rationalist allegorizarion was decisive, and 
the main point appears to have been that talmudic study retards conversion.
 On the counterban and the governor, see the references in Marc Saperstein, “The 
Conflict over the Rashba’s Herem on Philosophical Study: A Political Perspective,” 
Jewish History 1:2 (1986): 37, n. 19.
86 Shatzmiller has argued this point persuasively in “Bein Abba Mari la-Rashba,” pp. 128-130.
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Provençal Jewry was so pervasive that rationalist sermons were delivered 
in synagogues and even at weddings. Opposition to the ban came from 
the distinguished Perpignan Talmudist R. Menahem ha-Meiri, who 
argued that spiritual damage to a handful of people cannot be allowed to 
undermine entire fields of study, that even the books of the Greeks have 
great religious value, that Jews cannot allow gentiles to mock them for their 
intellectual backwardness, and that Provence can boast a variety of figures 
who have distinguished themselves in both talmudic and philosophical 
learning. Here again the antirationalist party demonstrated how much 
the atmosphere had changed since the 1230s: The reply to ha-Meiri by 
a disciple of Abba Mari fully conceded the great value of philosophy and 
pointed out that the ban was directed only at the young.87
Ha-Meiri himself was a paradigm of the ideal toward which moderate 
rationalists strove and to which even extreme rationalists paid lip 
service: a Talmudist of standing who valued philosophy and the sciences 
and devoted himself to their study. Ha-Meiri’s openness to general 
culture combined with his well-known attitude of toleration toward 
Christianity suggests an additional dimension of the issue that we have 
been addressing. Intellectual involvement with the dominant society 
often goes hand in hand with social involvement of a relatively benign 
sort. By this time, Christian intellectuals had attained an impressive 
level of philosophical sophistication to the point where ha-Meiri could 
express concern about their contempt for ignorant Jews; consequently, 
familiarity began to breed respect. In ha-Meiri’s case, this respect led 
to the formulation of a wholly novel halakhic category which roughly 
means civilized people, a category which helped to exempt Christians 
from a series of discriminatory Talmudic statements. While this is not a 
case of incorporating an external value or doctrine into Rabbinic law—
the Christendom that ha-Meiri knew had hardly developed a theory of 
religious toleration—it probably is an instance of reexamining halakhah 
and Jewish values in light of habits of mind developed by exposure to a 
culture shared with the gentile environment. Once again, the core of the 
Torah was touched—or its deeper meaning revealed—through insights 
inspired by involvement in general culture.88
87 See “Hoshen Mishpat,” Jubelschrift… Zunz, Hebrew section, pp. 142-174. For the last 
point, see especially pp. 162-164.
88 On ha-Meiri and Christianity, see Yaakov Blidstein, “Yahaso shel R. Menahem ha-Meiri 
la-Nokhri—Bein Apologetiqah le-Hafnamah,” Zion 51 (1986): 153-166, and the earlier 
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THE SEPHARDIM OF THE LATE MIDDLE AGES
The affirmation of the value of philosophy even by the conservatives in 
this dispute reflects a critically important characteristic of late medieval 
Jewish culture in Provence and in Spain. Virtually without exception, 
rabbinic figures of the first rank, whose pursuit of Talmudic study was 
their central preoccupation, either devoted some time to the study of 
“wisdom” or expressed no opposition to its cultivation.89
Rashba himself was not uninfluenced by philosophical ideas. This 
would be evident even from Bedershi’s apology, which clearly assumed 
that its recipient was receptive to the major thrust of the argument, but 
it is also explicit in Rashba’s own writings. In one elaborate responsum, 
for example, he analyzed the parameters within which philosophical 
arguments can be brought to bear on the reinterpretation of sacred texts, 
and he staked out a position that we would expect from a disciple of 
Nahmanides: there is a legitimate place for such arguments as long as 
the critical demands of tradition are accorded unchallenged supremacy.90 
R. Yom Tov Ishbili (Ritba), perhaps the greatest rabbinic figure in the 
generation following Rashba, wrote a work exemplifying the same general 
posture. He defended Maimonides against the strictures in Nahmanides’ 
studies cited there. See now the important analysis by Moshe Halbertal, “R. Menahem 
ha-Meiri: Bein Torah le-Hokhmah,” Tarbiz 63 (1994): 63-118, which points to a specific 
philosophical context for ha-Meiri’s position.
89 See Israel Ta-Shema’s “Rabbi Yona Gerondi: Spiritualism and Leadership,” presented 
at the Jewish Theological Seminary’s 1989 conference on “Jewish Mystical Leadership, 
1200-1270,” esp. p. 11. A bound volume of typescripts of the proceedings is available 
in the Mendel Gottesman Library, Yeshiva University. See also Ta-Shema’s “Halakhah, 
Kabbalah u-Pilosophiah bi-Sefarad ha-Nozerit—le-Biqqoret Sefer ‘Toledot ha-Yehudim 
bi-Sefarad ha-Nozerit’,” Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-‘Ivri 18-19 (1992-94): 479-495. For a 
balanced, moderate defense of a broad curriculum in fourteenth-century Spain, see 
Profiat Duran’s introduction to Ma‘aseh Efod, pp. 1-25.
90 She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba (1958) 1:9, also edited by L. A. Feldman, Shnaton Bar-Ilan 
7-8 (1970): 153-161. For a thorough analysis of Rashba’s stance, see the unpublished 
master’s thesis by David Horwitz, The Role of Philosophy and Kabbalah in the Works of 
Rashba (Bernard Revel Graduate School, Yeshiva University, 1986). See also Carmi 
Horowitz, “‘Al Perush ha-Aggadot shel ha-Rashba—Bein Qabbalah le-Pilosophia,” Da’at 
18 (1987): 15-25, and Lawrence Kaplan, “Rabbi Solomon ibn Adret,” Yavneh Review 6 
(1967): 27-40. (I should probably not press the argument from Bedershi’s perception 
too hard since Ktav Hitnazzelut takes for granted the questionable proposition that 
Rashba would recognize the value of philosophy because of its ability to refute the 
belief in metempsychosis, a kabbalistic doctrine that Rashba probably endorsed.)
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commentary to the Pentateuch while at the same time affirming that in 
the final analysis Nahmanides is usually correct.91
The endorsement of at least a moderate level of rationalism no 
doubt resulted from the importance of philosophy in traditional Spanish 
Jewish culture, but we should not underestimate the impact of the heroic 
image of Maimonides. Just as Nahmanides’ embrace of kabbalah made 
it very difficult to reject mysticism as a heresy, Maimonides’ devotion 
to philosophy rendered its thorough delegitimation by Sephardic Jews 
almost impossible. Even some kabbalists attempted to synthesize their 
discipline with a reinterpreted Maimonidean corpus, though others went 
so far as to assert that the author of the Guide had seen the error of 
his ways once the secrets of the hidden wisdom were revealed to him. 
This last example is a rare case of the exception that really proves the 
rule, because it demonstrates that Maimonides’ position stood as such 
a hallmark of legitimacy that some Jews could comfortably maintain a 
contrary position only by forcibly redefining the Maimonidean stance.92
Moderate rationalism was, of course, not the only approach endorsed 
by Provençal and Spanish Jews in the later Middle Ages. Despite the 
exaggerated nature of the conservative manifestoes issued during the 
controversy, some late medieval thinkers really did espouse radical 
positions with respect to many philosophical and exegetical issues. When 
Jacob b. Sheshet denounced rationalists who “assert that the world is 
primeval… , that divine providence does not extend below the sphere 
of the moon… , that there is no reward for the righteous or punishment 
for the wicked… and that there is no need to pray but only to purify 
one’s thoughts,”93 he was engaging in hyperbole but not in fantasy. The 
91 See his Sefer ha-Zikkaron, ed. by Kalman Kahana (Jerusalem, 1956), pp. 33-34.
92 For Abraham Abulafia’s effort to create a Maimonidean kabbalah, see sections IV-VI of 
Moshe Idel’s “Maimonides and Kabbalah,” in Twersky, Studies in Maimonides, pp. 54-78. 
On Maimonides as a kabbalist, see Gershom Scholem, “Me-Hoqer li-Mequbbal: Aggadot 
ha-Mequbbalim ‘al ha-Rambam,” Tarbiz 6 (1935): 90-98, and Michael A. Shmidman, 
“On Maimonides’ ‘Conversion’ to Kabbalah,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and 
Literature, ed. by Twersky, 2, pp. 375-386. For a discussion of this and similar legends 
in the broader context of folk conceptions about Maimonides, see the study by my 
father Isaiah Berger, “Ha-Rambam be-Aggadat ha-‘Am,” in Massad: Me’assef le-Divrei 
Sifrut 2, ed. by Hillel Bavli (Tel Aviv, 1936), pp. 216-238; and compare his eloquent 
observations on the contrast between the folk images of Maimonides and Rashi in his 
“Rashi be-Aggadat ha- ‘Am,” in Rashi: Torato ve-lshiyyuto, ed. by Simon Federbush (New 
York, 1958), pp. 147-149.
93 Cited in Me’irat ‘Einayim, ed. by Goldreich, p. 58.
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rationalist propensity toward allegorization undoubtedly went beyond 
anything that rabbis like Rashba would countenance, and we should 
not allow the Maimonist arguments of Bedershi and his colleagues to 
blind us to this reality. The works of Samuel ibn Tibbon, Moses Narboni, 
Joseph ibn Kaspi, Gersonides, and Isaac Albalag constitute but part of 
a corpus of literature attesting to a flourishing tradition of vigorous 
rationalism that severely tested the prevailing boundaries of religious 
orthodoxy.
Philosophers of this stripe were often prepared to make an explicit 
case against excessive concentration in Talmudic study. The most famous 
example of this attitude is the story ibn Kaspi tells in his will about the 
problem that arose during a party in his home when “the accursed maid” 
placed a dairy spoon in a pot of meat. Poor ibn Kaspi had to go to the 
local rabbi, who kept him waiting for hours in a state of near starvation 
before apprising him of the halakhah. Nonetheless, he tells us, he was 
not embarrassed by his ignorance, since his philosophical sophistication 
compensated for the shortcomings in his halakhic expertise. “Why,” he 
asks, “should a ruling or directive regarding the great existence or unity 
of God be inferior to a small dairy spoon?”94
Other expressions of this approach are less amusing but no less 
striking. Some Jews demonstrated the obscurantism of those who 
devote their lives to talmudic study by pointing to the Talmud’s own 
assertion that the phrase “He has set me in dark places like the dead of 
old” (Lamentations 3:6) refers to the Talmud of Babylon. R. Judah ibn 
Abbas maintained that people who study Talmud constantly “neglect the 
proper service and knowledge of God” and described Talmudic novellae 
and Tosafot as a waste of valuable time. It is a matter of no small interest 
that Hasdai Crescas wrote his philosophical refutation of Christianity 
in Aragonese or Catalan so that Jews could have ready access to his 
arguments; there was thus a substantial, sophisticated Jewish audience 
in late medieval Spain who could follow a difficult vernacular text but not 
a difficult Hebrew one.
94 Israel Abrahams, Hebrew Ethical Wills 1 (Philadelphia, 1926), pp. 151-152. The somewhat 
awkward use of the term “great,” which technically modifies unity in the original, is clearly 
intended to evoke Maimonides’ straightforward understanding of the Talmudic contrast 
between great and small matters. See above, n. 39. On Ibn Kaspi’s intellectual stance, see 
Isadore Twerksy, “Joseph ibn Kaspi: Portrait of a Medieval Jewish Intellectual,” in Studies 
in Medieval Jewish History and Literature [1], pp. 231-257.
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Ibn Kaspi himself, in a work marked by the arresting assertion 
that Job’s suffering was a just consequence of his failure to pursue a 
philosophical understanding of his faith, utilized the traditionalists’ 
affirmation of the importance of Talmudic study to support the 
indispensability of philosophy. After all, he argued, there exist both 
physical commandments and commandments of the heart or intellect. 
Everyone agrees that with respect to the former, an understanding of 
the intellectual underpinning is eminently desirable. “Why else should 
we toil to study the Talmud? We might just as well be satisfied with 
the rulings of Maimonides and R. Isaac Alfasi.” Now there is surely no 
basis for distinguishing the latter commandments from the former with 
respect to this principle, and books of physics and metaphysics stand in 
the same relationship to the commandments of the heart as the Talmud 
does to the physical commandments. Originally, such philosophical 
works were written by Jewish sages like Solomon, but “we were exiled 
because of our sins, and those matters have now come to be attributed 
to the Greeks” except for scattered references in the Talmud. In other 
words, one cannot affirm the critical importance of Talmudic study 
without being logically compelled to grant at least equal value to the 
pursuit of philosophy and the sciences.95
On the other side of the ledger, R. Asher b. Yehiel, who was born and 
trained in Germany, brought with him a pejorative attitude toward the 
value of general culture. In responding to the suggestion that no one 
without expertise in Arabic should render a legal decision, he maintained 
that his reasoning powers in Torah were in no way inferior to those 
95 On the “dark places” and the Talmud, see Me’irat ‘Einayim, p. 62; Isadore Twersky, 
“Religion and Law,” in Religion in a Religious Age, p. 77, and Twersky, “R. Yeda‘yah ha-
Penini,” Altmann Festschrift, p. 71. The Talmudic passage is in Sanhedrin 24a. For Ibn 
Abbas, see Goldreich’s quotations from the manuscript of Ya’ir Nativ (Oxford 1280, p. 
50a) in Me’irat ‘Einayim, pp. 412-413. The oft-quoted curriculum in ibn Abbas’s work, 
which culminates with the study of metaphysics, was published by Asaf, Meqorot 2, pp. 
29-33. On the vernacular original of Bittul ‘Iqqarei ha-Nozerim, see Lasker’s edition, pp. 
13, 33. Note too the Castilian Proverbos Morales by the fourteenth-century R. Shem Tov 
ibn Ardutiel, The Moral Proverbs of Santob de Carrion: Jewish Wisdom in Christian Spain, 
ed. by T. A. Perry (Princeton, 1988).
 If we contemplate for a moment the magnitude of Job’s suffering, we can begin to 
appreciate the importance attached to the philosophic quest by a man willing to propose 
ibn Kaspi’s explanation for such torment. This explanation appears along with the very 
clever argument linking Talmudic and philosophical study in Shulhan Kesef: Be’ur ‘al 
Iyyov, in ‘Asarah Kelei Kesef, ed. by J. Last (Pressburg, 1903), pp. 170-172.
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of Spanish Rabbis, “even though I do not know your external wisdom. 
Thank the merciful God who saved me from it.” The pursuit of such 
wisdom, he said, leads people away from the fear of God and encourages 
the vain attempt to integrate alien pursuits with Torah. Still, even R. 
Asher describes philosophers as very wise men, and an assessment of 
Spanish Jewish attitudes would have to assign greater weight to the 
remarkable suggestion that he rejected than to the negative reaction 
that he expressed.96
That suggestion reflects a real and significant phenomenon: the 
halakhic decision-making and Talmudic study of Provençal and Spanish 
rabbis were sometimes affected by philosophical considerations. To begin 
with the most famous example in Maimonides himself, the omission 
in the Mishneh Torah of talmudic laws based on the intervention of the 
creatures that the rabbis called shedim was almost certainly the result of 
philosophically motivated skepticism. R. Zerahiah Halevi cited technical 
logical terminology and philosophical references in a halakhic discussion. 
Conceptions of providence were brought to bear on decisions regarding 
the remarriage of a woman whose first two husbands had died. A more 
general illustration of the pervasiveness of the philosophical atmosphere 
emerges from the first sentence of R. Yeruham b. Meshullam’s introduction 
to a work of Talmudic scholarship, where he informs us how “the scholars 
of [philosophical] research” have classified the considerations leading to 
the pursuit of wisdom.97
96 See She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rosh (Venice, 1603), 55:9. Cf. Israel Ta-Shema, “Shiqqulim 
Pilosofiyyim,” Sefunot 18 (1985): 100-108.
97 On the impact of Maimonides’ attitude toward “popular religion” on the Mishneh 
Torah, see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, pp. 479-484; see especially 
Marc B. Shapiro’s forthcoming essay in Maimonidean Studies. I am unpersuaded by 
Jose Faur’s effort in his generally perceptive ‘Iyyunim be-Mishneh Torah le-ha-Rambam: 
Sefer ha-Madda (Jerusalem, 1978), pp. l-2 n. 1, to minimize the philosophical 
motivation for the omission of shedim. For some observations on the impact of 
Maimonides’ scientific posture on his halakhic approach, see Isadore Twersky, 
“Aspects of Maimonidean Epistemology: Halakhah and Science,” in From Ancient Israel 
to Modern Judaism: Intellect in Quest of Understanding. Essays in Honor of Marvin Fox, 
ed. by Jacob Neusner, Ernest S. Frerichs, and Nachum M. Sarna (Atlanta, Georgia, 
1989) 3, pp. 3-23. For R. Zerahiah Halevi, see I. Ta-Shema, “Sifrei ha-Rivot bein 
ha-Ravad le-bein Rabbi Zerahiah Halevi (ha-Razah) mi-Lunel,” Qiryat Sefer (1977): 
570-576. On the problem of remarriage, see Ta-Shema, Sefunot 18, p. 110, and Y. 
Buxbaum, “Teshuvot Hakhmei Sefarad be-Din Qatlanit,” Moriah 7 [78/79] (1977): 
6-7. R. Yeruham’s comments are in Sefer Mesharim (Venice, 1553; rep., Jerusalem, 
1975), p. 2a.
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Most strikingly, it now appears that an innovative methodology 
of Talmudic study which conquered Spain in the fifteenth century and 
dominated the approach of Sephardic communities for two hundred 
years was rooted in philosophical logic. R. Isaac Kanpanton produced 
guidelines which required the student to investigate the correspondence 
between the language and meaning of a Talmudic text with exquisite 
care and to determine the full range of possible interpretations so 
that the exegetical choices of the major commentators would become 
clear. In setting forth this form of investigation, or ‘iyyun, Kanpanton 
made explicit reference to logical terminology, and Daniel Boyarin has 
recently made a compelling argument that the system as a whole and all 
its major components originated in the medieval philosophical milieu. 
He maintains that
Jewish scholars in the final days of the Spanish Jewish community saw 
logic as the road to attaining truth in all sciences, including that of the 
Torah. Any argument which did not qualify under the canons of logical 
order was faulty in their eyes. Logical works and principles served as the 
foundation for scientific and philosophical investigation, and they pointed 
the way toward valid proof and the avoidance of error in these fields. Since 
the science of the Talmud differed in its language and its problems from the 
other sciences—mainly because it is essentially exegetical—the need was 
felt for general works specific to this field which would direct investigation 
there.98
These were indeed the final days of Spanish Jewry, and the 
connection between philosophical pursuits and the behavior of the 
community in extremis has exercised analysts both medieval and 
modern. Conservatives like R. Isaac Arama renewed the attack against 
allegorists by asking why they need the Torah at all. When it corresponds 
to philosophical truths, they accept it literally, and when it does not, they 
explain it figuratively; in either case, the knowledge they had before the 
revelation is coterminous with what they know after it. R. Yosef Yavetz 
attributed the relatively large number of conversions around the time of 
the expulsion to the corrupting influence of philosophical relativism, a 
98 Daniel Boyarin, Ha-’Iyyun ha-Sefaradi (Jerusalem, 1989), pp. 48-49. The main 
documentation of Boyarin’s general thesis is on pp. 47-68. For a similar development 
in the field of biblical exegesis, see Shimon Shalem, “Ha-Metodah ha-Parshanit shel 
Yosef Taitazak ve-Hugo,” Sefunot 11 (1971-77): 115-134.
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judgment endorsed in the twentieth century by Yitzhak Baer. R. Abraham 
Bibago, on the other hand, writing in the middle of the fifteenth century, 
denied that philosophically oriented Jews were any less steadfast than 
pure Talmudists; spiritual weakness is not dependent upon intellectual 
orientation. More generally, Bibago’s attack against extreme rationalists 
and especially against opponents of philosophy tends to demonstrate 
that both groups were active in late medieval Spain. Bibago himself was a 
relatively moderate rationalist who fits well into the category of Spanish 
Jews like R. Isaac Abravanel who studied philosophy but attempted to 
counter rationalist extremism through a conservative interpretation of 
Maimonides and his legacy. When such a person denounces fools who 
call “people of intellect and reason” heretics, his remarks deserve special 
notice; apparently, Spain too was not without thoroughgoing critics of 
the philosophical enterprise for whom even the rationalism of Bibago 
was an impermissible deviation from pristine Judaism.99
There is little evidence for the outright Averroist-style skepticism 
that Yitzhak Baer blames for the apostasy of beleaguered Iberian Jews. 
Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that an acculturated community 
is a less likely candidate for martyrdom than an insular one. Imagine 
two people with equal faith in the truth of Judaism confronting the 
executioner’s sword. The first is an admiring participant in the culture he 
is being told to embrace, however much he rejects its religion; the second 
responds to that environment with visceral revulsion. While there are 
no easy formulas for determining the willingness to be martyred, the 
second type, who represents the Ashkenazic Jew of the first crusade, is 
surely more likely to choose death. On this level, the Jews of Spain paid 
a spiritual price for integration into the cultural milieu of their potential 
persecutors.
99 See Yavetz’s Sefer Or ha-Hayyim (Lemberg, 1874), ch. 2, and the references in Baer, A 
History of the Jews in Christian Spain 2, p. 509, n. 12, and in Isaac E. Barzilay, Between 
Reason and Faith: Anti-Rationalism in Italian Jewish Thought, 1250-1650 (The Hague, 
1967), p. 148. For Baer’s citation of Arama and indictment of Jewish Averroism, see 
his History 2, pp. 253-259. Baer’s position was rejected by Haim Hillel Ben Sasson, 
“Dor Golei Sefarad ‘al ‘Azmo,” Zion 26 (1961): 44-52, 59-64. On Bibago, see Joseph 
Hacker, “Meqomo shel R. Avraham Bibag ba-Mahaloqet ‘al Limmud ha-Pilosophiah 
u-Ma‘amadah bi-Sefarad ba-Me’ah ha-Tet-Vav,” Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress 
of Jewish Studies 3 (Jerusalem, 1972), Heb. sec., pp. 151-158. Cf. also the oft-quoted 
anti-philosophical responsum by R. Isaac ben Sheshet, She’elot u-Teshuvot Bar Sheshet 
(Vilna, 1878), no. 45.
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As we have seen in various contexts, the pursuit of the natural sciences 
went hand in hand with philosophical study, and their status as a mere 
handmaiden of metaphysics did not prevent them from being investigated 
with intensity and sophistication. Jewish physicians remained prominent 
throughout the Middle Ages, and Maimonides’ medical treatises contain 
insights of lasting value. Gersonides made impressive contributions 
to astronomy, including the preparation of astronomical tables at the 
request of influential Christians, and fourteenth-century Provençal 
Jews continued to translate numerous scientific texts. Ibn Kaspi took 
pleasure in the unvarnished meaning of a Talmudic text which asserted 
that gentile scholars had defeated the sages of Israel in a debate about 
astronomy; this, he said, demonstrates that non-Jews have something 
to teach us and that their works should not be ignored.100
The relationship between astronomy and astrology raised scientific 
and theological questions which confound the usually predictable 
boundaries between rationalists and their opponents. From a modern 
perspective, Maimonides’ vigorous opposition to astrology seems 
precisely what we ought to expect from a person of his intellectual 
bent. To many medievals, however, astrology was not only validated 
by Rabbinic texts; it was a science like all others. Gersonides, for 
example, argued that the discipline was often empirically validated, 
and it was taken for granted that miracles must overcome not only the 
regularities of physics but the astrological order as well. At the same 
time, nonrationalist religious considerations could produce opposition 
100 For a succinct summary of Maimonides’ contributions to medieval medicine, see S. 
Muntner, “Gedulato ve-Hiddushav shel ha-Rambam bi-Refuah,” in Ha-Ram Bamza”l 
[sic]: Qovez Torani-Madda‘i, ed. by Y. L. Maimon (Jerusalem, 1955), pp. 264-266. On 
Jewish physicians in general, see inter alia, I. Munz, Die Jüdische Ärzte im Mittelalter 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1922), and D. Margalit, Hakhmei Yisrael ke-Rofe’im (Jerusalem, 
1962). On science in general and astronomy in particular, see Bernard R. Goldstein, “The 
Role of Science in the Jewish Community in Fourteenth-Century France,” Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences 314 (1978): 39-49, reprinted in his Theory and Observation 
in Ancient and Medieval Astronomy (London, 1985); L. V. Berman, “Greek into Hebrew: 
Samuel b. Judah of Marseilles, Fourteenth-Century Philosopher and Translator,” in 
Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, pp. 289-320; Twersky, “Joseph ibn Kaspi” 
(above n. 94), p. 256, n. 52, where he cites a variety of references to divergent Jewish 
interpretations of the passage in Pesahim 94b concerning the victory of the gentile 
astronomers. On continuing astronomical study by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Jews in the Eastern Mediterranean, see Goldstein, “The Hebrew Astronomical Tradition: 
New Sources,” Isis 72 (1981): 237-251, also reprinted in Theory and Observation.
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to astrology, so that on this issue the Maimonidean legacy found itself in 
the unaccustomed company of R. Moses Taku. In the case of Gersonides, 
astronomy and astrology were kept rigorously separated, so that the 
affirmation of astrological truths had no adverse effect on his important 
astronomical studies.101
Although Spain and Provence were the major centers of philosophical 
and scientific pursuits among the Jews of the high and late Middle Ages, 
they did not enjoy a monopoly. Byzantine Jewry lived in a culture which 
preserved much of the Greek legacy of antiquity, and its intellectual 
profile has been described as “catholic in outlook and integrated with 
its environment. Secular studies were pursued as much as traditional 
religious studies.”102 Israel Ta-Shema, who has read substantial portions 
of the massive, unpublished works of Byzantine Jews available in the 
Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts in Jerusalem, has spoken to 
me with wonderment of the immense size and scope of the encyclopedic 
compositions produced by that Jewry, although he is less impressed by 
their depth or creativity.
Yemenite Jews, in part because of the influence of the Muslim 
environment and in large measure because of the inspiration provided by 
Maimonides, produced works reflecting familiarity with the full range of 
101 For Maimonides’ position, see his letter in Alexander Marx, “The Correspondence 
between the Rabbis of Southern France and Maimonides about Astrology,” Hebrew Union 
College Annual 3 (1926): 311-358. (This letter [p. 351] also contains Maimonides’ well-
known remark that he had read a multitude of Arabic works on idolatry, an observation 
which has been regarded as problematic in light of Hil. ‘Avodah Zarah 2:2. For a 
discussion of the passage in Hil. ‘Avodah Zarah, see Lawrence Kaplan and David Berger, 
“On Freedom of Inquiry in the Rambam—and Today,” The Torah U-Madda Journal 2 
[1990]: 37-50.) For Nahmanides’ arguments from Talmudic texts, see his responsum in 
Kitvei Ramban 1, pp. 378-381; see also his Commentary to Job, Kitvei Ramban 1, p. 19, for 
the assumption that overturning someone’s astrological fate requires miraculous divine 
intervention. Gersonides presented his argument on dreams, divination, prophecy, 
and astrology in Milhamot Hashem 2:1-3 (Leipzig, 1866), pp. 92-101; Levi ben Gershon 
(Gersonides), The Wars of the Lord, trans. by Seymour Feldman, 2 (Philadelphia, 1987), 
pp. 27-41. On the frequent but imperfect success of astrologers, see p. 95; Feldman, p. 
33. For his separation of astronomy and astrology, see Goldstein, “The Role of Science,” 
p. 45. On Moses Taku, see Ketav Tamim, Ozar Nehmad 3, pp. 82-83. (I do not mean to 
imply that Taku’s position, which is reflected in a fleeting remark, was fully identical 
with that of Maimonides.)
102 Steven B. Bowman, The Jews of Byzantium: 1204-1453 (University, Alabama, 1985), p. 
168. Bowman goes on to suggest that this integration into Byzantine culture may have 
served to undermine the cultural independence of the established Jewish community 
in the face of the Ottoman conquest and Sephardi immigration.
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the medieval sciences. In an exceptionally strong formulation, R. Perahiah 
b. Meshullam wrote that “without the sciences of the intelligibles there 
would be no Torah,” and Hoter b. Shlomoh reiterated the standard 
justification of scientific study as a preparation for metaphysical 
speculation.103
Similarly, the successor culture of medieval Spain was largely true 
to its heritage. The relative decline and stagnation of Muslim culture in 
the late Middle Ages had taken its toll on the intellectual creativity of 
Eastern Jewry, but under the stimulus of the Spanish immigration, the 
Jews of the Ottoman Empire displayed a renewal of cultural ferment. 
While this activity was mainly exegetical and homiletical, it included the 
study and translation of philosophical works. A recently published text 
provides a striking glimpse into a cast of mind which takes all learning as 
its province. A young scholar felt insulted when his town was denigrated 
as climatically unfit for the production of intellectuals. In an indignant 
response, he challenged the critic to do battle:
Come out to the field and let us compete in our knowledge of the Bible, 
the Mishnah, and the Talmud, Sifra and Sifrei and all of Rabbinic literature; 
in the external sciences—the practical and theoretical fields of science, 
the science of nature, and of the Divine; in logic… , geometry, astronomy, 
and law; in the natural sciences—the longer commentary and the shorter 
commentary, Generatio et Corruptio, De Anima and Meteora, De Animalia 
and Ethics. . . Try me, for you have opened your mouth and belittled my 
dwelling-place, and you shall see that we know whatever can be known in 
the proper manner.104 
103 The first major scientific work by a Yemenite Jew was Netanel al-Fayyumi’s Bustan 
al-‘Uqul, and interest in these disciplines persisted into the seventeenth century. 
See, inter alia, Y. Tzvi Langermann, Ha-Madda‘im ha-Meduyyaqim be-Qerev Yehudei 
Teiman (Jerusalem, 1987); Yosef Kafih, “Arba‘im She‘elot be-Pilosophiah le-Rav 
Perahiah be-R. Meshullam,” Sefunot 18 (1985): 111-192; David R. Blumenthal, The 
Commentary of R. Hoter ben Shelomo to the Thirteen Principles of Maimonides (Leiden, 
1974); Meir Havazelet, “‘Al ha-Parshanut ha-Allegorit-ha-Pilosofit be-Midrash ha-
Hefez le-Rabbi Zekharyah ha-Rofe,” Teima 3 (1993): 45-56; and the references in 
Amos Goldreich, “Mi-Mishnat Hug ha-‘Iyyun: ‘Od ‘al ha-Meqorot ha-Efshariyyim 
shel ‘ha-Ahdut ha-Shavah’,” Mehqerei Yerushalayim be-Mahashevet Yisrael 6 (3 -4) 
(1987): 150, n. 35.
104 Joseph Hacker, “The Intellectual Activity of the Jews of the Ottoman Empire during 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth 
Century, ed. by Isadore Twersky and Bernard Septimus (Cambridge, Mass., and 
London, England, 1987), p. 120. (Hacker’s translation was printed in a somewhat 
garbled form, and so I have modified it slightly on the basis of the Hebrew version of 
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The polemical vigor and unmitigated pride in such remarks reflect a 
mentality that does not harbor the slightest twinge of doubt about the 
legitimacy and significance of all these pursuits.
At the same time, we have interesting evidence of opposition to 
philosophical study in this community. R. Menahem de Lonzano 
published an attack against philosophy which pointed to serious 
religious errors that it had inspired even in great figures of the past 
including Maimonides, R. Joseph Albo, and, strikingly, R. Bahya ibn 
Pakuda. We have already seen that Bahya decidedly belonged among 
the strongest advocates of speculation, but the piety that suffuses 
the bulk of his ethical work served to mute his rationalistic message 
and insulate him from serious attack by most anti-rationalists. De 
Lonzano was sensitive to this message and complained that Bahya, like 
Maimonides, placed metaphysics at the pinnacle of human endeavor 
despite the implications for the status of straightforward study of the 
Torah; indeed, the broadside cites a nameless rabbinic contemporary 
in Istanbul who wondered why the Guide had been burned while The 
Duties of the Heart had remained untouched. On the one hand, it is clear 
that de Lonzano’s attack reflected the view of an influential circle of 
Talmudists. It is equally clear, however, that he was deeply concerned 
about the likelihood that he would be subjected to scathing criticism for 
his position, and he describes contemporaries who advocated the study 
of halakhic codes rather than the Talmud so that they could devote their 
time to other disciplines. While we cannot know with any certainty 
why this critique of philosophy was omitted from the second, early 
seventeenth-century version of de Lonzano’s book, the opposition that 
it no doubt engendered is as likely an explanation as any.105 Ottoman 
Jewry, though on the verge of cultural decline and by no means univocal 
in its attitude to general culture, remained generally loyal to the legacy 
of medieval Sephardic thought.
his article, “Ha-Pe‘ilut ha-Intelleqtualit be-qerev Yehudei ha-Imperiah ha-‘Ottomanit 
ba-Me‘ot ha-Shesh-‘Esreh ve-ha-Sheva‘-‘Esreh,” Tarbiz 53 [1984]: 591.) Note also 
Hacker’s citations from Solomon le-Beit ha-Levi and Abraham ibn Migash on 
pp. 123-126.
105 See Joseph Hacker, “Pulmus ke-neged ha-Pilosophiah be-Istanbul ba-Me‘ah ha-Shesh-
‘Esreh,” Mehqarim be-Qabbalah be-Pilosophiah Yehudit u-be-Sifrut ha-Musar ve-he-Hagut 
Muggashim li-Yesha‘yah Tishbi bi-Melot lo Shiv‘im ve-Hamesh Shanim (Jerusalem, 1986), 
pp. 507-536.
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ASHKENAZ
The Northern European heartland of medieval Ashkenazic Jewry had 
a complex relationship with the dominant Christian civilization that 
defies the often simplistic characterizations describing the Ashkenazim 
as insular and narrow. There is no question that Northern French and 
German Jews, unlike their Sephardi counterparts, were deeply resistant 
to philosophical inquiry, largely because of the absence of a surrounding 
philosophical culture during their formative period; a Jewish civilization 
which reached maturity unaccustomed to speculation will be particularly 
sensitive to its alien dangers. Certainly the image of the Ashkenazim 
among Spanish and Provençal advocates of philosophy was that of 
benighted obscurantists. Radak wrote to Alfakar, “You and other wise 
men engage in the pursuit of wisdom and do not follow the words of the 
Ashkenazim, who have banned anyone who does so.” R. Isaac of Acre, 
who became an advocate of such inquiry late in his life, reacted with 
disdain to those who refuse to examine
a rational argument or to accept it. Rather, they call one to whom God has 
given the ability to understand rational principles… a heretic and non-
believer, and his books they call external books, because they do not have 
the spirit needed to understand a rational principle. This is the nature of 
the rabbis of France and Germany and those who are like them.
During the controversy of the 1230s, Maimonists in Narbonne 
sent a letter to Spain with a particularly vitriolic denunciation of 
the French rabbis as fools and lunatics with clogged minds, who are 
devoted to superstitious nonsense and immersed in the fetid waters of 
unilluminated caves.106
Even in the context of philosophical speculation narrowly defined, 
the situation was not quite so simple. A paraphrase of Saadya’s Beliefs and 
Opinions that made its way to early medieval Ashkenaz had a profound 
effect on the theology of significant segments of that Jewry. Unusual 
works like Ketav Tamim and Sefer ha-Maskil demonstrate familiarity 
with some speculative literature, and the author of the latter treatise 
106 For Radak, see Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam, p. 3b. For Isaac of Acre, see Goldreich’s 
quotation from Oxford ms. 1911 in Me’irat ‘Einayim, p. 412. The letter from Narbonne 
was published by Shatzmiller in Zion 34 (1969): 143-144.
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was conversant with a variety of up-to-date scientific theories and 
experiments. In general, technological advances, experimental results, 
and observations of nature raised no serious religious problems, and 
there was no intrinsic reason for people unaffected by a theory of 
propaedeutic studies to connect them to philosophy. We should not be 
surprised, therefore, that Ashkenazic literature, probably even more 
than that of the Sephardim, reflects the keen interest and penetrating 
eye of Jews evincing intense curiosity about the natural and mechanical 
phenomena that surrounded them.107 Moreover, the moment we broaden 
the question to include the Jewish response to the surrounding culture in 
general, we discover the possibility of creative interaction that may have 
transformed important aspects of Ashkenazic piety and thought.
First of all, the religious confrontation with the Christian world 
impelled some Jews to study Latin as a polemical tool. More important, the 
ruthless pursuit of straightforward interpretation, or peshat, by twelfth-
century Jewish commentators in France can plausibly be seen as a Jewish 
reaction to nonliteral Christian exegesis. A Jewish polemicist insisting 
107 On the paraphrase of Saadya and its influence, see Ronald C. Kiener, “The Hebrew 
Paraphrase of Saadiah Gaon’s Kitab al-Amanat Wa’l-I‘tiqadat,” AJS Review 11 (1986): 
1-25, and Yosef Dan, Torat ha-Sod shel Hasidut Ashkenaz (Jerusalem, 1986), especially 
pp. 22-24. On science and philosophy in Sefer ha-Maskil, see Ta-Shema, “Sefer ha-
Maskil,” pp. 435, 437-438.
 Though the observation about propaedeutic studies is mine, I owe the vigorous 
formulation about the Ashkenazim’s keen interest in the world around them to 
a conversation with Ta-Shema; cf. Noah Shapira, “‘Al ha-Yeda‘ ha-Tekhni ve-ha-
Tekhnologi shel Rashi,” Korot 3 (1963): 145-161, where Rashi’s extensive technological 
information is treated, probably wrongly, as exceptional. See now the brief but very 
important note by Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Hibbur Ashkenazi Bilti Noda‘ be-Madda‘ei ha-
Teva‘,” Kiryat Sefer 62 (1988-89): 448-449, where he describes a scientific treatise by 
a fourteenth-century French Jew who was particularly interested in practical science, 
including various instruments, and who reported that he had written a different work 
demonstrating how scientific knowledge sheds new light on the understanding of 
Torah. See also n. 131 below.
 The warm, respectful welcome extended to R. Abraham ibn Ezra by prominent Tosafists 
certainly does not bespeak instinctive hostility to bearers of a broader cultural 
orientation. For Ta-Shema’s more problematic assertion that Ashkenaz boasted full-
fledged rationalist allegorizers, see his “Sefer ha-Maskil,” 421; if such an approach had 
really attained an appreciable level of visibility in Northern Europe, it is hard to imagine 
that we would not find more substantial criticisms of it in the extant literature. Finally, 
it is worth noting an oral observation by Haym Soloveitchik that the major rabbinic 
luminaries of Northern France are not among the signatories of the ban against the 
Guide and Sefer ha-Madda.
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upon peshat in a debate with a Christian could not easily return home 
and read the Bible in a way that violated the very principles of contextual, 
grammatical interpretation that he had just been passionately defending. 
Even explanations that are not labeled as anti-Christian can be motivated 
by the desire to avoid Christological assertions. There is, moreover, 
substantial evidence of scholarly interchange of a cordial, nonpolemical 
sort among Jews and Christians attempting to uncover the sense of the 
biblical text, and the Jewish approach had a considerable impact on the 
churchmen of St. Victor and other Christian commentators. Finally, 
the fact that the explosion of Jewish learning and literary activity took 
place in twelfth-century France may well be related to the concomitant 
“renaissance of the twelfth century” in the larger society.108
The stereotype of the narrow Ashkenazi sometimes included the 
assertion that even biblical study was ignored, and there is a degree of 
validity in this image, particularly in the later Middle Ages.109 Nonetheless, 
108 See Aryeh Grabois, “The Hebraica Veritas and Jewish-Christian Intellectual Relations 
in the Twelfth Century,” Speculum 50 (1975): 613-634; David Berger, “Mission to the 
Jews and Jewish-Christian Contacts in the Polemical Literature of the High Middle 
Ages,” The American Historical Review 91 (1986): 576-591; Berger, “Gilbert Crispin, Alan 
of Lille, and Jacob ben Reuben: A Study in the Transmission of Medieval Polemic,” 
Speculum 49 (1974): 34-47 (on the use of Latin texts by a Jewish polemicist); Avraham 
Grossman, “Ha-Pulmus ha-Yehudi-ha-Nozri ve-ha-Parshanut ha-Yehudit la-Miqra be-
Zarfat ba-Me’ah ha-Yod-Bet (le-Parashat Ziqqato shel Ri Qara el ha-Pulmus),” Zion 51 
(1986): 29-60 (for persuasive examples of unlabeled anti-Christian commentaries); 
Grossman, Hakhmei Zarfat ha-Rishonim, 473-504; Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible 
in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, 1964); Elazar Touitou, “Shitato ha-Parshanit shel ha-
Rashbam ‘al Reqa‘ ha-Meziut ha-Historit shel Zemanno,” in ‘Iyyunim be-Sifrut Hazal 
ba-Miqra u-be-Toledot Yisrael: Muqdash li-Prof. Ezra Zion Melamed (Ramat Gan, 1982), 
ed. by Y. D. Gilat et al., pp. 48-74 (on the impact of the twelfth-century Renaissance).
 For the possible influence of Christian art on Ashkenazic Jews, see Joseph Gutmann’s 
presentation and my response in J. Gutmann, et al., What Can Jewish History Learn 
From Jewish Art? (New York, 1989), pp. 1-18, 29-38. Gabriele L. Strauch’s Dukus Horant: 
Wanderer Zwischen Zwei Welten (Amsterdam and Adanta, 1990) analyzes a fairly typical 
medieval German romance written or copied by a fourteenth century German Jew in 
Yiddish (or at least in Hebrew characters with some specifically Jewish terminology). 
Note also Dan, Torat ha-Sod, pp. 37-39, for some general observations on the impact 
of folk beliefs about magic, astrology, and the like on Ashkenazic Jewry. Finally, Ivan 
G. Marcus has now presented an analysis of an Ashkenazic ritual for the purpose of 
illuminating the manner in which responses to Christian society can make their way 
into the religious life of both scholars and the laity; see his Rituals of Childhood: Jewish 
Acculturation in Medieval Europe (New Haven and London, 1996).
109 See Profiat Duran’s introduction to Ma‘aseh Efod, p. 41, and the discussion in Isadore 
Twersky, “Religion and Law,” in Religion in a Religious Age, ed. by Goitein, pp. 74-77. 
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the innovative biblical exegesis in twelfth-century France demonstrates 
that this perception is selective and skewed. Not only did Ashkenazic 
Jews study Bible; biblical exegesis served as both a battleground and a 
bridge where Jews and Christians came into frequent, creative contact 
as enemies and as partners.
In the field of biblical study, interaction is firmly established; what 
requires elucidation is the extent and nature of its effects. We face a more 
fundamental problem with respect to the most intriguing question of all: 
Did the revolutionary use of dialectic in the Talmudic methodology of the 
Northern French Tosafists owe anything to the intellectual upheaval in 
the larger society? There is hardly any evidence of Jewish familiarity in 
Ashkenaz with the study of canon law and philosophy, which were the two 
major areas in which the search for contradictions or inconsistencies and 
their subsequent resolution began to play a central role. It is even more 
difficult to imagine that Christians, whose familiarity with the Talmud was 
virtually nil, could have been much influenced by Tosafists. At the same 
time, the very individuals who pursued the new methodologies in fields 
unknown by the members of the other faith met on the terrain of biblical 
studies. Rashbam, who was a Tosafist as well as a peshat-oriented biblical 
exegete, is a good Jewish example. In light of these well-documented 
contacts, it surely cannot be ruled out—indeed, it seems overwhelmingly 
likely—that some taste of the exciting new approaches was transmitted. 
When the German pietists wanted to criticize the Tosafist approach, they 
denounced the utilization of “Gentile dialectic” (dial tiqa [dialeqtiqah] 
shel goyim); though we are under no obligation to endorse the historical 
judgment of the pietists, the criticism establishes at least a threshold 
level of familiarity with the term and its application.110
See also Mordechai Breuer, “Min‘u Beneikhem min ha-Higgayon,” in Mikhtam le-David: 
Sefer Zikhron ha-Rav David Ochs, ed. by Yitzhak Gilat and Eliezer Stern (Ramat Gan, 
1978), pp. 242-264, and Frank Taimage, “Keep Your Sons From Scripture: The Bible in 
Medieval Jewish Scholarship and Spirituality,” in Understanding Scripture: Explorations 
of Jewish and Christian Traditions of Interpretation, ed. by Clemens Thoma and Michael 
Wyschogrod (New York, 1987), pp. 81-101. On evidence for Ashkenazic biblical study 
in the pre-crusade period, see Avraham Grossman, Hakhmei Ashkenaz ha-Rishonim, 
pp. 240, 288-289, 323 (inter alia), and cf. my review, “Heqer Rabbanut Ashkenaz ha-
Qedumah,” Tarbiz 53 (1984): 484, n. 7. For an overall analysis of the evidence, see 
Ephraim Kanarfogel, Jewish Education and Society in the High Middle Ages (Detroit, 
1992), pp. 79-85.
110 See Kanarfogel, Jewish Education, pp. 70-73. The pietists’ denunciation of dialectic 
is in Sefer Hasidim, ed. by J. Wistinetsky, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1924), par. 
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The relationship of these pietists to the surrounding culture is itself 
highly suggestive. The system of penances that they introduced into the 
process of repentance is no longer regarded as a defining characteristic of 
their movement; nonetheless, that system remains a major development 
in the history of Jewish piety, and despite a smattering of antecedents in 
rabbinic literature, it is overwhelmingly likely that the influence of the 
Christian environment was decisive.111 With respect to quintessentially 
religious behavior, the inhibition against following Christian models 
should have been overwhelming, and I think that the psychological 
factor that overcame it was analogous to the competitive imitation 
that we have already seen in Muslim Spain. It was critically important 
for the Jewish self-image that Jews not be inferior to the host society. 
In Spain, the competition was cultural and intellectual; in Ashkenaz, 
given the different complexion of both majority and minority culture, 
it was a competition in religious devotion. I have suggested elsewhere 
that this consideration may account in part for the assertions by Jewish 
polemicists that the chastity of monks and nuns is more apparent than 
real. Celibacy was an area in which Jewish law did not allow competition, 
and so the problem was resolved by the not entirely unfounded allegation 
that the religious self-sacrifice of Christians was illusory. With respect 
to self-mortification for sin, Jewish law was not quite so clear, and 
Ashkenazi pietists set out to demonstrate that they would not be put to 
shame by Christian zeal in the service of God.112
In the late Middle Ages, Northern European Jewry was subjected to 
expulsions, persecutions, and dislocations which disrupted its cultural 
752, p. 191. Note too the citation of some parallel methods in Tosafot and Christian 
works in Jose Faur, “The Legal Thinking of Tosafot: An Historical Approach,” Diné 
Israel 6 (1975): xIiii-lxxii. For intimate familiarity with Christian works in the writings 
of the probably atypical R. Elhanan b. Yaqar of London, see G. Vajda, “De quelques 
infiltrations chrétiennes dans l’oeuvre d’un auteur anglo-juif du XIIIe siècle,” Archives 
d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 28 (1961): 15-34.
111 On the Christian analogues to the penances of Hasidei Ashkenaz, see Yitzhak Baer, 
“Ha-Megammah ha-Datit ve-ha-Hevratit shel Sefer Hasidim,” Zion 3 (1938): 18-20. For 
the new evaluation of the movement’s center of gravity, see Haym Soloveitchik, “Three 
Themes in the Sefer Hasidim,” AJS Review 1 (1976): 311-357. See also Ivan Marcus, 
Piety and Society: The Jewish Pietists of Medieval Germany (Leiden, 1981).
112 On celibacy, see my observations in The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages, 
p. 27. I have elaborated somewhat in a forthcoming essay, “Al Tadmitam ve-Goralam 
shel ha-Goyim be-Sifrut ha-Pulmus ha-Ashkenazit,” in [Yehudim mul ha-Zelav], ed. by 
Yom Tov Assis, et al.
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life and moved its center of gravity eastward. By the late fourteenth and 
early fifteenth centuries, a figure like R. Yom Tov Lipmann Mühlhausen 
of Prague demonstrates that some Jewish intellectuals had achieved 
familiarity with philosophy and general culture. In 1973, Ephraim Kupfer 
published a seminal article which attempted to establish the substantial 
presence of rationalism in Ashkenaz during this period. There can be 
no question that much of the evidence that he adduced is significant 
and stimulating. We can hardly fail to be intrigued, for example, by 
an argument in an Ashkenazic text that ancient shifts in the halakhah 
of levirate marriage resulted from a rejection of metempsychosis by 
increasingly sophisticated rabbis. At the same time, it is far from clear that 
this material reflects the views and interests of substantial segments of 
Ashkenazic society, and it is very likely that one of the important figures 
in the article came to Europe from Israel bearing texts and ideas that stem 
from the Jewish communities of the Muslim East. Both the dissemination 
and the rootedness of philosophical study in fourteenth- and fifteenth-
century Ashkenaz remain an open question, and I am inclined to think 
that it stood considerably closer to the periphery than to the center.113
The question of the standing of philosophy among fifteenth-century 
Ashkenazim has a significant bearing on the proper evaluation of major 
113 See Kupfer, “Li-Demutah,” Tarbiz 42 (1973): 113-147. It is noteworthy that one of the 
texts cited by Kupfer (p. 129) takes it for granted that the ancient rabbis learned proper 
methods of demonstration from the works of Aristotle, a position which reverses the 
standard medieval Jewish assertion about the source of Greek philosophy. See also 
Kupfer’s brief supplementary notes in his “Hassagot min Hakham Ehad ‘al Divrei he-
Hakham ha-Rav R. Yosef b. ha-Qadosh R. Yosef ha-Lo‘azi she-Katav ve-Qara be-Qol 
Gadol neged ha-Rambam,” Qovez ‘al Yad n.s. 11 [21] (1985): 215-216, nn. 2, 4. For 
some evidence of interest in philosophy outside the “Mühlhausen circle,” particularly 
in Sefer Hadrat Qodesh written in Germany shortly before the middle of the fourteenth 
century, see Davis, R. Yom Tov Lipman Heller, pp. 88-103, and see now his “Philosophy, 
Dogma, and Exegesis in Medieval Ashkenazic Judaism: The Evidence of Sefer Hadrat 
Qodesh,” AJS Review 18 (1993): 195-222. For an early, brief expression of reservations 
about Kupfer’s thesis, see Joseph Dan, “Hibbur Yihud Ashkenazi min ha-Me’ah ha-Yod-
Dalet,” Tarbiz 44 (1975): 203-206. For a more detailed critique, see Israel Jacob Yuval, 
Hakhamim be-Doram (Jerusalem, 1988), 286-311. In an oral communication, Moshe 
Idel has noted several considerations pointing to the likelihood that Menahem Shalem 
came from Israel: His non-Ashkenazic name usually refers to a Jerusalemite; he makes 
reference to Emmaus, which he identifies as Latrun; he had a text by Abraham Abulafia 
and a translation of an Arabic text by Abraham Maimonides. If Idel is correct, and if 
Kupfer’s suggestion that the two Menahems in his study are really one and the same is 
also correct, then the dominant personality in the article was not an Ashkenazic Jew.
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trends and figures in the intellectual life of the burgeoning new center 
in sixteenth-century Poland. R. Moses Isserles and R. Mordecai Jaffe 
are the two most prominent examples of distinguished Talmudists who 
maintained a position of moderate rationalism in which a conservative 
understanding of Maimonides and a philosophical interpretation of 
kabbalah served to unite diverse strands of Jewish piety and theology in a 
manner that removed any threat to traditional religious affirmations.114 If 
Kupfer is correct, then this position can be seen as a natural continuation 
of intellectual trends in late medieval Ashkenaz, and the approach of 
Isserles and Jaffe would fit well into their generally conservative posture. 
If he is not, then we must seek other sources for the penetration of 
philosophical ideas into Polish Jewish thought.
The first of these is the Northern European Renaissance, which 
affected both Poland and Bohemia and can consequently help to account 
not only for the elements of rationalism in the works of Polish rabbis but 
for the significant scientific and philosophical activity among the Jews 
of late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century Prague. In the case of 
David Gans of Prague, the relationship with Christian society is crystal-
clear: Gans was the first influential Jew to confront Copernicanism, and 
he did so as a personal associate of Tycho Brahe and Johann Kepler. 
Gans’s illustrious contemporary, R. Judah Loew (Maharal), produced an 
impressive theological corpus which made extensive, though cautious 
use of the Jewish philosophical tradition, and described astronomy as 
“a ladder to ascend to the wisdom of the Torah,” while his student R. 
Yom Tov Lipman Heller, best known for his standard commentary to the 
Mishnah, displayed considerable interest in the pursuit of mathematics 
and astronomy. The period from 1560 to 1620 saw a significant increase 
in works of a philosophical and scientific nature throughout the 
Ashkenazic orbit, and the contacts between the Jewish communities of 
Prague and Poland no doubt contributed to the spread of these pursuits. 
A second significant source of cultural stimulation for Polish Jewry 
may well have been Renaissance Italy. Polish Jews were in continual 
contact with Italy in a multitude of contexts; numerous Padua-trained 
114 See Lawrence Kaplan, “Rabbi Mordekhai Jaffe and the Evolution of Jewish Culture in 
Poland in the Sixteenth Century,” in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century, ed. by 
Bernard D. Cooperman (Cambridge, Mass., and London, England, 1983), pp. 266-282. 
On Isserles’ thought, see Yonah Ben Sasson, Mishnato ha-‘lyyunit shel ha-Rama 
(Jerusalem, 1984).
Judaism and General Culture in Medieval and Early Modern Times 
— 97 —
physicians came to Poland, and a constant stream of literary material 
crossed the border.115
The use of this material would have been legitimated in the eyes of 
some conservatives by the heroic image of Maimonides, whose orthodoxy 
was now beyond reproach. Once again, we find an exception, which 
genuinely proves this rule. In midsixteenth-century Posen, the extreme 
and eccentric anti-rationalist R. Joseph Ashkenazi persuaded his father-
in-law R. Aaron to deliver an uncompromising attack against the study 
of philosophy. Ashkenazi, as we know from a later work of his, attacked 
Maimonides with startling vitriol as an outright heretic who deserves no 
defense and who is largely responsible for popularizing the allegorization 
of the Bible and of aggadah that has undermined authentic Judaism. 
Nevertheless, he himself cited with disgust the unanimity of the admiring 
chorus of Maimonides’ supporters, and R. Avraham Horowitz’s attack 
on Ashkenazi demonstrates further the passionate reaction inspired 
by unrestrained criticism of the author of the Guide. Horowitz’s work, 
which contains a vigorous defense of philosophical study, also reflects 
the presence in sixteenth-century Poland of unabashed exponents of 
speculation, although the author’s partial revision of his rationalist 
views years later points to the countervailing forces that may well have 
been dominant even at that time, as they surely were by the dawn of the 
Jewish enlightenment.116
115 On Gans in particular and Prague in general, see Mordecai Breuer, “Qavvim li-Demuto 
shel R. David Gans Ba‘al Zemah David,” Bar Ilan 11 (1973): 97-103, and his edition 
of Sefer Zemah David le-Rabbi David Gans (Jerusalem, 1983), esp. pp. 1-9. On Heller, 
see Davis, R. Yom Tov Lipman Heller, pp. 339-517; for documentation on the upsurge 
in Ashkenazic works of a philosophical and scientific nature, see Davis, pp. 121-129. 
On the contacts between Ashkenaz and Italy, see Jacob Elbaum, “Qishrei Tarbut bein 
Yehudei Polin ve-Ashkenaz le-bein Yehudei Italia ba-Me’ah Ha-Tet-Zayin,” Gal‘ed 7-8 
(1985): 11-40, and, more briefly, his Petihut Ve-Histaggerut (Jerusalem, 1990), 33-54. 
On Jews in the medical school at Padua, see Daniel Carpi, “Yehudim Ba‘alei Toar Doctor 
li-Refuah mi-Ta‘am Universitat Padua ba-Me’ah ha-Tet-Zayin u-be-Reshit ha-Me’ah ha-
Yod-Zayin,” in Sefer Zikkaron le-Natan Cassutto (Scritti in Memoria di Nathan Cassuto), 
ed. by Daniel Carpi, Augusto Segre, and Renzo Toaff (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 62-91.
116 Lawrence Kaplan has pointed out that despite the impression given by some earlier 
scholarship, Horowitz’s revision does not represent a radical rejection of his earlier views; 
see “Rabbi Mordekhai Jaffe,” p. 281, n. 8. Horowitz’s attack was published and discussed 
by Ph. Bloch, “Der Streit um den Moreh des Maimonides in der Gemeinde Posen um die 
Mitte des 16 Jahrh.,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums 47 
(1903): 153-169, 263-279, 346-356. For an analysis of Joseph Ashkenazi and selections 
from his work, see Gershom Scholem, “Yedi‘ot Hadashot ‘al R. Yosef Ashkenazi, ha-‘Tanna’ 
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Isserles’ conservative philosophical treatise contained considerable 
scientific discussion as well, and he also wrote a separate astronomical 
work in the form of a commentary to the standard textbook in that field, 
Georg Peurbach’s Theoricae Novae Planetarum. R. Solomon Luria, in an 
oft-quoted exchange with Isserles, denounced him for citing scientific 
information derived from gentile sources in a halakhic decision about the 
kashrut of a particular animal and for reading philosophical works at all, 
and he blames such attitudes for the bizarre and otherwise unattested 
phenomenon of young Polish Jews who recite an Aristotelian prayer in 
the synagogue. Isserles’ response is revealing. He justified his actions, but 
made it clear that he gained his scientific knowledge only from Jewish 
books and that he pursued these studies only at times when most people 
are out taking walks on Sabbaths and holidays.
Recent research has tended to portray a greater openness to 
rationalism and science than we had been accustomed to ascribe to this 
Jewry. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to take the pulse of sixteenth-
century Polish Jewish intellectuals with respect to our question: probably 
a small group of full-fledged rationalists, a substantial number of 
conservative advocates of a tamed philosophy, and a significant group of 
rabbis who either shied away from speculation or actively opposed it.117
mi-Zefat,” Tarbiz 28 (1959): pp. 59-89, 201-235. A detailed response to Ashkenazi by a 
contemporary Italian Jew was published by Kupfer, “Hassagot min Hakham Ehad,” Qovez 
al Yad n.s. 11 [21] (1985): 213-288. On Ashkenazi’s denunciation even of Maimondes’ 
code, see I. Twersky, “R. Yosef Ashkenazi ve-Sefer Mishneh Torah la-Rambam,” Sefer 
ha-Yovel li-Kevod Shalom Baron, ed. by Saul Lieberman (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 183-194. 
The moderate rationalism of R. Eliezer Ashekenazi of Posen also deserves mention, 
although the fact that he spent many years in the East mitigates his significance for a 
characterization of Polish Jewry; see the analysis of Ashkenazi’s exegetical independence 
in Haim Hillel Ben Sasson, Hagut ve-Hanhagah (Jerusalem, 1959), pp. 34-38.
117 On Isserles’ astronomical treatise, see Y. Tzvi Langermann, “The Astronomy of 
Rabbi Moses Isserles,” in Physics, Cosmology, and Astronomy, 1300-1700: Tension and 
Accommodation, ed. by S. Unguru (Dordrecht and Boston, 1991), pp. 83-98. For the 
exchange between Isserles and R. Solomon Luria, see She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rama, ed. 
by Asher Siev (Jerusalem, 1971), nos. 5-7, pp. 18-38, and cf. the summary in Ben Zion 
Katz, Rabbanut, Hasidut, Haskalah 1 (Tel Aviv, 1956), pp. 32-33. It is worth noting that 
even Luria maintains that he is as familiar with the disputed literature as Isserles (Siev, 
p. 26). On Poland specifically and sixteenth-century Ashkenazic Jewry in general, see 
Jacob Elbaum, Zeramim u-Megammot be-Sifrut ha-Mahashavah ve-ha-Musar be-Ashkenaz 
u-be-Polin ba-Me’ah ha-Tet-Zayin (Hebrew University dissertation, 1977), pp. 120-135; 
Elbaum, Petihut ve-Histaggerut, esp. chapter 5; Davis, R. Yom Tov Lipman Heller; and the 
still useful survey by Lawrence H. Davis, “The Great Debate: Secular Studies and the 
Jews in Sixteenth Century Poland,” Yavneh Review 3 (1963): 42-58.
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ITALIAN SYMBIOSIS
With respect to Poland and the Ottoman Empire, we could legitimately 
speak of successor cultures to Ashkenaz and Spain respectively, despite 
the fact that Middle Eastern Jewry had its own intellectual tradition 
before the Iberian immigration. Italy is a more complex and more 
interesting story. Despite their Christian environment, the Jews of 
medieval Italy appear to have maintained a greater degree of openness to 
the surrounding culture than did Ashkenazic Jewry. Shabbetai Donnolo 
is a well-known, early example of the sort of learned physician and 
scientist that we usually associate with Jews in the Muslim orbit. To 
some degree, this phenomenon may have resulted from the significant 
Muslim impact on Southern Italy, but I am inclined to attribute even 
greater importance to the fact that pre-twelfth-century Southern Europe 
maintained a greater continuity with the classical past than did the 
Christian communities of the North. A case in point is the familiarity 
of the anonymous tenth-century Italian Jew who wrote Josippon with 
earlier Latin works. By the thirteenth century, Italian Jews displayed a 
level of sophistication in philosophical and literary pursuits that owed 
something to contacts with Iberia but at least as much to a receptivity to 
the cultural developments in their immediate environment. Thus, easily 
the most philosophically sophisticated anti-Christian polemicist of the 
thirteenth century was Moses ben Solomon of Salerno, and the often 
secular, sometimes ribald poetry of Immanuel of Rome could not have 
been composed in any other Jewry in the medieval Christian world.118
Toward the end of the Middle Ages, both Sephardi and Ashkenazi 
immigrants introduced a mixture of new influences. Elijah del Medigo’s 
late fifteenth-century Behinat ha-Dat is a clear-cut example of the impact 
of rationalism, but the fate of Aristotelian philosophy among the Jews 
of Renaissance Italy is bound up with central questions about their 
118 On Donnolo, see the discussion and references in A. Sharf, The Universe of Shabbetai 
Donnolo (New York, 1976). For the greater cultural continuity in Southern Europe, see 
R. W. Southern’s observations in The Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven and London, 
1953), pp. 20-25. On Josippon, see Sefer Yosifon, ed. by David Flusser, 2 vols. (Jerusalem, 
1978, 1980); in particular, note Flusser’s well-documented observation that the author 
knew Latin works better than rabbinic literature. Moses of Salerno’s philosophical polemic 
was published by Stanislaus Simon, Mose ben Salomo von Salerno und seine philosophischen 
Auseinandersetzung mit den Lehren des Christentums (Breslau, 1931). For Immanuel, see 
Mahberot Immanuel, ed. by A. M. Haberman (Tel Aviv, 1946).
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cultural posture. Lists of books in Italian Jewish libraries in the fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries appear to reflect a decline of interest in 
philosophy from the beginning to the end of that period, with the 
important and unsurprising exception of Maimonides’ Guide and some of 
its commentators. This impression is reinforced by a complaint leveled by 
R. Isaac Abravanel in Venice as early as the late fifteenth century about the 
unavailability of Averroes’ Epistle on the Conjunction and Moses Narboni’s 
commentary on it. If the requisite work were “tosafot or codes, I would 
borrow it from one of the natives, but in philosophy this is impossible.” 
The declining philosophical content of Jewish sermons in the first half of 
the sixteenth century provides further evidence of the same significant 
development.119
The diminution of interest in metaphysics does not bespeak the end 
of Italian Jewish acculturation. First of all, the continuing use of the 
scholastic philosophical approach by no less a figure than R. Ovadiah 
Seforno demonstrates the persistent vitality of that tradition within 
important rabbinic circles. More important, Renaissance Christians 
were themselves engaged in disputes about the value of philosophy and 
tended to emphasize the scientific, ethical, and political dimensions of the 
Aristotelian corpus rather than its metaphysical component; in a sense, 
then, the very de-emphasis of the philosophical tradition can be seen not 
as a turning inward but as a reflection of a larger cultural trend. There is 
no denying that the gradual displacement of Aristotelianism by kabbalah 
in the minds of many Italian Jews reflected a desire to emphasize the 
uniqueness of the Jewish people and its culture in a manner reminiscent 
of Halevi, whose Kuzari underwent something of a popular revival; 
nonetheless, even R. Yehiel Nissim of Pisa, who produced the most 
impressive reasoned argument for this displacement, recognized the value 
of philosophical investigations, not to speak of scientific inquiry, provided 
that they were not assigned primacy in a rivalry with the Torah.120
119 For del Medigo, see his Sefer Behinat ha-Dat, ed. by Jacob Ross (Tel Aviv, 1984), and D. 
Geffen, “Insights into the Life and Thought of Elijah del Medigo Based on his Published 
and Unpublished Works,” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 41-
42 (1973-74): 69-86. On, libraries, sermons, and the overall phenomenon, see Reuven 
Bonfil, Ha-Rabbanut be-Italia bi-Tequfat ha-Renaissance (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 173-206; 
Rabbis and Jewish Communities in Renaissance Italy (Oxford and New York, 1990), pp. 
270-323. For the citation from Abravanel, see Hacker, “The Intellectual Activity of the 
Jews of the Ottoman Empire” (above, n. 104), n. 47 (pp. 117-118).
120 See Bonfil, Ha-Rabbanut, pp. 179-190; Rabbis, pp. 280-298.
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Once we step outside the four ells of Aristotelian metaphysics, the 
evidence for Renaissance Jewry’s immersion in the surrounding culture 
becomes overwhelming. Indeed, to an observer coming to the subject 
from the study of another Jewish community, including that of Iberia, the 
lively and genuinely significant historians’ debate over the inner or outer 
directedness of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italian Jews takes on a 
surreal quality. This is a community with intellectuals entranced by the 
rhetorical works of Cicero and Quintilian and with preachers who lace their 
sermons with references to classical authors while insisting that the Bible 
cannot be properly understood without a literary sensitivity nurtured by 
careful study of gentile as well as Jewish literature. It is a community 
with thinkers who set up the Renaissance ideal of homo universalis or 
hakham kolel as a paradigm of intellectual perfection attained by King 
Solomon and sought by anyone with healthy educational priorities. It is 
a community that produced a plan, at least on paper, of setting up what 
one observer has described as a Yeshiva University, where the primary 
emphasis would be on the study of “the written and oral Torah, laws, 
tosafot, and decisors,” but instruction would also be provided in the works 
of Jewish philosophers, Hebrew grammar, rhetoric, Latin, Italian, logic, 
medicine, non-Jewish philosophical works, mathematics, cosmography, 
and astrology. It is a community with vigorous, ongoing exchanges 
with the contemporary Christian elite. Not only did Elias Levita teach 
Hebrew to Christian scholars; not only did kabbalah itself, which was 
sometimes taught by Jews, inspire the speculative creativity of Christian 
thinkers; it now appears likely that Pico della Mirandola’s version of the 
quintessentially Renaissance definition of man as a median creature with 
the power to fashion himself in freedom owes much to a medieval Muslim 
formulation mediated by Pico’s Jewish associate Yohanan Alemanno.121
121 On rhetoric, see The Book of the Honeycomb’s Flow. Sefer Nofeth Suphim by Judah 
Messer Leon. A Critical Edition and Translation by Isaac Rabinowitz (Ithaca and 
London, 1983). See also R. Bonfil’s introduction to the facsimile edition of Nofet 
Zufim (Jerusalem, 1981). Like del Medigo, Messer Leon was interested in philosophy 
as well. On homo universalis and King Solomon, see Arthur M. Lesley, The Song of 
Solomon’s Ascents (University of California at Berkeley dissertation, 1976), and the 
citation from David Messer Leon’s Shevah Nashim in Hava Tirosh-Rothschild, “In 
Defense of Jewish Humanism,” Jewish History 3 (1988): 54 (n. 55); note also her 
remarks on p. 33.
 On the proposal in 1564 to set up an academy for Torah and general studies in Mantua, 
see the text in Asaf, Meqorot 2, pp. 116-120; Asaf noted (p. 115) that only an Italian 
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At the same time, vigorous opposition to philosophy and the humanist 
agenda produced a continuing debate. The fact that Joseph Ashkenazi 
wrote his vitriolic attack against Maimonides while in Italy is no doubt 
fortuitous, but it made enough of an impact there to have elicited 
an elaborate refutation. Yosef Yavetz’s Or ha-Hayyim is the work of a 
Spanish exile in Naples who rejected philosophical pursuits as damaging 
to faith and did battle with the hallowed rationalist understanding of 
the biblical admonition to “know” God as a philosophical imperative; 
a pious individual needs to be rescued from “the ambush of human 
reason, which lurks in wait… at all times.” R. David Proventzalo advised 
the young David Messer Leon to follow the ways of distant Talmudists 
rather than the philosophical agenda of local rabbis, who appear to assign 
no value to the Torah and Talmud. R. Ovadiah of Bertinoro denounced 
the study of Aristotle in particular and philosophy in general in both 
his commentary to the Mishnah and his correspondence, writing 
approvingly of the untainted piety that he found in the land of Israel in 
contrast to the deplorable situation in Italy. In the introduction to his 
halakhic work Giddulei Terumah, R. Azariah Figo lamented his youthful 
pursuit of general culture in the late sixteenth century and described his 
decision to “expel this maidservant” and return to the Talmud, although 
it is noteworthy that he berated himself only for reversing the proper 
order of priorities, not for pursuing a forbidden path.122
Jew could have thought of such a project. The apt analogy to Yeshiva University was 
made by Yehezkel Cohen, “Ha-Yahas le-Limmudei Hol me-Hazal ve-‘ad Yameinu—
Seqirah Historit-Sifrutit,’” in Yahas ha-Yahadut le-Limmudei Hol (Israel, 1983), p. 20. 
Although this would not have been a degree granting institution, the plan envisioned a 
preparatory program that would enable the student to enroll subsequently in a formal 
studio and receive a secular degree (semikhah) in a very short time. On Elias Levita 
and the teaching of Hebrew and kabbalah to Christians, see the discussion in Yitzhak 
Penkower, “‘Iyyun Mehuddash be-Sefer Masoret ha-Masoret le-Eliyyahu Bahur: Ihur 
ha-Niqqud u-Biqqoret Sefer ha- Zohar,” Italia 8 (l989): 36-50, and the references in n. 
93 (pp. 37-38).
 For Alemanno’s likely influence on Pico’s crucial conception of man, see Moshe Idel, “The 
Anthropology of Yohanan Alemanno: Sources and Influences,” Topoi 7 (1988): pp. 201-
210. David Ruderman has recently argued that Pico’s replacement of a narrow vision of 
Christian culture with one that was more broadly human created a new challenge and 
a new opportunity for Renaissance Jews confronting their intellectual environment; 
see his very useful summary article, “The Italian Renaissance and Jewish Thought,” in 
Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms, and Legacy, Volume I: Humanism in Italy, ed. 
by Albert Rabil Jr. (Philadelphia, 1988), pp. 382-433.
122 On the response to Ashkenazi, see Kupfer, “Hassagot min Hakham Ehad” (above, 
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Despite the advice that he received, David Messer Leon ultimately 
opted for humanist pursuits to the point of arguing that the Talmudist 
who is also a hakham kolel is more deserving of rabbinic ordination than 
an ordinary Talmudist. When he left Italy for Constantinople, he found 
himself under attack for his frequent citation of classical literature in his 
sermons; in response, he produced a passionate defense of the humanist 
enterprise, arguing for the value of classical poetry and rhetoric in 
achieving human perfection, which is bound up with the quest for 
religious perfection. Two Jewish biographies, one of King Solomon, the 
other of Isaac Abravanel, written in Italy between the late fifteenth and 
mid-sixteenth centuries, clearly reflect Renaissance literary trends and 
further illustrate Jewish involvement in humanistic study and creativity. 
The seventeenth-century autobiography of Leone da Modena, which can 
be seen as an extension of this genre, is but one of many indications 
not only of its author’s extraordinary range of interests but of the 
continuing, even growing Jewish familiarity with the broader culture 
well into the Baroque period. The glorification of Hebrew reached its peak 
at the height of the Renaissance, while in the post-Renaissance period 
even Jewish authors with an excellent command of Hebrew were ever 
more likely to write in the vernacular.123
n. 113). For the translation from Yavetz’s Or ha-Hayyim (Lublin, 1910), pp. 74-76, 
see Arthur M. Lesley, “The Place of the Dialoghi d’amore in Contemporaneous Jewish 
Thought,” in Ficino and Renaissance Neoplatonism, ed. by K. Eisenbichler and O. Z. 
Pugliese (University of Toronto Italian Studies I, Ottawa, 1986), p. 75, and cf. Barzilay’s 
discussion, Between Reason and Faith, pp. 133-149. For R. Ovadiah of Bertinoro, see 
his commentary to Sanhedrin 10:1 and the letter published in A. Kahana, Sifrut ha-
Historiah ha-Yisre’elit 2 (Warsaw, 1923), p. 47, and cf. the commentary to Avot 5:22. 
Cf. also Immanuel Benevento’s kabbalistically motivated hostility to philosophy; see 
the references in Segal, Historical Consciousness and Religious Tradition, pp. 61-62 (n. 
20). On Proventzalo’s advice, see Bonfil, Ha-Rabbanut, pp. 173-174; Rabbis, p. 270. For 
Figo, see Sefer Giddulei Terumah (Venice, 1643), and Barzilay, pp. 192-209. A similar 
statement of regret at excessive attention to works of general culture appears in the 
early seventeenth-century Shiltei ha-Gibborim of Abraham Portaleone, but the book 
itself, despite its presumed character as an act of penitence for these intellectual 
indiscretions, is replete with references to the classics; see Segal, p. 52, and the 
references in n. 23. In a personal communication, David Ruderman has underscored 
his view of Portaleone and Figo as anti-Aristotelians who nevertheless maintained a 
positive attitude toward empirical science.
123 Messer Leon’s observation on the qualifications for ordination is reminiscent of the 
assertion that angered R. Asher b. Yehiel about the connection between knowledge of 
Arabic and the right to render a decision in Jewish law. The apologia for humanism 
is in Messer Leon’s unpublished Shevah Nashim; for a summary and analysis, see 
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In her study of David Messer Leon’s work, Havah Tirosh-Rothschild 
observes that 
by the end of the fifteenth century, Jewish rationalist tradition had so 
absorbed Greek philosophy that it had become far less subversive and was 
even palatable. By David ben Judah’s day, however, no such absorption 
had yet occurred of the poetry, oratory, geography, history and letters of 
classical antiquity—all introduced to Jews through Renaissance humanism. 
These subjects, if not philosophy, still seemed to threaten Jewish traditional 
values, at least in Constantinople if not in Italy.124
The point is an important one; nevertheless, most of these pursuits 
did not have the potential to challenge Judaism in the manner of 
Aristotelian philosophy. The one which did was history, and the Italian 
Jew who utilized the discipline dangerously generated a brief but 
revealing cause célèbre.
In its most common mode, history was a humanistic endeavor 
no more dangerous than poetry or rhetoric, and some sixteenth- and 
Tirosh-Rothschild, “In Defense of Jewish Humanism.” On the biographies, see Arthur 
M. Lesley, “Hebrew Humanism in Italy: The Case of Biography,” Prooftexts 2 (1982): 
163-177. Da Modena was a multifaceted figure who continues to fascinate. See The 
Autobiography of a Seventeenth-Century Venetian Rabbi: Leon Modena’s The Life of Judah, 
trans. and ed. by Mark R. Cohen (Princeton, 1988), and cf. Cohen’s “Leone da Modena’s 
Riti: A Seventeenth-Century Plea for Social Toleration of Jews,” Jewish Social Studies 
34 (1972): 287-321. On the persistence and growth of certain forms of acculturation, 
including use of the vernacular, in the Baroque period, see Robert Bonfil, “Change in 
the Cultural Patterns of a Jewish Society in Crisis: Italian Jewry at the Close of the 
Sixteenth Century,” Jewish History 3 (1988): 11-30. For some observations on Italian 
Jewish familiarity with Christian philosophy and, more generally, on the relatively 
painless absorption by this Jewry of a multitude of diverse disciplines and approaches, 
see Yosef Sermoneta’s review of Barzilay’s Between Reason and Faith in Kiryat Sefer 44 
(1970): 539-546.
 Despite changes in orientation and advances in methodology, the material accumulated 
in Cecil Roth, The Jews in the Renaissance (Philadelphia, 1959), and Moses Shulvass, The 
Jews in the Life of the Renaissance (Leiden, 1973), retains its value and documents Jewish 
activity in fields like art, drama, music, and printing, which I have been unable to treat in 
this survey. The most vigorous and influential argument for a new perspective is Bonfil’s 
“The Historian’s Perception of the Jews in the Italian Renaissance. Towards a Reappraisal,” 
Revue des Études Juives 143 (1984): 59-82, which sees Italian Jewish acculturation as part 
of a competitive struggle affirming Jewish identity in the face of pressure rather than a 
reflection of an idyllic cultural symbiosis. See now Bonfil’s synthetic treatment, Jewish 
Life in Renaissance Italy (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1994).
124 “In Defence of Jewish Humanism,” p. 39.
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seventeenth-century Jews in Italy and elsewhere utilized it to provide 
religious consolation, to place the Jewish experience in a broader 
context, to validate the tradition, to set the stage for the end of days, to 
ponder the causes of the Jewish condition, or simply to entertain. Some 
of these purposes had been pursued even in the Middle Ages by the few 
Jews who had engaged in the enterprise of setting down events that 
had, after all, already taken place and whose utility was consequently 
viewed with considerable skepticism. R. Sherira’s epistle took the form 
of a standard responsum; Josippon provided a basic historical survey as 
well as implicit advice about appropriate Jewish behavior in the face 
of superior force; R. Abraham ibn Daud’s Book of Tradition validated 
the tradition, defended the glories of Andalusian Jewry, and may 
have pointed esoterically to the date of the redemption; the crusade 
chronicles provided emotional release and religious inspiration in the 
wake of unspeakable tragedy.125
Whether or not the historical writings of sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Jews reflect a significant historiographical movement has 
recently become a disputed question. On the one hand, Jewish authors 
produced ten books of a roughly historical character in the course of 
about a century, a number that exceeds the entire output of the Middle 
Ages, and some of these are clearly indebted to the historiographic 
corpus that emerged in Renaissance society. On the other hand, a 
rigorous definition of history would exclude many, perhaps most, of 
these works, and even if they are all counted, they do not approach the 
number that one might reasonably expect in light of the proportion 
of Christian Renaissance works devoted to historiography.126 In any 
125 See Sefer Yosifon, ed. by Flusser; ibn Daud’s Sefer Ha-Qabbalah, ed. by Cohen; Shlomo 
Eidelberg, The Jews and the Crusaders (Madison, Wisconsin, 1977), and Robert Chazan, 
European Jewry and the First Crusade (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 223-297. 
On R. Sherira, see above, n. 19. For an example of medieval Jewish denigration of the 
value of history, see Maimonides’ Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 10:1 (almost 
immediately before the list of the thirteen principles of faith).
126 See Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi’s Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle 
and London, 1982), pp. 55-75, and his “Clio and the Jews: Reflections on Jewish 
Historiography in the Sixteenth Century,” American Academy for Jewish Research Jubilee 
Volume (PAAJR 46-47 [1979-80]): 607-638; Robert Bonfil, “How Golden Was the Age of 
the Renaissance in Jewish Historiography?” History and Theory 27 (1988): 78-102. Bonfil 
accounts for what he regards as the relative paucity of Jewish historical works on the 
grounds that diaspora Jews did not have the sort of political and military history that 
lent itself to the narrative style most characteristic of Renaissance historiography.
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event, despite the great interest of several of these books and despite 
their frequent debt to Christian models, they do not challenge Jewish 
tradition.
Except one. Azariah de’ Rossi’s Me’or ‘Einayim, which is not a 
narrative history but a series of historical studies, utilized non-Jewish 
sources to test the validity of historical assertions in Rabbinic texts to 
the point of rejecting the accepted chronology of the Second Temple 
and modifying the Jewish calendar’s assumptions about the date of 
creation. The author was clearly sensitive to the prospect of opposition, 
and he defended the study of history on the grounds of religious utility 
and the intrinsic value of the search for truth. There is, however, 
considerable irony in his argument for rejecting historical statements 
of the Rabbis in favor of gentile authorities. The Sages, he writes, were 
concerned with important matters; with respect to trivial concerns like 
history, we should expect to find a greater degree of reliability in the 
works of gentiles, who after all specialize in trivialities.127 The difficulty 
of distinguishing the strands of sincerity and disingenuousness in this 
assertion speaks volumes for the problematic nature of de’ Rossi’s 
undertaking. He can justify his methodology only by minimizing the 
significance of his discipline.
Contemporary histories differ about the novelty of de’ Rossi’s 
challenge. Since the reinterpretation and even rejection of aggadah 
had respectable medieval precedent, Salo Baron and Robert Bonfil 
have argued that Azariah did little more than broaden the grounds for 
such a step to embrace historical as well as philosophical or kabbalistic 
considerations. Yosef Yerushalmi, on the other hand, sees a more radical 
and significant innovation in Me’or ‘Einayim; philosophy and kabbalah, 
he argues, had long been regarded as sources of truth, while Azariah 
was willing to utilize “profane history… drawn from Greek, Roman 
and Christian writers” to judge the validity of rabbinic statements.128 
The distinction is important and the formulation can, I think, be 
sharpened. Philosophical truth was not based on the authority of 
Aristotle; it rested on arguments that Aristotle may have formulated 
127 Sefer Me’or ‘Einayim, ed. by David Cassel (Vilna, 1866), p. 216.
128 See Baron, History and Jewish Historians (Philadelphia, 1964), pp. 167-239, 405-442; 
Bonfil, “Some Reflections on the Place of Azariah de’ Rossi’s Me’or ‘Einayim in the Cultural 
Milieu of Italian Renaissance Jewry,” in Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 23-48, 
esp. 23-25; Yerushalmi, “Clio and the Jews,” pp. 634-635, and Zakhor, p. 72.
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but were now available to any thinker in an unmediated fashion. It was 
reason, not Aristotle, that required the reinterpretation of whatever 
Rabbinic text was at issue. History is different. Although reason is very 
much involved and the decision to follow a gentile account instead of a 
rabbinic one does not result from a simple preference for Tacitus over 
Rabbi Yosi, the fact remains that on some level one is accepting the 
testimony of gentiles rather than that of the Talmudic sages. This may 
be a legitimate extension of the medieval precedent, but it is hardly a 
straightforward one.
This point tells us something significant about Italian Jewry and 
not merely about de’ Rossi. Bonfil has demonstrated convincingly that 
the Italian attack on Me’or ‘Einayim was much more limited in both its 
ideological scope and its degree of support than historians used to think. 
Since Bonfil himself does not see the work as radically innovative, he 
regards the relatively mild opposition as roughly the sort of reaction that 
we might have expected. Yerushalmi, writing before Bonfil’s study, made 
the cautious observation that “it is perhaps a token of the flexibility of 
Italian Jewry that the ban upon the book, [which] only required that 
special permission be obtained by those who wanted to read it, was not 
always enforced stringently.” If we accept, as I think we should, both 
Yerushalmi’s perception of the book and Bonfil’s findings about the ban, 
the implications for Italian Jewry become more striking. A substantial 
majority of the rabbinic leadership accepted with equanimity a work 
which treated the historical statements of the ancient Sages with 
startling freedom. The contrast with the intense opposition to Me’or 
‘Einayim from R. Joseph Caro in Safed and R. Judah Loew (Maharal) 
in Prague highlights the openness of sixteenth-century Italian Jews to 
non-Jewish sources and the willingness to utilize them even in the most 
sensitive of contexts.129
129 See Yerushalmi, “Clio,” p. 635; Zakhor, pp. 72-73. On R. Joseph Caro, see the references 
in Segal, Historical Consciousness, p. 68, n. 51; on the Maharal, see Segal, pp. 133-161. 
Another, perhaps fairer way to make the point would be to say that Italian Jewry 
agreed with Bonfil while the Maharal and R. Joseph Caro agreed with Yerushalmi, but 
this alone would fail to convey the significance of the Italian position. For a nuanced 
discussion of major features of de’ Rossi’s work, see now Bonfil’s elaborate introduction 
to his anthology, Kitvei ‘Azariah min ha-Adummim: Mivhar Peraqim mi-tokh Sefer Me’or 
‘Einayim ve-Sefer Mazref la-Kesef (Jerusalem, 1991).
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THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION
AND THE TRANSITION TO MODERN TIMES
Apart from the humanistic pursuits that characterized the Renaissance, 
early modern Europe also witnessed an increasing interest in the natural 
world. Though the most significant manifestation of this interest was 
the Copernican revolution and its aftermath, scientifically oriented Jews 
in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and early eighteenth centuries evinced 
greater interest in new approaches to chemistry, medicine, zoology, 
botany, mineralogy, and geography. Hundreds of Jews graduated from the 
medical school in Padua. Various Jewish works demonstrate familiarity 
with Paracelsian chemical medicine and Cartesian mechanics, and they 
display an insatiable curiosity about wondrous beasts and other natural 
marvels widely reported in an age of exploration. We find a revival and 
elaboration of the medieval arguments for the Jewish origin of the 
sciences and their religious utility along with a recognition that the 
ancient philosophers had attained important religious truths unaided 
by Jewish instruction.130
Jewish enthusiasm for these new scientific pursuits was greatly 
facilitated by a critically important conceptual change. In the Middle 
130 See David B. Ruderman, Science, Medicine, and Jewish Culture in Early Modem Europe. 
Spiegel Lectures in European Jewish History 7 (Tel Aviv, 1987), and his overlapping article, 
“The Impact of Science on Jewish Culture and Society in Venice,” in Gli Ebrei e Venezia 
(Milan, 1987), pp. 417-448. See also his Kabbalah, Magic, and Science: The Cultural 
Universe of a Sixteenth-Century Jewish Physician (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1988). 
In light of Abba Mari of Lunel’s salute to Aristotle for achieving genuine monotheism 
in the absence of revelation, Ruderman’s description of Abraham Yagel’s “remarkable” 
assertion that pagan philosophers “discovered their faith independently of Jewish 
revelation” (p. 146) needs to be toned down a bit; see above, n. 76. For Jews at the 
medical school in Padua, see above, n. 115.
 On the Jewish origins of the sciences, see, in addition to the references in n. 37 of 
Ruderman’s lecture, the introduction to David Kaufmann’s Die Sinne, and D. Margalit, 
“’Al Galenus ve-Gilgulo ha-‘Ivri Gamliel,” Sinai 33 (1953): 75-77. On geography, see L. 
Zunz, “Essay on the Geographical Literature of the Jews from the Remotest Times to 
the Year 1840,” in The Itinerary of R. Benjamin of Tudela, trans. by A. Asher, 2 (London, 
1841), pp. 230-317; Ruderman, The World of a Renaissance Jew: The Life and Thought of 
Abraham ben Mordecai Farissol (Cincinnati, 1981), pp. 131-143; André Neher, Jewish 
Thought and the Scientific Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: David Gans (1541-1613) 
and His Times (Oxford and New York, 1986), pp. 95-165.
 For a major synthesis and analysis of the entire subject, see now Ruderman’s Jewish 
Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe (New Haven, 1995).
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Ages, the natural sciences were part of a larger tapestry whose dominant 
element was metaphysics. During the Renaissance and beyond, 
philosophy and certain kinds of science grew apart, and the scientific 
domain itself came to be divided between empiricist and rationalist-
mathematical spheres. In this environment, certain scientific fields were 
uncontaminated by the philosophical baggage associated in some Jewish 
minds with Aristotelianism, and a Jew could remain a staunch opponent 
of rationalism in its medieval mode while retaining an intense interest 
in the new science.131
The Jewish absorption of the monumental revolution in astronomy 
was far more problematic. David Gans of late sixteenth-century Prague, 
though best known for his historical work Zemah David, was the first 
influential Jew to confront Copernicanism, and his attitude to the new 
astronomy is characteristic of what was probably the dominant reaction 
by knowledgeable Jews through the early eighteenth century: interested 
awareness but ultimate rejection.132 Although Yosef Shlomo Delmedigo, 
who studied with Galileo and ended his days in Prague, spoke very highly 
of Copernicus, two major compendia at the very end of our period still 
reject the heliocentric theory in sharp terms. Toviah Katz described 
Copernicus’s position with some care and even presented a series of 
Copernican arguments; at the same time, he called him “the firstborn of 
Satan” and described the adherents of his view as heretics.133 Similarly, 
131 David Ruderman is largely responsible for sharpening my awareness of this point. On 
the division within the sciences, see Thomas S. Kuhn, “Mathematical vs. Experimental 
Traditions in the Development of Physical Science,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1 
(1976): 1-31. As I indicated above, it is important to note that for medieval Ashkenazic 
Jews, the link between empirical science and rationalist philosophy had never been made, 
and so their interest in the physical world was never encumbered by this complication.
132 See Neher, Jewish Thought and the Scientific Revolution.
133 Ma‘aseh Toviah (Krakau, 1908), pp. 43b-44b (“‘Olam ha-Galgalim,” ch. 4). Ruderman 
(Science, Medicine, and Jewish Culture, p. 21) notes correctly that the chapter ends 
“limply,” without any refutation of the Copernican arguments noted. Nonetheless, the 
conclusion is slightly more forceful than he indicates. Toviah does not assert that the 
unspecified counterarguments “are easily confusing [even] to one who understands 
them”; he says that their validity is easily evident to such a person (benaqel nekhohot, 
not nevukhot). Moreover, the previous chapter sets forth six standard arguments 
against the Copernican theory.
 On Delmedigo, see Isaac Barzilay, Yosef Shlomo Delmedigo, Yashar of Candia: His Life, Works, 
and Times (Leiden, 1974), and Yosef Levi, “Aqademiah Yehudit le-Madda‘im be-Reshit ha-
Me’ah ha-Sheva-‘Esreh: Nisyono shel Yosef Shlomoh Delmedigo,” Proceedings of the Eleventh 
World Congress of Jewish Studies, Division B, vol. 1, Hebrew section, pp. 169-176.
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David Nieto dismissed the Copernican conception as an abomination.134 
By this time, the scientific defense of the Ptolemaic system had become 
very difficult, but Copernicus had still not carried the day among all 
intellectuals, let alone among the masses. Since most seventeenth- and 
early eighteenth-century European Jews, especially outside Italy, were 
relatively isolated from the burgeoning scientific community, and since 
they had rabbinic as well as biblical texts to inhibit their receptivity to 
the new astronomy, it is not surprising that they generally cast their lot 
with the rear guard action aimed against the Copernican revolution.
During the centuries in which modern Europe was being formed, 
the major Jewish cultural centers turned inward despite the growing 
Jewish involvement in national and international commerce. In a recent 
revisionist work, Jonathan Israel has argued that the period from 1550 
to 1713, and particularly from 1650 to 1713, saw “the most profound and 
pervasive impact on the west which [the Jews] were ever to exert while 
retaining a large measure of social and cultural cohesion.” To the extent 
that he applies this observation to economics and politics, including the 
ascendancy of Court Jews in Central Europe and elsewhere and the rough 
synchronism of Ashkenazi and Sephardi influence on finance and trade, 
he provides an important new perspective on early modern Jewry. On 
the other hand, he underestimates and misconceives much of medieval 
Jewish culture and considerably overrates the achievements of early 
modern Jews when he writes that “the radical transformation of Jewish 
culture which occurred during the middle decades of the sixteenth 
century was, assuredly, one of the most fundamental and remarkable 
phenomena distinguishing post-Temple Jewish history” and then extends 
his enthusiastic evaluation into the following century as well.135
As we have seen, Italian Jewish culture was indeed marked by an 
impressive synthesis of Jewish pride and openness to the surrounding 
134 This translation may be a trifle too strong for piggul, but Neher’s effort to soften Nieto’s 
anti-Copernicanism by taking “piggul hu lo yerazeh” in the narrow legalistic sense 
determined by the phrase’s biblical context (“a sacrifice which would not be acceptable in 
the Temple”) is an apologetic distortion of a very strong expression; see Jewish Thought 
and the Scientific Revolution, p. 256. On Delmedigo, Katz, Nieto, and others, see Hillel 
Levine, “Paradise Not Surrendered: Jewish Reactions to Copernicus and the Growth of 
Modern Science,” in Epistemology, Methodology, and the Social Sciences, ed. by Robert S. 
Cohen and Mark W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1983), pp. 203-225.
135 Jonathan I. Israel, European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550-1750, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford, 1989). The quotations are from pp. 1 and 70.
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culture. In the new Jewish community of seventeenth-century Holland, 
Sephardic Jews, including some with a Marrano past that made them 
fully conversant with Christian civilization, contributed philosophical, 
polemical, and scientific works that utilized wide learning and, when 
written or available in the vernacular, sometimes influenced European 
intellectuals. It was not only in Italy that Christian Hebraists held 
discussions with Jews about scholarly and religious issues. Court Jews 
were necessarily conversant with the surrounding culture while remaining, 
at least in many cases, loyal members of the Jewish community.136
At the same time, the major seventeenth-century Jewish centers 
outside Italy were either in a state of cultural decline or evinced relatively 
little concern with intellectual trends in the surrounding society. Jewry 
under Islam confronted a Muslim world that was itself culturally 
stagnant and consequently failed to provide the stimulus that Jewish 
thinkers needed for creative engagement with disciplines outside of 
Torah. Theoretically, this Jewry continued to value the sort of intellectual 
described in an early seventeenth-century chronicle from Fez as
a complete scholar thoroughly familiar with all the sciences: the science 
of speculation (‘iyyun) to an infinite degree, the science of grammar, the 
science of philosophy, the science of metrical poetry. There was no one 
like him among all the scholars of Israel.… If anyone had an uncertainty 
regarding a passage in Tosafot or the work of R. Elijah Mizrahi or the 
Talmud, he would come to this scholar and would not leave until those 
uncertainties would be fully resolved.137
Nevertheless, such scholarship, at least with respect to philosophy, 
meant mastery of an existing corpus rather than the production of 
original, creative work.
Ashkenazic Jewry had always felt more of an adversarial relationship 
with the surrounding society, and even the examples of cultural interaction 
136 Israel, European Jewry, pp. 70-86, 142-144, 216-231. On the former Marranos, see Yosef 
Kaplan, “The Portuguese Community of Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century between 
Tradition and Change,” in Society and Community, ed. by Abraham Hain (Jerusalem, 
1991), pp. 141-171, and Kaplan, “Die Portugiesischen Juden und die Modernisierung: zur 
Veränderung  jüdischen Lebens vor der Emanzipation,” in Jüdische Lebenswelten: Essays, 
ed. by Andreas Nachama et al. (Frankfurt a.M., 1991), pp. 303-317.
137 Divrei ha-Yamim, in Fez va-Hakhameha, ed. by David Ovadia, 1 (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 
47-48. Cf. Elazar Touitou, Rabbi Hayyim Ibn ‘Attar u-Perusho Or ha-Hayyim ‘al ha-Torah 
(Jerusalem, 1981), p. 28.
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that we examined earlier were often characterized by an element of 
reserve or competition. With the removal of the Ashkenazic center to 
the alien environment of Poland, the sense of existential separateness 
was reinforced, and Jacob Katz has noted that even the martyrdoms 
in seventeenth-century Poland differ from those of the Crusades as 
defiant confrontation gave way to a sense of isolation from a hostile 
environment.138 Although sixteenth-century Poland was not unaffected 
by the intellectual currents inspired by humanism and the Reformation, 
the rationalism that found lukewarm expression in R. Moses Isserles 
and some of his contemporaries essentially came from a culture outside 
the immediate environment. As Poland became a cultural backwater in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, this mild philosophical 
interest found no reinforcement either in the surrounding society or 
the indigenous Ashkenazic tradition, and without such reinforcement 
it largely faded away.
Even in seventeenth-century Germany, which was closer to the center 
of European creativity, there was insufficient impetus for Ashkenazic 
Jews to overcome the cultural legacy of their formative period without 
substantial struggle and considerable delay. In many cases, the 
communities were being reconstituted in the wake of expulsions and 
persecutions. The gradual opening of Christian society to some Jews 
began to undermine the observance of Jewish individuals rather than 
inspire an intellectual transformation and Renaissance.
Profound differences separated the medieval Iberian experience 
of a culturally stimulating environment from the situation of early 
modern Ashkenazim. First, the Jews of Northern Europe came to 
modernity with a deeply entrenched, fully formed approach that was 
highly suspicious of external wisdom. Second, the challenges of modern 
science and philosophical skepticism could not be faced in the kind of 
partnership with the dominant society that medieval Jews had enjoyed. 
It is true that Christianity had to face these challenges quite as much as 
Judaism, but the challenges emanated from Christian society itself, not 
from a philosophy inherited from classical antiquity. Thus, the search 
for intellectual allies was severely complicated. Traditional Christians 
were for the most part heirs to a fully developed, millennial legacy of 
138 Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961), pp. 131-155, and “Bein Tatnu LeTah-
Tat,” Sefer Yovel le-Yitzhak Baer, ed. by S. Ettinger et al. (Jerusalem, 1961), pp. 318-337.
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contempt for Judaism; seventeenth-century skeptics and eighteenth-
century philosophes regarded Judaism with at least as much disdain as 
they felt for Christianity and were in any event the authors of the very 
challenge that had to be faced. When medieval philosophers were called 
heretics, they usually denied the charge; the moderns often embraced it, 
indeed, shouted it from the rooftops. The pursuit of speculative thought 
became associated with irreligion to a far more profound and extensive 
degree than it had in the Middle Ages.
Moreover, the nature of modern philosophy was so different from 
that of the medieval past that the religious attractiveness of the discipline 
was severely undermined. To the medievals, if philosophy posed serious 
challenges to religious faith, it also provided indispensable insights into 
the nature of God. Modern philosophy seemed to supply little more than 
the problems. At best, religious philosophers could refute attacks against 
the faith, but they would probably not emerge with new insights about the 
issues that they were accustomed to regard as the classic subject matter of 
philosophy. They would find little but heresy on divine providence, hardly 
anything on attributes or incorporeality, and nothing at all about the 
recently deceased active intellect and celestial spheres. If all philosophy 
could achieve was the neutralizing of its own evil influence, then ignoring 
the enterprise could achieve the same result at a great saving of time and 
effort, not to speak of averting danger to one’s faith. The imperative of 
answering the heretic was rarely sufficient in itself to inspire philosophical 
study. In addition to these critical considerations, the religious value 
of philosophical inquiry was radically diminished by the conviction of 
many traditional Jews at the dawn of the Enlightenment that the crucial 
information about God was available through kabbalah.
For the sake of sharpening the analysis, I have intentionally formulated 
these points with one-dimensional vigor. If modern philosophy did not 
provide solutions to medieval questions about God and creation, it 
might nevertheless suggest new areas of fruitful inquiry. The medieval 
argument that studying the world inspires love of God seemed all the more 
persuasive to believers beholding the mathematically elegant universe 
of the new science. We cannot, however, expect the rabbinic leadership 
of Ashkenazic Jewry to have known the evolving new approaches well 
enough to have formulated an innovative positive response; indeed, in 
the early stages they did not know them well enough even to have fully 
appreciated the new dangers.
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Thus, when we do find an interest in philosophical inquiry among the 
rabbis of early modern Ashkenaz, it tends to take a very traditional form. 
R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach, for example, laid great emphasis on the practical 
primacy of talmudic study and the theoretical primacy of kabbalah, while 
demonstrating considerable familiarity with Jewish philosophical literature. 
In a study of Bacharach, Isadore Twersky observes that “philosophic 
literature was studied for religious reasons, as part of a spiritual quest, 
totally separate from external contacts and influences.” R. Jacob Emden 
reports in his autobiography that his father Hakham Zevi Ashkenazi read 
secular works “in his spare time” and studied “other knowledge” with the 
scholars who attended the Klaus that he headed in late seventeenth-century 
Hamburg “until they achieved perfection in Torah and wisdom”; here too 
we are undoubtedly dealing with something other than a fresh and creative 
confrontation with the world of modern wisdom.139
By the mid-eighteenth century, Emden’s own ambivalent attitude to 
the study of the “external” disciplines reflects the growing impact of the 
European opening to the Jews. His essential position is quite negative; at 
the same time, he speaks of a yearning for the sciences which he fulfilled 
in part by reading Hebrew books in fields like history and geography 
and in part by studying the works of non-Jews in the bathroom. His 
familiarity with the New Testament is striking, and it comes together 
with a relatively favorable attitude to Jesus and even to Paul. What is 
most interesting is a recurring justification for secular study that does 
not appear in premodern times. Jews, says Emden, must achieve some 
familiarity with gentile language and culture for the sake of mingling 
comfortably with people. This is a striking reflection of a changed social 
atmosphere with far-reaching importance for the integration of Jews 
into European society.140
Outside of rabbinic circles, incipient social integration in a world 
of growing religious skepticism gradually eroded the loyalties of some 
Ashkenazic Jews. Beginning around the end of the seventeenth century, 
139 On Bacharach, see I. Twersky, “Law and Spirituality in the Seventeenth Century: A Case 
Study in R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach,” in Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 
447-467 (quotation from p. 455). On Hakham Zevi, see Emden’s Megillat Sefer, ed. by 
D. Kahana (Warsaw, 1897), pp. 11, 16-17, cited in Jacob J. Schacter, Rabbi Jacob Emden: 
Life and Major Works (Harvard University dissertation, 1988), pp. 587-588.
140 See chapter 6 of Schacter’s dissertation for a discussion of Emden’s general stance, 
and see especially p. 505, where he notes the novelty of the argument from social 
interaction.
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substantial numbers of Jews began to drift away from accepted religious 
norms, and a smaller number may even have rejected traditional beliefs 
under the influence of Enlightenment thought. The official community, 
however, did not begin to change until the second half of the eighteenth 
century, when leaders of the Jewish Enlightenment began to demand 
curricular reform and social accommodation.141
Despite the fact that these demands were often made in the name of 
the well-attested rationalist tradition that we have examined throughout 
this study, the timing, the context, and the orientation of the new 
movement made it a threat to the established order both politically and 
religiously. European Jewry, like European Christendom, faced a world 
in which religion itself could no longer be taken for granted. In the new, 
largely secular order that established itself in the eighteenth century and 
continues to our own day, the legitimacy of general culture remained 
an issue only for the traditionalist segment of the Jewish people, and 
the terms of the debate were narrowed and transformed. For some, the 
overwhelming new dangers required an ever more stringent isolation 
from the evils of modernity. For others, these dangers could be tamed by 
selective admission of the religiously neutral elements of the new society 
and culture. For a few, the Torah itself required a heroic confrontation 
with modernity in all its fullness, a confrontation that would enrich both 
Judaism and the world. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This essay was written when I was a fellow at the Annenberg Research 
Institute during the academic year 1989-1990. It is a pleasure to 
thank the staff of the Institute and of its library for their courtesy and 
141 On the timing and extent of these transformations, see the debate between Azriel 
Schochet, ‘Im Hillufei Tequfot (Jerusalem, 1960), and Jacob Katz, Out of the Ghetto 
(Cambridge, 1973). Cf. Schochet’s “Reshit ha-Haskalah ba-Yahadut be-Germania,” Molad 
23 (1965): 328-334. See also Israel, who argues very strongly that there was widespread 
abandonment of tradition, including outright conversion (European Jewry, pp. 254-
256). On apostasy in the wake of Sabbatianism, see Elisheva Carlebach, “Sabbatianism 
and the Jewish-Christian Polemic,” Proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of Jewish 
Studies, Division C, 2 (1990): 6-7. For a relevant analysis that focuses primarily on a 
later period, see David Sorkin, The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780-1840 (New 
York, 1987).
— 116 —
The Cultural Environment: Challenge and Response
professionalism. It is a particular pleasure to thank Professor Daniel J. 
Lasker, who occupied the office next to mine and served as an unfailing 
source of sound advice and refreshing good humor. I no doubt invaded 
the offices of two additional fellows of the institute far too frequently, 
but Professors Anita Shapira and William C. Jordan provided such 
intellectual stimulation that any expression of regret that I might offer 
for those interruptions would be insincere. Please forgive me, but I 
confess that I would do it again.
Outside the institute, Professors Menahem Ben Sasson and David 
Ruderman read the entire manuscript and provided illuminating, 
significant suggestions, many of which I had the good sense to incorporate. 
I am very grateful to Dr. Jacob J. Schacter for his meticulous editorial 
supervision, which was often substantive as well as technical. After my 
return from Annenberg, I benefited from the welcoming atmosphere, 
extraordinary resources, and knowledgeable staff at the Mendel 
Gottesman Library of Yeshiva University in preparing the final version of 
the study. While I have added references to more recent scholarship and 
included many observations reflecting subsequent research, the 1990 
text remains at the core of this work.
Finally, my wife Pearl as well as Miriam, Elie, Yitzhak, and Gedalyah 
not only endured my weekly absences during preparations for the 
marriage which brought Elie into the family, but, together with Ditza and 
Miriam, who have joined us more recently, provided love, encouragement, 
and the inspiration that comes from their own embodiment of Torah and 
the best of general culture. 
How Did Nahmanides Propose to Resolve the Maimonidean Controversy? 
— 117 —
HOW DID NAHMANIDES PROPOSE TO RESOLVE 
THE MAIMONIDEAN CONTROVERSY?
From: Meah She‘arim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life in Memory 
of Isadore Twersky, ed. by Ezra Fleischer et al. (Magnes: Jerusalem, 2001), 
pp. 135-146.
The permissibility of pursuing “external wisdom” became a major 
motif in the intellectual history of the Jews during the Middle Ages, 
and in the 1230’s it exploded into the greatest controversy that had 
ever shaken European Jewry, cutting across the three major cultural 
centers of Northern Europe, Southern France, and Iberia. Concerned 
by allegorization of Scripture and other manifestations of philosophical 
radicalism, R. Solomon b. Abraham of Montpellier dispatched his 
distinguished student R. Jonah Gerondi to Northern France with copies 
of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed and Sefer ha-Madda so that he 
might alert the Northern Rabbis to the sort of works that had been used 
and misused by the radical allegorizers.
Whatever Rabbi Solomon’s intentions, the result was a ban prohibiting 
the study of both books. Enraged, Provencal advocates of philosophical 
study proclaimed a counterban against R. Solomon and his disciples and 
sent their own distinguished representative, the aged R. David Kimhi, 
to solicit support for the counterban among their presumed natural 
allies in Northern Spain. Radak’s mixed reception speaks volumes 
for the intellectual and religious changes in certain segments of the 
Sephardic elite during the early thirteenth century. In some circles he 
received the unalloyed support that he expected; elsewhere, however, 
for reasons ranging from the ideological to the personal, he encountered 
reluctance, ambivalence, even hostility.1 With the benefit of hindsight, 
1 The best reconstruction of the course of events remains that of Azriel Schochet, 
“Berurim be-Parashat ha-Pulmus ha-Rishon ‘al Sifrei ha-Rambam,” Zion 36 (1971): 27-
60. For a recent analysis, see my discussion in Gerald J. Blidstein, David Berger, Sid Z. 
Leiman and Aharon Lichtenstein, Judaism’s Encounter with Other Cultures: Rejection or 
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we can unhesitatingly identify Nahmanides as the most distinguished 
Spanish Rabbi in the 1230’s, indeed, in the entire history of Christian 
Spain. At the time, his preeminence was not quite so unambiguous, but 
all sides surely recognized that his stand in the controversy would loom 
large. It was hardly a simple matter, however, to predict the position of 
a figure who exemplified in striking fashion the kaleidoscopic variety of 
intellectual and spiritual currents which swirled through Provencal and 
Spanish Jewish communities during those decades. Talmudic exegete 
and codifier, mystic, physician, theologian, poet, biblical commentator, 
communal leader, and future polemicist, Nahmanides absorbed and 
reshaped the influence of Tosafist dialectic, of Southern French Rabbinics 
and kabbalah, and of indigenous Spanish traditions. Nahmanides’ attitude 
toward philosophical study reflected the complexity of his intellectual 
and spiritual legacy. He studied the philosophical corpus of his Jewish 
predecessors, greatly admired Maimonides, and insisted on the value of 
theological investigation in his work on theodicy. At the same time, he 
despised Aristotle, vigorously rejected many of Maimonides’ rationalistic 
assertions, and believed the secrets of the Torah to be embodied in 
mysticism rather than metaphysics. As I have noted elsewhere, Nahmanides 
regarded the revelation as an empirical datum par excellence, so that 
philosophical inquiry could build upon it without struggling by unaided 
reason to reach conclusions already provided by God. Consequently, 
Nahmanides expressed his central views in the form of a commentary to 
the revelation, and his attraction to kabbalah was itself an expression of 
his search for a revealed source of theological truths.2 This presentation of 
Nahmanides’ position hardly reflects the unvarying consensus of modern 
scholarship. Because of the great variety of strands which formed his 
religious persona, students of medieval history and philosophy, of the 
Maimonidean controversy, and of Nahmanides himself have perceived 
him in strikingly different ways. Until quite recently, most scholars placed 
Integration?, ed. by Jacob J. Schacter (Northvale, N.J., and Jerusalem, 1997), pp. 85-
100.
2 See my “Miracles and the Natural Order in Nahmanides,” in Rabbi Moses Nahmanides 
(Ramban): Explorations in his Religious and Literary Virtuosity, ed. by Isadore Twersky 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1983), pp. 110-111, and my discussion in Judaism’s Encounter, pp. 
99-100. See too my unpublished Master’s essay (which analyzes more briefly the letter 
which stands at the center of this article), Nahmanides’ Attitude toward Secular Learning 
and Its Bearing upon his Stance in the Maimonidean Controversy (Columbia University, 
1965), chapter 1 (pp. 2-23).
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him squarely in the anti-philosophical camp, and some of these regarded 
his expressions of admiration for Maimonides and his works as tactical 
stratagems that did not reflect his deepest convictions.3 Other scholars 
understood that this one-sided picture of Nahmanides was a caricature, 
but presenting a balanced, integrated portrait of his multi-faceted genius 
remained a daunting task.4 As we shall see, all students of Nahmanides 
face a difficult challenge in describing and accounting for his position 
during the Maimonidean controversy. Though a full characterization of his 
stand requires the analysis of more than one document, by far the most 
important source is a much-discussed letter that he wrote to the rabbis of 
Northern France. Here, textual uncertainties and ideological perplexities 
have produced contradictions and confusion in the scholarly literature. 
My limited purpose in this essay is to examine some of these uncertainties 
with the hope that confusion will give way to clarity. The bulk of this 
3 Note, inter alia, Salo Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, first edition (New 
York, 1937), vol. 2, p. 140 (“With the growth of antirationalist forces, most kabbalists 
rejected Maimonides and all scholasticism. With Nahmanides, the antiphilosophical 
reaction received the stamp of approval from a revered authority.”); J. Newman, The 
Commentary of Nahmanides on Genesis Chapters 1-6:8 (Leiden, 1960), pp. 13-14; the 
references to Y. Baer, H.H. Ben Sasson, Y. Kaplan, S. Krauss and others in Bernard 
Septimus, “‘Open Rebuke and Concealed Love’: Nahmanides and the Andalusian 
Tradition,” in Twersky, Rabbi Moses Nahmanides, p. 14, n. 12. Krauss (Ha-Goren 5 
[1905]: 84, 88) affirms that Nahmanides was insincere even in his limited defense 
of philosophy and goes so far as to ascribe to him a belief in the corporeality of 
God; for a more recent affirmation of the erroneous view that Nahmanides was an 
anthropomorphist, see Martin A. Cohen, “Reflections on the Text and Context of the 
Disputation of Barcelona,” Hebrew Union College Annual 35 (1964): 169, 176.
4 Though leaving much to be desired, the most successful effort in the ninetenth century 
was Joseph Perles, “Über den Geist des Commentars des R. Moses ben Nachman 
zum Pentateuch und über sein Verhältniss zum Pentateuch-Commentar Raschis,” 
Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums (MGWJ) 7 (1858): 81-
97, 117-136. The best characterization to date is Septimus, “‘Open Rebuke and 
Concealed Love’” (n. 3). See too Ch. Henoch, Ha-Ramban ke-Hoqer ve-ki-Mequbbal 
(Jerusalem, 1978); Moshe Idel, “R. Mosheh ben Nahman—Kabbalah, Halakhah, 
u-Manhigut Ruhanit,” Tarbiz 64 (1995): 535-580; Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Acceptance 
and Devaluation: Nahmanides’ Attitude toward Science,” Journal of Jewish Thought and 
Philosophy 1(1992): 223-245; David Novak, The Theology of Nahmanides Systematically 
Presented (Atlanta, 1992); Josef Stern, “Nachmanides’s Conception of Tacamei Mitzvot 
and its Maimonidean Background,” in Community and Covenant: New Essays in Jewish 
Political and Legal Philosophy ed. by Daniel Frank (Albany, 1995), pp. 141-171; Stern, 
“The Fall and Rise of Myth in Ritual: Maimonides versus Nahmanides on the Huqqim, 
Astrology, and the War against Idolatry,” The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 
6 (1997): 185-263.
— 120 —
The Cultural Environment: Challenge and Response
highly respectful, even deferential letter explains that the rabbis of the 
North do not fully understand the cultural circumstances that produced 
Maimonides’ Guide and indicates why his purportedly objectionable views 
are either correct or at least well within the framework of normative 
Judaism. The Mishneh Torah, including Sefer ha-Madda, receives unstinting 
praise; while one may challenge specific points, the work itself is Torah 
pure and simple. Finally, as he concludes his lengthy, eloquent defense 
of “the great rabbi,” Nahmanides sets forth a concrete proposal. The first 
element of this proposal is crystal clear: the ban against both books must 
be revoked. At this point, however, textual problems begin to muddy the 
waters. Nahmanides’ letter is extant in three versions. Chaim Dov Chavel 
reproduced the poorest of these in the first two printings of his standard 
Kitvei Ramban; beginning with the third printing, he published a better 
one based on the first printed edition. The best text was published in 
1860 from a Saraval manuscript by Joseph Perles, who supplied variant 
readings from the other versions.5 Because Chavel’s text is by far the most 
widely used and hence the most influential, our story must begin there.
After the vigorous recommendation that the ban against the Guide and 
the Sefer ha-Madda be revoked, the letter in the current printings of Kitvei 
Ramban continues as follows:
ויצא דבר מלכות מלפניכם ותהיו לאגודה ולקשר של קימא לאבד זרוע רמה להחרים לנדות 
ולשמת כל לשון מדברת גדולות אשר האלוהים יצמת המלעיג על ההגדות או מרחיב פה על 
האסמכתות ואל עוסקי ספר מורה הנבוכים כתות כתות תשימו יד מוראכם אל פיהם, (והיא מן 
המדה) כי מצות הרב הגדול המחברו הוא לאמור: 'לא תפרשוהו ולא תפרסמוהו'.
Let a royal command issue forth from you as you become a single group and 
a lasting bond to destroy an upraised arm, to excommunicate, ban, and place 
under a curse every tongue speaking arrogantly which God will destroy, one 
who mocks the aggadot or opens his mouth against asmakhtot. As for those 
who study the Guide of the Perplexed in groups, place your fearsome hand to 
their mouth, for the command of the great rabbi who wrote it was, “Do not 
5 See C.D. Chavel, Kitvei Ramban (Jerusalem, 1963), vol. 1, pp. 333-351; Joseph 
Perles, “Nachträge über R. Moses ben Nachman,” MGWJ 9 (1860): 175-195. For the 
publication history of the various versions, see Mauro Perani, “Mistica e Filosofia: 
La Mediazione di Nahmanide nella Polemica sugli Scritti di Maimonide,” in Correnti 
Culturali e Movimenti Religiosi del Giudaismo, ed. by Bruno Chiesa (Rome, 1987) (Atti 
del V Congresso internazionale dell’ Associazione Italiana per lo Studio del Giudaismo [AISG 
Testi e Studi 5]), p. 239, n. 35.
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interpret or publicize it.”6
This appears to be perfectly clear, and indeed it is. The ban on private 
study of the Guide should be revoked, but a ban on group study should 
remain (or be instituted). Nonetheless, Chavel, following Ze’ev Jawitz, 
was persuaded by a later passage (which we shall examine presently) 
that Nahmanides did not want any ban at all against the Guide. A reader 
who regards such a conclusion as firmly established can force this text to 
conform to it. Thus, the ban might apply to those who speak arrogantly 
and who mock Rabbinic texts, but for those who study the Guide in 
groups, a fearsome hand (without a ban) is sufficient. Chavel himself 
goes even further than this. His English translation of the letter reads 
as follows: 
...to excommunicate, ban, and desolate every “tongue that maketh great 
boasts,” while God will crush whoever mocks the Agadoth (homilies) or 
speaks boldly [and disparagingly] about the Scriptural supports [for Rabbinic 
interpretations]. Concerning those who engage [themselves] in group study of 
the book Moreh Nebuchim, lay the hand of your fear upon their mouth.7
This translation appears to limit the ban to those who make 
unspecified “great boasts” without applying it even to those who mock 
the Rabbis. As for group study of the Guide, Chavel explains in his note 
to the last line that “lay the hand of your fear upon their mouth” means, 
“Your fear will leave them awestricken, unable to contravene your word.” 
Any formal ban against organized study of the Guide has been made to 
disappear.8 The language of the Saraval manuscript, however, links the 
6 Kitvei Ramban I, p. 349. Aggadot are the non-legal pronouncements of the Rabbis; 
asmakhtot are Scriptural citations used to buttress Rabbinic laws. On the parenthetical 
phrase והיא מן המידה, which I have left untranslated, see n. 8. 
7 Nahmanides, Writings and Discourses, translated by Charles B. Chavel (New York, 1978), 
vol. 2, p. 409.
8 Two additional points make the story of Chavel’s understanding of this passage even 
more interesting. 1. His translation continues, “This is the proper measure [of action], 
for the charge of the great Rabbi [Maimonides], its author, was as follows: ‘Do not 
explain it or publicize it.’” Presumably, he takes the first clause to mean that striking 
fear without a ban is the proper measure of action. The clause itself, however (והיא מן 
 ,does not appear in the text utilized in the later printings of Kitvei Ramban ,(המידה
a text which forms the basis for Chavel’s translation of the letter as a whole; it is, 
rather, borrowed from the text he used in the first two printings (see the end of this 
note), where it substitutes for a line in the current text and, as Perles remarked in his 
apparatus (MGWJ 9 (1860): 193, n. 15), defies comprehension. Chavel has not only 
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treatment of those who study the Guide in groups even more tightly to 
those who mock the Rabbis and speaks unambiguously of a ban.
מדבר  לשון  על  ולשמת  לנדות  קיימא  של  ולקשר  לאגודה  ותהיו  לפניכם  מלכות  דבר  ויצא 
עוסקי  ועל  האסמכתות  על  פה  מרחיב  או  ההגדות  על  המלעיג  יצמת,  אלהים  אשר  גדולות 
ולא  תפרסמוהו  לא  היא  המחבר  הגדול  הרב  מצות  כי  כתות.  כתות  הנבוכים  מורה  בספר 
תפרשוהו.
Thus, the Rabbis should ban “the tongue speaking arrogantly which 
God will destroy, one who mocks the aggadot or opens his mouth against 
the asmakhtot, and those who study the Guide of the Perplexed in groups.” 
Here there is no room for maneuver. Group study of the Guide is to be 
placed under a ban.9 Let us now continue with Chavel’s text:
ואם אתם רבותינו תסכימו עם חכמי פרובינצה וגם אנחנו נצא בעקבותיכם, תחזקו הדבר הזה 
בחרם ואלה, ברעם וברעש ובקול המולה גדולה ולהב אש אוכלה ובמלחמת תנופה עבדותו 
הרדפה הן למות הן לשרושי הן לענוש נכסין ולאסורין הלא די בזה תקנה וגרר.
And if you our Rabbis will agree with the Provencal sages and we too 
will follow in your footsteps, you will strengthen this matter with an 
excommunication and curse, with thunderous noise, a great roaring sound, 
the blaze of consuming fire, and sweeping warfare, engaging in pursuit unto 
death, uprooting, confiscation of possessions, or imprisonment [cf. Ezra 
7:26]; with this step there will be a sufficient enactment and restraint.10 
borrowed it from the other version; he has changed its location in order to provide 
the necessary transition. (In the current Hebrew printings, it appears in parentheses 
in its new location.) 2. In the version published in the first two printings, we find 
the erroneous reading תשימו יד מוראכם אל פיכם (“place your fearsome hand to your [not 
“their”] mouth”). In his note to that line, Chavel commented, “The intention is that 
you should place your hand to your mouth by refraining from issuing a curse and an 
excommunication, but only an enactment and restraint, as he explains later.” In the later 
printings, this note has, of course, disappeared, but the overall interpretation which it 
presumably supported remains intact. (The truth is that even in the first version this 
reading was virtually impossible to sustain because of the immediate continuation.)
To clarify these two points, let me present the relevant lines in Chavel’s first printings, 
which correspond to the text in Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam (Leipzig, 1859), sec. 3, p. 
10a:
הנבוכים  מורה  ספר  עוסקי  ואל  המדה.  מן  והיא  קימא  של  ולקשר  לאגודה  ותהיו  מלפניכם  דבר  ויצא   
ולא  תפרשוהו  לא  לאמר:  הוא  המחברו  הגדול  הרב  מצות  כי  פיכם  אל  מוראכם  יד  תשימו  כתות  כתות 
תפרסמוהו.
9 Perles’ ed., p. 193. The point is that this text leaves us no syntactic option at all. ועל 
.לנדות ולשמת can only be governed by עוסקי בספר מורה הנבוכים כתות כתות
10 Kitvei Ramban, p. 349. The word that I have translated “pursuit” (hardafah) is actually 
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The last part of this sentence is the crux of our problem. As I have 
translated it, it means that a stringent ban against those who mock the 
Sages and study the Guide in groups is sufficient to address the legitimate 
concerns of the Northern French Rabbis; there is no need for a general 
ban against the Guide, let alone the Sefer ha-Maddac. The exaggerated 
rhetoric is there to persuade the Rabbis of the North that the narrow 
ban Nahmanides proposes is more than a symbolic gesture; at the same 
time, no one took literally the references to death and imprisonment 
taken from Ezra 7:26. This rhetoric does not obscure the main thrust of 
the proposal, which is the abolition of the key ban. Thus, Nahmanides 
can continue, as we shall see, with a description emphasizing the irenic 
character of his recommendation.
Jawitz, however, and Chavel after him, did not see the possibility 
of this reading or did not find it plausible in light of the continuation 
emphasizing peaceful persuasion. Thus, Chavel translates, “An ordinance 
and safeguard will suffice for this [problem].”11 In other words, this 
clause explicitly rules out any ban. How, then, can this be reconciled 
with the categorical statement, “You will strengthen this matter with 
an excommunication...”? There is only one solution to the problem, and 
it was proposed as self-evident by Jawitz. The little word “not” (lo) is 
missing from the text. Hence, read, “Do not strengthen this matter with 
an excommunication.”
Jawitz was so certain of this that in his critique of Graetz’s 
understanding of the letter, he wrote the following remarkable 
footnote:
It may well be that a little word, the word lo which is missing between 
‘footsteps’ and ‘strengthen’ in the Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam before me, is 
also missing in the other versions of the letter to which I do not currently 
have access; perhaps (sic!) this is what caused Graetz to err. But who can 
fail to see that every word in the remainder of this passage demonstrates 
its [erroneous] omission, indeed proclaims that omission in the loudest 
tones?”12 
the Talmud’s explanation of the word I have translated “uprooting” (sheroshi); hardafah 
is in turn defined as excommunication. See Bav. Moced Qatan 16a.
11 Writings and Discourses, p. 411.
12 Ze’ev Jawitz, Toledot Yisrael, vol. 12 (Tel Aviv, 1954), p. 183. Jawitz’s conviction was 
certainly reinforced by the fact that he was working with the text that reads, “Place 
your fearsome hand to your mouth.” (See above, n. 8.)
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Although Chavel did not incorporate this emendation into his text, 
he cited it in a note, inserted it in brackets into his English translation, 
and predicated his entire understanding of the letter upon its validity. 
In the most recent study of the letter, Mauro Perani does not address 
this textual issue directly; nonetheless, his unqualified assertion that 
Nahmanides simply proposed the annulling of the ban indicates quite 
clearly that he reads the passage along the same lines.13 I hesitate to 
say that this reading is the current state of the question—despite the 
crucial role of this letter in the controversy, there probably is no state 
of the question. What is certain is that this is a central position in 
current scholarship and the reigning impression among lay readers of 
the standard edition.14
I have already alluded to the irenic continuation of the letter and its 
impact on the deletion of the ban from the text by some scholars. Here, 
then, is that continuation, again following Chavel’s text:
במרעה השלום תנהלו הצאן ובנאות האהבה תרביצו העדר, ועוד ראוי לכם להזהיר בנחת את 
13 “Mistica e Filosofia” (n. 5), p. 251. 
14 Neither Schochet nor Septimus clearly articulates his understanding of Nahmanides’ 
position, though both properly refer the reader to Perles’ edition. Schochet discusses only 
Nahmanides’ proposal to annul the ban and tells his reader nothing about the concomitant 
recommendation to ban group study of the Guide; see “Berurim” (n. 1), p. 44.
 In his Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy 1180-1240 (Leiden, 1965), 
Daniel Jeremy Silver, who used the edition in Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam, reported that 
Nahmanides “suggests peace and a withdrawal of the ban as the sole remedy; if not the 
withdrawal of the whole ban, at least of that part which subjects the Mishneh Torah” 
(p. 171). This summary, which misses the distinction between private and public study 
of the Guide while accurately reflecting Nahhmanides’ far greater enthusiasm for the 
Mishneh Torah, is an indication of Silver’s own struggle to determine the bottom line 
of this text.
 The other book-length treatment of the controversy (Joseph Sarachek, Faith and Reason: 
The Conflict over the Rationalism of Maimonides [Williamsport, Penn., 1935]) maintains 
that Nahmanides urged that the ban be revoked. “In the first place, it should never 
have been enacted.... Under no circumstances...should the Book of Knowledge, a part 
of the Code, have been prohibited because it could not be put in the same category 
as the Guide.... On the other hand, extreme caution must be exercised in using the 
Guide. Maimonides himself urged that it not be studied save under certain stipulations, 
particularly, that people occupying themselves with it be mature in age and steeped in 
rabbinic literature” (pp. 116-118). In other words, no ban at all should remain, even 
against the Guide, although the latter should be studied only by properly qualified 
readers. Here again, the author’s struggle to make sense of a challenging text is painfully 
evident.
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הכל להניח העסק מכל וכל, ירא שמים ישוב וישקוד על ספר תורה שבכתב ותורה שבעל פה, 
לכם להוכיח  אפשר  שאי  ישמע והחדל יחדל,  תגדל, השומע  מעלתנו  בית חיינו ובזה  כי הוא 
כי  אף  גדולים,  חכמים  מזה  ליסר  העולם  אבות  נהגו  ובזה  חסידים.  להיות  ישראל  כל  לכוף 
ז״ל  גאון  האי  רבינו  בתשובת  שמצאתי  כמו  ללמוד,  המתחילים  התלמידים  ההגיון  מן  למנוע 
לנגיד מ״כ שכתב לו בלשון הזה: 'תקון הגוף ומישור הנהגת האדם הוא עסק המשנה והתלמוד, 
תורה  מעליו  יסיר  בלבד,  ההם  בדברים  ויתעסק  מזה  לבו  יסיר  ואשר  לישראל…  טוב  ואשר 
ויראת שמים, ויפסיד עצמו באותן הענינים הכתובים בספרים החצונים, ויסיר מעליו כל דברי 
התפלה…  לעזיבת  יחוש  שלא  עד  דעתו  שישבש  לאדם  יארע  ההסרה  ומזאת  לגמרי.  תורה 
ואם תראה שאותן בני אדם המתעסקים באותן הדברים ודרכי הפילוסופיא יאמרו לך שהיא 
דרך סלולה ושבזה ישיגו לידיעת הבורא, לא תאבה להם, ודע כי יכזבו לך באמת. ולא תמצא 
יראת חטא וענוה וקדושה אלא באותם המתעסקים במשנה ובתלמוד ובחכמה יחד, לא בדברי 
חכמה בלבד'.
Guide the sheep in a peaceful pasture and rest the flock in meadows of 
love. It is also proper for you to admonish everyone gently to set aside the 
pursuit (ha-ceseq) altogether, so that a Godfearing individual will return to 
diligent study of the written and oral Torah, for this is the abode of our life 
and through this will our standing increase. He who listens will listen, and 
he who refrains will refrain, for you can not admonish and compel all Israel 
to be saints. In such fashion were the fathers of the world accustomed to 
reprove even great scholars to refrain from this, and all the more to prevent 
beginning students from pursuing philosophy (higgayon), as I have found 
in a responsum of R. Hai Gaon of blessed memory to the Nagid, may his 
rest be honored, in which he wrote him as follows: “The perfection of the 
body and proper human behavior is [the result of] the pursuit of Mishnah 
and Talmud; this is what is good for Israel.... Anyone who removes his heart 
from this and pursues those matters alone will remove from himself Torah 
and the fear of heaven; he will ruin himself with those matters written in 
external books and will entirely remove from himself all the words of the 
Torah. And this removal will result in the confusion of a person’s mind to 
the point where he will not be concerned about abandoning prayer.... If 
you will see that those people who pursue those matters and the ways of 
philosophy tell you that this is a paved road which enables them to attain 
knowledge of God, do not heed them, and know that they are in fact lying 
to you. You will not find fear of sin, humility and sanctity except in those 
who study Mishnah, Talmud, and wisdom together, not matters of wisdom 
alone.”15
The authenticity of R. Hai’s letter is in question, but this difficult 
15 Kitvei Ramban, pp. 349-350. Whatever the meaning of higgayon may be in its original 
Talmudic context (Bav. Berakhot 28b), in this letter it appears to refer to philosophy.
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problem need not detain us here.16 There is no persuasive reason to 
believe that it was interpolated into Nahmanides’ letter, and our concern 
here is with Nahmanides, not with R. Hai.17 In the text printed by Chavel, 
which is distinguished by the words I have italicized, the Gaon opposes 
the exclusive study of philosophy but explicitly approves the study of 
“wisdom” along with Torah. Jawitz, Chavel, and Perano endorse this 
version as consistent with what they believe to be the overall tenor of 
the letter. This reading, however, must overcome nearly insuperable 
obstacles.
First of all, it is difficult to sustain even in its original setting. Did R. 
Hai really have to polemicize against the position that one should study 
no Torah at all? Moreover, Nahmanides introduces the Gaon’s letter by 
saying that one should gently admonish people “to set aside the pursuit 
(ha-ceseq) altogether.” This has to mean that philosophy should not be 
studied at all. Jawitz apparently took the “pursuit” here to mean study 
of the Guide in groups, while Chavel and Perano take it as “excessive 
study of the Guide”;18 given their version of the quotation from R. Hai, 
such desperate efforts are understandable, but they are implausible in 
the extreme.
The Saraval manuscript as well as other citations of R. Hai’s letter 
omit the crucial words בלבד (alone) [in the phrase “those matters alone”] 
and בלבד חכמה  בדברי  לא  יחד,   and wisdom together, not matters) ובחכמה 
of wisdom alone).19 Thus, R. Hai criticizes one who removes his heart 
16 I have discussed this question in my essay in Judaism’s Encounter (see n. 2), pp. 
68-69. The most careful recent analysis is in Amos Goldreich’s dissertation, Sefer 
Me’irat ‘Einayim le-Rav Yitzhak de-min ‘Akko (Jerusalem, 1981; Pirsumei ha-Makhon 
le-Limmudim Mitqaddemim, 1984), pp. 405-407. Goldreich is inclined to accept the 
authenticity of the letter; I am more inclined to be skeptical.
17 Graetz, who first challenged the authenticity of R. Hai’s letter, also expressed suspicion 
that it was interpolated into our text. Once the first position is affirmed, the second 
has the advantage of avoiding the conclusion that Nahmanides was misled by a forgery. 
See H. Graetz, “Ein pseudoepigraphischen Sendschreiben, angeblich von Hai Gaon an 
Samuel Nagid,” MGWJ 11 (1862): 37-40.
18 Chavel may equate excessive study with study in groups. See Kitvei Ramban, p. 349, 
n. 62: ,'העסק, השקידה היתירה על ספר המורה. מבואר שכל עצמה של הצעת רבינו היתה 'להזהיר בנחת 
בחבורה זה  בתלמוד  עסוק  לבלתי  וגדר  תקנה  רק  איסור,  גזרת  שום  לגזור  לא   Perano (“Mistica e .אבל 
Filosofia,” p. 251), clearly influenced by Chavel’s formulation, speaks of “un tempo 
eccessivo dedicato allo studio del Moreh,” while Chavel’s English translation of “lehaniah 
ha-‘eseq mi-kol ve-khol” reads (p. 411), “To completely desist from engaging abundantly 
[in the study of the Moreh Nebuchim]” (bracketed phrase in the original).
19 Perles’ ed., p. 194. The quotation from R. Hai in the Saraval manuscript differs in 
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from Torah and studies those matters—not those matters alone—and he 
asserts that you will find fear of sin, humility, and sanctity only in those 
who study Mishnah and Talmud—not in those who study Mishnah and 
Talmud along with philosophy. The point is that someone who turns his 
attention from the exclusive study of Torah will eventually reach the point 
of removing himself from Torah entirely. In this version, both R. Hai 
and Nahmanides present a coherent argument. The study of philosophy 
should be discouraged, period.
What, then, did Nahmanides propose to resolve the Maimonidean 
controversy? First, the ban on the Sefer ha-Maddac, which is a wonderful 
book, must be lifted. Second, the ban on the Guide, a ban which currently 
applies to private as well as public study, must be lifted as well. Third, a 
ban on group study of the Guide should be instituted. Fourth and finally, 
the study of philosophy should be entirely discouraged, but gently and 
without a ban.
Read in this fashion, the letter is smooth and clear—but the fourth 
point remains troubling. Nahmanides had studied Maimonidean 
philosophy, and he continued to do so. The letter of R. Hai is explicitly 
directed to a great scholar, and so we cannot easily appeal to special 
dispensation for exceptional people. I am inclined to think that this 
provision results in part from the exigencies of the moment and in part 
from a genuine element in the complex psyche of the author. Nahmanides 
was of two minds as he struggled with the question of philosophical 
study. In his own very capable hands, it could be a useful handmaiden 
of the Torah; for most others, it was fraught with peril. The gentle 
discouragement of this pursuit—even if applied to scholars—was by no 
means bad public policy, particularly if it could persuade the Northern 
Rabbis to withdraw their damaging ban.20
Faced with a major communal crisis, Nahmanides crafted a delicately 
balanced resolution. Even though the proposal was never implemented in 
all its details, it may well have been instrumental in helping to defuse a 
other, minor ways from the passage I have reproduced from Chavel’s edition, but these 
changes are not sufficiently significant to detain us here. On other citations of R. Hai’s 
letter, see Ozar ha-Geonim to Hagigah, pp. 65-66, and the literature noted by Goldreich, 
Sefer Me’irat ‘Einayim (above, n. 16).
20 Note that despite his observation that even great scholars were admonished against 
philosophical study, Nahmanides makes a point of indicating the special importance 
of discouraging beginning students.
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situation which jeopardized cordial intellectual and communal interaction 
among the three great centers of European Jewry in the formative period 
of their relationship. I suspect that the rabbis of Northern France regarded 
Nahmanides’ suggestion as so nuanced that pursuing it would only lead 
them deeper into the morass. After reading it they decided that they 
should leave this matter in the hands of the local authorities, and they 
simply withdrew from the fray, perhaps after a formal revocation of their 
ban.21 In the final analysis, it is more than likely that this was precisely 
what Nahmanides preferred and precisely what the Jews of Europe 
needed as they shaped their distinctive cultural and religious profiles 
aware of one another but driven by diverse instincts and aspirations to 
produce the rich and varied tapestry of a united and divided people.
21 For evidence that Nahmanides’ letter had a significant impact on the Northern French 
Rabbis, see Shohet, “Berurim,” p. 44.
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MIRACLES AND THE NATURAL ORDER IN 
NAHMANIDES*
From: Rabbi Moses Nahmanides (Ramban): Explorations in his Religious and 
Literary Virtuosity, ed. by Isadore Twersky (Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, Mass., 1983), pp. 107-128.
The centrality of miracles in Nahmanides’ theology cannot escape the 
attention of even the most casual observer, and his doctrine of the 
hidden miracle exercised a particularly profound and abiding influence 
on subsequent Jewish thought. Nevertheless, his repeated emphasis on 
the miraculous—and particularly the unrestrained rhetoric of a few key 
passages—has served to obscure and distort his true position, which 
was far more moderate, nuanced and complex than both medieval and 
modern scholars have been led to believe.
I
To Nahmanides, miracles serve as the ultimate validation of all three 
central dogmas of Judaism: creation ex nihilo, divine knowledge, and 
providence (hiddush, yedi‘ah, hashgahah).1 In establishing the relationship 
between miracles and his first dogma, Nahmanides applies a philosophical 
argument in a particularly striking way. “According to the believer in the 
eternity of the world,” he writes, “if God wished to shorten the wing of 
* Some of the issues analyzed in this article were discussed in a more rudimentary form 
in chapters one, three, and four of my master’s essay, “Nahmanides’ Attitude Toward 
Secular Learning and its Bearing upon his Stance in the Maimonidean Controversy” 
(Columbia University, 1965), which was directed by Prof. Gerson D. Cohen.
 1 Torat HaShem Temimah (henceforth THT), in Kitvei Ramban, ed. by Ch. Chavel I (Jerusalem, 
1963), p. 150. On Nahmanides’ dogmas and their connection with miracles, see S. 
Schechter, “Nachmanides,” in Studies in Judaism I (Philadelphia, 1878), pp. 118-122, and 
Ch. Henoch, Ha-Ramban ke-Hoqer ve-ki-Mequbbal (Jerusalem, 1978), pp. 159-179.
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a fly or lengthen the leg of an ant he would be unable to do so.”2 Hence, 
miracles demonstrate creation.
The reverse contention that creation demonstrates the possibility of 
miracles is an assertion which goes back to Philo.3 In this case, however, 
Nahmanides is applying to miracles an argument that Saadya had used 
about the fundamental hypothesis of creation from primeval matter. 
Such creation, the Gaon had contended, would have been impossible, 
since “God would not have [had] the power to create things out of” pre-
existent matter; “it would not have accepted his command nor allowed 
itself to be affected according to his wish and shaped according to his 
design.”4 The direct source of Nahmanides’ imagery, however, is not 
Saadya but Maimonides. In discussing the Aristotelian version of the 
eternity of the universe, Maimonides remarked that if the world operates 
through necessity and not through will, “very disgraceful conclusions 
will follow… Namely, it would follow that the deity, whom everyone 
intelligent recognizes to be perfect in every kind of perfection, could, as 
far as all the beings are concerned, produce nothing new in any of them; 
if He wished to lengthen a fly’s wing or shorten a worm’s foot, He would 
not be able to do it.”5
The glaring anomaly in Nahmanides’ borrowing of this vivid image 
is that Maimonides applied the argument not to any denial of ex nihilo 
creation but only to an Aristotelian universe governed by necessity; 
2 THT, p. 146. All translations from Nahmanides’ works are mine.
3 H. A. Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1948) I, pp. 298-299, 354; II, pp. 199-
200. Cf. also the references in Wolfson’s Religious Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1961), p. 223.
4 Translation from A. Altmann’s selections in Three Jewish Philosophers (Cleveland, New 
York, and Philadelphia, 1960), p. 61 = The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, translated by S. 
Rosenblatt (New Haven, 1948), p. 48. Halevi (Kuzari I.91, and cf. V.14) also spoke of a 
connection between miracles and creation; he was, however, less dogmatic about the 
indispensability of the belief in creation ex nihilo since “a believer in the Torah” who 
accepted the reality of eternal hylic matter could nevertheless retain the conviction 
that “this world was renewed at a certain time and the beginning of humanity is Adam 
and Eve” (I.67; contrast, however, II.50). Apparently Halevi’s characteristic skepticism 
about the decisive force of philosophical arguments—in this case the demonstration 
of a link between miracles and ex nihilo creation—ironically enables him to tolerate a 
radical philosophical position more readily than Saadya or Nahmanides. (On the other 
hand, he may have been thinking of a specific refutation of this link, perhaps along the 
lines of the argument that we shall be examining shortly.)
5 Guide II. 22 (Pines’ translation).
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according to the “Platonic” version of eternity, miracles are possible.6 
Maimonides, in fact, practically begins his discussion of the question 
of creation by describing how the Platonic approach can maintain both 
the eternity of matter and divine control over it by appealing to an 
analogy with the potter’s relationship to his clay. Here is a case in which 
control is manifestly not dependent upon creation or even chronological 
priority.7
Since Nahmanides uses only the word hiddush (not creation me-‘ayin) 
in connection with this argument in his Torat Ha-Shem Temimah and since 
Maimonides at one point uses the word hiddush about the Platonic view of 
eternity,8 there is a fleeting temptation to suggest that Nahmanides was 
not pressing this particular argument, at least to the discerning reader, 
beyond the point where Maimonides had taken it. This temptation, 
however, must almost certainly be resisted, for we find Nahmanides 
using the same argument (though without the Maimonidean language) 
in his Commentary to Exodus explicitly about creation ex nihilo; miracles 
demonstrate hiddush by showing that everything is God’s since he created 
it from nothing.9 Nahmanides nowhere addresses the “Platonic” analogy 
with the potter, and it must be said that, in the very same chapter of 
the Guide where he presents the analogy, Maimonides himself suggests 
that the Aristotelian and Platonic versions of creation do not differ 
significantly in the eyes of one who follows the Torah.10 Hence, it may 
well be that Nahmanides was disarmed by Maimonides’ ambiguities and 
was not fully cognizant of the disparity between his use of the “fly’s 
wing” image and the use to which it was put in his source.
In any event, we are left to speculate about Nahmanides’ response 
to the potter analogy. He may have felt that the potter’s control over 
his clay is far too restricted to serve as a paradigm for God’s power over 
the world. Perhaps more significantly, he might have argued that this 
analogy begs the question since the control of a potter over his clay is 
6 Guide II. 25.
7 Guide II. 13.
8 Guide II. 25. The word appears in Al-Harizi’s translation (II. 26), which was the one 
Nahmanides used, as well as in Ibn Tibbon’s.
9 To Exodus 13:16.
10 Guide II. 13. Cf. also the end of n. 14 below. For some of the peculiarities in Maimonides’ 
treatment of Platonic eternity, see H. Davidson, “Maimonides’ Secret Position 
on Creation,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. by I. Twersky 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1979), pp. 16-40.
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ultimately derived from God (Genesis 1:28; Psalms 8:7), but God’s own 
power must be called into question if matter is primeval. Miracles are 
possible only, to use Shem Tov’s play on a talmudic phrase, because “the 
mouth which prohibited is the one which permitted.”11
However Nahmanides may have dealt with this question, the most 
telling aspect of his presentation involves the sharpening of another, 
related point made by Saadya. To the Gaon, the denial of creation ex 
nihilo is motivated by the excessive empiricism of people who believe only 
what their eyes see and what their senses perceive,12 and Nahmanides 
twice refers to Aristotle as a man who believed only what he could 
sense.13 In light of this perception, the argument from miracles can be 
sharpened into a remarkably effective polemical weapon: since miracles 
are an empirical datum, and they establish creation ex nihilo through a 
straightforward philosophical demonstration, the affirmation of eternity 
is a rejection of empiricism. “Hence you see the stubbornness of the leader 
of the philosophers, may his name be erased, for he denies a number of 
things that many have seen, whose truth we ourselves have witnessed, 
and which have become famous in the world.”14 The arch-empiricist is 
revealed as a pseudo-empiricist.
In an important way, this argument exemplifies Nahmanides’ 
fundamental philosophical stance. Because revelation—and hence 
the content of the revelation—is an empirical datum, there is hardly 
much point in wasting energy and ingenuity in demonstrating such 
11 Commentary to Guide II. 25.
12 For example, Beliefs and Opinions I, Rosenblatt’s translation, pp. 38-39, 61-62, 71, 76.
13 THT, p. 147; Comm. to Lev. 16:18.
14 THT, p. 147. Saadya’s attack against the empiricism of believers in eternity usually 
took the form of arguing that they too end by believing in things that they have 
never experienced (cf. the references in n. 12). He does appeal to miracles as well 
(e.g. Rosenblatt’s translation, pp. 40, 58, 73), but on at least one of those occasions 
(and probably the others too) he seems to have in mind the less direct argument that 
miracles validate Scripture, which in turn teaches the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. In 
any case, he never formulates the argument found in Nahmanides as clearly, sharply, 
or effectively.
 In Maimonides’ “fly’s wing” passage, the argument was based not on the fact that God 
had demonstrated his control of the world but on the assertion that lack of such control 
would be a philosophically inadmissible imperfection in the deity. In the Treatise on 
the Resurrection, however (ed. by. J. Finkel [New York, 1939], p. 32, #46), which was 
directed to a more popular audience, Maimonides did argue that miracles demonstrate 
hiddush “as we have explained in the Guide.” Most readers were not likely to realize that 
this hiddush can include Platonic eternity.
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things as God’s existence or unity, and Nahmanides never bothers with 
such philosophical exercises. At the same time, the use of reason to 
understand God, creation, and other key theological issues is essential. 
Those who spurn an investigation into theodicy on the grounds that it 
will inevitably remain a mystery are “fools who despise wisdom. For we 
shall benefit ourselves in the above-mentioned study by becoming wise 
men who know God in the manner in which he acts and in his deeds; 
furthermore, we shall become believers endowed with a stronger faith 
in him than others.”15
In our case, the reality of miracles is taken for granted, and the 
connection with creation ex nihilo is made by a philosophical argument. 
Without denigrating the use of reason, Nahmanides has eliminated 
the boundary between revelation and reason by incorporating revealed 
information, openly and unselfconsciously, into what might be described 
as the data base for philosophical analysis. It is this approach which 
accounts for his discussing theological issues primarily in the context of 
a commentary to the revelation,16 and it is this, I think, which attracted 
him to kabbalah. Nahmanides’ mysticism, after all, is essentially a revealed 
philosophical system, and the function of kabbalah as a harmonizing 
force subsuming both reason and revelation may well precede and 
transcend Nahmanides to account for the attractiveness of medieval 
Jewish mysticism in precisely the time and place where it first became a 
major force. It is no accident that late twelfth-century Provençal Jewry 
was the locus of both the rise of kabbalah and a confrontation with 
philosophy by a Jewish community without a philosophical tradition. 
Jewish mysticism provided an ideal solution for a mind captivated by 
the philosophic quest but committed only to authentic, revealed sources. 
The Talmud, it is true, spoke of the danger that esoteric investigation 
could lead to heresy; nonetheless, the perils posed by the study of 
15 Sha‘ar ha-Gemul, in Kitvei Ramban II, p. 281. The phrase “fools who despise wisdom” 
 וכסילים ישנאו) though based, as Chavel remarks, on Proverbs 1:22 ,הכסילים מואסי החכמה)
 is borrowed from a similar discussion in Saadya: “Many people have erred and ,(דעת
despised wisdom (בחכמה  some because they did not know the way to it, while ,(מאסו 
some knew and entered the path but did not complete it… Therefore, let not the 
contemptuous fool (הכסיל הקץ) blame God for his sin.” My translation from Ibn Tibbon’s 
Hebrew. See Sefer ha-Emunot ve-ha-De‘ot (Józewów, 1878) I, p. 41 = Rosenblatt’s 
translation, p. 13. On the reading הקץ הקץ not) הכסיל  או   see M. Ventura, La ,(הכסיל 
Philosophie de Saadia Gaon (Paris, 1934), p. 311.
16 Cf. Chavel, Ramban: His Life and Teachings (New York, I960), pp. 67-68.
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esoteric doctrines revealed by God pale in comparison with the heresies 
awaiting a student of ultimate questions whose only guides are reason 
and Aristotle.17 Within the kabbalistic system, the boundary between 
revelation and philosophy was completely erased, so that Nahmanides 
and like-minded contemporaries could satisfy their yearning for what 
might best be termed not a religious philosophy but a philosophical 
religion.
This commitment to kabbalah raises a crucial final question 
concerning the sincerity of the argument that we have been examining. 
Nahmanides demonstrates creation ex nihilo through an appeal to 
miracles—but did he really believe in creation ex nihilo? Scholem has 
shown that the mystical school in Gerona, of which Nahmanides was the 
most prominent representative, turned the naive understanding of the 
term on its head and understood ‘ayin (= nihil) as a word for the hidden 
recesses of the Godhead itself; creation is a process of emanation from 
the divine Nothing, not the sudden appearance of matter from ordinary 
nothingness.18 Although there may be a certain disingenuousness in 
the kabbalist’s use of this term to an uninitiated audience, Nahmanides’ 
argument remains relatively unaffected and must almost certainly be 
regarded as sincere. The kabbalistic doctrine continues to assert—indeed, 
to insist—that the process of creation precludes the primeval existence 
of matter independent of God; even from a mystical perspective, then, 
the argument from miracles can be mobilized to deny the existence of 
such independent matter, and that is essentially what Nahmanides has 
done. Whether the alternative is creation from nothing or from Nothing 
depends on the reader’s kabbalistic sophistication, but Nahmanides’ 
appeal to miracles in support of his first dogma remains both ingenious 
and ingenuous.19
17 Though he is referring to a later period, A. S. Halkin’s remarks can be applied to the 
twelfth century as well: “Its [kabbalah’s] concern with fundamental problems and 
its incorporation of philosophical concepts into a system which vaunted a purely 
Jewish ancestry and claimed that it represented the deepest understanding of the 
revealed books, qualified it both to satisfy the curiosity of those who sought answers 
to theological and cosmological questions and to challenge Aristotelianism and its 
Jewish exponents as alien plants within Jewry.” “Yedaiah Bedersi’s Apology,” in Jewish 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. by A. Altmann (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967), 
p. 183.
18 Scholem’s most elaborate discussion is in Ha-Qabbalah be-Gerona, pp. 212-240.
19 For the possibility that Nahmanides may have attempted somehow to salvage the 
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II
Nahmanides goes on to assert that miracles—or more precisely, manifest 
miracles—validate the remaining two dogmas of divine knowledge 
and providence.20 The connection here is so obvious as to be scarcely 
interesting, but it is in this discussion of the nature of providence that 
Nahmanides cites his central, seminal doctrine of the hidden miracle—
and that doctrine is exceptionally interesting. Although similar views 
had been expressed earlier by Bahya, Halevi, and even Maimonides,21 
straightforward understanding of creation ex nihilo within a mystical framework, see 
Ha-Qabbalah be-Gerona, pp. 255-265, esp. 261-265. On the subject of straightforward 
versus esoteric biblical exegesis (peshat vs. sod), A. Funkenstein has recently written that 
“peshat and sod correspond [or ‘overlap’—hofefim] in only one place [in Nahmanides’ 
exegesis]: kabbalah is the central dimension in understanding the reason for sacrifices 
(Comm. to Lev. 1:9). Everywhere else peshat and sod are different, and in Genesis 1:1 this 
reaches the point of syntactical contradiction: according to ‘the way of genuine truth,’ 
the word ‘God’ is not the subject of the verse but rather its object” (“Parshanuto ha-
Tippologit shel ha-Ramban,” Zion 45 [1980]:46-47). Cf. also H. H. Ben Sasson, “Rabbi 
Moshe ben Nahman: Ish be-Sivkhei Tequfato,” Molad, n.s. 1 (1967):360, 362-363.
 In fact, however, Nahmanides displays a pronounced tendency to equate peshat and 
sod by finding that the plain meaning of Scripture can be explained satisfactorily—or 
most satisfactorily—only by resorting to kabbalistic doctrine. Thus, only the esoteric 
interpretation pointing to metempsychosis really “fits the verses” of Elihu’s critical 
speech in Job (Comm. to Job 32:3), only according to the kabbalistic interpretation is the 
sin of Moses and Aaron “mentioned explicitly in the biblical text” (Comm. to Numbers 
20:1), only a midrash requiring kabbalistic elaboration ‘fits the language of the verse 
best” in Genesis 6:4, only after understanding a mystical secret in connection with the 
second commandment will “the entire verse become clear in accordance with its simple, 
straightforward meaning” (Comm. to Exodus 20:3), and Exodus 6:2-3 will reveal its 
“simple, straightforward meaning” (Comm. ad loc.) “with nothing missing or superfluous” 
(Sermon on Qohelet, Kitvei Ramban I, p. 192) only through kabbalistic exegesis. Cf. also 
Scholem’s remark about the Commentary to Job, Ha-Qabbalah be-Gerona, p. 75, specifically 
with respect to Job 28 (cf. too p. 230). It is particularly significant that although 
Nahmanides endorses the content of the kabbalistic doctrine read into that chapter 
by his source (R. Ezra’s commentary to the Song of Songs), he expresses reservations 
(not noted by Scholem) about the validity of the exegesis (Kitvei Ramban I, p. 90). In 
a sense, this underlines the point; if Nahmanides were prepared to find sod through 
forced interpretation, he would have accepted such exegesis without resistance. On the 
importance of peshat to Nahmanides, see also J. Perles, “Über den Geist des Commentars 
des R. Moses ben Nachman zum Pentateuch und über sein Verhältniss zum Pentateuch-
Commentar Raschi’s,” MGWJ  7 (1858):119-120, esp. n. 2.
20 THT, pp. 150, 155.
21 See Ha-Qabbalah be-Gerona, pp. 305, 309. Nahmanides himself (THT, p. 154) noted that 
Maimonides’ Treatise on the Resurrection contains a passage supporting his view; the 
passage he had in mind, which certainly influenced him, was without question the one 
— 136 —
The Cultural Environment: Challenge and Response
no previous Jewish thinker had laid equivalent emphasis on such a 
conception, applied it as widely, or made it as central to his world view. 
The hidden miracle, then, justly came to be regarded as a Nahmanidean 
doctrine par excellence, and the intellectual image of Nahmanides has 
often been drawn in significant measure with this doctrine in mind. 
Thus, to the extent that we have misunderstood the hidden miracle, we 
have misunderstood Nahmanides.
In at least two formulations of his position, Nahmanides permitted 
himself some rhetorical excesses that have inevitably fostered such 
misunderstanding. “A person has no portion in the Torah of Moses,” he 
writes, “without believing that all things that happen to us are miracles; 
they have nothing to do with ‘nature’ or ‘the customary order of the 
world’.”22 More succinctly, “One who believes in the Torah may not believe 
in the existence of nature at all.”23 The analysis underlying these remarks 
appears almost as a refrain throughout Nahmanides’ works: since the 
Torah promises rewards and punishments ranging from famine to plague 
to constant good health, and since there is nothing “natural” about the 
link between human behavior and such phenomena, providence must 
be realized through a series of hidden miracles disguised as part of an 
apparent natural order.24
It is hardly surprising, then, that students of Nahmanides have 
perceived him as a thinker who denied, or virtually denied, the existence 
of natural law. Solomon Schechter, for example, argues that “We may…
maintain that in Nachmanides’ system there is hardly room left for such 
a thing as nature or ‘the order of the world’… Miracles are raised to a 
place in the regular scheme of things, and the difficulty regarding the 
possibility of God’s interference with nature disappears by their very 
multiplication. [There is] an unbroken chain of miracles.”25
To Gershom Scholem, Nahmanides tends
to turn what we call the laws of nature into a sort of optical illusion, since 
we regard what is really a continuum of miracles as a manifestation of 
pointed out by Scholem (Finkel’s ed., pp: 33-36, #48-50), not the ones noted by Chavel 
in his edition of THT ad loc.
22 Comm. to Exodus 13:16; THT, p. 153.
23 Sermon on Qohelet, Kitvei Ramban I, p. 192.
24 See Comm. to Gen. 17:1, 46:15; Exod. 6:2; Lev. 18:29, 26:11.
25 “Nachmanides,” pp. 119-120.
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natural law… These hidden miracles, which are the foundation of the entire 
Torah, are miracles which do not appear miraculous to us… The world and 
the behavior of nature and their relationship to man are not at all in the 
category of what we call nature; they are, rather, a constant and constantly 
renewed miracle, a continuous chain of miracles…26 
Nahmanides’ position, Scholem says, is very close to occasionalism, a 
later philosophical school which denied natural law entirely, though there 
is one very significant exception: Nahmanides was a virtual occasionalist 
only with respect to Israel; other nations live in a world of nature.27
In his recent book on Nahmanides, Chayim Henoch makes the same 
comparison between the “constant miraculous renewal” in Nahmanides’ 
thought and both occasionalists and mutakallimun, while pointing out, like 
Scholem, that this applies only to Israel.28 Yitzhak Baer’s classic History 
presents Nahmanides as an anti-rationalist who denied the natural order, 
Haim Hillel Ben Sasson’s characterization is even more extreme and 
explicit, and a recent study by Amos Funkenstein refers somewhat more 
cautiously to “Nahmanides’ tendency to blur the boundaries between the 
natural and the miraculous.”29
There can be no question that Nahmanides perceives the operation 
of providence as a phenomenon consisting of repeated miracles. Indeed, 
he has forced himself into a position where he denies that God enters the 
causal chain in any but the most direct way.
26 Ha-Qabbalah be-Gerona, pp. 306-307.
27 Ibid., pp. 309-310.
28 Ha-Ramban ke-Hoqer ve-ki-Mequbbal, p. 178. Henoch goes on to emphasize the kabbalistic 
character of Nahmanides’ position, which we shall touch on briefly a bit later. In a much 
earlier footnote (p. 54, n. 162), he had proposed, as we shall see, a crucial additional 
qualification, but there is no echo of that note in his later discussion.
29 See Baer’s History of the Jews in Christian Spain I (Philadelphia, 1971), p. 245; Toledot 
ha-Yehudim bi-Sefarad ha-Nozrit (Tel Aviv, 1959), p. 145; Ben Sasson in Molad, n.s. 1 
(1967):360-61; Funkenstein in Zion 45 (1980):45. Ben Sasson’s discussion clearly 
implies that Nahmanides did not recognize a natural realm even in areas that do not 
impinge on human affairs; thus, it is not only “all things that happen to us” that are 
miracles. According to Nahmanides, we are prohibited from mixing species because this 
would constitute unwarranted interference with creation, a sort of hubris reflecting 
the conviction that we can improve on the divine handiwork. To Ben Sasson, the 
motivation for this interpretation stems from Nahmanides’ conviction that even such 
a “natural” phenomenon as the maintenance of species in their present form is an 
ongoing miraculous process; hence, human intervention would involve an unseemly 
attempt to compete not merely with God’s creative acts in the distant past but with 
miracles that He is performing at this very moment.
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If we will stubbornly insist that the [non-priest] who eats of the heave-
offering will not die through a change in nature, but that God will cause 
him to eat food that causes sickness or that he will go to war and die, the 
fact would remain that the astrological configuration of his constellation 
would have changed for ill through his sin or for good through his merit so 
that nature would in any event not prevail. Thus, if the alternative is that 
God would change this person’s mind as a result of his sin so that he would 
eat harmful foods that he would not have eaten otherwise, it is easier to 
change the nature of the good food so that it will do him harm.30
Since there is no conceptual difference to Nahmanides between 
indirect, “natural” providence and miraculous divine intervention, the 
workings of providence are best understood as direct hidden miracles 
unmediated by natural forces. There is therefore hardly any point in 
asking why Nahmanides does not formally list the hidden miracle as one 
of his dogmas. He does list it—under the name “providence.”31
Nevertheless, Nahmanides was forced by the Bible, the halakhah, and 
intuitions influenced by philosophy or common sense or both, to recognize 
that natural law often does operate—even for Jews and probably even for 
the Jewish collective. Consequently, a careful examination of the totality 
of Nahmanides’ comments on this issue reveals nature in operation 
ninety-nine percent of the time, and it is perforce nature without 
30 Introduction to Job, Kitvei Ramban I, p. 19.
31 In THT, p. 155, Nahmanides comes very close to saying this explicitly:
כבר נתברר כי הנסים המפורסמים מורים על החידוש ועל הידיעה שיש לו להקב“ה בפרטי העולם   
ועל ההשגחה והנסים הנסתרים לדעת כל מאמין בעונש העבירות ובשכר המצוות ולדעת כל מתפלל 
וכל נושא עיניו לשמים, כלם מודים על החידוש ועל הידיעה וההשגחה הודאה אמיתית אלא שהיא 
נסתרת והם שלש מוסדות התורה
 Henoch (p. 171) cites this passage, but I don’t think he takes it (as I do) as a virtual 
equation of hidden miracles and providence in particular. The references to hashgahah 
and nissim nistarim really merge into one another, and, despite the syntactical 
awkwardness which I must ascribe to Nahmanides, the phrase ella shehi nisteret seems 
to me to modify hashgahah (not hoda’ah) and to mean that providence takes the form 
of hidden miracles. (Henoch’s subsequent citation of the phrase “all the fundamentals 
of the Torah come through hidden miracles” from Comm. to Gen. 46:15 as another 
assertion of the connection between miracles and dogmas is probably not germane; 
in that context, “fundamentals of the Torah” does not mean creation, knowledge and 
providence but reiterates Nahmanides’ standard assertion that all the Torah’s promises 
of reward and punishment [=”the fundamentals of the Torah”] come through hidden 
miracles.) Manifest miracles are not listed among the dogmas for the reason Henoch 
suggests: they are not a dogma in themselves but an expression of divine power and a 
means by which the fundamental dogmas are validated.
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providence, since “natural,” indirect providence is a contradiction in 
terms.32 Nahmanides’ world is therefore exceptionally—extraordinarily—
naturalistic precisely because of his insistence on the miraculous nature 
of providence.
This is, to say the least, an unexpected conclusion, and we must now 
take a careful look at the texts which make it inescapable.
God’s knowledge, which is his providence in the lower world, is to guard 
species, and even individual human beings are left to accidents until their 
time of reckoning comes. With respect to people of special piety (hasidav), 
however, God turns his attention to such a person to know him as an 
individual and to see to it that divine protection cleaves to him always; 
knowledge and remembrance are never separated from him at all. This 
is the meaning of “He withdraws not his eyes from the righteous” (Job 
36:4); indeed, many verses refer to this principle, as it is written, “Behold, 
the eye of the Lord is on those who fear him” (Psalms 33:18), and others 
besides.33
Since he is commenting on a verse which says that God “knew” 
Abraham, Nahmanides here understands the term knowledge in a strong 
sense as the equivalent of providence, but there is no reason to think that 
this passage limits divine knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word.34 
The limitation on providence itself, however, is significant enough; not 
many people are designated hasidim in Nahmanides’ terminology, and 
the attribution of constant providence to precious few individuals is 
made even clearer by the phrase he uses in a later passage.
Know that miracles are performed for good or ill only for the absolutely 
righteous (zaddiqim gemurim) or the absolutely wicked. Those in the middle 
have good or ill occur to them according to the customary order of the 
world “in accordance with their way and their actions” (Ezekiel 36:17).35
32 Contrast Maimonides, Guide II. 48.
33 Comm. to Gen. 18:19.
34 Cf. the passage from Bahya cited by Chavel ad loc., and contrast L. Stein’s assertion cited 
in n. 37 below. Note too that, if we would not assume constant divine knowledge in the 
weak sense, we would need to resort to complex and obscure triggering mechanisms 
to account for the “time of reckoning” and perhaps even for God’s recognition that so-
and-so has become the sort of pious man deserving of constant divine protection. See 
the related discussion at nn. 38-42 below.
35 Comm. to Deut. 11:13.
— 140 —
The Cultural Environment: Challenge and Response
The assertion that miracles are performed only for the absolutely 
righteous or wicked is couched in general terms and appears to include 
every variety of miracles. Hence, ordinary people are excluded from the 
regular operation of hidden miracles and are left, as in the Commentary 
to Genesis, to the customary, natural order. The last phrase from Ezekiel, 
however, remains troublesome. It could mean that such people are left 
to some sort of indirect providence weaker than the one which works 
by hidden miracles, but this would directly contradict the introduction 
to the Commentary to Job, which virtually denies the existence of such 
providence, it would contradict the assertion in the Commentary to 
Genesis that non-hasidim are left to “accidents,” and it would introduce 
a category or providence found nowhere else in Nahmanides. The most 
likely meaning, then, is that people left to accidents will be subjected 
to good or evil according to “their way and their actions” in a purely 
naturalistic sense; those who are careful will be safer than those who 
are not. Just such a position, in fact, emerges from a passage in the 
Commentary to Job that we shall examine in a moment where Nahmanides 
maintains that people left to accidents are likely to stumble unless they 
are particularly cautious.
Reinforcing this conception that God may well decide to leave people 
to accidents is Nahmanides’ celebrated discussion of medicine, where he 
maintains that in an ideal Jewish society even individuals would be dealt 
with miraculously so that medical treatment would be either unnecessary 
or futile. Regrettably, people began to consult doctors, and so God left 
them “to natural accidents.”36 In this case, the halakhic permissibility of 
consulting physicians, which Nahmanides goes on to cite, undoubtedly 
played a role in moderating his skepticism about his own profession; the 
Torah, he says, does not rest its laws on miracles. This halakhic principle 
is not especially congenial to an occasionalist, and, as we shall see, this 
is not the only instance in which it worked to mitigate Nahmanides’ 
emphasis on the miraculous.
These passages leave no alternative to a thorough rethinking of the 
standard image of Nahmanides. Chayim Henoch, who studied Nahmanides’ 
oeuvre with painstaking care, does confront them in a footnote, and he 
suggests that the passages about miraculous providence may refer to the 
Jewish collective and not to all Jewish individuals. Nevertheless, since 
36 Comm. to Lev. 26:11.
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we have seen that he later describes Nahmanides as maintaining a view 
close to that of the occasionalists and the mutakallimun, the enormity of 
this concession has apparently failed to make a sufficient impression.37 
Finally, even the sharply shrunken position which applies Nahmanides’ 
denial of the natural order only to the Jewish collective (in addition to 
a handful of extraordinarily righteous and wicked individuals) must be 
shaken by a particularly striking passage in the Commentary to Job.
He withdraws not his eyes from the righteous (Job 36:7): This verse explains 
a great principle with respect to providence concerning which there are 
in fact many verses. For people of Torah and perfect faith believe in 
providence, i.e., that God watches over and protects the members of the 
human species… It is not said in the Torah or prophets that God watches 
over and protects the individuals of other groups of creatures that do not 
speak; rather, he guards only the species… The reason for this is clearly 
known, for since man recognizes his God, God in turn watches over him 
and protects him; this is not true of the other creatures, which do not speak 
and do not know their creator.
This, then, is why he protects the righteous, for just as their heart and eyes 
are always with him, so are the eyes of God on them from the beginning of 
the year until the end, to the point where the absolutely pious man (hasid) 
who cleaves to his God always and who never separates himself from him 
in his thoughts by paying attention to mundane matters will be guarded 
always from all accidents, even those that take place in the natural course 
of events; such a person will be protected from these accidents through 
a miracle occurring to him constantly, as if he were considered one of 
the supernal beings who are not subject to generation and corruption by 
accidents. To the extent that this individual comes close to God by cleaving 
to him, he will be guarded especially well, while one who is far from God 
in his thought and deeds, even if he does not deserve death because of his 
sin, will be forsaken and left to accidents.
Many verses make this point. David [sic] said, “He will guard the feet 
of his holy ones, but the wicked shall be put to silence in darkness” (I 
Samuel 2:9). He means by this that those who are close to God are under 
37 See above, n. 28. One nineteenth-century scholar noticed the passage in Comm. to Gen. 
18:19 and allowed it to make too great an impression, asserting in a brief passage that 
Nahmanides’ view of both divine knowledge and providence is virtually identical with 
that of Gersonides. See L. Stein, Die Willensfreiheit und ihr Verhältniss zur göttlichen 
Präscienz und Providenz bei den Jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1882), pp. 
126-127. See above, n. 34.
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absolute protection, while those who are far from him are subject to 
accidents and have no one to protect them from harm, just as one who 
walks in the darkness is likely to fall unless he is cautious and walks 
slowly. David also said that “it is not with sword and spear that the Lord 
saves” (I Samuel 17:47), and it is written, “Behold, the eye of the Lord is 
on those who fear him, on those who wait for his mercy” (Psalms 33:18); 
i.e., God’s eyes are on them when they wait for him constantly and their 
souls cleave to him.
Since most of the world belongs to this intermediate group, the Torah 
commanded that warriors be mobilized, and that the priest anointed 
for war send back the fearful so that they will not sap the courage of the 
others. It is for this reason too that we find the preparation of the order of 
battle in the Torah and the prophets, for example, “And David inquired of 
the Lord, and the Lord said, ‘Do not go up; circle around behind them...’ (II 
Samuel 5:23), and ‘Go and draw toward Mount Tabor, and take with you 
ten thousand men” (Judges 4:6). Had they been meritorious, they would 
have gone out with a few people and achieved victory without arms, and 
had they deserved defeat, no multitude would have helped them. In this 
case, however, they deserved to be treated in the manner of nature and 
accident. This is a matter which was explained well by Maimonides in the 
Guide of the Perplexed.
As Nahmanides hints in his last sentence, much of this passage (until 
the final paragraph) is a paraphrase of Maimonides’ discussion in Guide 
III. 18, and it is so striking in its naturalism and limitation of providence 
that we shall first have to devote some time to demonstrating that 
Nahmanides has not changed into a Maimonides in disguise. The truth 
is that he has introduced some subtle but crucial—and characteristic—
changes into his paraphrase of the Guide, so that his final sentence, 
implying an identity of views with Maimonides, is profoundly misleading. 
First, despite Maimonides’ use of the term pious (hasidim in both Ibn 
Tibbon and Al-Harizi) to describe people who attain the benefits of 
providence, the Guide repeatedly emphasizes the intellectual dimension 
as well; to put it moderately, providence is connected not only with 
righteousness but also with intellectual achievement. In Nahmanides, 
this central point of the Guide vanishes entirely; though even he could 
hardly have perceived his hasid as a pious fool, the emphasis on intellect 
is completely absent.
A second and for our purposes even more important divergence 
comes through Nahmanides’ introduction of an apparently innocuous 
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phrase into the final sentence of the second paragraph. Maimonides 
had asserted that pious intellectuals are close to God and hence attain 
providence while those who are far from him are likely to stumble 
because they remain unprotected. The absolutely wicked, who constitute 
an extreme example of the second category, are thus likely to fall because 
of an absence of protection; consequently, the citation of the verse “The 
wicked shall be put to silence in darkness” interpreted as blind, unguided 
groping in the dark is especially appropriate. Nahmanides, however, as 
we have seen in his commentary to Deuteronomy 11:13, believed that the 
absolutely wicked are punished by miraculous divine intervention, and so 
he slipped his crucial phrase into the Maimonidean discussion: “One who 
is far from God in his thoughts and deeds, even if he does not deserve death 
for his sins, will be forsaken and left to accidents.” When Nahmanides 
then continues to paraphrase the Guide by citing “the wicked shall be put 
to silence in darkness” understood merely as absence of protection, the 
reference becomes forced and inappropriate. All of a sudden, “wicked” 
excludes the truly wicked and refers  only to an intermediate category 
that plays no role in the Maimonidean passage. It is only because of 
this tampering with the analysis in the Guide that Nahmanides’ final 
paragraph, which is not derived from Maimonides, can begin with a 
reference to “this intermediate group.”
The introduction of the person who deserves death for his sins also 
undermines the essentially naturalistic character of Maimonides’ analysis. 
To Maimonides, a person who reached the requisite level attained 
providence “by necessity” through his link with the divine overflow, 
and Nahmanides’ discussion of his hasid’s achieving providence through 
cleaving to God (devequt) could also be read in a relatively naturalistic, 
though mystical sense.38 Later kabbalists, in fact, were uncomfortable 
with the entire concept of the hidden miracle because of their conviction 
that the process by which human actions affect both nature and the 
individual’s fate is one of clearcut cause and effect involving the esoteric 
relationship between upper and lower worlds.39
38 On the process of devequt, in which the sefirah of ti’feret plays a special role, cf. Henoch, 
pp. 248-251. On the hasid who cleaves to God, cf. also Comm. to Deut. 5:23, 11:22; 
Comm. to Lev. 18:4; Sermon on Qohelet, Kitvei Ramban I, p. 192.
39 Meir ibn Gabbai, ‘Avodat HaQodesh (Warsaw, 1894), II. 17, p. 36b (brought to my 
attention by Prof. Bernard Septimus); Isaiah Horowitz, Shnei Luhot HaBerit (Józewów, 
1878), pp. 9b-10a, discussed by Chavel, Ramban, pp. 85-86, and Henoch, p. 56, 
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Nevertheless, it would almost certainly be a mistake to understand 
Nahmanides’ miracles as entirely “naturalistic” mystical events. It is, first 
of all, overwhelmingly likely that Nahmanides understood sefirotic action 
as involving specific divine volition,40 and so the providence attained by 
the hasid who cleaves to God does not have to be understood as coming 
“by necessity.”41 Moreover, the miraculous punishment of the person 
deserving to die for his sins certainly does not come through any cleaving 
to God (just as it could not come through linkage to a Maimonidean 
overflow), and, while an alternative kabbalistic mechanism of a naturalistic 
sort is theoretically feasible, Nahmanides does not provide one. In 
particular, the search for a “naturalistic” mystical triggering mechanism 
to account for the “time of reckoning” of intermediate individuals who 
are normally ignored would be especially difficult.42 In short, for all its 
limitation of providence, this passage in the Commentary to Job does not 
lead to naturalism of a Maimonidean or even mystical variety.
The fact remains, however, that it not only provides a vigorous 
reassertion of the largely accidental life of ordinary individuals, it calls 
into question the exclusively miraculous fate of even the Jewish collective. 
The final paragraph of this passage, which is Nahmanides’ own, asserts 
unambiguously that miraculous providence did not always protect the 
Jewish people in its biblical wars. Ironically, Nahmanides is once again 
forced into a naturalistic posture precisely by his miraculous conception 
of providence. The verses that he cites include direct advice given to the 
Jewish army by God himself; for someone who believed that providence 
normally operates through nature, these battles would constitute classic 
examples of divine protection of Israel. Instead, Nahmanides explicitly 
cites them to show that when Jews are in the intermediate category, they 
n. 171. Prof. Septimus’s Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition: The Career and Controversies 
of Ramah (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1982), which appeared after the 
completion of this article, contains a discussion of the argument in ‘Avodat Ha-Qodesh 
(pp. 110-111); the book also called my attention to a two-sentence passage in E. 
Gottlieb’s Mehqarim be-Sifrut ha-Qabbalah (Tel Aviv, 1976), p. 266, which comments 
on the central theme of this essay with real insight (Septimus, pp. 110, 170 n. 54).
40 See Henoch, p. 18, n. 21.
41 Note that Nahmanides’ remark that the hasid “will be protected from accidents through 
a miracle occurring to him constantly” is another elaboration on his Maimonidean 
source.
42 The systems of the later kabbalists did not generally assume the existence of a group 
of Jews usually left to accidents.
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are abandoned to accidents, with a clear analogy to the individual who is 
allowed to stumble in the darkness. We are apparently left to assume that 
in an age without prophecy, when no divine advice is proffered, such an 
army would have been left to accidents pure and simple. But if a Jewish 
army fighting under the judges of Israel is not the Jewish collective, it 
is hard to imagine what is. Hence, although Nahmanides could never 
consider the possibility that God would allow the Jewish people to be 
utterly destroyed through the accidents of nature, it seems clear that 
even the Jewish collective is not always governed by an unbroken chain 
of hidden miracles.43
Finally, a responsum by Nahmanides on astrology raises questions 
about the constancy of miraculous providence even for the remaining 
handful of extraordinarily righteous individuals. From a talmudic 
discussion, he says,
it follows that it is permissible to listen to [astrologers] and to believe them. 
This is clear from Abraham, who said, “I looked at astrological calculations,” 
and from R. Akiba, who worried deeply about his daughter [who had been 
the subject of a dire astrological prediction] and concluded after she was 
saved that charity had rescued her literally from death… However, God 
sometimes [my emphasis] performs a miracle for those who fear him by 
nullifying the decree of the stars for them, and these are among the hidden 
miracles which occur in the ordinary manner of the world and upon which 
the entire Torah depends. Consequently, one should not consult astrologers 
but should rather go forth in simple faith, as it is written, “You shall be 
wholehearted with the Lord your God” (Deut. 18-13). If someone does see 
43 Needless to say, miraculous providence often does govern the wars of Israel; see the 
references in Henoch, pp. 60-61. On the suspension of such providence from the Jewish 
collective, cf. Rashba’s responsum (1.19) cited by Henoch, p. 57, n. 171, which asserts 
that, although Jews are generally excluded from astrological control, their sins can lower 
them to a position where this is no longer the case. Though Henoch apparently considers 
this inconsistent with Nahmanides’ view, the passage from the Comm. to Job may suggest 
otherwise, since nature and the astrological order are pretty much synonymous. For 
Nahmanides’ frequent denials that the Jewish people or the land of Israel are subject to 
the constellations, see Sermon on Qohelet, Kitvei Ramban I, pp. 200-201; Sermon on Rosh 
HaShanah, Kitvei Ramban I, p. 250; Comm. to Gen. 15:18; Comm. to Lev. 18:25; Comm. to 
Deut. 29:25; THT, p. 150. It was presumably the repeated assertions in these passages 
that Gentiles are subject to the constellations which persuaded Scholem and Henoch 
that Nahmanides’ supposed denial of a natural order applied only to Jews. The belief 
that nature prevails in the absence of special merit was used by Solomon ibn Verga as a 
clever transition from religious to naturalistic explanation of Jewish exile and suffering 
(Shevet Yehudah, ed. by A. Schochet [Jerusalem, 1947], p. 127).
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something undesirable through astrology, he should perform good deeds 
and pray a great deal; at the same time, if he saw through astrology that 
a particular day is not auspicious for his work, he should avoid it and not 
depend on a miracle. It is my view that it is prohibited to go counter to the 
constellations while depending on a miracle.44
A legal responsum requires a particularly strong measure of 
caution and responsibility, and it may therefore be dangerous to draw 
conclusions about Nahmanides’ more general theological inclinations 
from this sort of source; even occasionalists do not walk off cliffs, and 
occasionalist halakhists do not advise others to do so. Nevertheless, 
the plain meaning of the passage appears to be that even “those who 
fear” God are not favored with continuous miracles, and methodological 
reservations cannot entirely neutralize the impact of such a remark. 
Thus, Nahmanides’ denial of nature may not apply in undiluted form 
even to that final category of the absolutely righteous.45
Moreover, even though Nahmanides complains that Maimonides 
“limits miracles and increases nature,”46 his own exegesis is by no means 
free of such a tendency. The plain meaning of the biblical text indicates 
that the rainbow was first created after the flood, but Nahmanides is 
prepared to resort to reinterpretation under the pressure of scientific 
evidence. “Against our will, we must believe the words of the Greeks 
that the rainbow comes about as a result of the sun’s burning in the 
moist air, for the rainbow appears in a vessel of water placed in the sun.”47 
Thus, the Bible means only that the rainbow, which had appeared from 
the beginning of creation, would henceforth be invested with symbolic 
significance. Similarly, he reinterprets a Rabbinic statement that the 
land of Israel was not inundated by the waters of the flood, arguing that 
there was no fence around it to prevent the water from entering; all the 
Rabbis meant was that the rain did not actually fall in Israel nor were its 
44 Kitvei Ramban I, p. 379. The talmudic discussion that Nahmanides cites is in B. Shabbat 
156a-b.
45 It may be relevant to note Maimonides’ sudden insight in Guide III. 51, where he 
explains that even the pious intellectual is likely to stop concentrating on the divine for 
a while, and during that time he remains unprotected. Even within a less naturalistic 
framework than that of Maimonides, a parallel analysis is not impossible. Cf. also the 
somewhat enigmatic passage in Sermon on Qohelet, Kitvei Ramban I, p. 192, which 
apparently speaks of occasional accident with respect to the righteous.
46 THT, p. 154.
47 Comm. to Gen. 9:12, and cf. THT, p. 174.
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subterranean waters let loose, but the water that originated elsewhere 
covered Israel as well.48
With respect to the age of the antediluvians, there is a well-known 
dispute in which Nahmanides takes Maimonides to task for ascribing 
extreme longevity only to the figures explicitly mentioned in the Bible. 
There is an almost instinctive tendency to ascribe Maimonides’ position 
to his desire to restrict miracles49 and Nahmanides’ to his tendency to 
multiply them. In fact, however, Nahmanides attacks Maimonides for 
precisely the opposite offense. The argument in the Guide, he reports, is 
that a few people lived such long lives either because of the way they took 
care of themselves or as a result of a miracle. But it is hardly plausible 
that people could quadruple their life span by following a particular 
regimen; as for miracles, “why should such a miracle be performed for 
them when they are neither prophets nor especially righteous men?” The 
real reason for this longevity was the superior air before the time of the 
flood combined with the excellent constitution with which their recent 
ancestor Adam had been created, and these reasons, of course, apply to 
all antediluvians equally.50
It is a matter of special interest that Ritba’s defense of Maimonides 
on this point already reflects what was to become the standard 
misreading of Nahmanides’ position on hidden miracles. Maimonides, 
Ritba argues, believed in the constancy of natural phenomena over the 
generations, and so Nahmanides’ naturalistic explanation about superior 
air could not appeal to him. As for the objection that miracles would not 
be performed for ordinary people, this is a peculiar argument coming 
from Nahmanides. He himself, after all, “has taught us that there is a 
great difference between a miracle like longevity that comes to a certain 
extent in a natural way and a miracle that comes entirely outside the 
natural order.”51 In other words, manifest miracles would happen only 
to the specially righteous, but hidden miracles happen to everyone. 
48 Comm. to Gen. 8:11. As M. D. Eisenstadt pointed out in his comment ad loc. (Perush 
ha-Ramban ‘al HaTorah [New York, 1958]), Nahmanides’ exegesis ignores a Rabbinic 
statement that the inhabitants of the land of Israel died only from the vapors.
49 Maimonides wanted to leave the natural order intact, said Judah Alfakar at the height 
of the Maimonidean controversy, but what does it matter if someone tells you that he 
saw one camel or three flying in the air? See Qovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam (Leipzig, 1859), 
III, p. 2a.
50 Comm. to Gen. 5:4.
51 Sefer ha-Zikkaron, ed. by K. Kahana (Jerusalem, 1956), pp. 37-39.
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Whether Nahmanides would have considered the Maimonidean version 
of antediluvian longevity a hidden or manifest miracle is debatable,52 but 
the main point is that Ritba has misread his view of the ubiquity of the 
hidden miracle: such miracles too happen regularly only to “prophets or 
especially righteous men.”
One place where Nahmanides introduces a miracle which is not in any 
of his sources is in the account of the flood, where he suggests that the ark 
miraculously contained more than its dimensions would normally allow. 
The problem here, however, is so acute, and the alternative solutions so 
implausible, that it is difficult to regard this as evidence of eagerness 
to multiply miracles, particularly since he makes a point of saying that 
the ark was made relatively large “for the purpose of minimizing the 
miracle.”53
Nahmanides, then, was no occasionalist or near occasionalist. Except 
in the rarest of instances, the natural order governs the lives of non-Jews, 
both individually and collectively, as well as the overwhelming majority 
of Jews. The Jewish collective is often (usually?) guided by miraculous 
providence, but it too can find itself forsaken and left to accidents; and 
though the absolutely righteous and absolutely wicked also enjoy (or 
suffer) a chain of hidden miracles, the chain is apparently not unbroken. 
Moreover, Nahmanides’ uncompromising insistence that providence is 
exclusively miraculous means that, although God is constantly aware of 
everyone, he does not exercise providence when nature prevails; since 
nature almost always prevails, the routine functioning of Nahmanides’ 
world is, as we have already noted, extraordinarily naturalistic.
52 As Kahana notes, Ritba was probably thinking of Nahmanides’ assertion (Comm. to 
Gen. 46:15) that Jochebed’s giving birth at the age of 130 is a hidden miracle. It is 
worth noting, however, that even though hidden and manifest miracles are performed 
through different divine names (e.g., Comm. to Exodus 6:2), the boundary line between 
them is not always hard and fast, if only because the constant repetition of certain 
hidden miracles can make them manifest (Comm. to Lev. 26:11).
53 Comm. to Gen. 6:19. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that unless Nahmanides had in 
mind the miniaturization of the animals in the ark (and he does not say this), the 
miracle he is suggesting appears to involve the sort of logical contradiction that Jewish 
rationalists refrained from accepting even in miracles and which they ascribed only 
to their Christian adversaries. See D. Lasker, Jewish Philosophical Polemics Against 
Christianity in the Middle Ages (New York, 1977), passim, and esp. pp. 25-43, and cf. 
my The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages (Philadelphia, 1979), pp. 351-
352, esp. n. 11, for a possible affirmation of this rationalist position by Nahmanides 
himself.
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What, then, is the meaning of Nahmanides’ assertions that “a person 
has no portion in the Torah of Moses without believing that all things 
that happen to us are miracles; they have nothing to do with ‘nature’ or 
‘the customary order of the world’ “ and that “one who believes in the 
Torah may not believe in the existence of nature at all”?54
To resolve this question, we must look again at his standard argument 
for hidden miracles and the terms in which it is usually couched. As we 
have already seen, the essence of this argument is invariably the fact 
that the Torah promises rewards and punishments which cannot come 
naturally; hence, they are all miracles. This is true, he says, “of all the 
promises (ye‘udim) in the Torah.”55 “The promises of the Torah (ye‘udei 
ha-Torah) are all miracles.”56 Hidden miracles were performed for the 
patriarchs in the manner of “all the promises (ye‘udim) of the Torah, for 
no good comes to a person as the reward of a good deed and no evil befalls 
him as a result of sin except through a miraculous act… The reward and 
punishment for the entire Torah in this world comes through miracles 
that are hidden.”57 “All the promises (ye‘udim) in the Torah, favorable or 
unfavorable, are all miraculous and take the form of hidden miracles.”58 
“All the blessings [in the Torah] are miracles.”59
In all of these passages, Nahmanides’ affirmation of miracles refers 
specifically to the realm of reward and punishment promised by the Torah. 
Similarly, when he makes the extreme assertion in his commentary that 
“all things that happen to us are miracles,” he immediately continues, “If a 
person observes the commandments his reward will make him successful, 
and if he violates them his punishment will destroy him.”60 In his sermon 
Torat HaShem Temimah, where be repeats his strong statement about 
miracles, the evidence again comes from the “promises of the Torah” 
(ye‘udei haTorah).61 Nahmanides’ intention is that “all things that happen 
to us” in the context of reward and punishment “are miracles.”
The passage in his sermon does appear to be arguing for a somewhat 
broader conclusion, but that conclusion is not the non-existence of 
54 See notes 22-23.
55 Comm. to Gen. 17:1.
56 Comm. to Gen. 46:15.
57 Comm. to Exod. 6:2.
58 Comm. to Lev. 18:29.
59 Comm. to Lev. 26:11.
60 Comm. to Exod. 13:16.
61 THT, p. 153.
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nature. Nahmanides is concerned by Maimonides’ tendency to limit 
miracles wherever possible, a tendency exemplified most disturbingly 
in his allegorical interpretation of Isaiah’s prophecy that the nature of 
wild animals will be transformed at the end of days. Since Maimonides 
himself once demonstrated an understanding of ongoing miraculous 
providence, his apparent inclination to resist every extra miracle through 
the mobilization of all his considerable ingenuity appears pointless, 
inexplicable, and unwarranted.62 The religiously unavoidable belief in 
such providence must logically lead to a relaxation of inhibitions against 
the recognition of miracles. There is nothing achieved by the tendency of 
Maimonides and Ibn Ezra to approach every miracle stated or implied in 
Scripture with the hope that it can be made to disappear through some 
naturalistic explanation; we will still be left with a world punctuated by 
the regular appearance of miraculous providential acts. No denial of the 
natural order is either explicit or implicit in this argument. Aside from the 
fact that such a denial would contradict a number of Nahmanides’ explicit 
statements, it would be an extravagant inference from the evidence of 
ye‘udei haTorah. The Torah’s promises of reward and punishment do not 
demonstrate the non-existence of nature, and Nahmanides never meant 
to say that they do.63
The Nahmanides that emerges from this discussion is a complex, 
multi-dimensional figure whose world view is shaped by an almost 
bewildering variety of intellectual forces. He must grapple with the 
pressures of profound religious faith, philosophical argument, halakhic 
doctrine, mystical belief, astrological science, and Scriptural teaching to 
forge a concept of the miraculous that will do justice to them all. On the 
one hand, his God retains the unrestricted right of intervention in the 
62 THT, p. 154 (cf. n. 21). The argument in Comm. to Gen. 46:15 is virtually the same, except 
that here the target is Ibn Ezra’s refusal to recognize Jochebed’s advanced age when 
she gave birth. Here too this unreasonable resistance stems from a failure to appreciate 
the fact that the Torah is replete with hidden miracles. Nahmanides’ statement that 
the punishment of a woman suspected of infidelity is the only permanent miracle 
established by the Torah (Comm. to Numbers 5:20) refers, of course, only to manifest 
miracles (cf. Henoch, p. 55, n. 169).
63 The remark in the Sermon on Qohelet that “one who believes in the Torah may not 
believe in the existence of nature at all” (Kitvei Ramban I, p. 192) appears in an elliptical 
context with many of the same features as the other discussions of hidden miracles, 
and I am confident that it too refers to the realm of reward and punishment. See also 
the end of n. 45 above.
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natural order; even ordinary individuals have their time of reckoning, not 
only the absolutely righteous or the absolutely wicked die from eating the 
heave-offering, non-Jewish collectives can surely be punished for sin64—
and Nahmanides’ logic requires that all these divine acts be understood as 
miraculous. At the same time, such interventions remain very much the 
exception in a world which otherwise functions in an entirely naturalistic 
way. Nahmanides’ position allows for untrammeled miracles within a 
fundamentally natural order and is a striking example of his effort to 
integrate an uncompromising religious position into a world view that 
recognizes the validity of much of the philosophical achievement of the 
medieval world.
64 Comm. to Gen. 1:1.
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POLEMIC, EXEGESIS, PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE:
REFLECTIONS ON THE TENACITY OF ASHKENAZIC 
MODES OF THOUGHT
From: Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts 8 (2009): 27-39.
RATIONALIST PHILOSOPHY
The presumed absence or near-absence of what we usually call rationalism 
in medieval Ashkenaz raises a series of questions large and small: If 
rationalism is in fact absent or largely absent, what accounts for this, 
especially in light of recent scholarship demonstrating that Ashkenazic 
Jews were exposed to the works and culture of Sephardic Jewry to a 
greater degree than we had thought? Should the evidence of such 
exposure lead us to conclude that philosophical rationalism was in fact 
present among Northern European Jews, an approach that would greatly 
diminish the cultural contrast between Ashkenaz and Sepharad? Indeed, 
the assertion that new evidence diminishes that contrast served as the 
basis for one of Elisheva Carlebach’s arguments against Gerson Cohen’s 
thesis that differences between Sephardic and Ashkenazic messianism 
are linked to different approaches to rationalism.1 If we insist that the 
contrast is real, should we assume in light of the new scholarship that 
Ashkenazim were in fact fully aware of rationalist ideas but refrained 
from utilizing or even addressing them out of motives that they had 
articulated clearly and consciously, at least in their own minds? Thus, as 
we shall see, several outstanding scholars have accounted for the absence 
of philosophical arguments or interpretations in specific Ashkenazic 
texts or intellectual endeavors such as anti-Christian polemic and biblical 
exegesis by positing local explanations relevant to those discrete areas or 
1 Elisheva Carlebach, Between History and Hope: Jewish Messianism in Ashkenaz and 
Sepharad: Third Annual Lecture of the Victor J. Selmanowitz Chair of Jewish History (New 
York 1998), pp. 3-4. See note 16 there for references to studies that have pointed to 
the interaction between the cultures.
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even to particular figures. Is this the appropriate approach to account for 
what appears to be a large, more or less consistent cultural phenomenon? 
Finally, should science and rationalist philosophy be treated separately 
or as two aspects of the same discipline or mode of thought?
Let me begin with a working definition of rationalism (or rationalist) 
that I formulated a decade ago in a footnote apologizing for the use of this 
“admittedly imperfect term”: “By rationalist I mean someone who values 
the philosophical works of non-Jews or of Jews influenced by them, 
who is relatively open to the prospect of modifying the straightforward 
understanding (and in rare cases rejecting the authority) of accepted 
Jewish texts and doctrines in light of such works, and who gravitates 
toward naturalistic rather than miraculous explanation.” I hastened to 
add that “I do not regard this as a rigid, impermeable classification.”2
If we work with this understanding of rationalism, we will find it very 
difficult to endorse a fundamental reassessment affirming Ashkenazic 
openness to the philosophical culture characteristic of medieval Sephardic 
thinkers. Yes, a paraphrase of Saadya’s philosophical work influenced a 
certain sector of Ashkenazic Jews. Yes, as Ephraim Kanarfogel notes in 
this volume, opposition to anthropomorphism characterized this and 
arguably other sectors of Ashkenazic Jewry, and one might be inclined 
to describe such opposition as a reassessment of the straightforward 
understanding of accepted texts. Yes, one can find references or figures 
here and there that evince familiarity with philosophical works and may 
even allude to characteristically rationalist positions. But the instinct 
that tells us that the rationalist inclinations delineated in this definition 
are for the most part alien to Ashkenaz is not an antiquated scholarly 
prejudice. Exceptions remain exceptions; allusions remain allusions; 
rejection of anthropomorphism is not in itself rationalism; and the 
reading of a few books does not necessarily alter deeply entrenched 
modes of thought.
Ashkenazic culture was initially formed in a Northern European 
Christian environment largely innocent of a philosophical tradition, 
at least of the sort that fits the model that we have been utilizing. As 
Christian Europe became exposed to that tradition, it began to change, 
2 “Judaism and General Culture in Medieval and Early Modern Times,” in Gerald J. 
Blidstein, David Berger, Sid Z. Leiman, and Aharon Lichtenstein, Judaism’s Encounter 
with Other Cultures: Rejection or Integration?, edited by Jacob J. Schacter (Northvale, 
N.J. and Jerusalem, 1997), pp. 62-63.
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although even then the dominant expression of scholastic thought 
remained considerably more conservative than the strongly rationalist 
strain of Arabic and Jewish philosophy. The major figures of Ashkenazic 
Jewry are very unlikely to have read Latin, and so the inner workings of 
nascent and even mature scholasticism were largely closed to them. More 
to the point, whatever exposure Ashkenazic Jews may have had to the 
philosophical works of Sephardic Jews in Hebrew translation came after 
their cultural profile had been largely formed. 
At this point, it is worth turning to the controversy surrounding 
a book to whose fundamental insight I subscribe even as I remain 
uncertain about its concrete theses. In 1985, Charles Radding published 
a study entitled A World Made by Men that aroused a brief but vigorous 
tempest. His essential argument was that Europeans in the early Middle 
Ages thought and acted on a moral level that corresponds not to that 
of modern adults but to one or another of the levels that Jean Piaget 
ascribes to children. Inter alia, he noted that they disregarded intent 
in evaluating the seriousness of a crime. Some of his critics argued that 
it is simply impossible for early medieval Christian legislators to have 
dismissed the significance of intent since they read and revered the 
Bible, where intent is an important element in determining the gravity 
of a crime and its appropriate punishment. Moreover, as Radding 
himself pointed out, Augustine and other patristic figures whom the 
medieval legislators considered authorities also ascribed significance 
to intent.
It seems to me, however, that this argument, which affirms that 
people who believe in certain books will necessarily internalize the 
values in those books, does not accord with psychological reality. Peoples 
that developed certain modes of thinking during a lengthy formative 
period do not quickly undergo a fundamental transformation because 
they embraced a belief in a text that reflects a different perspective. 
It is much easier to adopt a new doctrine than a new conception of 
reality, of the world order, and of modes of thinking and arguing. To 
the degree that Radding succeeded in pointing to data demonstrating 
that the mentalité of pre-twelfth-century Europeans really exemplified 
the moral perception that he attributes to them, the fact that this 
perception is not consistent with that of the Bible or of Augustine does 
not undermine his thesis.
If this point is correct with respect to Christian works that were seen 
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as transcendentally authoritative —and I realize that I have essentially 
asserted the point rather than proven it—it follows that we should not 
resist the possibility that Ashkenazic Jews could have been exposed to 
Sephardic philosophical texts, nodded in agreement with some though 
surely not all of their arguments, and continued to think along lines 
that remained entirely alien to the spirit of those texts. I note in passing 
the even more far-reaching argument by Haym Soloveitchik that at least 
in their pietistic mode, hasidei Ashkenaz somehow managed to remain 
unaffected by the most basic concepts of the midrashic worldview that 
permeated the liturgy and the essential construction of collective Jewish 
identity.3 To return to our concerns, a highly instructive case in point 
emerges in two articles by the pre-eminent scholar of the medieval 
philosophical debate between Jews and Christians on the nearly complete 
absence of philosophical polemic in Ashkenazic works preceding the end 
of the thirteenth century.
PHILOSOPHICAL POLEMIC
In the first of these articles, Daniel Lasker sets forth the evidence for 
the absence of such polemic while simultaneously demonstrating that 
some anti-Christian philosophical arguments were known to Ashkenazic 
authors even in the early period. Thus, the paraphrase of R. Saadya’s 
work was available, but its philosophical arguments against Christianity 
leave no trace at all.4 Nestor ha-Komer was mined, but its philosophical 
material, to which we shall return, usually was not. In his first article, 
Lasker explained the phenomenon with a formulation that I endorse: 
3 Soloveitchik, “The Midrash, Sefer Hasidim and the Changing Face of God,” in Creation 
and Re-Creation in Jewish Thought: Festschrift in Honor of Joseph Dan on the Occasion of 
His Seventieth Birthday, ed. by Rachel Elior and Peter Schaefer (Tuebingen, ca. 2005).
4 Upon reading the typescript of this article, Yehuda Galinsky remarked in an email 
message, “A trace there is, even if barely,” pointing to R. Moses of Coucy’s Sefer 
Mitzvot Gadol, positive commandment #2, where we find a citation from Saadya of 
a philosophical argument against multiplicity in God. When I brought this to Daniel 
Lasker’s attention, he was grateful for the reference but noted that the passage cited 
is not among Saadya’s more sophisticated arguments. I would add that R. Moses of 
Coucy, unlike the vast majority of Ashkenazic rabbis, spent significant time among 
Sephardic Jews. In any event, the passage is surely of interest, but, as Galinsky’s careful 
formulation indicates, it does not change the larger picture.
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Most Ashkenazic Jews were not familiar with ‘Greek wisdom’; even the 
intellectuals among them were generally not fluent in philosophy. There is 
no reason to believe that a polemicist, who addressed his book to a Jewish 
audience which itself was not philosophically sophisticated, would use 
arguments which even he would regard as foreign.5
At the end of the article, he succinctly captures what I see as the 
key point, although I am uncomfortable with the level of familiarity 
with philosophical arguments that he ascribes to Ashkenazic Jews. “The 
lack of a Sephardi style full-scale philosophical critique of Christianity 
in Ashkenaz was not a function, then, of Ashkenazi ignorance. It was 
a result of a totally different intellectual outlook.”6 I do not think that 
Ashkenazim had the knowledge needed to launch a full scale philosophical 
critique, but I do think that their distinct intellectual outlook accounts 
for the almost total absence of philosophical arguments.7
Several years later, however, Lasker extended a greater level of 
generosity to Ashkenazic polemicists, and here the tendency to assume 
that familiarity with texts must penetrate an individual’s psyche leads to 
a position that grants the authors of these works a greater philosophical 
orientation than I think they had. In the second article, he reiterated 
some of the evidence surveyed in the first, but this time he argued that 
it was primarily the Ashkenazic audience that had “a totally different 
intellectual outlook from that of Sephardic Jews.” Because of this different 
outlook, “the Jewish polemicists felt that their audiences would not have 
responded well to the same type of philosophical argumentation that 
appealed to the Sephardic Jews….The classics of Ashkenazic polemic…
all play down any possible philosophical critique of Christianity. To a 
great extent, it was the audience, and not so much the author, which 
determined that fact.”8
5 Daniel J. Lasker, “Jewish Philosophical Polemics in Ashkenaz,” in Contra Iudaeos: Ancient 
and Medieval Polemics between Christians and Jews, ed. by Ora Limor and Guy Stroumsa 
(Tuebingen 1996), pp. 197-198.
6 ibid, p. 212.
7 I made a briefer version of the argument in the preceding paragraphs (beginning with 
the discussion of Radding) in “Ha-Meshihiyyut ha-Sefaradit ve-ha-Meshihiyyut ha-
Ashkenazit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim: Behinat ha-Mahloqet ha-Historiografit,” in the 
Avraham Grossman Festschrift, which should have appeared before the publication of 
this volume. [English translation in this collection]
8 Lasker, “Popular Polemics and Philosophical Truth in the Medieval Jewish Critique of 
Christianity, “The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 8 (1999): 254-255.
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In light of my view that deep structures of thought are not readily 
undermined by exposure to a few books, I do not see convincing evidence 
for this distinction. The Ashkenazic polemicists and their audience 
inhabited the same cultural world, and very little in it resonated with 
Sephardic style philosophical argument. It is far from clear that an 
intellectual chasm separated the composers of polemical works, who 
stood a cut or more below the intellectual elite of Ashkenaz, from their 
literate readers, and some members of that audience stood above them. 
Moreover, numerous passages in Ashkenazic polemical works make it 
clear that the authors were not writing solely to bolster the morale of 
their Jewish readers. To a significant degree, they were providing manuals 
to be used by Jews in real confrontations. A Jewish polemicist would 
have to think twice or thrice before depriving the most capable segment 
of his audience of arguments that would have the greatest effect in an 
actual exchange with Christians. Our first assumption should be that the 
philosophical arguments in question did not resonate with the authors 
any more than with their audience.
An examination of one of the few examples of Ashkenazic 
philosophical polemic before the fourteenth century will, I think, reinforce 
this assumption. The author of Sefer Nizzahon Yashan, working with an 
argument reflecting the direct or indirect influence of Nestor ha-Komer, 
addressed the question of whether Jesus was the incarnation of just one 
person of the trinity or of all three. Nestor and other Jewish polemicists 
objected to the possibility that all three persons were incarnated by 
insisting either that this would constitute an impermissible separation 
in God—assuming the partial incarnation of each of the three—or, in 
the event of the complete incarnation of all three, that it would mean 
that God is limited.9 For the last argument from the infinitude of God, 
the Nizzahon Yashan substitutes the almost amusing question, “Who was 
in heaven all that time?” supplemented by “Who ran the world during 
the three days when they were buried and none of them was either in 
heaven or on earth?”10 I suppose that one could argue that the author 
9 For an excellent survey and analysis of these arguments, see Lasker, Jewish Philosophical 
Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2007), pp. 121-125.
10 David Berger, The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages: A Critical Edition of 
the Nizzahon Vetus with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Philadelphia, 
1979), English section, p. 137. See too my discussion in Appendix 5 (“Who Was 
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intentionally changed the argument because he did not believe his readers 
would understand the point that the incarnation of all three persons 
would limit God. This is not, however, such an intellectually challenging 
argument; a Tosafot passage of average difficulty is considerably more 
daunting. I am much more inclined to assume that the author himself, who 
shows no signs anywhere in his lengthy work of thinking in philosophical 
terms, naturally shifted into language that was more congenial to his 
instinctive pattern of thought.
WISDOM, TORAH, AND RATIO
We turn now to a very recent article regarding biblical exegesis by one 
of the towering scholars of medieval Ashkenazic Jewry where I think 
we encounter an unwarranted reluctance to adopt a straightforward 
explanation of a phenomenon rooted in the traditionalist rabbinic 
mentality of that culture. Avraham Grossman has argued that Rashi’s 
commentaries to Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job 28 evince a striking, 
tendentious commitment to understand “wisdom” (hokhmah) as Torah.11 
This is the case, he says, even though the plain meaning generally 
points to straightforward human wisdom. Since Rashi’s approach 
presumably requires explanation, Grossman suggests two possibilities. 
The first begins with the contention that Rashi’s familiarity with the 
works of Sephardic grammarians makes it difficult to assume that he 
was not also familiar with the ideas of Sephardic thinkers and those 
Babylonian geonim who engaged in speculative pursuits, even though 
such familiarity is not attested in France until the works of Rashbam 
and especially of Bekhor Shor. Thus, Rashi may have been attempting 
to guide his readers away from such philosophical rationalism. The 
second explanation, which Grossman considers more plausible, is that 
Christians, at a time when polemic had reached one of its peaks, were 
beginning to use arguments from reason in their exchanges with Jews, 
and Rashi wanted to keep his readers away from an enterprise that could 
lead them to religious doubts.
Incarnated?”), pp. 366-369.
11 “Ha-Metah bein Torah le-‘Hokhmah’ be-Perush Rashi le-Sifrut ha-Hokhmah she-ba-
Miqra,” in Teshurah le-Amos: Asufat Mehqarim be-Parshanut ha-Miqra Muggeshet le-Amos 
Hakham, ed. by Moshe bar Asher et al. (Alon Shevut, 2007), pp. 13-27.
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For Grossman, the reason for preferring the second explanation is 
not because of any deficiency in the first. Rather, it follows from the 
emphasis in the uncensored version of Rashi’s commentary on Proverbs 
on the dangers of Christianity, which he identifies as the seductive 
woman who appears so frequently in that work. Since the commentary 
focuses so often on this danger, and since wisdom understood as Torah 
is presented as the antidote to the blandishments of the seductress, it is 
reasonable to assume that concern with the Christian appeal to ratio is 
what motivated Rashi’s insistence, in the face of the plain meaning of the 
text, that wisdom in fact refers to Torah with absolute consistency. 
Grossman of course points to Anselm as the prime example of a 
contemporary of Rashi who utilized dialectic in a theological context, but 
the example that he supplies illustrating the polemical appeal to reason 
by Christians is the assertion that the exile demonstrates that the Jews 
have been rejected in favor of the True Israel. There is really nothing 
particularly new about this, and if I were to argue for the late-eleventh 
and early twelfth-century utilization of ratio in a specifically anti-Jewish 
polemical context, I would be more inclined to cite Odo of Tournai’s (or 
Cambrai’s) Disputatio contra Judaeum Leonem nomine de adventu Christi 
filii Dei, which reports what is likely to be a real exchange in which Odo 
argued for the logical necessity of Jesus’ sacrifice for the forgiveness 
of sin.12 This work, virtually alone, provides a serious evidentiary base 
for the self-conscious, explicit appeal to ratio by a Christian polemicist 
in France who engaged in actual exchanges with Jews more or less 
contemporary with Rashi.
Before proceeding, let me note that the issue before us, as I hope 
we shall see, has considerable methodological significance beyond 
its specific context. Moreover, historians in the last several decades 
have ascribed many cultural practices and literary phenomena in late 
antique and medieval Jewry to the influence of the Jewish-Christian 
confrontation. These range from midrashic passages to significant 
elements of the Passover Haggadah to the evolution of life-cycle rituals 
to the motivation of peshat exegesis as a whole to specific exegetical 
observations, and the assessment of these assertions has in some cases 
12 See On Original Sin; and, A Disputation with the Jew, Leo, concerning the Advent of Christ, 
the Son of God : two theological treatises / Odo of Tournai, translated with an introduction 
and notes by Irven M. Resnick. (Philadelphia, ca. 1994).
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produced a mini-literature.13 Avraham Grossman’s oeuvre is generally a 
paradigm of caution and sober judgment, and his essay on the influence 
of the Christian context on Joseph Kara’s commentaries is one of the 
most convincing and insightful studies in this scholarly genre.14 To the 
degree that my reservations about his position in our case are persuasive, 
they may serve as a salutary reminder of the occasional need to resist 
inappropriate utilization of an often valuable and persuasive scholarly 
approach whose seductive attractions can sometimes penetrate the 
defenses of even the greatest and most responsible historians.
It seems to me that in evaluating a thesis proposing an extraneous 
motive for a particular exegetical position, we need to begin with two 
fundamental questions. First, how compelling is the argument for seeking 
such a motive? Put differently, can the exegetical position be accounted 
for without undue strain by straightforward considerations emerging out 
of the exegete’s culture and approach to text? Second, how persuasive 
is the extraneous motive? These considerations work in tandem. If the 
proposed motive is highly plausible, we may entertain it seriously even 
if there is little reason to seek it. If it is not particularly persuasive, we 
may decide that internal considerations suffice even if we began with a 
sense of dissatisfaction that sent us searching for external motivations.
In our case, I am not inclined to go far afield. With respect to the 
first question, Rashi’s position can be explained to my satisfaction on 
the basis of traditional Ashkenazic mentalité without recourse to other 
considerations. With respect to the second question, I am not persuaded 
that Rashi was likely to have been motivated by concern about Sephardic 
hokhmah or Christian ratio.
Is Rashi’s emphasis on hokhmah as Torah really problematic? It 
indeed stands in some tension with what moderns and even some 
Jewish medievals considered peshat. Rashbam (or the commentary to 
Job that incorporates material from Rashbam) pointedly comments that 
according to the peshat, the term hokhmah in Job 28:12 refers to hokhmah 
mammash (literal wisdom) and not to Torah. 15 For Rashi, however, whose 
13 I have commented on some of that literature in “A Generation of Scholarship on Jewish-
Christian Interaction in the Medieval World,” Tradition 38:2 (Summer, 2004): 4-14.
14 “Ha-Pulmus ha-Yehudi-Nozri ve-ha-Parshanut ha-Yehudit la-Miqra be-Zarfat ba-Me’ah 
ha-Yod-Bet (le-Parashat Zikato shel Ri Qara el ha-Pulmus),” Zion 51 (1985/86): 29-60.
15 Sarah Yafet, Perush Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir (Rashbam) le-Sefer Iyyov (Jerusalem, ca. 
2000), ad loc.
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immersion in the world of midrash was deeper and in large measure 
taken for granted, we need to ask whether there were powerful enough 
reasons in the text itself to impel him toward other interpretations.
First we need to consider the weight of the midrashic tradition. 
Prof. Grossman refers to midrashim that understand hokhmah as 
Torah in Proverbs and elsewhere, but he argues that Rashi could have 
chosen other midrashim. This is a familiar and often valid argument, 
but in this case, even a casual look through the midrashic and other 
rabbinic materials reveals that the equation of Torah and hokhmah is 
simply overwhelming. It made its way into the liturgy and is treated as 
virtually self-evident.
Moreover, key passages in Proverbs discuss Torah, commandments 
(mitzvot), and wisdom (hokhmah)—as well as the righteous and the 
wise—in closely linked contexts. “The mouth of the righteous produces 
wisdom (hokhmah)” (Proverbs 10:31). One especially instructive example 
is 7:1-5: 
My son, heed my words, and store up my mitzvot with you. Keep my mitzvot 
and live, my Torah, as the apple of your eye. Bind them on your fingers; 
write them on the tablet of your mind. Say to Wisdom (hokhmah), “You are 
my sister,” and call Understanding a kinswoman. She will guard you from 
a foreign woman whose talk is smooth.
Modern biblical scholars will say that Torah here and elsewhere in 
the Wisdom Literature refers to the teaching of the sage and the mitzvot 
to his directives. But to medieval Jews—including rationalists—Torah is 
Torah and mitzvot are mitzvot. Ralbag on this passage writes as follows: 
“My son, heed my words” in your heart. These are the stories of the Torah 
and the commandments of the Torah. Put them away with you to observe 
them. “Keep my mitzvot and live”: The mitzvot of the Torah, so that you will 
attain eternal life. And keep my Torah as you keep the apple of your eye. 
It is, moreover, not sufficient that you keep the mitzvot in your heart; you 
must bind them on your fingers to do them…
Now it is true that when Ralbag comments on the next verse about 
wisdom he does not continue to speak of Torah, but the connection 
between the two in this passage is so intimate that we can hardly 
expect Rashi to have felt a peshat-driven impulse to seek a different 
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interpretation. Thus, when the passage proceeds to speak of how wisdom 
protects against a foreign woman, it is more than natural for Rashi to 
identify this wisdom as Torah.
And so we come to two revealing passages that Grossman cites. 
Proverbs 2: 10-16 asserts that wisdom can save its bearer from an alien 
woman. Rashi affirms that the foreign woman is 
A gathering of idolatry, i.e. heresy. It is not plausible that the verse speaks of 
an adulteress literally understood, for how is it the praise of Torah… that it 
protects you from a foreign woman and not from a different transgression? 
Rather, this refers to heresy and idolatry, which constitutes throwing off 
the yoke of all the commandments.
Similarly, on Proverbs 6:24, which says, “It will keep you from an evil 
woman, from the smooth tongue of a foreign woman,” Rashi remarks, 
The Torah will keep you from an evil woman…We must conclude that 
Solomon was not speaking of an evil woman but rather of heresy, which is 
as weighty as everything. For if you will say that this refers to a prostitute 
in the literal sense, is this the entire praise and reward of Torah that it 
protects against a prostitute and nothing else?
There is, however, a key distinction between the passages. In the 
first case, the verses speak of wisdom, but in the second they speak of 
Torah. The verse preceding 6:24 reads, “For the mitzvah is a candle, and 
Torah is a light,” which of course even ibn Ezra and Ralbag understand 
in accordance with what any medieval Jew would have considered the 
peshat. It is also noteworthy that Ibn Ezra, though he understands Torah 
here as Torah, inserts a reference to wisdom without any textual basis. 
The Torah, he says, gives light, while the fool walks in the dark; thus, the 
way of life refers to wisdom. In this passage, at least, Torah and hokhmah 
are intertwined, virtually identified with one another, even for ibn Ezra. 
Even more striking is a passage in Ralbag’s commentary where, as Prof. 
Richard Steiner noted to me, the rationalist exegete tells us that wisdom 
in a series of verses (Proverbs 3: 15-18) that the Rabbis had famously 
utilized in their encomia to the Torah very likely means precisely what 
the Rabbis assumed.16 
16 Prof. Steiner also notes that the identification of wisdom and Torah is already present 
in Ben Sira 24.
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Two highly relevant points emerge from this discussion. First, the 
parallels between passages on wisdom and on Torah are so close that an 
exegete with a strong predisposition to follow rabbinic precedent would 
have little reason to seek an understanding of wisdom different from 
that of the Rabbis. Second, it is extremely revealing that in his comment 
on the passage in chapter 2 where the biblical text speaks of hokhmah, 
Rashi demonstrates that the foreign woman is idolatry or heresy using 
the same argument that he does when the text speaks of Torah: “Is this 
the praise of Torah,” he asks, that it saves you from a harlot? But you 
do not prove something on the basis of an interpretation that itself 
requires proof unless you have so internalized that interpretation 
that you simply take it for granted. It appears that Rashi did not even 
consider the possibility that the reader might say, “Wait a moment. 
How do you know that the verse here is referring to Torah?” Rashi’s 
assumption could result in part from the similarity between chapters 2 
and 7; as we have seen, 7:2 refers to “my Torah,” which Rashi would have 
taken in the traditional sense. Still, for Rashi, the equation of wisdom 
with Torah appears to have been foundational, not just ideologically 
but psychologically. If this is true, as I think it is, we need to be very 
hesitant about assuming that he rejected the non-Torah explanation in 
an exegetical campaign inspired by external concerns.17
Let us now turn very briefly to the proposed external concerns. There 
is little or no evidence that Rashi was sufficiently aware of Sephardic 
rationalism for him to have provided a tendentious interpretation of 
hokhmah in order to protect his readers, who probably needed no such 
protection, from its baneful influence. What then of the dangers of 
the Christian use of ratio? Despite Odo of Tournai, the evidence that 
the recent introduction of this category into the lexicon of Christian 
polemicists had come to Rashi’s attention is tenuous at best. Even the 
later Ashkenazic polemics do not address ratio as a category. When the 
author of the Nizzahon Yashan, writing two centuries after Anselm, 
addresses the Christian explanation for the incarnation, he deals only 
with the antiquated ransom theory in apparent blissful ignorance of the 
17 None of this means that Rashi was unaware of the fact that the plain meaning of the 
word hokhmah is wisdom and that it sometimes signifies nothing more than that. Thus, 
he is unprepared to rely on an overarching introductory observation and instead points 
out to his readers on repeated occasions that their untutored instincts embracing this 
understanding are incorrect.
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satisfaction theory in Cur Deus Homo?18 Moreover, when Jews in Spain 
and Provence did confront arguments from ratio, they usually took the 
offensive, maintaining that it was precisely Christian dogmas that were 
unreasonable; it is not clear why a Jew who was the product of an often 
assertive Ashkenazic culture would choose to react to the challenge not 
by utilizing the category but by fleeing from it.
This Ashkenazic assertiveness and self-confidence— akin to the 
self-image noted in the title of Haym Soloveitchik’s study of the laws 
governing the taking of interest19—may well play a role in the larger 
phenomenon that we are examining. Limited exposure, perhaps even 
substantial exposure, to books representing alternative ways of thinking 
would not easily transform the psychic world of people confident about 
their mode of understanding God and the world. Indeed, it is by no 
means clear why we should take for granted that they should have 
adopted the new approach. Are the workings of the Active Intellect really 
so intrinsically plausible that anyone who hears about them should nod 
in automatic assent? Setting this last point aside, I suspect that the 
self-confidence that characterized Ashkenazic Jewry played a role in its 
resistance to the absorption of non-Ashkenazic works and influences 
in the realm of Torah as well. The Jews of Southern France were more 
receptive—perhaps one should say more vulnerable— than Northern 
European Jewry to Sephardic rationalism for various reasons. First, their 
self-image in the area of halakhic observance studied by Soloveitchik 
was less secure, and this may mean something for their overall self-
confidence as well. Second, the culture of Provencal Christian society 
during the formative period of the region’s Jewry was itself marked by 
greater sophistication than that of the North, so that the Jews of the 
South may have developed a somewhat more open cultural orientation, 
at least in potentia. Most important, with the immigration of Sephardic 
Jews into Languedoc in the second half of the twelfth century, Provencal 
Jewry was exposed not just to books but to people. Sustained interaction 
with human beings is far more powerful than reading alone. You cannot 
set aside people the way you can set aside books.
18 The Jewish-Christian Debate, English section, pp. 195-196, and cf. my remarks in 
Appendix 2, p. 353.
19 Halakhah, Kalkalah ve-Dimmuy Azmi: ha-Mashkona’ut bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem, 
ca. 1985).
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Finally, a word about science that will return us to the subject of hokhmah 
in medieval Ashkenazic exegesis. A decade ago, I wrote a piece on the 
understanding of Solomon’s wisdom by Jewish exegetes.20 In their 
comments on the passage in Kings describing that wisdom, both Rashi and 
R. Joseph Kara gave pride of place to Solomon’s command of the sciences 
and only then went on to mention a “midrash aggadah” that understands 
the king’s discourses on trees, birds, and fish as halakhic discussions. 
I noted that in Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, traditionalist commentators 
routinely identified wisdom with Torah, but in this instance there were 
powerful textual reasons to marginalize this understanding. Let me add 
here that if Rashi really had a driving ideological motive for avoiding 
an understanding of wisdom as human understanding, he should have 
avoided it in Kings as well as in Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes despite the 
fact that the local context of the passage about Solomon militated against 
the identification of wisdom with Torah. Indeed, the very fact that Rashi 
does regard the identification of Solomonic wisdom with mastery of 
halakhah as a viable possibility makes his primary interpretation all the 
more difficult to explain if he had an overriding concern with preventing 
his readers from understanding hokhmah as human wisdom.
But my primary reason for citing this article is the following argument 
for distinguishing the attitude of Ashkenazic Jews toward science from 
their attitude toward philosophy:
We should not wonder about the positive assessment of practical scientific 
knowledge expressed in [the] commentaries of the [Northern] French 
exegetes. As I have argued elsewhere,21 the pursuit of natural science could 
become the subject of controversy precisely in the Sephardic orbit, where 
it was caught up in the web of philosophy. If the natural sciences were part 
of the “propaedeutic studies” leading to the queen of the sciences, they 
could be tainted by the unsavory reputation of the queen herself. Where 
they stood on their own, it is hard to imagine any grounds of principle 
for dismissing them or for failure to admire one who had mastered their 
20 “’The Wisest of All Men’: Solomon’s Wisdom in Medieval Jewish Commentaries on the 
Book of Kings.” In Hazon Nahum: Studies in Jewish Law, Thought and History presented 
to Dr. Norman Lamm on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, ed. by Yaakov Elman and 
Jeffrey S. Gurock (New York, 1997), pp. 93-114.
21 “Judaism and General Culture,” p. 118 and p. 134, n.131.
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secrets. The very indifference of Ashkenazic Jews to philosophical study 
liberated them to examine the natural world with keen, unselfconscious 
interest.22
In sum, I see no reason in principle for Ashkenazic Jews to have 
resisted an interest in science. But the rationalist spirit of Sephardic 
philosophy, with its questioning of the plain meaning of biblical texts and 
rabbinic aggadah, its valuing of philosophical inquiry as an enterprise at 
least on a par with traditional study of Torah, its suspicion of miracles, 
and its pursuit of the works of non-Jewish thinkers, was decidedly alien 
to the most deeply embedded instincts of Ashkenazic Jews. When we 
find an approach in an Ashkenazic work or series of works that accords 
with the traditionalist instincts of that culture, we need not look any 
further in an attempt to explain it.
22 “The Wisest of All Men,” p. 95.
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MALBIM’S SECULAR KNOWLEDGE AND HIS 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE SPIRIT OF THE HASKALAH
From: The Yavneh Review 5 (Spring, 1966): 24-46.
Rabbi Meir Loeb ben Yehiel Michel (1809-1879), who became known 
by his initials as Malbim, was a fascinating and significant figure on the 
Orthodox Jewish scene in the nineteenth century. Born in Volochisk, 
Volhynia and troubled by a stormy Rabbinical career in a half-dozen 
Jewish communities, Malbim wrote a large number of books, many of 
which had a powerful influence upon the intellectual life of those Jews 
who remained opposed to the Haskalah movement, even rejuvenating 
the much neglected study of the Bible to a considerable extent.1 The 
degree of his influence may be partially gauged by two quite divergent 
sources which yield the same impression — that the admiration for 
Malbim was almost boundless. Tzvi Hirschfeld, in an article in Zion 
1841, which will be discussed more fully below, wrote of Malbim, “I 
know very well that the Jews who live in Eastern lands, upon whom 
the light of wisdom has not yet shone, have decided to raise him up 
and exalt him.” Many years later, the famous Rabbi Yitzchak Isaac of 
Slonim said, “He is matchless in our generation and is as one of the 
great scholars of medieval times (rishonim), and one page of his books 
is as beloved to me as any treasure and is dearer than pearls.”2
Yet Malbim, the champion of Orthodoxy, was imbued with a very 
wide range of secular knowledge; indeed, as we shall see, he could never 
have exercised such influence without it. It is the purpose of this paper to 
1 S. Glicksburg (Ha-Derashah be-Yisrael [Tel Aviv, 1940], p. 406) writes, “In the circles 
of the extremely orthodox it was permitted with difficulty to study Bible with the 
commentary of the ‘Kempener’ (= Malbim)."
2 Quoted by Isaac Danzig in his Alon Bakhut, Evel Kaved ‘al ha-Rav ha-Gaon... Malbim (St. 
Petersberg, 1879), p. 14.
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examine Malbim’s secular learning and to determine how he related it to 
his faith and to the religious, intellectual, and social developments of his 
time. We shall thus gain insight into the worldview of a very influential 
rabbi who, while remaining within the orbit of the strictest Orthodoxy, 
grappled with the manifold problems of the age of Haskalah.
Let us turn first to a central issue, Malbim’s attitude toward the 
Jewish Enlightenment and toward religious reform, problems which 
were closely intertwined in his mind. This subject is best approached 
through an analysis of perhaps the most painful experience of 
Malbim’s life, his tenure as chief rabbi of Bucharest from 1860 to 
1865. Here he suffered intensely from people sympathetic to religious 
reform who accused him of obscurantism and who eventually had 
him thrown into jail, from which he was released only through the 
intervention of Moses Montefiore. His reaction to these events, 
detailed in a long article he wrote in Ha-Levanon 2,3 is of great value 
in giving us an understanding of his feelings on these questions. 
We must constantly keep in mind, however, the circumstances 
under which this article was written. Malbim was very angry and 
bitter; his negative feelings will thus be exaggerated and the picture 
of his enemies will approach caricature. Yet exaggeration is often 
valuable, for it clarifies beliefs and emotions that might otherwise 
have remained vague.
Malbim’s article, important for social and economic as well as 
intellectual history, divides the Jewish population of Bucharest into 
three groups: 1) artisans, 2) peddlers and storekeepers, and 3) the 
upper class. His attitude toward the first two groups is friendly, for 
despite their ignorance they were responsive to his preaching and 
careful in religious observance.4 This friendliness toward the ignorant 
masses is found elsewhere in Malbim’s works as well; he says, for 
example, that “the masses can reach the (religious) level of a scholar by 
supporting him.”5 These Jews apparently returned his affection, for he 
relates that many made valiant physical efforts to prevent his arrest,6 
3 “Shenat HaYovel,” Ha-Levanon 2 (1865): 68-71, 85-87, 101-103, 116-118, 134-136, 
199-201, 230-233, 261-263, 294-297.
4 Pp. 231-233.
5 Manuscript notes published in Eretz Hemdah (Warsaw, 1881; henceforth E.H.) on Deut., 
p. 170.
6 “Shenat HaYovel,” p. 86.
Malbim’s Secular Knowledge and His Relationship to the Spirit of the Haskalah
— 169 —
and at his funeral the crowds were so large that the city administration 
of Kiev had to supply a special guard.7
The upper class, however, was viewed by their rabbi with dislike 
and contempt. Malbim, as we shall see presently, felt that genuine 
enlightenment and religious belief are inseparable; the rich lacked 
the latter and, Malbim maintains, did not, despite their pretenses, 
possess the former. When asked by his fictitious questioner about 
the philosophical position of his opponents, Malbim answers that 
previous philosophers based their systems upon knowledge obtained 
through the mind, the eye, and the ear, while these “philosophers” 
depend upon taste, touch, and smell. “Their taste gains wisdom (ישכיל) 
in understanding the nature of all sorts of animals about which no 
Jew has ever gained wisdom; it investigates ‘all animals that go on all 
fours and that have many feet’ and all ‘that have no fins or scales in 
the waters.’ The sense of touch looks into the nature of the generative 
faculty... and investigates prohibited women for three [cf. Mishnah 
Hagigah 2:1] of these philosophers. And the sense of smell, because it 
is a spiritual faculty, was not privileged to reign on weekdays but only 
on the Sabbath, for those who do not smoke all week ‘have their smoke 
rise’ on the Sabbath in all streets.”8
Now Malbim, we know, did not care much for rich people generally. 
This dislike goes back to his unpleasant experiences with his first wife, 
of a very rich family, whom he divorced largely because she wanted 
him to give up his studies and enter the world of business.9 Thus, 
Malbim may well have antagonized these people by not treating 
them respectfully. But there can be little doubt that their religious 
observance was minimal and that this was a major factor in the 
development of antagonism. Malbim, as we shall see, was exaggerating 
when he said that their opposition was based solely on his preaching, 
which emphasized religious observance, but there is surely some basis 
for his assertion.10
7 Danzig, Alon Bakhut, p. 11.
8 “Shenat HaYovel,” p. 263.
9 David Macht, Malbim, The Man and his Work (1912?, reprinted from Jewish Comment 
[Baltimore, February 9-16, 1912]), p. 7.
10 The assertion comes in the following sarcastic passage of “Shenat HaYovel” (p. 117): 
ויאמר עוד (החוזה): ״כי עבור שהוכיח אותם לשמור את השבת מחללו ולהנזר מבשר החזיר מלאכלו,   
לכן חיתו למומתים נתנו״ — פג לבי מלהאמין שהיו הדברים כפשוטן, אמרתי גם אם לא ידעו היהודים 
האלה כי הזהירה התורה על חלול שבת ועל מאכלות אסורות וחשבו כי מלבי בדיתי המצוות החדשות 
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The militant non-observance of some of Malbim’s detractors is 
illustrated by the well-known story that on Purim one of them sent 
him a sugar pig as mishloah manot [items of food traditionally sent to 
a neighbor], whereupon he paid the messenger and sent back his own 
picture “saying that Malbim thanks the sender for his image which 
the respectable gentleman was kind enough to send the rabbi, and 
that in return he sends his own likeness.”11 It is also told of Malbim 
that a non-observant Jew asked him whether smoking was permitted 
on the Sabbath; the answer: yes, if it is done with some change (על 
שינוי  that is, by putting the burning side into one’s mouth.12 The ,(ידי 
fact that such incidents are related about Malbim indicates that there 
was strong antagonism which at least manifested itself in the form of 
militant opposition to religious observance and which, as we shall see, 
was justified on the basis of enlightenment.
Malbim’s preaching, then, was a major factor in the developing 
animosity. Still, it is clear from his writings that he felt that a 
preacher must not admonish people with unmitigated harshness and 
severity. “One who admonishes the people… must be one of the sons 
of Aaron… to love peace and pursue peace, to love people and bring 
them closer to Torah.”13 Elsewhere, he emphasizes the fact that the 
reprover must see to it that he does not embarrass the person being 
admonished.14 In his commentary on Genesis,15 Malbim attributes to 
God an approach which he is likely to have followed himself: “This was 
God’s custom in most of the prohibitions: to first mention what was 
permitted, e.g., “Six days thou shalt work”… “Six years thou shalt sow 
thy land”… intending to show that the prohibitions of the Sabbath 
and of the Sabbatical year are not impossible to observe. Here too he 
האלה ונבאתי להם בשם ה׳ ונביא שקר חייב מיתה: בכ״ז  הלא לא אמרתי להם ״כה אמר ה׳ אלי אמור 
אל בני ישראל... כל טמא לא תאכלו״, כה אמרתי להם, ״כה אמר ה׳ אל משה נביאו זכור את יום השבת 
דלא  לאו  על  עברתי  הנה  משה,  תורת  על  מלבי  אלה  דברים  הוספתי  כי  מחשבתם  לפי  וגם  ״  לקדשו... 
ואחשבה  דבר,  על  דבר  המוסיף  רק  הוא  המוסיף  הלא  עוד:  אמרתי  מיתה!  לא  מלקות,  וחייבתי  תוסיף 
לדעת איזה דבר שמרו מתורת משה וקיימוהו, עד שיאמרו שאני הוספתי על הדבר הזה עוד דבר זולתו? 
ואיך יאמרו שעברתי עמ״ש בתורה: ״לא תוסיפו על הדבר׳׳, על איזה דבר?
11 Macht, op. cit., p. 13. For a different version, see A. Ettinger, Da‘at Zeqenim (Warsaw, 
1898), p. 54.
12 E. Davidson, Sehoq Pinu (Tel Aviv, 1951), p. 239. Cf. also p. 238, no. 874b.
13 Torah Or (supplementary notes to the commentary on the Pentateuch, henceforth T.O.) 
to Numbers 10:8.
14 Com. to Lev., Qedoshim no. 43.
15 2:16-17.
Malbim’s Secular Knowledge and His Relationship to the Spirit of the Haskalah
— 171 —
meant to say (to Adam), ‘After all, I have prohibited only one tree; I 
have prohibited only luxuries and the pleasure which causes evil, and 
I have not commanded that you refrain from enjoying food.’” Such 
a man is unlikely, despite the frequent difference between theory 
and practice, to have been unrestrained in the violence of his attack 
against the practices of the people of Bucharest. Still, the troubles 
he experienced in other cities as well tends to indicate that he was 
perhaps short-tempered and somewhat intolerant of those with whom 
he differed, although it should be recalled that these incidents were 
all after his bitter experience in Bucharest. Earlier, he had had a long 
and successful rabbinical career without such friction. In any event, 
he tells us that ten days before his arrest he came to an agreement 
with his opponents permitting him, as he puts it, to preach about the 
Sabbath and prohibited foods only to those who would willingly listen.16 
Malbim probably agreed to this compromise or at least rationalized 
his agreement on the basis of a realization that admonitions to his 
opponents would go unheeded, and one of the necessary components 
of the commandment “Thou shalt rebuke thy neighbor” is that he be 
a person who might accept reproof.17 In any case, the agreement was 
broken by Malbim’s enemies, and his unhappy years in Bucharest were 
brought to an end.18
At this point, we must examine the charges made against Malbim 
by his opponents. S. Sachs, in an article defending Malbim in Ha-
Levanon,19 says that he was blamed for three reasons: 1) preaching 
in Hebrew, 2) inability to represent the Jewish community to the 
government because of inability to speak languages (German, French, 
or Rumanian) well, 3) lack of supervision of the schools to see to it 
that secular subjects and languages (ספרים ולשונות) be taught. There is 
unquestionably much truth in all these allegations. It should, however, 
be pointed out that even if Malbim did not speak these languages 
fluently, he could read at least German quite well. This is clear from 
his treatise on logic (Yesodei Hokhmat ha-Higgayon) where he refers, in 
16 “Shenat HaYovel,” p. 117.
17 Com. to Lev., loc. cit.
18 Malbim probably saw his own fate reflected in Amos 5:13:  "והמשכיל בעת ההיא ידום", where 
he comments, משכילי עם היודעים רעתכם והיה דרכם להוכיח ועתה ידמו וישימו יד לפה באשר ״עת רעה 
.היא״ ושונאים את המוכיח והורגים אותו
19 2 (1865): 92-94, 106-110.
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frequent parentheses, to many difficult German philosophical terms 
which he has translated into Hebrew.20
The third charge is more serious and more significant. On December 
7, 1864, the Rumanian government passed a law requiring elementary 
education of all children between eight and twelve years of age.21 That 
there was strong Jewish opposition to this law is clear from a letter 
from the Minister of Public Instruction sent to Jewish communities 
in 1865. “I have been receiving requests,” writes the minister, 
“from several Israelite communities to continue to tolerate the old, 
unsystematic schools.” This he refused to do and proposed instead a 
sort of “released time” program for Jews. He ends: “The separation of 
schools will perpetuate the Jews’ separation from the nation, for they 
will not become accustomed to the life of Rumanians and will accustom 
themselves, from infancy, to the idea of a separation between Jews 
and Christians.”22 Thus, some degree of Jewish assimilation was the 
avowed aim of this program. Malbim probably felt that national and 
cultural assimilation of this sort was but the first step toward religious 
assimilation, and he was surely familiar and probably in sympathy with 
the cry of many Russian Jews, “No secular schools!”23 It is true that he 
himself had broad secular knowledge, but he had not obtained it in an 
assimilation-oriented, government-sponsored program. Furthermore, 
there was long-standing Jewish precedent for permitting such studies 
to people of more advanced age and knowledge while prohibiting it to 
youngsters.24
Malbim’s experience in Bucharest aroused within him powerful 
feelings of distaste for what he regarded as pseudo-enlightenment. 
20 Cf. also E.H. on Gen., p. 18. Sachs writes of Malbim, (ולוא היה חי בימי הרמב״ן (צ״ל הרמבמ״ן 
 ורנה״ו ובעלי המאספים ז״ל כי אז היו שמחים כמוצא שלל רב למצא טוב בדורם רב גדול כמוהו, אשר נקבצו
בישראל ירבו  כמותו  והמעלות,  השלמות  כל  מכלל  יחדו  לו   p. 109). He also makes the point) באו 
that Malbim knew German, though he could not speak it fluently.
21 E. Sincerus, Les Juifs en Roumanie (London and New York, 1901), p. 119.
22 “La séparation des écoles perpetuera leur séparation de la nation; car ils ne s’habitueront 
pas à la vie des Roumains, et se feront, des leur enfance, a l’idée d’une séparation entre 
Juifs et Chrétiens.” V.A. Urecke, Oeuvres Complètes, I, pp. 393-4. Cited in Sincerus, pp. 
119-120.
23 Cf. Gideon Katznelson, Ha-Milhamah ha-Sifrutit bein ha-Haredim ve-ha-Maskilim (Tel 
Aviv, 1954), ch. 1, esp. p. 14.
24 Cf. the famous ban of R. Solomon ben Adret as well as a similar reaction of Italian 
rabbis to Azariah de’ Rossi’s Me’or Einayim. Cf. also Malbim’s Com. to Lev., Aharei Mot 
no. 41, where he explains the limited value of secular learning.
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He expressed these feelings in poetic form in “Shenat HaYovel”: “The 
darkness is dispelled, you say, the light has come; you say, ‘Ethics and 
justice were born in my time; religion and faith are slaves of my light.’ 
You say, ‘I have grown wise though my fathers were fools…’ O pure and 
enlightened generation! When the light descended, darkness ascended 
from beneath it… So has darkness turned to light!… What is to be 
done to the shepherds of Israel who say that there are still Torah and 
commandments for Israel?… What is to be done to obscurantists who 
say that ‘a commandment is a candle and Torah light’ and whose ear is 
deaf to the voice of the times that cries, ‘There is no Torah, for liberty 
has come’?”25
In truth, Malbim believed in haskalah — in his own way. In the 
introduction to his commentary on Leviticus and Sifra, he says that his 
book is intended for wise or enlightened people (משכילי עם), and he is 
fearful lest it be seen by obscurantists (מורדי אור). The candelabrum in 
the sanctuary is a symbol of the light of wisdom and knowledge (אור 
 To Malbim, however, haskalah means either knowledge 26.(ההשכלה והדעת
and understanding of God and Torah or the use of linguistic, logical, 
and even scientific tools to buttress faith or to explain it.
Malbim felt that the non-belief or “heresy” of his time was a result 
of a perversion of the intellectual process. He discusses the person 
“who sins because of disbelief and comes ‘with a high hand’ to deny the 
Sinaitic revelation as did Menasseh ben Hezekiah… who equated the 
words of the Torah with those of men.” There is no doubt that he has in 
mind the reformers of the nineteenth century, for in the introduction 
to his commentary on Leviticus, he accuses those who gathered at 
Brunswick of comparing the Torah to other ancient stories and its 
poetry to that of Homer and the Greeks. The passage about Menasseh 
 סר החושך — אמרת — בא האור / אמרת: המוסר והיושר ילידי דורי / אמרת הדת והאמונה עבדי אורי 25
 / אמרת: אני השכלתי ואבותי סכלו / אני קמתי ואבותי נפלו... הדור הטהור! / הדוד הנאור! / כי ברדת
 האור עלה החשך מתחתיה... הדור הטהור והנאור! / כך היה החשך לאור!... מה לעשות לרועי ישראל /
 האומרים יש עוד תורה ומצוות לישראל / האומרים תורה אחת לנו ולאבותינו / תורה צוה משה מורשה
 היא גם לקהילותינו / מה לעשות למורדי אור ! / האומרים דודי לי צרור המור / בין שדי ילין, דבר צוה
 לאלף דור, / אל תמיר כבודו בתבנית שור. / מה לעשות למורדי אור ! / האומרים אל תבכר בן כזבי בת
 צור / על פני בן הישראלית השנואה הבכור / אל תצמד ישראל לבעל פעור. / מה לעשות למורדי אור?
 Shenat“ .האומרים נר מצוה ותורה אור, / אזנם חרשה לקול העת והתור / הקורא: אין תורה כי בא דרור
HaYovel,” pp. 134-136.
26 Rimzei ha-Mishkan on Exodus, ch. 25. Cf. also T.O. on Numbers, beginning of 
Beha‘alotekha and Com. to Song of Songs 2:5.
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continues: “There is a difference between one who sins through passion 
— for he will later repent — and one who sins through disbelief, for 
he will never repent. The first act is called sin (חטא); the second — 
an act of perversity (עוון) because it is a perversion of intellect (עוות 
 Malbim’s pessimism about repentance is qualified somewhat 27”.(השכל
in his eschatological speculations, but it is clear here that he considers 
the non-believer hopelessly lost. In any case, the idea that certain 
manifestations of the haskalah, viz. the anti-orthodox developments, 
are perversions not only of faith but also of intellect is a central 
one in Malbim’s thought. Examples of this conviction can be easily 
multiplied;28 we shall see later that he considered certain aspects of 
disbelief in Orthodoxy to be absolutely untenable philosophically.
Malbim, in fact, wrote a long poem called Mashal u-Melitzah to 
emphasize the interdependence of wisdom and faith. It has been 
suggested that this poem was written as a response to Emet ve-
Emunah of Adam ha-Kohen. Klausner points out that the two books 
appeared in the same year but adds that Malbim may have seen the 
other work in manuscript form.29 This seems far-fetched. It is much 
more likely that this poem, which was first given to the editor of Ha-
Levanon, is the result of Bucharest; it is a poetic expression of the ideas 
of the unfinished “Shenat HaYovel.” The latter appeared in 1865 and 
the former in 1867; the essential idea of both is that enlightenment 
without faith is folly. The fact that the chief protagonist, a man in love 
with Wisdom (חכמה) but repelled by her sister Fear of God (יראה), is 
named Rich (עשיר) lends further plausibility to this conjecture. The 
central point, that Wisdom and Fear of God are “twin sisters,” is made 
over and over again.30 It is significant that Malbim used the poetic 
27 Com. to Numbers 15:30 (Shelah no. 48).
28 Following are a number of examples: Com. to Gen. 2:7: וכן בכחות הנפש המשכלת. לפעמים ישכיל 
 Com. to .לדעת ה׳ ודרכיו ותורתו, ולפעמים ישמש בשכלו להתנכל ולהתחבל בתחבולות רשע ודרך רע וכדומה
Gen. 3:6: כשתקדם התאוה אל השכל ואז תקרא התאוה את השכל לעזר לה, והשכל ימשך אחר התאוה ויעזר לה 
 .בשכלו, בתחבולות רשע ובהמציא היתרים ואמתלאות למעשיו ויחפה כסף סיגים על חרש לאמר שהדבר מותר
Com. to Isaiah 1: 29: וחטא זה, (בחירת ע״ז בשכל) היה גדול יותר כי יד השכל והבחירה היה במעל הזה.
29 Joseph Klausner, Historiah shel ha-Sifrut ha-lvrit ha-Hadashah, vol. 3 (Jerusalem, 
1952/53), p. 224.
30 Mashal u-Melitzah, p. 22: אור חכמה אל הולך בנתיבתה / אשת חן, אם לא יגרע עונתה: / אשה רעה אל 
 ממיר את דתה. / הישכב איש את להבת שלהבת / ולא יהיה לשרפת אש צרבת ? — / כך שוכב חיק חכמה ועוזב
 אם אין יראה אין :(P. 110 (note אחיות תאומות דומות יראה וחכמה מלידה מבטן ומהריון״ :P. 34 תורתה!
תבונה אין  אמונה  אין  ואם   ;Cf. note on p. 95. Also Artzot ha-Shalom (Munkacs, 1895 .חכמה, 
henceforth Ar. Sh.). p. 2b: מבורכת ה׳ ארצי, ממגד האמונה מעל, ומתהום המחקר רובצת תחת.
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form to express this idea; he was interested in proving that technical 
skill in language can and does go hand in hand with strict fidelity to 
religious tradition. This too, as we shall discover, was a basic approach 
in all Malbim’s literary endeavors.
One of the clearest examples to Malbim of the use of intellect for 
perverse purposes was the discovery of rationalizations to justify the 
abandonment of certain biblical injunctions. These rationalizations 
usually took the form of discovering a reason for the commandment 
and showing how that reason is no longer relevant. In discussing 
Eve’s encounter with the serpent, Malbim writes, “Here we learn the 
serpent’s method of seduction and leading astray which exists to this 
very day. For if people investigate the reasons for the commandments 
as do those of our nation who are breaking away, they ask why God 
prohibited five impure animals and try to discover as the reason the 
fact that they do damage to the body of the one who eats them. Then, 
when they discover that the foods are not harmful to the body, they 
throw away the commandment.”31 In his homiletical work, Artzot ha-
Shalom, Malbim blames Maimonides for laying a trap into which many 
have fallen by saying that the reason for prohibited foods is medical.32 
Finally, he says that people who indulge in such speculation should at 
least be uncertain as to the reasons they advance and therefore not 
abandon religious observance.33
Thus far, we have sketched Malbim’s attitude toward the 
Enlightenment, particularly as it affected religious reform. Later, 
we shall discuss other aspects of his approach and the scope and 
application of his secular knowledge. First, however, we must examine 
his attitude as reflected in his life work: biblical exegesis.
In 1839, a book of sermons by Malbim called Artzot ha-Shalom 
appeared. Tzvi Hirschfeld, in Zion 1841,34 reviewed the book and asked 
Malbim to abandon far-fetched, homiletical interpretations of Scripture 
and to write a commentary based on the simple, true interpretation 
(peshat). Hirschfeld notes the fact that Malbim is greatly admired by 
the Jews of Eastern Europe and can thus influence them profoundly; 
he points, furthermore, to Ha-Ketav ve-ha-Kabbalah of Rabbi Jacob 
31 Com. to Gen. 3:3-4.
32 Ar. Sh. Sermon III, p. 18a.
33 Com. to Gen. 2:16-17.
34 Pp. 59-62, 73-75.
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Meklenburg as a work worthy of emulation by Malbim. In turning 
to Malbim’s commentaries, we see an attempt to fulfill Hirschfeld’s 
request by explaining the Bible according to the plain meaning, though 
Malbim’s idea of peshat and that of Hirschfeld were undoubtedly quite 
different. But there was much more to motivate Malbim than a single 
review of Artzot ha-Shalom. There was one of the overriding ambitions 
of his life: to prove that modern attacks on the divine authorship of 
the Bible and the oral law are not based on genuine scholarship and 
that, on the contrary, a more profound understanding of grammar and 
logic can demonstrate the validity of tradition. Thus, Malbim decided 
to use the tools of the Enlightenment to oppose its anti-Orthodox 
tendencies. It should be stated at the outset that his command of the 
tools and the spirit of modern scholarship was far more restricted 
than that of a man like David Hoffmann, for example, whose goals 
were quite similar. Yet Malbim’s influence was much wider, and his 
approach, both in its successes and failures, merits careful study.
Malbim tells us in his introduction to Leviticus that what really 
motivated him to write his commentary was the conference of reform-
minded rabbis at Brunswick in 1844, although it is quite clear from the 
same introduction that he himself was deeply concerned with the basic 
problems involved and did not want to neglect the plain meaning of 
either the written or oral Torah. Thus, the commentary is avowedly a 
reaction to the times, a phenomenon which we see in the case of Artzot 
ha-Shalom35 and Artzot ha-Hayyim, [a commentary on Orah Hayyim] 
which, says Y.L. Maimon,36 was to be a commentary on the entire 
Shulhan Aruch as well. The reaction, in the case of the commentary to 
Leviticus, was to unite the oral and written law. It is interesting that 
Malbim uses the phrase ha-ketav ve-ha-kabbalah in this context, yet 
does not refer explicitly to Meklenburg at all, perhaps because his own 
methods were to be novel.
Malbim based his commentary on a very thorough study of 
Hebrew grammar,37 a pursuit very popular among the maskilim. His 
central purpose in this pursuit was to demonstrate that “none of the 
35 Introduction to Ar. Sh., pp. 3a-b: אך אנכי תולעת עצלה!... לא עשיתי כל מאומה... אך בחלום חזיון 
ואשכב הפכו ילדי יום...  אשר  כל המהפכה  ואת  השמש  אשר נעשו תחת  המעשים  כל  את  לבבי  ראה   תרדמה 
.וארדם״
36 Sarei ha-Meah (Jerusalem, 1965), vol. 6, pp. 109-110.
37 Introduction to Isaiah.
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grammarians have reached even the ankles of the first generation,” 
a demonstration which will give “ammunition… against any 
heretic… denier, or critic.”38 The method Malbim employs to effect 
this demonstration is the bringing of proof that previous attempts 
to explain grammatical phenomena have been inadequate and that 
only the rabbinic midrash provides a full explanation. To do this, 
he conveniently assumes that fixed rules for all phenomena must 
be preserved at all costs, ignoring the fact that languages develop 
through use.39 He would justify this assumption, of course, on the 
basis of the special sanctity of Hebrew. When Malbim cannot establish 
the accuracy of a rabbinic statement, he tries to show its probability 
and the impossibility of contrary demonstration. When dealing, for 
example, with certain rabbinic comments on the compound nature of 
some Hebrew words (e.g. תנאף = תתן אף ;יחניף = יחן אף ;רכיל = רך אל), Malbim 
shows that many words probably are compounded, “and we do not 
know how. The Rabbis, however, who were near the source and knew 
the language and its origin knew how the development took place.”40 
This exaggerated agnosticism as to liguistic development ignores the 
role of comparative Semitic philology of which Malbim may or may not 
have been aware, but it aids him in making his point in an area where 
proof of rabbinic accuracy would be well-nigh impossible.
Malbim, in using grammatical and logical principles, is allegedly 
seeking the simple meaning of the text. In his introduction to Joshua, 
Isaiah, and the Song of Songs, he explicitly differentiates between peshat 
and derash and says that he seeks only the former. In his commentary 
to Genesis41 he begins in one place by quoting his homiletical Artzot 
ha-Shalom and then says, “But according to our present method…” and 
gives another explanation. Despite the fact that Malbim ordinarily 
insists that the simple meaning and the rabbinic interpretation are 
identical, there are passages where he distinguishes the two and feels 
impelled to explain the simple meaning separately. “This,” he writes, “is 
in accordance with the simple meaning (פשט). And now let us explain 
the verses according to the interpretation of the Sifrei and Talmud.”42 
38 Introduction to Lev.
39 Com. to Lev., Tazria‘ no. 17: וזה רחוק שתהיה לשוננו הקדושה כעיר פרוצה אין חומה וגדר.
40 Com. to Lev., Va-Yiqra, no. 152; Qedoshim no. 40.
41 12:22-23.
42 Com. to Deut. 24:1.
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“Till here,” he writes elsewhere, “we have interpreted according to 
the Mishnah (ch. 5 of Ma‘aser Sheni) and the Sifrei, and now let us 
explain according to the peshat.”43 He feels it necessary to explain the 
lex talionis according to its biblical formulation and therefore says that 
“in the hands of heaven” there is theoretically such punishment and 
payment is to be regarded as ransom money (44.(כפר In Eretz Hemdah,45 
he mentions a rabbinic explanation of a non-halakhic matter together 
with one from the Kuzari as if they had equal weight. Malbim’s 
theoretical recognition of the primacy of the simple interpretation is 
present in his Artzot ha-Hayyim as well,46 although we shall later see 
that Malbim often lost sight of the simple meaning completely and 
indulged in the most fanciful homilies in his commentary.
We must now examine a vitally important question with regard 
to Malbim’s biblical exegesis, and that is the extent of his familiarity 
with biblical criticism, both historical and textual. Probably the most 
significant passage in Malbim’s writings which deals with higher 
criticism is in his introduction to Psalms. Here, he confesses that 
certain psalms were written under divine inspiration as late as the time 
of Cyrus and tries to adduce Talmudic authority for a similar opinion. 
He adds that he admits this “to remove from us the arguments of 
scoffers who ask how it is possible that in the time of David, when 
the monarchy was still powerful, Israel was on its land, and the decree 
was not yet made, that the priests should have sung about the end of 
the monarchy and the exile in the time of Zedekiah.” Malbim, in other 
words, is willing to grant a small concession in order to strengthen 
the foundations of the faith; he is attempting to show that the divine 
inspiration of Psalms can be defended without farfetched reasoning 
that insists upon Davidic authorship.
Malbim, however, always had a double audience in mind, and to 
his Orthodox readers he supplied the necessary far-fetched reasoning. 
The Bible, he explains, traditionally has four levels of meaning (peshat, 
43 Com. to Deut. 26:15.
44 Com. to Lev., Emor no. 249.
45 Gen., p. 55.
46 Ar. H. on Orah Hayyim 1.6, Ha-Me’ir la-Aretz no. 73: ״ועיין בארץ יהודה כתבתי בדרך אחר, והוא 
החידוד בדרך  בנויים :Cf. also the introductory comment of Rabbi Moses Sofer .רק   הדברים 
על אדני השכל, וקרובים לאמיתתה של
תורה, לא כדרך הפלפול הנהוג. 
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remez, derash, sod [or kabbalah, as he puts it] known as PaRDeS) and as 
many as seventy different valid interpretations (ע‘ פנים לתורה). Malbim 
is interpreting according to the simple meaning, but the traditional 
view may be correct on some other level. Here he is in serious logical 
difficulty. The principle of PaRDeS makes sense in some areas of 
exegesis; an author, especially if that author is God, can intend to 
convey various nuances and even levels of meaning. But it makes little 
sense in this case. Even if “the Torah has seventy faces,” how can both 
David and a priest of Cyrus’ time have written the same psalm? Malbim 
was quite aware of this difficulty and suggests that the psalm may have 
been written early, transmitted secretly by a few select individuals, and 
finally made public in the time of Cyrus. While this is hardly derash, 
remez or sod, it is an interesting attempt to solve a problem which 
obviously perplexed Malbim and troubled him considerably.47
A striking parallel to this reasoning, one, in fact, which may have 
influenced Malbim, is found in an article by S. D. Luzatto on Isaiah 
published much before Malbim wrote his introduction to Psalms.48 
Luzzatto, in defending the unity of Isaiah, wrote, “Those prophecies 
which refer to the distant future Isaiah did not proclaim publicly… but 
he wrote them down to be preserved for future generations.”
It is significant that Malbim scarcely mentions the critical dissection 
of Isaiah and certainly does not enter into a careful polemic against it. 
That he knew about it is clear from his introduction to Ezekiel where 
he says, “This well (of Ezekiel’s words) ... has been left undisturbed by 
the commentators and critics of the last generation, unlike the books 
of Isaiah and Job and other wells of holy water which come from the 
sanctuary which they have disturbed; and some of them have come 
to Marah and thrown in their trees and made the water bitter, while 
others closed up the wells and filled them with dust.” He was well 
aware of the critical approach to the Song of Songs as well, and writes 
in his commentary, “You see that God… has closed the eyes of some 
of the commentators and translators of the German Bibles… who have 
47 Following are selections from this passage: ,אצלנו אולם  חמלעיגים...  לגול מעלינו טענת   ״וכתבתי 
במחזה צפו  כבר  האלה  המזמורים  כל  והקבלה,  והרמז  הדרוש  דרך  וכפי  לתורה  פנים  שבעים  כי  אומן   אמונה 
הנביאים והמשוררים... והיו גנוזים וצפונים ביד אנשי הרוח דור דור עד עת שיצא הדבר אל הפועל ואז נאמרו
.בקול רם 
48 Kerem Hemed 7. Reprinted in Mehqerei ha-Yahadut (Warsaw, 1913), Vol. 1, part 2. The 
relevant passage [in Mehqerei ha-Yahadut] is on p. 38.
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profaned the sanctity of this song, for they have explained it according 
to its outer form, according to its husk, and have considered it like 
the song of a harlot… They have therefore cut it in pieces and torn it 
to shreds... and considered it a combination of many songs — a wine 
song, a song of friendship, a song of spring, a song for the dance, etc.”49 
In the case of Job, it is fairly clear that Malbim believed it was written 
by Moses, for he says in his introduction, “Its value, order, character, 
and wisdom are evidence that there is divine wisdom in it and that 
it was composed through divine inspiration by a man unique in the 
history of Israel (איש לא קם בישראל כמוהו).”
In the case of Isaiah and the Song of Songs, it was religiously 
crucial to reject higher criticism. In Job, Malbim thought the objective 
evidence to be clearly in favor of traditional views. His general feeling 
was, as he relates at the end of his introduction to Joshua, that recent 
commentators had either repeated what had already been done before 
or had gone dangerously astray. In the one case where the core of 
the significant religious assertion could be preserved even after the 
acceptance of certain critical conclusions and where the objective 
evidence favored such conclusions — the case of Psalms — we see 
Malbim torn by a number of opposing forces: his desire to show that 
one did not require far-fetched reasoning to affirm divine inspiration, 
his adherence to tradition, his Orthodox audience, his common sense. 
He finally arrived at an unoriginal but instructive compromise trying 
to preserve all elements and satisfy all his readers.
Malbim’s position on textual criticism is wholly negative. It may 
even be probable that his opposition to lower criticism caused him to 
adopt a position which profoundly affected his most basic exegetical 
method. In his introduction to Jeremiah, he carries on a polemic 
against Abravanel who had dared criticize the stylistic skill of the 
prophet. Malbim maintains that God dictated the specific language of 
each prophet word for word, for if we do not affirm this and assume 
instead the fallibility of the prophet in transmitting the content of 
his prophecy then we are opening the door to an unusual sort of 
lower criticism (stylistic improvement rather than restoration of a 
corrupt text). “Then,” writes Malbim, “a person would dare to add 
49 “He-Harash ve-ha-Masger,” an epilogue to the commentary on Song of Songs, vol. 2 
(Jerusalem, 1956 ed. of Malbim), p. 1730.
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and subtract from Holy Writ according to his stylistic preference, and 
the holy books will be like an open, unwalled city which ‘little foxes 
that destroy vineyards’ would enter to damage and destroy… And we 
are commanded not to change even one letter.” In his introduction 
to Leviticus, Malbim refers to those who gathered at Brunswick as 
“little foxes” bent on destruction, a parallel which indicates that he 
is not merely referring to a theoretical danger here but was quite 
well aware of the growing tendency toward conjectural emendation 
even, to a limited extent, in a man as religious as Luzzatto. He may 
have felt that by raising the sanctity of each prophetic word to that 
of the Pentateuch itself he would prevent this tendency. Luzzatto, 
for example, did not emend Pentateuchal passages. In light of this 
conviction, the principles he laid down in his commentary to Isaiah 
that prophetic writings can contain no redundancy or superfluity in 
style takes on new meaning, for the style too is not the prophet’s but 
God’s. Thus, in an indirect and perhaps subsidiary way his reaction 
against lower criticism is responsible for the principles underlying a 
major part of his exegetical works.
Malbim, as we have seen, maintained that his sole quest was for 
the simple meaning. Yet, despite Hirschfeld’s request and despite his 
own resolution, he very often lapses into a homiletical excursus. Torah 
Or is replete with them, but there they are at least labeled. In Ha-Torah 
ve-ha-Mitzvah (the commentary proper) as well, we find him explaining 
that land cannot be sold forever because the human soul is merely 
sojourning on earth.50 This sort of lapse is excusable and even welcome 
because of its brevity and beauty, and it justifies Glicksburg’s comment 
that Malbim introduced some very appealing homiletical ideas into his 
commentary which do not stray too far from the plain meaning.51
There are instances, however, where the homiletical passage is longer 
and flagrantly violates the plain meaning of the text. In Artzot ha-Shalom, 
Malbim explained that the true test of Abraham was not in the command 
to sacrifice his son but rather in the second command — to spare him! 
The test was to discover whether Abraham would feel the joy that a 
father naturally experiences when his son is saved or whether his only 
joy would be that of fulfilling “a positive commandment” (מצות עשה). The 
50 Com. on Lev., Behar no. 39.
51 Ha-Derashah be-Yisrael, p. 406.
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latter was true, and Abraham thus passed the test. This explanation is 
repeated at length in the commentary to Genesis and in Eretz Hemdah.52 
The dehumanization of Abraham had its precedents — in Abravanel, for 
example, upon whom Malbim often relies heavily, Abraham begs God for 
permission to sacrifice Isaac — but Malbim completes his interpretation 
with the following far-fetched exegesis of Gen. 22:12 (“And thou hast 
not witheld thy son, thine only son, from Me”): “Thou hast witheld” him 
“not” because he is “thy son, thine only son” but only because you heard 
a command “from Me.” This type of interpretation is, unfortunately, not 
rare in Malbim’s commentaries.53
We have seen, then, that Malbim’s entire commentary was a reaction 
to the developing world of Haskalah and reform. It was the work of a 
man who wanted to fight these tendencies with their own tools and 
to prove that a proper understanding of the texts refutes almost all 
the major conclusions of both historical and textual criticism. But the 
task of trying to completely satisfy his extremely orthodox audience 
and to employ fully the tools of modern linguistics and research was 
a task too great even for a man with as fine a mind as Malbim. Hence 
the numerous shortcomings of a work which is, nevertheless, a valiant 
and valuable effort to accomplish a monumental task.
After this discussion of Malbim’s attitude toward the Haskalah, 
biblical criticism, and reform in his great works of scholarship, we can 
now turn to his position on some more practical matters.
The two most important political developments among Jews 
during Malbim’s lifetime were emancipation and the rise of proto-
Zionist activity. His practical attitude toward emancipation is not 
quite clear, although we know of his opposition to government-
sponsored schools. One fact, however, is clear and instructive. Malbim 
succeeded in placing emancipation within the framework of a religious 
philosophy of history. “In this exile,” he writes, “and especially in the 
last generation, many states have given Jews the rights of citizens 
(Buergerrecht), and their fortune and honor have risen to the extent 
that there is no difference between the period of exile and the time of 
redemption except observance of the commandments connected with 
the land of Israel and the Temple. Why has God done that in this last 
52 Ar. Sh., Sermon II, p. 14a; Com. to Gen. 22:12; E.H. on Gen., p. 69.
53 Cf., for example, his almost incredible explanation of Numbers 11:5.
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generation?” The answer: it is a test to determine whether the desire to 
return to the land of Israel and to repent is based only upon suffering. 
If the Jews are wise, they will not be satisfied with the temporal good 
to be obtained in exile; if they are foolish and remain content, God 
may leave them in exile indefinitely.54 Thus, emancipation is the final, 
crucial test for the Jewish people, and it is a test Malbim expected 
them to pass. For in his commentary on Daniel he calculates that the 
complete redemption will take place in 1927-28; thus, according to 
the Zohar in Shemot, “an awakening for redemption” should begin in 
1867-68. Malbim expected just such an awakening.
The awakening that did take place was proto-Zionist agitation for a 
return to Palestine. Chaim Heshel Braverman, in Knesset Yisrael of 1888,55 
writes as follows of Malbim’s attitude toward this movement: “Malbim 
was a true lover of Zion… who approved of the intention of the ‘Lovers 
of Zion’ (חובבי ציון)… to transport a number of Jews who find it extremely 
difficult to make a living… to the desolate land of our fathers, to develop 
and till its soil and take bread out of our fatherland that has remained 
as a living widow for two thousand years.” It is particularly interesting 
that Malbim, in a number of passages, emphasizes his belief that the 
redemption will take place in stages, the first stage expressing itself 
in a state with only a small amount of power.56 Malbim’s nationalistic 
feelings left little room for universalism, and even the book of Jonah 
and a verse like Amos 9:7 are interpreted—in the latter case with total 
disregard for the plain meaning57—in a manner not at all complimentary 
toward Gentiles.
In other practical matters of less significance we find Malbim 
defending old customs which had been ridiculed by maskilim. He 
defends, for example, the method of arranging marriages in which 
bride and groom do not see each other till the wedding. His defense is 
based first on biblical precedent (Isaac and Rebecca), but he then adds 
54 Notes published in E.H. to Deut., p. 173. It should, however, be noted that the 
implication concerning indefinite exile is questionable, because in many passages 
Malbim says that the final date cannot be delayed.
55 Sefer 3, p. 212.
56 Com. to Micah 4:8, and see Malbim’s own references there. Pointed out by Ephraim 
Wites, Evel Yahid (1887), pp. 44-45.
57 Com. to Amos 9.7: ...״אתם״ מיוחדים לי ״כבני כושיים״ שהם מצויינים ונכרים תמיד... ע״י שחרות עורם 
 כן אתם... ומביא ראיה לזה ״הלא את ישראל העליתי מארץ מצרים״... ולא התערבתם עם המצריים והעליתי
את ישראל...אבל הכי ״פלשתים״ (העליתי) ״מכפתור וארם מקיר״ בתמיה?ה
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the following psychological observation: “According to the modern 
custom, children learn to show each other love which does not exist 
in real life but only in parables and stage performances; therefore, 
when they later discover that they deceived each other, their love cools 
off until it might dissolve into nothingness.”58 Thus, Malbim defends 
a much-attacked custom not only on the basis of the Bible, but on 
grounds that no maskil could challenge: the perpetuation of love. 
The conservatism in dress which characterizes nineteenth century 
Orthodoxy is reflected in Malbim,59 yet in his commentary to Orah 
Hayyim he defends the opinion of R. Solomon Luria that covering the 
head is a sign of special piety and not a legal requirement.60
At this point, it should be mentioned at least in passing that 
Malbim studied kabbalah from his youth, but he was opposed to the 
Hasidic movement, an opposition which caused him serious trouble 
in at least two towns where he was Rabbi.61 Maimon maintains that 
Malbim eventually became more sympathetic to Hasidism,62 but this 
never became very apparent.
Finally, we must examine Malbim’s secular knowledge—in 
philosophy, science, and history—and discover how he used this 
knowledge in his works.
Malbim’s early education, under R. Moshe Halevi Hurwitz, included 
the classics of medieval Jewish philosophy.63 Later he was to write a 
commentary on Behinat Olam and a treatise of more than one hundred 
pages on the principles of logic. Malbim insisted on the validity of 
logical and philosophical reasoning and argued against the contrary 
claims of skeptics. He writes in his treatise on logic that the first step 
in philosophy is “to clarify the fact that it is in our power to attain 
knowledge through syllogistic reasoning… for the Skeptics denied 
this, and decided that a man cannot deduce matters through scientific 
reasoning but only through sense-perception and common sense. And 
58 Com. to Deut. 24:1.
59 Com. to Gen. 48:8-9.
60 Ar. H. on Orah Hayyim Vol. 2, Eretz Yehudah no. 4; on 2:6, Ha-Me’ir la-Aretz no. 43.
61 H.N. Maggid -Steinschneider, Ir Vilna [Jerusalem, 1968], p. 234 note. Also Macht, op. 
cit., p. 12.
62 Sarei HaMeah, vol. 4, p. 177. Malbim even wrote a treatise on kabbalah called מגלת סתרים 
(not סגולת סתרים as Macht quotes it).
63 Macht, op. cit., p. 5.
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for this a special study is needed called a critique of pure reason.”64 
Malbim, then, maintained the possibility of reaching fairly certain 
conclusions in philosophical discourse.
This certainty is reflected in metaphysical questions taken up by 
Malbim in his other works. Knowing of Kant, Malbim nevertheless 
considers the belief in God to be philosophically demonstrable 
through the argument from design. He says, in fact, that it is almost 
impossible to conceive of “a fool who could think that the world came 
about by chance.”65 Occasionally Malbim displays an exaggerated 
feeling of certainty even when his argument is not particularly 
convincing. He writes, for example, in his discussion of God’s reply 
to Job, that it is a “foolish question” (סכלה  to ask why God (שאלה 
created predatory animals, because it would not be in accordance 
with God’s glory to create “only worms and ants. His glory is shown 
by the fact that there are powerful animals… which He subdues with 
His might.” 66 Sometimes, on the other hand, Malbim argues against 
non-believers by insisting upon the limitations of human knowledge: 
“Do you know God, and do you weigh your knowledge on the same 
scales as His?”67
Malbim, though he read modern philosophers, was completely 
immersed in the problems of medieval philosophy in general and 
medieval Jewish philosophy in particular. He discusses hylic matter 
and the question of man’s soul— whether it is one with three functions 
or whether there are distinct souls;68 he constantly operates with the 
Nahmanidean concept of the hidden miracle;69 he deals with the opinion 
that angels “are made up of matter and form, their matter sometimes 
being of fire and sometimes of air, as is the opinion of Ibn Ezra, the 
Kuzari, and Ibn Gabirol”;70 he accepts the idea that Jews are uniquely 
receptive to divine inspiration (הענין האלקי) straight out of the Kuzari;71 
64 Yesodei Hokhmat ha-Higgayon (Warsaw, 1900), p. 95. Occasionally, Malbim uses technical 
principles of this treatise in his commentaries. Cf. Deut. 4:32.
65 Com. to Gen. 1:1. Cf. also Ar. Sh. pp. 43b-44a for a more elaborate philosophical 
discussion. Also E. H. on Gen., p. 15.
66 Com. to Job 40:7.
67 Ar. Sh., Sermon 5, p. 25a.
68 Com. to Gen. 2:7.
69 Com. to Gen. 17:3; Exod. 3:13, 6: 2; Deut. 3:24 and passim.
70 Com. to Gen. 18:3.
71 Com. to Exod. 19:1.
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he frequently discusses man as a microcosm (עולם קטן) and the world as 
a large man;72 he accepts the opinion that elemental fire is dark.73
Malbim often opposes Maimonides in philosophical matters, 
though he occasionally comes to his defense.74 Malbim maintains, 
against Maimonides, that man is the purpose of all creation;75 he 
opposes Maimonides on prophecy in two major areas;76 most 
important, he maintains that modern logic has re-established the 
philosophic probability of creatio ex nihilo.77 This assertion is repeated 
in his commentary on Exodus78 with an argument that is most 
interesting in the age of the controversy over Darwin: “I think that 
the principal testimony for ex nihilo is the fact that we see that for 
thousands of years no new species has been added to the world, while 
according to those who believe in the eternity of the world, it would be 
necessary that new creatures appear from time to time as they did in 
the past.” Here is another example of Malbim’s philosophical certainty 
in complicated matters.
The philosophical knowledge that Malbim possessed was put to use 
for ethical and exegetical purposes as well as for philosophical ones. He 
explains, for example, that success or suffering in this world is not very 
important and scarcely even exists, for it is predicated upon things which 
are merely contingent and haven’t any necessary, intrinsic existence, 
“as has been explained in philosophy.”79 Malbim explains the Talmudic 
statement that the Septuagint began, “God created in the beginning” by 
saying that since the Greeks believed in the eternity of the world, the 
biblical order could have been misunderstood as implying hylic matter co-
existent with God.80 This is a remarkably perceptive comment by a person 
who did not even know the philosophical uses of the Greek arche.
Malbim’s knowledge of the sciences, particularly astronomy, was 
extensive if not systematic. His major use of science, as we have by 
72 Com. to Lev., Qedoshim no. 2; Com. to Psalms 104:1 and passim.
73 Com. to Deut. 4:11. Cf. Nahmanides at the beginning of Genesis.
74 Cf. Com. to Exodus 20:2 for a defense of Maimonides against an important criticism by 
Crescas.
75 E.H. on Gen., p. 12.
76 E.H. on Exod., pp. 10-11.
77 E.H. on Gen., p. 17.
78 20:8.
79 Com. to Psalms 73:20
80 E.H. on Gen., p.5.
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now learned to expect, is in the service of religion. He shows, for 
example, that it is implied in Genesis that the sun, already created 
as a sphere, was invested with light by God on the fourth day. He 
continues: “Scientists have all been confused as to the light which 
comes from the sun and why its source is not depleted. Actually, its 
source can never be depleted, for it comes from the hidden light that 
has no end.”81 Malbim refutes an interpretation of Abravanel with 
a refutation based on the modern sciences,82 yet he seems to have 
believed in celestial intelligences.83 He expresses belief in astrology 
in many passages, though in others the belief is qualified or denied,84 
and in one place implies that he might believe in alchemy.85 He uses 
his scientific knowledge extensively for biblical exegesis;86 occasionally, 
however, his information is very dubious, and he relies on as old a 
source as Shevilei Emunah for medical information.87
This knowledge of science impelled Malbim to engage in 
naturalistic interpretations of some miracles. The fact that the 
rainbow was not seen before the flood, a problem that disturbed R. 
Saadyah Gaon and Nahmanides, is given a scientific explanation by 
Malbim.88 So, too, he gives a scientific analogy to Abraham’s seeing 
of stars during the day.89
Despite his extensive scientific knowledge, and despite his assertion 
that it is not the purpose of the Torah to teach science,90 Malbim insists 
that the Rabbis had literally superhuman knowledge of scientific facts. 
“Although the power of inquiry is insufficient to clearly ascertain the 
nature of that thin air (of the upper atmosphere), still the Rabbis, who 
viewed, through the holy spirit (ברוח הקדש), places that investigation 
81 Com. to Gen. 1:14.
82 Com. to Gen. 1:1 and 6.
83 Com. to Psalms 89:3.
84 Belief: Com to Gen. 12:1, 15:5 and elsewhere. Qualification, doubt or denial: Com. to 
Deut. 4:19 and especially Com. to Job, introd. to chs. 4 and 6.
85 E.H. to Gen., p. 25.
86 Cf. Com. to Gen. 1:6 (on electricity and the atmosphere), 1:25, 3:1; E.H. on Gen., p. 15 
(on gravity) and elsewhere.
87 ‘Aleh li-Terufah, a commentary on ch. 4 of Hilkhot De‘ot, pub. in E.H. on Numbers, p. 62. 
Cf. Com. to Gen. 6:1 and 30:1 for dubious information.
88 Com. to Gen. 9:13.
89 Com. to Gen. 15:17.
90 T.O., note 2 to Gen. 1:1.
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cannot teach, told us…”91 When Malbim was younger, he was criticized 
in a letter by R. Ephraim Horowitz of Volochisk for implying that in a 
rabbinic dispute one opinion was that what we now call the Western 
Hemisphere is unpopulated. R. Ephraim exclaims, “Even if the Gentile 
scholars erred, is the Jewish people like all nations?!” Malbim answers 
by pointing out that in every dispute one opinion is erroneous; however, 
in deference to the principle that there must be an element of truth 
in both views (אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים), he constructs a defense for the 
other opinion as well.92 Thus, we see that there were powerful social 
as well as intellectual pressures upon Malbim to defend the scientific 
infallibility of the Rabbis.
Malbim read historical works as well, particularly on ancient history. 
He knows that early civilizations sprung up near rivers93 and indicates 
a familiarity with mythology and ancient idolatory.94 Occasionally, he 
is somewhat credulous in historical matters, but he certainly read a 
great deal in the field.
It is clear, then, that Malbim’s secular knowledge was quite 
extensive, and he put it to use for his central goal, the defense of his 
tradition.
We have seen that Malbim did not reject the pursuit of philosophy, 
the sciences, and other intellectual endeavors, although he was wary 
of including them in elementary education. He believed in haskalah in 
his own way. What he did oppose, however, was what he considered 
the perversion of intellect that led to the antireligious manifestations 
of the enlightenment. This feeling was strengthened by his position on 
the ability of the intellect to attain philosophical certainty.
Malbim could never have exercised the influence he did without 
his secular learning, for his life’s work expressed itself in the use 
of science, logic, philosophy, grammar, and poetry to further and 
defend religion. This use, however, is often uncritical, because 
Malbim is caught in the dilemma of trying to satisfy completely his 
own orthodoxy and his orthodox readers and yet remain within the 
framework of secular scholarship. Given the approach of many of 
91 Com. to Gen. 1:6.
92 Letter published as epilogue to Ar. H.
93 Com. to Gen. 2:10.
94 Com. to Gen. 4:22, where he makes a statement that anticipates the methodology of 
Cassutto and Kaufmann; Gen. 6:2, 4; Exod. 2:23; Isaiah 9:7; E.H. on Gen., p. 59.
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his readers on the infallibility of the Rabbis in all areas, this was 
an impossible task. Malbim himself often gets carried away by 
homilies and loses sight of his resolution to approach texts in a 
straightforward manner.
Still, Malbim is a fascinating example of a brilliant individual who 
could not close his eyes to the Haskalah and to secular learning and 
who was yet unwilling to compromise his orthodoxy by one jot or 
tittle. His solution was to use his learning to defend religion, a solution 
which gained him enormous influence and which, whatever its failings, 
was a courageous effort to turn two worlds into one.
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THE USES OF MAIMONIDES 
BY TWENTIETHCENTURY JEWRY
From:  Moses Maimonides: Communal Impact, Historic Legacy, 
ed. by Benny Kraut (Center for Jewish Studies, Queens College, 
CUNY: New York, 2005), pp. 62-72.
The influence of iconic figures and texts can be complex to the point of 
inscrutability. We all know, for example, that the Devil can quote Scripture; 
what, then, does this tell us about the influence of Scripture? On the one 
hand, believers feel bound by Scriptural teachings; on the other, this very 
loyalty can lead them to force Scripture to say what they badly want to do 
or believe on other grounds. To cite a sharp pre-modern observation of 
this point in an area of great relevance to Maimonidean studies, R. Isaac 
Arama, a distinguished fifteenth-century Spanish thinker, asked why 
certain philosophers need the Bible at all. After all, their modus operandi 
appears to be as follows: If the Bible agrees with their philosophical views, 
they interpret it literally; if it does not, they interpret it allegorically or 
symbolically so that it is made to agree with those views. In what sense, 
then, are they bound or even influenced by the Bible?1
Maimonides is not the Bible, but he has achieved such stature in the 
minds of Jews that citing his authority is always useful and sometimes 
compelling, while dismissing him out of hand is difficult or at least 
undesirable. In assessing his impact or how he is used, we consequently 
need to ask ourselves a series of questions: Was the position in question 
actually formed under the impact of Maimonides? If it was formed out 
of other considerations, was it genuinely honed or reinforced by his 
authority? Is his view simply a useful aid in arguing for that position? 
Is the position really in tension with his but forced into compatibility 
1 Hazut Qashah, appended to Sefer Aqedat Yitzhak, vol. 5 (Pressburg, 1849), chapter 8, p. 
16b. Cf. Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol. 2 (Philadelphia and 
Jerusalem, 1992), p. 257.
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by questionable reasoning? Has a position acknowledged to be different 
from his nonetheless been modified and moderated under the impact 
of his opposing view? What makes this complex enterprise even more 
daunting is the fact that Maimonidean positions themselves can be 
divided into those that more or less reflect straightforward recording of 
earlier rabbinic texts, those that endorse one strand of rabbinic opinion 
over another, and those that are more or less the independent views of 
Maimonides. The more quintessentially Maimonidean the position, the 
more its impact reflects that of Maimonides himself.
Maimonides’ iconic status in the twentieth century was greater than 
that of any other Jew in post-biblical history. Now this may be true of 
earlier periods as well, but there was a time when Rashi might have 
given him a run for his money. Unlike Maimonides, whose positions as 
codifier and philosopher produced assertions clearly seen as his own, 
Rashi’s originality was somewhat obscured by the fact that he was 
primarily an elucidator of other texts. Still, serious students of those 
texts understood the nature of Rashi’s contribution and realized that his 
understanding contrasted with that of other authorities in innumerable 
cases. But in modern times, and especially in the twentieth century, the 
bulk of Jewry saw itself as very different from Rashi, while Maimonides 
remained a model for serious Jews in all religious denominations and 
even for some who saw themselves as secular. He was, after all, a 
physician and philosopher, perhaps a radical philosopher, as well as a 
Talmudist, and even his great rabbinic code was suffused with a broad, 
philosophical spirit.
On the other hand, the percentage of Jews who studied Maimonides 
seriously - or even not so seriously - was much lower in the twentieth 
century than in any previous period. Thus, a discussion of his impact and 
how he was used is primarily a discussion of elites - and largely, though 
far from exclusively, of Orthodox elites, who regarded his work as in 
some sense authoritative.
Maimonides’ extraordinary standing was illustrated in an academic 
environment when the late Isadore Twersky of Harvard—admittedly a 
not-altogether typical academician—was invited to deliver the keynote 
address in the amphitheater of the Hebrew University’s Mt. Scopus 
campus at the quadrennial conference of the World Congress of Jewish 
Studies. What he chose to do for nearly an hour was to read excerpts of 
Jewish testimonials through the ages to the greatness of Maimonides. 
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My father was a folklorist who wrote articles about legends concerning 
both Rashi and Maimonides. Folk legends about Rashi, he wrote, are 
largely depictions of the personality of a beloved father, underscoring 
his devotion to Torah and his outstanding character. The legends about 
Maimonides, on the other hand, reflect the awestruck admiration of “a 
village-dweller for an international personality, the attitude of an ordinary 
person to his relative occupying a position in the highest circles,” so that 
the popular imagination did not even shrink from attributing to him an 
effort to create an immortal human being.2
It is not surprising, then, that few controversies in twentieth-
century Jewish life bearing a religious dimension were carried on without 
reference to Maimonides, and often his presence loomed very large 
indeed, sometimes bestriding the discussion like a colossus. The reasons 
for this extend beyond his exceptional stature and reflect several special 
characteristics of his great legal code. First, despite the importance of R. 
Isaac Alfasi’s earlier compendium, Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah was the 
first comprehensive code, so that the trajectory of later decision-making 
was in many cases set by his judgment as to the Talmudic opinion that 
should prevail. Second, he included assertions that we would normally 
describe as theological rather than legal in that code. For some readers, 
this transformed an expression of opinion into a position that bore legal 
force. Related to this point is his formulation of a creed, some of whose 
elements are also incorporated in his code, in which he asserted principles 
that could not, he said, be rejected without crossing the line into heresy. 
Thus, the deviant believer would forfeit his or her portion in the world-
to-come. How many people could screw up the courage to defy a figure of 
Maimonides’ stature once the stakes had been ratcheted up to so high a 
level?3 Finally, his code, unlike the later Shulhan Arukh, incorporated laws 
that applied only to a sovereign Jewish state, whether in the past or in 
the future. Thus, for several issues that arose in the twentieth century, 
Maimonides was the prime, sometimes virtually the only, classical source 
with something relevant and authoritative to say.
2 Isaiah Berger, “Ha-Rambam be-Aggadat ha-Am,” in Massad, vol. 2, ed. by Hillel Bavli 
(Tel Aviv, 1936), p. 216; “Rashi be-Aggadat ha-Am” in Rashi: Torato ve-Ishiyyuto (New 
York, 1958), ed. by Simon Federbush, p. 148.
3 This is not to say that his dogmas went entirely unchallenged. See Marc B. Shapiro, 
The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised (London & 
Portland, OR, 2004).
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Let us, then, take a fleeting glimpse at the role Maimonides played 
and continues to play in a series of issues dividing twentieth and early-
twenty-first-century Jewry.
For Orthodox Jews, the issue of the permissibility and desirability 
of advanced secular education remains, perhaps remarkably, a major 
point of contention. For obvious reasons, Maimonides appears to lend 
support to the position affirming the desirability of such education, not 
only because of what he said but because of what he so patently did. 
Indeed, Norman Lamm once remarked that if Maimonides returned to 
this world, he would surely choose to teach at Yeshiva University.  But, as 
we shall see, nothing about the uses of Maimonides is straightforward. 
In this instance, a genuine characteristic of Maimonides that we shall 
encounter again, to wit, his elitism, affords the opportunity to challenge 
this assessment. Thus, representatives of Traditionalist Orthodoxy have 
argued that Maimonides’ own pursuit of philosophy was to be restricted 
to a small coterie of the elite. Did he not say that his great philosophical 
work was intended for a tiny number of readers? Did he not also say 
that one may not turn to philosophical pursuits without first mastering 
the corpus of rabbinic law? Now, these arguments do not accomplish 
all that their advocates wish, since they leave in place Maimonides’ 
value judgment as to the superiority of philosophically accomplished 
individuals to philosophically naïve rabbinic scholars, but at least the 
traditionalists’ educational and curricular priorities can be salvaged 
without an overt rejection of Maimonides.
Moreover, Maimonides did not always formulate his legal rulings in 
a manner conducive to the interests of Orthodox modernists. Thus, he 
forbade the reading of idolatrous books and apparently extended this 
prohibition to anything that could engender religious doubts. This passage 
became the basis for an article by Rabbi Yehudah Parnes, then at Yeshiva 
University, in the first issue of The Torah U-Madda Journal, a publication 
dedicated to the principle of integrating Torah and worldly knowledge, 
arguing that Jewish law requires severe restrictions on the reading habits 
and hence the curriculum of all Jews. I responded to this argument in an 
article co-authored with Lawrence Kaplan, invoking other Maimonidean 
texts as well as the evident behavior of Maimonides himself, but there is 
no better illustration of the ability to appeal to Maimonidean authority 
on both sides of almost any issue than an exchange in which advocates 
of a broad curriculum need to defend themselves against the assertion 
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that they are defying the precedent set by a man who took all of human 
learning as his province.4
A delicate issue with a long history that became particularly acute in the 
late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the Jewish attitude toward 
non-Jews. Beginning in the thirteenth century, Christians pointed to 
Talmudic passages discriminating against Gentiles. Without diminishing 
the acute threat that these arguments posed to medieval Jews, one can 
still point out that the matter became all the more sensitive (though 
slightly less dangerous) in an age that began to advocate an egalitarian 
ethic granting Jews citizenship, genuine religious freedom, and legal 
equality. Here again Maimonides plays a major role on both sides of the 
discussion. Antisemites cited Maimonides’ codification of discriminatory 
laws such as the exemption from returning lost objects to non-Jews, 
even a prohibition against doing so, while defenders of the Jews, both 
Jewish and Gentile, pointed to his citation in similar contexts of the 
biblical verse that God’s mercy is upon all his creatures, as well as specific 
rulings such as those prohibiting theft from non-Jews as well as Jews.5 
More than one Orthodox rabbi in the late twentieth century maintained 
that Maimonides’ formulation of the reason why one may not return lost 
objects to non-Jews, namely, that one would be “strengthening the hand 
of the world’s wicked,” limits the prohibition only to wicked Gentiles. For 
reasons rooted in the values of the commentator, an apparently general 
statement that non-Jews are wicked becomes an explicit distinction 
between those who are wicked and those who are righteous.6
Now, Maimonides did famously affirm that pious non-Jews have a 
portion in the world to come; at the same time, he conditioned this on 
their belief in revelation. This condition has troubled some Jews since the 
days of Mendelssohn, when its source was unknown. We now know the 
source, and one recent scholar - the late Marvin Fox - noted Maimonides’ 
requirement, apparently approved of it, and enthusiastically endorsed a 
4 Yehuda Parnes, “Torah U-Madda and Freedom of Inquiry,” The Torah U-Madda Journal 
1 (1989): 68-71; Lawrence Kaplan and David Berger, “On Freedom of Inquiry in the 
Rambam - and Today,” The Torah U-Madda Journal 2 (1990): 37-50.
5 See, for example, Joseph S. Bloch, Israel and the Nations (Berlin and Vienna, 1927).
6 For a discussion of this and related matters, see my “Jews, Gentiles, and the Modern 
Egalitarian Ethos: Some Tentative Thoughts” in the forthcoming proceedings of the 
2001 Orthodox Forum; on returning lost property, see the discussion at note 15 there 
and the references provided in that note.  [The article was published in Formulating 
Responses in an Egalitarian Age, ed. by Marc Stern (Lanham, 2005), pp. 83-108.] 
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version of the Mishneh Torah text denying that those who observe moral 
laws on the basis of reason alone are even to be considered wise.7 What 
motivated Fox was his own philosophical argument against the existence 
of a morality independent of the divine will. Most moderns, who have 
different instincts about morality and fairness, remain troubled, and so 
they eagerly point to a letter attributed to Maimonides that appeals to 
contradict the condition he set forth in his code.8 It is perfectly evident 
that larger moral instincts are at work in the choice of which Maimonides 
you embrace.
This issue applies to non-Jews in general, but Maimonides has also 
been invoked in very different ways with specific reference to Christianity. 
In a famous censored passage near the end of his code (Hilkhot Melakhim 
11:4), he explains why he thinks the divine plan arranged for the spread of 
Christianity and Islam. It has not been uncommon for twentieth-century 
Jews motivated by ecumenical sentiments to cite this explanation as 
evidence of Maimonides’ positive stance toward those religions, to the 
point of asserting that he saw them as a way of preparing the world 
for the messianic age by disseminating monotheism. In fact, as rabbinic 
authorities know very well, this is not what he says at all. Christianity 
and Islam, he maintains, prepare the world for the messianic age by 
familiarizing many people with the Torah, so that the Messiah will be able 
to speak to them within a familiar universe of discourse. But Christianity, 
unlike Islam, is in Maimonides’ view full-fledged avodah zarah, usually 
translated loosely but not quite accurately as idolatry.
The central philosophical and religious beliefs of Maimonides have 
been the subject of fierce debate in academic circles with little impact 
on more than a few Jews. Still, the subject deserves some attention 
even in this forum. Under the influence of Leo Strauss, Shlomo Pines, 
and others, the perception of Maimonides as a theological radical who 
disguised many of his real views has attained pride of place among many 
historians of philosophy. In this perception, Maimonides considered 
matter eternal, denied that God actively intervenes in human affairs, 
rejected physical resurrection, considered philosophical contemplation 
superior to prayer, and did not believe that anyone other than the most 
sophisticated philosopher has a portion in the world to come. For these 
7 Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides (Chicago and London, 1990), pp. 130-132.
8 See my “Jews, Gentiles and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos,” n. 49.
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scholars, his legal works and more popular philosophical teachings were 
intended for the political purpose of establishing a stable social order. 
One deep irony of this position is that the author of the standard list of 
Jewish dogmas would be revealed as one whose adherence to some of 
those dogmas is very much in question. The irony is deepened in light 
of the contention in Menachem Kellner’s Must a Jew Believe Anything? 
that Maimonides virtually invented the notion of Jewish dogmas, a 
contention that I consider overstated but nonetheless reflective of an 
important reality.9
Other scholars, such as Arthur Hyman, Isadore Twersky, and Marvin 
Fox, resisted the extreme radicalization of Maimonides. It is, I think, very 
difficult to reconcile the portrait of a radical Maimonides who denied 
immortality to any non-philosopher with the Maimonides who fought to 
teach even women and children that God has no body so that they would be 
eligible for a portion in the world to come. Maimonides battled to establish 
a conception of God that in its pristine form was indeed inaccessible to 
the philosophically uninitiated, but I believe that he meant his dogmas 
sincerely as a realistic vehicle for enabling all Jews to achieve immortality. 
In recent years, several efforts have been made to render Maimonides the 
philosopher accessible and relevant to a larger audience. Kenneth Seeskin 
has made this an explicit objective,10 Yeshayahu Leibowitz’s depiction 
of an austere, distant Maimonidean God for whom halakhah is the be-
all and end-all of Judaism was broadcast on Israeli radio,11 and David 
Hartman’s Maimonides: Torah and the Philosophic Quest was clearly aimed 
at an audience beyond the academy. But the Maimonides presented in 
these works and others is not always the same Maimonides. 
A few moments ago, I allowed myself the expression “even women 
and children.” The role of women is an issue that came to occupy center 
stage in much twentieth-century discourse, and Maimonides played 
no small part in Jewish debates about this matter. His dismissal of the 
intellectual capacity of women is well known, but his heroic image and 
immense influence have led committed Jewish thinkers and scholars with 
twentieth-century sensibilities to see if some more positive assessment 
can be elicited from his works. Thus, Warren Harvey argued in an article 
9 See my review essay in Tradition 33:4 (1999): 81-89.
10 Searching for a Distant God: The Legacy of Maimonides (Oxford University Press, 2000).
11 The Faith of Maimonides, trans. by John Glucker (New York, 1987).
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published more than twenty years ago that although Maimonides 
excluded women from the study of the Oral Law, and preferably even 
from that of the written Torah, he regarded the commandments to know 
God and love him, which certainly obligate women, as inextricably bound 
up with the study of Torah, indeed of Talmud or gemara. Thus, we have 
a powerful deduction to set against Maimonides’ explicit assertion, and 
we ought at least to take it into account.12
An even stronger example of this approach is Menachem Kellner’s 
recent article13 contrasting Gersonides, who allegedly regards women as 
intellectually inferior by their very nature, with Maimonides, who allegedly 
sees their deficiencies as environmentally induced. Among other things, 
Kellner points to a passage in which Maimonides lists Moses, Aaron, and 
Miriam as the three individuals who died in a state reflecting the highest 
level of human achievement. Thus, says Kellner, one-third of those who 
reached the highest level ever achieved were women. (One could quarrel 
with his use of the plural here.) I am inclined to think that Kellner is 
too hard on Gersonides and too easy on Maimonides. No rationalist 
philosopher in the Middle Ages—including Gersonides—could really 
exclude all women from the capacity of attaining a high level of intellectual 
achievement, since these philosophers regarded such achievement as 
necessary for prophecy, and there were indisputably women prophets. As 
to Maimonides, Kellner’s arguments for his higher estimation of women 
strike me as very weak, to the point where I understand them primarily 
as a result of the admirable desire to interpret the stance of the greatest 
of Jewish thinkers in as favorable a light as possible.
And so we come to two issues where a Maimonidean ruling placed 
significant restrictions on women. As Harvey pointed out in that article, 
it is very far from clear that the usual guidelines for deciding among 
conflicting talmudic opinions required the ruling that women should not 
be taught Torah. But that is how Maimonides ruled in his pioneering code, 
with lasting impact on Jewish law and practice. The twentieth century 
has seen major changes, but Beis Yaakov schools had to be justified as 
an emergency measure, and Orthodox institutions teaching Talmud to 
12 “The Obligation of Talmud on Women according to Maimonides,” Tradition 19:2 
(Summer, 1981): 122-130.
13 “Sin’at Nashim Pilosofit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim: ha-Ralbag le-‘ummat ha-Rambam,” in 
Me-Romi li-Yerushalayim: Sefer Zikkaron le-Y. B. Sermonetta (Mehqerei Yerushalayim be-
Mahashevet Yisrael 14 [5758]), pp. 113-128.
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women, though they rely on the position of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik 
and other distinguished authorities, are subject to ongoing criticism that 
requires incessant justification.
The second of these issues reflects the fact that only Maimonides’ code 
ruled on matters relating to Jewish kingship and authority. A rabbinic 
text had affirmed that a Jewish king must be male, and Maimonides 
extended this, without a clear source, to all positions of authority 
(Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5). In pre-State Palestine, this ruling was mobilized 
to argue even against women’s suffrage, but it was particularly relevant 
to the holding of political office. A discussion of this issue by Rabbi 
Ben Zion Uzziel illustrates strikingly some of the motifs that we have 
already encountered.14 First, he berates his correspondent for suggesting 
that Maimonides may have misunderstood the rabbinic text under the 
influence of the custom of his own time. We are permitted to disagree 
with Maimonides, but we may not say such things about him. Second, 
Rabbi Uzziel stresses that Maimonides’ position is not articulated in 
any other classical source. (Note that Maimonides’ addressing of issues 
not dealt with by other authorities usually endows him with special 
authority; in this instance, it was used against him.) Finally, Rabbi 
Uzziel deduces from a discussion of the Tosafists that they disagree with 
Maimonides even though they do not say so explicitly. In the presence 
of a strong desire to rule against Maimonides, both inference and the 
silence of other sources can count against an explicit ruling. It is worth 
noting that the Maimonidean prohibition of positions of authority for 
women played a role in Saul Lieberman’s opposition to the ordination 
of women, a stand that had a significant impact on the decision of some 
Conservative traditionalists to leave the Jewish Theological Seminary or 
break with organized Conservative Judaism when women were admitted 
into the rabbinical program.
The role of women in the Israeli polity leads us to the question of 
the State itself. Maimonides has been a central figure for both religious 
Zionists and religious anti-Zionists. His position that the messianic 
process will develop naturalistically was seized upon by religious Zionists 
to demonstrate that Jewish sovereignty must be reestablished by human 
effort, this despite his explicit admonition that we are simply to wait. 
His assertion that the final Temple would be built by human hands and 
14 Pisqei Uzziel bi-She’elot ha-Zeman (Jerusalem, c. 1977), #24.
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not, as Rashi thought, by the hand of God, reinforced this perception.15 
On the other hand, the vehemently anti- Zionist Satmar Rov pointed 
to Maimonides’ omission in his Book of the Commandments of the 
commandment to live in Israel. The Lubavitcher Rebbe, sympathetic to 
the State and hawkish on territorial concessions but opposed to Zionist 
ideology, “proved” that the State has no messianic significance whatever 
by citing the fact that Maimonides did not list the return of the dispersed 
of Israel until a late stage of the Messianic process - this despite the 
fact that Maimonides wrote that the order of events in the unfolding 
messianic scenario is not a fundamental religious principle. The Rebbe 
was well aware of the rabbinic texts about gradual redemption cited by 
religious Zionists, but he maintained that Maimonides knew them too 
and had effectively ruled against them in a binding, authoritative code.
Beyond the State there is the Messiah. Here Maimonides looms 
enormously large. In the last two chapters of his code, he set forth 
criteria for identifying first a presumptive Messiah and then one who 
had attained his status with certainty. While many Jews had written 
about the Messiah, only Maimonides expressed his views in a code, which 
once again led some readers to grant them the force of law. A king from 
the House of David becomes presumptive Messiah by studying the Torah, 
strengthening it, compelling all Israel to obey it, and fighting the wars 
of the Lord. He attains the status of certain Messiah by gathering the 
dispersed of Israel and building the Temple in its place.
The waning years of the twentieth century produced a major messianic 
movement that apparently violated these Maimonidean guidelines, 
and it was precisely the movement whose leader had described the 
last two chapters of the Mishneh Torah as legally binding. Here we are 
witness to the most creative efforts to establish that a position that 
Maimonides explicitly rejected is in fact compatible with his guidelines. 
Thus, Lubavitch hasidim during the Rebbe’s lifetime argued that he had 
achieved the criteria of presumptive Messiah. He was a king because 
rabbis are called kings in the Talmud; he “compelled” by persuasion; 
several thousand Jews qualify as “all Israel”; and mitzvah tanks qualify 
as instruments of the wars of the Lord. Some even argued that he had 
15 See my discussion in “Some Ironic Consequences of Maimonides’ Rationalistic 
Messianism” (in Hebrew), Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991): 1-8 (Hebrew section) [English 
translation in this volume].
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at least begun the activities associated with the certain Messiah; he was, 
after all, instrumental in preserving the Jewish identity of Soviet Jews 
so that they could be gathered into the land of Israel, and 770 Eastern 
Parkway is at least the interim Temple and the spot where the final, 
heavenly Temple will descend before both buildings are transported to 
Jerusalem. As to Maimonides’ assertion that if the figure in question 
“does not succeed to this extent or is killed, then it is known that he is 
not the [Messiah],” this refers only to one who was killed, not one who 
died of natural causes, or it refers only to a scenario in which the Messiah 
would arrive naturalistically, or it is irrelevant because the Rebbe did 
not die at all.16 Remarkably, almost incredibly, a learned Lubavitch rabbi 
arguing that a supremely righteous man can annul himself to the point 
where he is nothing but divinity found a Maimonidean passage that 
allegedly reflected this conception.17
These are instances where people who know Maimonides’ statements 
very well and even consider them binding nonetheless disregard or 
refashion them through creative exegesis. But many people who revere 
him reject his positions or even consider them heretical without knowing 
that he held them at all. Orthodox Jewish education, even in Modern 
circles and all the more so in Traditionalist ones, pays little attention to 
what we call theology. Thus, it is easy to compile a list of explicit positions 
of Maimonides - not those of the putative esoteric radical - that would be 
labeled heresy or near-heresy in many contemporary yeshivas. Examples 
include his assertion that rabbinic statements about the details of the 
messianic process may be unreliable, that the Rabbis could have made 
scientific errors, that God does not intervene in the lives of individual 
animals, and more. Maimonides’ iconic status was achieved at the price 
of consigning many of his views to a black hole of forgetfulness.
In these circles, however, Maimonides’ great rabbinic works are 
alive and well. In the course of the twentieth century, the Mishneh 
Torah moved to center stage in traditionalist bastions of Torah study. 
Here too there is a certain degree of irony, but it predates the twentieth 
century. Maimonides envisioned his code as a work that would serve as 
a standard handbook for scholars, summarizing the results of Talmudic 
16 For these arguments and much more on Lubavitch messianism, see my The Rebbe, the 
Messiah, and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference (London and Portland, Oregon, 2001).
17 Avraham Baruch Pevzner, ‘Al ha-Zaddikim (Kfar Chabad, 1991), pp. 8-10.
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discussions and freeing people already familiar with those discussions 
from the need to revisit them in painstaking detail. He did not realize 
that it would become an adjunct to Talmudic study, complicating and 
enriching it even further.
At the dawn of the twentieth century, R. Meir Simchah of Dvinsk 
wrote his classic Or Sameah centered on Maimonides’ code. The immensely 
influential, pathbreaking methodology of R. Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk 
took Maimonides as its point of departure even as it revolutionized 
the study of the Talmud itself. Two generations later, R. Joseph B. 
Soloveitchik made Maimonides’ “Laws of Repentance” the centerpiece of 
annual discourses during the High Holiday season that drew thousands 
and influenced thousands more, discourses captured in part in On 
Repentance, one of the great Jewish religious works of the century. In 
an effort at popularization that engendered criticism but also enjoyed 
modest success, the Lubavitcher Rebbe urged daily study of sections 
of the Mishneh Torah modeled after similar initiatives in the study of 
Mishnah and Talmud. And in the far narrower world of the academic 
study of Talmud in a university setting, scholars specializing in the field 
sought to find in Maimonides evidence of sensitivity to their own central 
contention, to wit, that the anonymous sections of the Babylonian 
Talmud are later than the rest and should be treated accordingly.
When Prof. Kraut sent the participants in this conference an e-mail 
message indicating that many hundreds of people had registered, I 
replied, “Did you tell them that Maimonides himself was speaking?” 
The attendance here is ample testimony to the magic of Maimonides’ 
name. This wide appeal leads me to a final observation about the abiding 
power of Maimonides the communal leader and gifted writer to inspire 
audiences to this day.
In early 1989, I spent seven extraordinary weeks teaching at the 
inaugural mini-semester of the Steinsaltz yeshiva in Moscow, the 
first such institution to be granted government recognition since the 
Communist revolution. The students consisted largely of refuseniks 
who had risked careers and livelihoods to commit themselves to Jewish 
learning and observance. In addition to the study of Talmud, Bible and 
more, there was a slot twice a week for Jewish Thought. I decided that 
the text I would teach would be Maimonides’ Epistle to Yemen, a work 
directed to a beleaguered Jewish community pressured to abandon its 
faith. It was as if Maimonides had composed the work for the students 
— 202 —
The Cultural Environment: Challenge and Response
in that yeshiva. The greatest challenge in teaching the Epistle to Yemen in 
that environment was to read the words without shedding tears.
I conclude then with one small selection from the many relevant 
passages in which Maimonides speaks to Soviet Jews during the 
transitional moments between implacable persecution and the beginnings 
of hope.
Persecutions are of short duration. Indeed, God assured our father Jacob 
that although his children would be humbled and overcome by the nations, 
they and not the nations would survive and endure. He declares, “Your 
descendants shall be as the dust of the earth,” that is to say, although they 
will be abased like the dust that is trodden under foot, they will ultimately 
emerge triumphant and victorious. And as the simile implies, just as the 
dust settles finally upon him who tramples upon it and remains after him, 
so will Israel outlive its oppressors. The prophet Isaiah predicted that 
during its exile various peoples will succeed in their endeavor to vanquish 
Israel and lord over them, but that ultimately God would come to Israel’s 
assistance and put an end to their woes and afflictions… The Lord has 
given us assurance through His prophets that we are indestructible and 
imperishable, and we will always continue to be a preeminent community. 
As it is impossible for God to cease to exist, so is our destruction and 
disappearance from the world unthinkable.18
18 Abraham Halkin and David Hattman, Epistles of Maimonides: Crisis and Leadership 
(Philadelphia and Jerusalem, 1993), p. 102.
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A lecture on the Institute for Jewish Studies and its place in the 
constellation of the academic study of the Jewish people and its faith 
in the past, present and future no doubt deserves to be listed among 
those matters that have no measure (Mishnah Pe’ah 1:1), though it is 
by no means clear that it also deserves to be counted in accordance with 
the continuation of the mishnah among those matters whose fruits one 
consumes in this world and whose core remains in the world to come. 
Nonetheless, even if that promise is not applicable in our case, I find my 
reward in the very fact that I was invited to address this esteemed body 
in such an impressive venue.
It is customary to speak of a Jerusalem school at the time of the 
formation of the yishuv and the State that saw Jewish history through 
a Zionist-nationalist perspective. There is clearly much truth in this 
assertion. The majority of scholars in the field of Jewish Studies who 
arrived in the Land of Israel during the major migrations saw themselves 
through the prism of a monumental historical revolution that they 
simultaneously perceived as a continuation of the central motif in the 
nation’s history. Nonetheless, in his book on the first decades of the 
Institute, David Myers pointed persuasively to the complex reality that 
forbids us to ignore the ideological disagreements among the greatest 
Judaica scholars in that period and all the more so the opposing influences, 
images, and aspirations that animated each of them individually.1
1 D.N. Myers, Reinventing the Jewish Past: European Jewish Intellectuals and the Zionist 
Return to History (New York and Oxford, 1995).
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On this occasion, I would like to focus on several of the motifs that 
emerged in the early days of the Institute and to examine—even if 
superficially—how they developed and to what degree they are relevant 
to the world of Jewish Studies today. I refer to the abandonment of 
apologetics, the search for a presumably objective scholarly truth, the 
place of the national vision in that objective scholarly matrix, the revival 
of the Hebrew language, and the attitude toward scholars of Jewish 
history and culture who lived in the diaspora. The establishment of a 
center for Jewish Studies in the yishuv and later in the State served 
as the basis for the assertion that scholars in the Land of Israel would 
succeed in freeing themselves from the bonds of self-abnegation and the 
fear of what gentiles will say, so that they would be capable of dealing 
with the behavior and beliefs of Jews through the generations “with all 
their lights and shadows,” as Gershom Scholem put it in his classic and 
penetrating article on Jewish scholarship.2 Despite the reservations that 
I will express in the course of my remarks, I must emphasize that anyone 
familiar with the apologetic Jewish literature of the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries will understand that there is indeed a deep 
divide between that literature and the scholarly literature that appeared 
under the aegis of the institution established in Jerusalem.
A striking example from the fourth decade of the Institute illustrating 
both the rejection of apologetics and its stubborn survival is Jacob Katz’s 
Bein Yehudim le-Goyim that also appeared in an English translation entitled 
Exclusiveness and Tolerance, which enjoyed an impressively wide readership. 
In an essay on Rabbi Menahem ha-Meiri that preceded the book, Katz 
had set for himself the explicit objective of studying the attitudes of Jews 
toward Christianity and Christians without an apologetic orientation. 
And in fact, unlike his predecessors, Katz emphasized in his book that 
ha-Meiri’s liberal approach was not at all typical. Nonetheless, as I noted 
some years ago, even this book contains a passage that demonstrates 
clearly that residence in the Land of Israel did not provide protection 
against older concerns. In that passage we find a fascinating difference 
between the English and Hebrew versions of the book. In the Hebrew text, 
Katz affirms that “the vision of the end of days signifies the overturning 
of the current order, when the dispersed and humiliated people will see 
2 G. Scholem, “Mi-Tokh Hirhurim ‘al Hokhmat Yisrael,” Devarim be-Go: Pirqei Morashah 
u-Tehiyyah, ed. by A. Shapira (Tel Aviv, 1976) II, p. 398.
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its revenge from its tormentors. The hope for a day of revenge and the 
prayer for the arrival of that day may be considered as conflicting with a 
profession of loyalty to the government …” Here now is the English: “A 
reversal of the existing order was envisaged in the messianic age, when 
the dispersed and humiliated Jewish people was to come into its own. 
The entertaining of such hopes, and the prayer for their fulfillment, 
might well be considered as conflicting with a profession of loyalty.…” 
Thus, we discover that the proper equivalent of “see its revenge from its 
tormentors” is “was to come into its own.”3
Katz wrote his book in 1960, when it was plausible to assume that 
a Hebrew book would remain, in the well-known midrashic formulation 
referring to the oral law, the “mystery” of the Jewish people. In the age 
of the internet, globalization, and the increasing role of excellent non-
Jewish Judaica scholars, one cannot rely on this assumption, and we 
shall have occasion to return to this point presently.
The motivations for an apologetic presentation do not always stem 
from concern about critical reaction from the outside. The environment 
in which academics develop and work causes them to internalize to a 
large degree the values of the larger society with regard to interaction 
among faiths and respect for the culture of the Other. Consequently, 
even a Jewish scholar in the Land of Israel, who is relatively free of 
external pressures, will feel impelled to describe the Jewish heritage in 
colors that appear attractive to him, and this is after all a quintessentially 
apologetic approach. Moreover, it was precisely the national pride 
essential to Zionism that engendered a powerful desire to point to the 
special qualities that characterize the nation.
This inclination even affected the choice of topics for research. 
Thus, Yitzhak Baer abandoned the study of medieval Spanish Jewry to 
concentrate on the period of the Second Temple and the Mishnaic rabbis 
in order to uncover what he saw as the glorious foundational principles 
of the Jewish people. Even his unusual introduction to his great work 
on Spain clearly exemplifies this approach. It seems to me that Yehezkel 
Kaufmann abandoned the broad expanse of Jewish history analyzed in 
his book Golah ve-Nekhar and moved to the study of the biblical period 
3 I noted this passage in my article, “Jacob Katz on Jews and Christians in the Middle 
Ages,” in The Pride of Jacob: Essays on Jacob Katz and his Work, ed. by Jay M. Harris, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2002), pp. 41-63.
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because in his understanding that is where the historic contribution of 
the Jewish people was to be found. The concept of divine unity spread 
throughout the world, but for reasons that were clarified in Golah ve-
Nekhar, that expansion took place not through the direct action of 
the nation that first produced that concept, but through messengers 
called Christianity and Islam. This development was simultaneously 
a monumental Jewish achievement and a profound Jewish tragedy. 
Kaufman chose to focus on the achievement without the admixture of 
the tragedy.4
The most blatant nationalist apologetics—to the point where it 
is almost superfluous to underscore the matter—can be found in the 
studies of Joseph Klausner. What is interesting is precisely his rhetorical 
sensitivity to concerns about subjectivity. In the introduction to his 
work Jesus of Nazareth he emphasized what he saw as the care that he 
takes to avoid subjectivity and apologetics, and almost forty years later 
he devoted the introduction to his History of the Second Temple to “the 
problem of subjectivity and relativism,” affirming unequivocally that one 
can achieve absolute objectivity, that is, a quest for truth unaffected by 
any personal or political predilections whatsoever.
To a significant degree we now inhabit a different scholarly universe, 
one in which the very ideal of objectivity is in question. It is not just that 
no scholar would dare allow Ranke’s famous sentence about history as 
it actually was to emerge from his lips or his pen; rather, the recognition 
that one cannot avoid subjectivity entirely has led in certain circles to 
an utterly unrestrained erasure of all boundaries, so that one may not 
express criticism even of complete fabrications. Several years ago, it 
became evident that Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchu had invented 
entire chapters of her autobiography ex nihilo. Many historians, especially 
those with leftist ideologies, argued that one should nonetheless refrain 
from even the slightest criticism of the book since the overall reality 
described there is in the final analysis essentially correct, and we are 
dealing with a justified effort to denounce evildoers. When I expressed 
disapproval of this position to a distinguished Jewish historian, he 
replied with equanimity that every autobiography is written from a 
4 See my observations in “Religion, Nationalism, and Historiography: Yehezkel 
Kaufmann’s Account of Jesus and Early Christianity,” Scholars and Scholarship: The 
Interaction between Judaism and Other Cultures, ed. by Leo Landman (New York, 1990), 
pp. 149-168.
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subjective perspective that apparently differs from fiction only with 
respect to literary genre. Similarly, many observers reacted with utter 
disdain to criticisms leveled at Edward Said after it became known that he 
knowingly created a misleading impression that his permanent residence 
was in Jerusalem until he was expelled at the age of twelve in the midst 
of the “naqba.” Needless to say, here too ideological considerations played 
a role, but in both cases, the widespread emphasis on the subjective 
element in all the social sciences and humanities facilitated reactions 
that in my view exceed appropriate bounds.
Subjectivity is itself a complex phenomenon with varied consequences 
that can be exemplified in the history of the Institute. Occasionally, the 
desire to reach a particular conclusion motivates a scholar to discover 
reliable information or achieve a plausible insight that would have eluded 
him or her in the absence of an internal impulse that was conceived 
outside the realm of academically objective purity. Thus, I argued in an 
article written in the eighties that Moshe David (Umberto) Cassutto 
succeeded in finding subtle criticisms of the actions of the patriarchs 
in the Book of Genesis precisely because he wanted to defend the Torah 
against the assertion that it lacks sensitivity to moral offenses.5 On the 
other hand, the very effort to flee from apologetics can sometimes lead 
to an excessively pejorative characterization of the views and behavior of 
Jews in earlier generations. I have great respect for all the participants in 
the controversy surrounding the famous and important article by Israel 
Yuval in which he argued that the blood libel, which is assuredly a total 
lie, was nonetheless nurtured by Jewish behavior and Jewish beliefs. I do 
not wanted to enter into the actual content of the dispute that swirled 
around the article, but the debate itself demonstrated that both the 
apologetic impulse and the anti-apologetic impulse are alive and well 
and have the capacity to produce new approaches as well as affirmations 
that are open to challenge.6
5 “On the Morality of the Patriarchs in Jewish Polemic and Exegesis,” in Understanding 
Scripture: Explorations of Jewish and Christian Traditions of Interpretation, ed. by Clemens 
Thoma and Michael Wyschogrod (New York, 1987), pp. 49-62. Reprinted with minor 
changes in Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah: Contributions and Limitations, ed. by 
Shalom Carmy (Northvale and London, 1996), pp. 131-146 [reprinted in this volume]. 
6 Y. Yuval, “Ha-Naqam ve-ha-Qelalah, ha-Dam ve-ha-Alilah,” Zion 58 (1992-93): 33-90, and 
the polemical exchange in Zion 59 (1994). I expressed my views regarding the issues in 
question in my lecture, From Crusades to Blood Libels to Expulsions: Some New Approaches 
to Medieval Antisemitism, The Second Victor J. Selmanowitz Memorial Lecture, Touro 
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I doubt very much that there remains in our generation a material 
difference between Israel and the diaspora with respect to the willingness 
of scholars to express opinions or present information dangerous to the 
image of Jews. Geographic location and even the use of a particular 
language can no longer protect scholars against the diffusion of their 
works, and it is any event evident that even those who are concerned 
about the consequences do not recoil entirely from the prospect that 
their scholarship will exert wide influence. Even scholars of Jewish 
studies in the diaspora have succeeded in persuading themselves that 
despite the revival of anti-Semitism, open and honest engagement with 
elements of Jewish tradition that arouse unease at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century will not at this point create existential danger, and 
even if they do—as the recent initiative among Russian anti-Semites 
to ban the standard code of Jewish law (Shulhan Arukh) suggests—any 
effort to conceal crucial data will be ineffectual.
However, the problem of apologetics and national pride arises now 
in a different context, which surely involves existential danger. The 
history of Zionism, relations between Jews and Arabs in the days of the 
yishuv, expulsion versus voluntary flight or emigration during the War of 
Independence, the behavior of the IDF or intelligence agencies in times of 
war and intifada—all these are not a matter for political or public relations 
figures alone. They are quintessentially academic topics that decidedly 
belong within the sphere of Jewish Studies. This assertion itself points 
to the transformations that have taken place in the definition of the field 
since the days the Institute was founded. On the one hand, scholars who 
identify with the State confront the challenge of objectivity since their 
ideological predilections are liable to lead to a presentation that obscures 
problematic Israeli behavior. On the other hand, scholars who identify 
with Palestinian aspirations are liable to endorse interpretations or even 
make factual assertions that violate proper standards of judgment in 
order to lay blame on the State and reveal its perversity. Regrettably, 
the atmosphere in the field of Middle Eastern Studies in European and 
College Graduate School of Jewish Studies (New York, 1997) as well as in my article, 
“On the Image and Destiny of Gentiles in Ashkenazic Polemical Literature” (in Hebrew), 
Facing the Cross: The Persecutions of 1096 in History and Historiography, ed. by Yom Tov 
Assis et al. (Jerusalem, 2000), pp. 74-91 [English translation including an addendum 
in David Berger, Persecution, Polemic and Dialogue: Essays in Jewish-Christian Relations 
(Boston, 2010), pp. 109-138].
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American universities exercises severe pressures on anyone who wishes 
to refrain from untrammeled attacks against the State and even against 
the Zionist vision itself. Here, devotion to Zionist ideology leads not to 
apologetics but to the capacity to maintain loyalty to balanced analysis.
When the Institute was established, the national renaissance that 
stood at its core was intimately connected to the revival of the Hebrew 
language. In a famous essay, Bialik sharply criticized scholars of Jewish 
Studies for writing their works in German,7 and this original sin was to 
be rectified in Jerusalem. And indeed the great miracle of the revival of 
the language left its mark not only on scholarly academic literature in 
Hebrew but also on the study of the language in the Institute itself, an 
enterprise that continues to be pursued on the highest level. It is true 
that the teaching of Jewish Studies in Hebrew and even the writing of 
scholarly studies in Hebrew are by no means endangered species, but 
it is nonetheless necessary to point to the well-known academic joke 
that embodies too large an element of truth, to wit, that God would 
not receive tenure in an Israeli university because he wrote only one 
book—and he wrote it in Hebrew. Fifteen years ago, I spent a sabbatical 
in the Annenberg Research Institute in Philadelphia, and an Israeli 
professor specializing in the sociology of Israel saw that I was writing 
an article about Maimonides in Hebrew. With genuine puzzlement, he 
asked me, “Why are you writing in Hebrew? After all, you know how 
to write English.” It is indeed important that knowledge of scholarly 
works in Jewish Studies not be restricted to readers of Hebrew, but the 
Institute and the departments of Jewish Studies throughout Israel have 
a sacred obligation to assign equal standing to Hebrew and non-Hebrew 
publications.
I must add that eight years ago I received a copy of a page of the 
schedule of the Twelfth Congress of Jewish Studies before its final 
publication, and I was astonished to see that in the Hebrew section my 
first name appeared with the spelling דיוויד, i.e., a phonetic transliteration 
of the name David as it is pronounced in English. I was able to correct this 
to the standard Hebrew spelling of what is after all a biblical name, but 
this phenomenon continues; an American scholar who moved to Israel 
informs me that he faces bureaucratic difficulties in both governmental 
7 H.N. Bialik, “Al ‘Hokhmat Yisrael’,” Kol Kitvei H.N. Bialik (Tel Aviv, 1956), pp. 221-224, 
as well as at http://benyehuda.org/bialik/artcle22.html#_ftn1.
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and academic administrative contexts that compel him to use his English 
name in his publications as well as on other occasions. The State that 
once pressured its representatives to Hebraize their names—a practice 
that was also improper in my view—now pressures its new citizens to 
set aside the Hebrew name given to them at birth. It is not difficult to 
imagine Bialik’s reaction to this phenomenon.
Speaking of names, an examination of the names of the members 
of the Institute in its early days yielded only those of males. This reality 
clearly reflected the place of women in the academic world at large, but 
in the field of Jewish Studies, the exclusion of women from the study of 
classical Jewish texts in the religious educational tradition exacerbated 
this deficiency all the more. Without deep knowledge of Talmud and 
rabbinic literature, serious work in central areas of research in Jewish 
Studies was virtually impossible. This problem has not achieved full 
resolution to this day, but it is evident that the situation has changed. 
This transformation not only reflects progress in society as a whole; it 
also engenders substantive scholarly advances by providing a different 
perspective that enriches the overall field, and particularly the burgeoning 
studies of the history and creativity of women throughout the course of 
Jewish history.
Another motif that served as the subject of discussion in the 
early days of the Institute was the role of the Jewish religion. Several 
members of the Committee wanted to establish a rabbinical seminary 
on the European model as part of the new enterprise in Jerusalem. This 
proposal was not realized for understandable reasons, but the question 
of the relationship between the academic study of Judaism and the 
religion itself remains intact. On the one hand, there is a fundamental 
tension between faith and the untrammeled intellectual freedom that is 
the hallmark of academic research. At the same time, believing Jews who 
are familiar with the academic study of Judaism and even participate 
in it cannot escape—and do not wish to escape—from its interaction 
with their religious commitment. It is consequently no surprise that a 
disproportionately large percentage of students in departments of Jewish 
Studies in Israel come from the religious sector. As a result of unfortunate 
sociological forces, many secular Israelis are indeed interested in modern 
Hebrew literature and other areas that they do not associate with religion, 
but they are not interested in classical texts or pre-modern history. With 
respect to the study of the Bible, the picture appears more complicated, 
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but I do not regard myself as qualified to assess the situation. In any 
event, we are dealing with an educational challenge that Israeli society 
must confront.
It is clear from everything that I have noted to this point that the 
quest for scholarly objectivity does not free academics from responsibility 
to society and its problems. On the contrary, by the very nature of things 
political leaders turn to universities and avail themselves of expert advice, 
and in the State of Israel, issues embedded in Jewish Studies are always 
on the agenda. Even without external consultation, the impulse toward 
engaged scholarship emerges out of one’s social, political or religious 
conscience. The challenge facing responsible scholars is to mobilize the 
knowledge that they have accumulated in the academic environment to 
advance objectives important to them without distorting the results of 
their research and to continue to pursue that research without dictating 
predetermined conclusions that will provide them with ideological 
satisfaction. In matters of this sort, it is easy to set forth the ideal; it is 
far more difficult to realize it.
Finally, since I stand here as a citizen of the United States, I need to 
conclude with some remarks about the complex relationship between the 
Institute and the Israeli establishment in the field of Jewish Studies and 
scholars in the diaspora. From a certain perspective, Israeli scholars can 
feel isolated. They are careful to travel outside the country for intellectual 
stimulation provided by contact with academics, not necessarily in Jewish 
Studies, who carry out their research with the aid of novel, up-to-date 
methodologies. On the other hand, they speak with disdain about the 
overall level of diaspora Jewish Studies out of the conviction that the 
knowledge of Hebrew and the deep understanding of classical Jewish 
texts are highly deficient outside the State of Israel.
As to the perspective of Judaica scholars in the diaspora, one 
sometimes hears the assertion that certain areas of Jewish Studies in 
Israel are marked by narrow philological and textual concerns that do 
not interest more than a dozen or so insiders. With respect to the last 
point, it seems to me that linguistic and textual discipline must not 
be compromised even when this means that topics of narrow interest 
will be pursued, and the members of the Institute along with their 
colleagues in Israel bear maximal responsibility to protect such areas 
of inquiry and not to be embarrassed by those who would subject them 
to mockery.
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I must also note the Institute’s initiatives to encourage the pursuit 
of Jewish Studies in the diaspora both by providing educational 
opportunities for young scholars who come to Israel and through programs 
in a variety of diaspora locales. Despite all the difficulties and obstacles 
noted here, we are dealing in this session not simply with the founding 
of a single institute but with the establishment of an Israeli Center of 
Jewish Studies unparalleled in the world. The traditional blessing “until 
a hundred and twenty” is inappropriate for an organization, and so I 
mobilize the blessing (Genesis 24:60) that the spiritual descendants of 
the Institute, which has reached the point described by the Mishnah as 
the age of strength, “will grow into thousands of myriads.”
INTERPRETING 
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"THE WISEST OF ALL MEN": SOLOMON'S WISDOM IN 
MEDIEVAL JEWISH COMMENTARIES ON 
THE BOOK OF KINGS
From: Hazon Nahum: Studies in Jewish Law, Thought and History 
presented to Dr. Norman Lamm on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, 
ed. by Yaakov Elman and Jeffrey S. Gurock (Yeshiva University Press: 
New York, 1997), pp. 93-114.
The Book of Kings informs us that Solomon was granted 
incomparable wisdom, but it presents a narrative of his reign which 
stands in considerable tension with this assertion. Both religious 
transgressions and troubling policy decisions engender serious 
doubts about Solomon’s judgment, and these in turn raised a series 
of intriguing challenges for Jewish biblical commentators in the 
Middle Ages.
What is the meaning of wisdom in general and of Solomon’s 
wisdom in particular? Was Solomon granted miraculous discernment 
ex machina, or did this divine gift build upon impressive preexisting 
intellectual strengths? What is the relationship between wisdom and 
piety? To the extent that these are intertwined, we need to understand 
Solomon’s real or apparent transgressions. How many sins are to be 
imputed to him, at what points in his life did he commit them, and how 
serious were they? Was his marriage to Pharaoh’s daughter permissible, 
moderately objectionable, or profoundly sinful? Did he act knowingly 
or inadvertently? How should we view the multiplicity of horses, the 
accumulation of wealth, the many wives? Is it possible that he really 
worshipped idols in the straightforward sense of the term? Finally, on 
a more mundane but no less critical level, was he guilty of policy errors, 
including unconscionable levels of taxation and forced labor, that led to 
the political catastrophes, both foreign and domestic, which followed in 
the wake of his reign?
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Not every commentator appears sensitive to each of these questions, 
and occasionally the proposed solution is less interesting than the deeper 
issue of whether the problem is raised at all. As we shall see, both the 
threshold level of sensitivity and the modes of resolution can rest upon 
the overall worldview and cultural environment of an exegete and provide 
insights into the relationship between the reading of a biblical passage and 
attitudes toward fundamental issues of philosophy, politics, and faith.
THE CONTOURS OF SOLOMONIC WISDOM
What, then, was the nature of the extraordinary wisdom with which 
Solomon was blessed? Let us begin, as any exegete must, with the biblical 
data themselves. Strikingly, Solomon made the wisest decision of his 
life before he received his special blessing: he chose to request wisdom. 
In his crucial dream, he responds to the divine offer by asking God for 
“an understanding mind to judge Your people, to distinguish between 
good and bad; for who can judge this vast people of Yours?” (I Kings 
3:9). God responds by praising Solomon for requesting “discernment in 
dispensing justice. ... I grant you a wise and discerning mind; there has 
never been anyone like you before, nor will anyone like you arise again” 
(I Kings 3:12).
Two chapters later, we are provided a more extensive definition:
The Lord endowed Solomon with wisdom and discernment in great measure, 
with understanding as vast as the sands on the seashore. Solomon’s wisdom 
was greater than the wisdom of all the Kedemites and than all the wisdom 
of the Egyptians. He was the wisest of all men… He composed three 
thousand proverbs, and his songs numbered one thousand and five. He 
discoursed about trees, from the cedar in Lebanon to the hyssop that grows 
out of the wall; and he discoursed about beasts, birds, creeping things, and 
fishes (I Kings 5:9-13).
As to concrete, explicit applications of Solomon’s wisdom, we are 
afforded two examples: the famous judgment determining the true 
mother of a child, and the ability to solve the unspecified riddles posed 
by the Queen of Sheba (I Kings 3:16-28, 10:1-9).
Aside from judicial discernment, which can itself be understood in 
many ways, the biblical material leaves us extensive leeway in interpreting 
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the character of Solomon’s wisdom. Despite the apparent numbers, Rashi 
restricts the proverbs and songs to the biblical books ascribed to Solomon, 
and he makes reference to a “midrash aggadah” which understands the 
discourses about trees, birds, and fish as halakhic discussions. Before 
citing this midrash, however, he presents a straightforward reading which 
interprets Solomon’s wisdom as medical knowledge concerning trees and 
animals, the usefulness of particular trees as building materials, the diet 
of various animals, and the like.1 R. Joseph Kara, who hailed from the 
same cultural sphere as Rashi, exhibits similar inclinations, though he 
provides a lengthier, more detailed list of the scientific fields and specific 
questions which Solomon mastered, so that we are informed that the 
wisest of men knew the precise measure of a given animal’s strength, 
whether or not it could be domesticated, whether it inhabited deserts 
or settled areas, and more. Almost as an afterthought, he too notes the 
midrashic comment explaining the passage in halakhic terms.2
Not surprisingly, we find no reference to metaphysical insights in the 
comments of these French exegetes. At the same time, we should not 
wonder about the positive assessment of practical scientific knowledge 
expressed in their commentaries. As I have argued elsewhere, the pursuit 
of natural science could become the subject of controversy precisely in 
the Sephardic orbit, where it was caught up in the web of philosophy. If 
the natural sciences were part of the “propaedeutic studies” leading to the 
queen of the sciences, they could be tainted by the unsavory reputation 
of the queen herself. Where they stood on their own, it is hard to imagine 
any grounds of principle for dismissing them or for failure to admire one 
who had mastered their secrets. The very indifference of Ashkenazic Jews 
to philosophical study liberated them to examine the natural world with 
keen, unselfconscious interest.3
1 Commentary to I Kings 5: 12-13. The midrash is in Pesiqta Rabbati, chap. 14. In 
commenting on the earlier verses of this passage, Rashi also alludes to astronomy, or 
astrology (hokhmat ha-mazzalot), and music.
2 Perush R. Yosef Kara ‘al Nevi’im Rishonim, ed. by S. Eppenstein (Jerusalem, 1972), 
commentary to I Kings 5:13.
3 I made the basic point in Gerald Blidstein, David Berger, Sid Z. Leiman, and Aharon 
Lichtenstein, Judaism’s Encounter with Other Cultures: Rejection or Integration?, ed. by 
Jacob J. Schacter (Northvale, N.J., and London, 1997), p. 118, and cf. p. 134, n. 131. The 
intensive study of natural science might remain problematic because it takes time from 
the study of Torah, but this concern is far less acute or fundamental than the issues raised 
by pursuit of scientific knowledge as part of the philosophic quest.
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Despite the citation of the midrash equating Solomon’s wisdom with 
mastery of the Torah, the secondary role of this interpretation is striking. 
In Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, the Rabbis and traditionalist commentators 
routinely identified wisdom with Torah. Here, perhaps because of the 
plain meaning of the references to trees and beasts, perhaps because 
Solomon’s wisdom appears to refer to the same disciplines pursued by 
the Kedemites and Egyptians, perhaps because of the apparent relevance 
of his wisdom to the riddles of the Queen of Sheba, this understanding 
is thoroughly marginalized.
At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Joseph ibn Kaspi 
provided an explanation tenuously rooted in the text and driven almost 
entirely by his thoroughgoing rationalism. Here is the meaning of 
Solomon’s discoursing about trees and animals:
It is evident (mevo’ar) that this is the science of nature, which is included 
in the interpretation of the account of creation and the account of the 
chariot, held in contempt by our masses in their sinfulness. Indeed, in our 
sinfulness we lost the works of Solomon and other of our sages, so that 
matters pertaining to the intellectual disciplines are attributed to Plato 
and Aristotle.4
Anyone with elementary discernment, then, will see an “evident” 
reference in this verse to Aristotelian metaphysics, which is 
unquestionably how ibn Kaspi understood “the account of the chariot.” 
Here, the connection between natural science and philosophy taken for 
granted by certain Provençal and Spanish thinkers enabled ibn Kaspi to 
expand the reference to trees and beasts to the point where Solomon’s 
self-evident command of philosophy serves as an admonition to the 
obscurantist objects of the exegete’s acerbic critique. In fairness, the 
grandiose biblical rhetoric describing Solomon’s wisdom opens the door 
to a legitimate expansion beyond trees, beasts, and fish, but the distance 
between this rhetoric and a confident reference to Plato and Aristotle 
rests upon a series of rationalist assumptions far removed from the 
biblical text.5
4 Adnei Kesef, ed. by Isaac Last (London, 1911), commentary to 5:13, p. 47.
5 These include most notably the Maimonidean identification of the accounts of creation 
and the chariot with physics and metaphysics and the belief that Jewish wisdom was lost 
to its original masters, appropriated by the Greeks, and hence available to medieval Jews 
primarily through the study of alien texts. On the first point, see Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 
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Ralbag, whose intellectual profile was close to that of ibn Kaspi, 
provided an interpretation which stands somewhere between the readings 
of the Northern European exegetes and of his Provençal contemporary. 
Solomon knew the causes, composition, and essential traits of trees, 
beasts, and fish by investigating their nature, and he probably also knew 
the uses to which they could be put. Ralbag describes this knowledge with 
the technical language of philosophically oriented scientific discourse, 
and in a comment on Solomon’s prayer several chapters later, he takes 
for granted the king’s familiarity with the celestial intelligences and the 
acquired intellect. At the same time, he does not indicate in any way that 
the Solomonic wisdom singled out by Scripture is to be understood as 
the mastery of metaphysics.6
The reason for this may emerge from an examination of the position 
of his philosophically oriented but more conservative predecessor Radak. 
That position is at first a bit surprising but ultimately highly revealing. 
Despite his vigorous affirmation of the importance of philosophical 
study, Radak’s understanding of these verses also attributes no special 
metaphysical knowledge to the wise king. Here, however, we are provided 
enough information to discern the explanation, which could have 
motivated Ralbag as well as Radak. The moment a commentator provides 
a definition of wisdom in our context, he is committed to the position 
that Solomon attained the apex of achievement in that field, surpassing 
all others, including Moses. Thus, it is precisely because Radak valued 
philosophy so highly that he refrained from identifying it with Solomon’s 
wisdom; such an identification would have forced him to affirm that the 
greatest of prophets was not the greatest of philosophers. Solomon, says 
Radak, achieved ultimate superiority in the science of nature (hokhmat 
ha-teva‘), but in the divine science (ba-hokhmah ha-elohit), Moses was 
greater than he.7
Abravanel, the final commentator that I will examine in this study, 
was, like Radak, a philosophically oriented exegete with a conservative 
2:11-12; 4:10, 13; Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:11-12. Cf. Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the 
Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah) (New Haven, 1980), pp. 488-507. On the second, see 
the material collected in Norman Roth, “The ‘Theft of Philosophy’ by the Greeks from the 
Jews,” Classical Folia 22 (1978): 53-67.
6 Commentary to 5:13, and cf. Commentary to 8:23.
7 Commentary to 3:12, and cf. to 5:12. See Maimonides, Guide 3:54, and Sara Klein- Braslavy, 
Shlomo ka-Melekh ve-ha-Esoterizm ha-Pilosofi be-Mishnat ha-Rambam (Jerusalem, 1996), 
pp. 121-123.
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bent. In his case, however, this orientation led to more complicated 
conclusions. Like ibn Kaspi, Abravanel was unwilling to limit the wisdom 
described with such sublime rhetoric to a single field of endeavor. 
Solomon’s intellectual perfection embraced the totality of wisdom. 
Indeed, Abravanel exploited this opportunity to write a lengthy excursus 
on the nature of wisdom itself, the categories of which it is comprised, 
and its limitations.8
This approach, however, forced him to confront the apparently 
unavoidable conclusion that Solomon was superior to Moses and all 
the other prophets in every form of wisdom despite the inextricable 
connection for medieval philosophers between prophecy and intellectual 
perfection. It is almost painful to observe Abravanel’s acute discomfort 
with this dilemma and his difficult struggles to extricate himself from 
its grasp. Perhaps there is, after all, no intrinsic connection between 
wisdom and prophecy. Perhaps there is, but the former is not necessarily 
proportional to the latter. Perhaps it is proportional, but this is the 
case only for the highest forms of knowledge, not for the lower forms 
(management of household and state) in which Solomon excelled but 
Moses needed the advice of Jethro. (And so we watch incredulously as 
Solomon’s perfection in the totality of wisdom, underscored in page after 
page of Abravanel’s excursus, fades into anticlimax.)9 Finally, perhaps 
the unqualified Scriptural assertion that Solomon was wiser than all 
who came before or after him refers only to those who failed to attain 
prophecy.10
To a certain degree, Abravanel deflects the full force of the question by 
arguing that Solomon obtained his wisdom miraculously, so that it may 
not be governed by the usual rules of nature. The immediate impetus to 
this position was Ralbag’s hypernaturalistic assertion that the assurance 
of unique wisdom is incomprehensible, since nothing, not even a miracle, 
can provide a person with intellectual gifts that could not be attained to 
an equal degree by a later individual.11 Abravanel’s sharp retort is that 
8 Perush ‘al Nevi’im Rishonim (Jerusalem, 1955), pp. 466-480.
9 The suggestion is especially striking in light of the fact that in one of his preliminary 
questions (p. 451), Abravanel explicitly rejected Radak’s assertion that Solomon’s 
blessing was confined to natural science and did not extend to metaphysics.
10 Pp. 479-480.
11 Ralbag to 3:12. On another occasion, I hope to address the tension between Ralbag’s 
denial of this possibility with respect to wisdom and his affirmation of precisely this 
reality regarding Mosaic prophecy.
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Ralbag’s belief in miracles and divine power is sorely wanting if he thinks 
that God could not miraculously grant Solomon the ability to be wiser 
than he.12
This position leads Abravanel to an extremely strong formulation 
of the miraculous nature of Solomonic wisdom. On the evening of 
Solomon’s dream, he went to sleep as “a brutish man who does not 
know, and he awoke wise as an angel of God.”13 The first part of this 
sentence is, of course, hyperbole, and it would be unfair to Abravanel to 
hold him to it in its literal sense. On the one hand, the perception that 
Solomon’s wisdom was miraculous guides Abravanel’s understanding of 
both Scriptural examples of the practical application of this wisdom; on 
the other, his deviation from the assertion that Solomon was without 
prior intelligence is sometimes so sharp that it appears inconsistent even 
with a discounted version of that assertion.
Let us begin with the examples. The Queen of Sheba, says Abravanel, 
was interested precisely in the supernatural quality of Solomon’s 
discernment. The solutions to the riddles she proposed were based 
on her subjective understanding; no one could have perceived her 
intentions naturalistically. The fact that Solomon provided precisely the 
interpretations which she had in mind demonstrated conclusively that 
his knowledge was of divine origin.14 At first glance, it is truly remarkable 
that this interpretation, whose emphasis on the miraculous apparently 
results from Abravanel’s rejection of Gersonidean naturalism, is derived 
from Gersonides himself. To Ralbag, Solomon’s experience exemplifies 
the fundamental truth that knowledge can be obtained in a dream 
without the usual intellectual effort;15 precisely because such knowledge 
was obtained in atypical fashion, it appears that its beneficiary might 
achieve insight that goes beyond the information available through 
logical reasoning.16 Despite their very different views of the scope and 
nature of miracles, both Ralbag and his most distinguished critic agree 
that it was a form of nonrational perception which provided Solomon 
12 P. 471.
13 Ibid.
14 Commentary to 10:2, pp. 540-541.
15 Commentary to I Kings 11, to‘elet 3.
16 Commentary to I Kings 10:1: The queen wanted to see “if [Solomon] would determine 
the secrets that she had in mind in these riddles, for in this manner one can test if this 
wisdom is a gift of God. If it is, he would be able to discern her intention even though 
[the riddles themselves] are susceptible of other interpretations.”
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with his success in deciphering the riddles of the queen.17
With respect to the second practical application of Solomon’s 
wisdom, Abravanel and Ralbag present contrasting approaches. The latter 
expresses the straightforward understanding that Solomon determined 
the true mother by a clever, rational ruse. To Abravanel, on the other 
hand, the famous stratagem appears insufficiently impressive; no “great 
wisdom” was needed to think of it. What really happened was that 
Solomon identified the true mother from an examination of the litigants’ 
facial expressions alone, and he communicated his conclusion to his 
aides; only then did he pursue his stratagem to demonstrate that he had 
been correct.18 Needless to say, there is not a sliver of textual evidence for 
this interpretation, which results either from Abravanel’s commitment 
to his portrait of supernal wisdom or from personal experience with 
intrigues in royal courts that made Solomon’s creative trickery seem 
entirely routine.
Despite Ralbag’s affirmation that wisdom can sometimes be attained 
through dreams and prophecy without the usual effort, medieval 
philosophers did not believe that divine inspiration rests on individuals 
bereft of any preparation. In light of this conviction, Abravanel’s 
assertion of Solomon’s thorough ignorance before the dream was highly 
problematic. Near the beginning of the Commentary to Kings, he 
writes that David was concerned that Solomon, in the typical manner 
of youths, would be unduly influenced by Shimi son of Gera’s flattering 
behavior toward him;19 in fact, however, Solomon’s decision to send 
Shimi away should be seen not as a mechanical act of obedience to his 
father’s final wishes but as a display of intelligent initiative.20 Much more 
strikingly, Abravanel’s summary of Solomon’s reign asserts that David’s 
references to his son’s wisdom at the beginning of Kings demonstrate 
“that Solomon had natural preparation for wisdom before the dream, 
and that knowledge was added to him through a divine overflow in a 
17 On Abravanel’s critical stance toward Ralbag, see Menachem Kellner, “Gersonides and his 
Cultured Despisers: Arama and Abravanel,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6 
(1976): 269-296.
18 Commentary to 3:24, p. 482.
19 Commentary to 2:8, p. 448.
20 Commentary to 2:36, p. 457. Note too his assertion that Solomon had to be no less 
than twenty years old when he became king in light of his understanding of the policies 
necessary to sustain his rule; see Commentary to 3:7-8, p. 466.
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prophetic manner.”21 Indeed, the gold in the Temple, which symbolizes 
Solomon, was affixed to the cedars, which represent David, to indicate 
the intimate connection through which Solomon, who was similar to 
his father, inherited wisdom from him along with kingship.22 Hardly “a 
brutish man who does not know.”
WISDOM AND RELIGIOUS TRANSGRESSION
The varying perceptions of Solomon’s wisdom inevitably affect the 
approaches to his real or apparent sins. In principle, it seems reasonable 
to assume that a commentator who understands this wisdom as primarily 
scientific and who does not see the natural sciences as a step toward 
the knowledge of God will face only minor obstacles in accepting the 
reality and, within limits, even the gravity of Solomon’s transgressions. 
On the other hand, a broad understanding of Solomonic wisdom makes 
it more difficult to understand how such an individual could have sinned, 
particularly in light of the standard philosophical approach which saw 
sin as an intellectual, not merely a moral failing, and which encouraged 
developing the faculty of reason as the most effective weapon against 
the evil inclination.
Solomon’s marriage to Pharaoh’s daughter, which appears to violate 
the biblical injunction against marrying an Egyptian, took place before 
the dream. Needless to say, the focus of this study on Solomon’s wisdom 
should not obscure the obvious: traditionalist commentators were 
disturbed by the sins of biblical heroes even in the absence of a special 
21 Commentary to chapter 11, p. 551.
22 Commentary to chapter 8, p. 521. 
Commentators outside the philosophic tradition could presumably have affirmed 
Solomon’s ignorance prior to the divine gift of wisdom with equanimity. Nonetheless 
– though I would be hesitant in the extreme to draw confident conclusions from 
this evidence – it is at least worth noting an intriguing passage in the Sifrei cited by 
Rashi in his commentary to Deuteronomy 1:9. “Is it possible that the one of whom 
it was written, ‘He was the wisest of all men’ would say ‘For who can judge [this 
vast people of yours]?’?” The glaring difficulty in Rashi’s – or the Sifrei’s – question 
is that Solomon became the world’s wisest man as a result of his comment about 
the difficulty of judging. There appears to be an instinct at work here which cannot 
imagine that unparalleled wisdom would be granted to one who was not already 
exceptionally wise. (So Siftei Hakhamim ad loc., though cf. Maharal’s Gur Aryeh ad 
loc.)
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bestowal of discernment.23 In our case, the problem was sharpened by 
the assumption of several exegetes that Solomon was exceedingly wise 
even before the dream and by the persistence of the marriage even after 
it.
Rashi, who is not likely to see a special connection between piety 
and Solomonic wisdom, understands this union as a straightforward 
transgression. Following Rabbinic precedent, he remarks that as long 
as Solomon’s teacher Shimi was present, he did not establish a marital 
relationship with Pharaoh’s family; we see, then, the critical importance 
of residing near one’s teacher. Moreover, Rashi endorses Seder Olam’s 
rearrangement of the chronological order of I Kings 3 in order to blunt the 
appearance of the verse “And Solomon loved the Lord” (3:3) immediately 
after this forbidden marriage.24
R. Joseph Kara goes even further by taking the apparently neutral 
phrase “And he brought her to the city of David” (3:2) as evidence of 
compounded transgression. “Know that this point is mentioned by 
Scripture to indicate improper behavior. This place was designated for 
holiness, since the city of David, which is Zion, is where the ark of the 
divine covenant was brought; and this man brings Pharaoh’s daughter 
there.”25 The comment was no doubt triggered by the Chronicler’s report 
(II Chron. 8:11) that Solomon eventually removed Pharaoh’s daughter 
from the city of David for this very reason, but the critical reference here 
clearly goes beyond what the verses require and reflects a relatively low 
threshold of resistance to intensifying the sin of a biblical figure.
Ralbag too extends and heightens Solomon’s sinfulness with respect 
to his marriages, but he does not do so until chapter 11, where the biblical 
text itself sharply criticizes the king’s behavior. The tone of Ralbag’s 
23 See my “On the Morality of the Patriarchs in Jewish Polemic and Exegesis,” in 
Understanding Scripture: Explorations of Jewish and Christian Traditions of Interpretation, 
ed. by Clemens Thoma and Michael Wyschogrod (New York, 1987), pp. 49-62; reprinted 
in Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah, ed. by Shalom Carmy (Northvale, N.J., and 
London, 1996), pp. 131-146. Also see Avraham Grossman, Hakhmei Zarfat ha-Rishonim 
(Jerusalem, 1995), pp. 488-492.
24 Commentary to 3:1. Rashi (to 11:39) also cites Seder Olam’s assertion that a thirty-six-
year punishment was initially set for the Davidic kingdom to correspond to the thirty-
six years that Solomon was married to Pharaoh’s daughter. So too Radak to 11:39 and 
R. Joseph Kara to 11:41.
25 Commentary to 3:1, where he also makes reference to the Rabbinic comment about 
Shimi.
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comment in chapter 3, where Pharaoh’s daughter is first introduced, 
differs markedly, and the difference reflects a crucial point which can 
often determine an exegete’s approach. The changing local contexts of 
biblical data may lead to profoundly different emphases and even to 
outright inconsistencies in a commentator’s approach. Thus, the report 
of the questionable marriage in chapter 3 is followed immediately by the 
assertion that Solomon loved the Lord though he continued to sacrifice 
at a variety of shrines. We have already seen how this juxtaposition 
disturbed Rashi and Seder Olam, and the reference to the shrines as 
the only exception to Solomon’s love of God further strengthens the 
implication that the marriage was unobjectionable. At this point, then, 
Ralbag writes, “It is appropriate for you to know that Solomon married 
into Pharaoh’s family after the latter’s daughter converted; nevertheless, 
this was a slight deviation (yezi’ah qezat) from the ways of the Torah, 
which permitted Egyptians to enter the community only in the third 
generation.”26 It is difficult to envision a milder formulation.
In chapter 11, we find ourselves in a different world. Here, we no 
longer encounter a Solomon who loved the Lord, but one who
loved many foreign women in addition to Pharaoh’s daughter—Moabite, 
Ammonite, Edomite, Phoenician, and Hittite women, from the nations of 
which the Lord had said to the Israelites, “None of you shall join them…” 
Such Solomon clung to and loved… And his wives turned his heart away 
(vv. 1-4).
So we search Ralbag’s commentary in vain for a marriage which 
constituted a “slight deviation” from the ways of the Torah.
If someone will argue that it is appropriate for us to believe that [these 
foreign women] converted before Solomon married them, we would 
nonetheless be unable to avoid a conclusion of improper behavior 
(genut). Pharaoh’s daughter, after all, was prohibited from entering the 
community of the Lord because only the third generation is permitted 
to do so. Moreover, Ammonite and Moabite women also come from a 
nation unworthy of entering the community… , and even though the 
females among them were not forbidden to enter the community… , it 
was inappropriate for a king to marry them, since it was impossible for the 
offspring that he would have from them to be truly perfect.27
26 Commentary to 3:1.
27 Commentary to 11:1.
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A genuine exegetical problem is certainly at work here, since 
the verses appear to imply that Solomon’s marriages to women from 
nations other than Egypt were forbidden, while the halakhah actually 
permits marriage to converted women from all the peoples on that 
list. Nonetheless, the reference to necessarily deficient offspring is not 
forced upon Ralbag—indeed, Solomon’s own descent from a Moabite 
convert named Ruth makes it highly problematic—and while we do not 
face a full-fledged contradiction, the attitude toward the truly forbidden 
marriage is considerably less forgiving than it was when the king who 
contracted it loved the Lord.28
The juxtaposition between Solomon’s marriage and the reference to 
his love of the Lord led other commentators to remarkable conclusions. 
Radak argued that the biblical account here reveals that the Talmudic 
sage who limited the prohibition against marrying Egyptians to their 
males was correct (nir’in devarav) despite the fact that “the halakhah has 
not been fixed in accordance with [his] view.”29 Abravanel tells us that 
if he were to approach this question “according to the plain meaning of 
the verses,” he would argue that Solomon did not sin at all, and what 
follows is a veritable assault upon standard Rabbinic law on this point. 
First, there is the rejected position cited by Radak which Solomon, who 
was, after all, one of the Sages, might have endorsed. Moreover, “the 
third generation” could begin from the Exodus, not from each act of 
conversion; even if the count begins with conversion, the assertion that 
the third generation “will enter” may mean that at this juncture such a 
step becomes a quasi-obligation (be-hiyyuv u-mi-derekh mizvah), but it is 
permissible even earlier; finally, “entering the community” may not mean 
marriage at all but admission to positions of leadership.
Only after this lengthy and vigorous presentation of the thorough 
rejection of Rabbinic law that a straightforward examination of the 
text would have impelled Abravanel to propose does he assert that the 
position of the Sages constitutes the transmitted truth (ha-mequbbal ve-
28 In his retrospective evaluation at the end of the biblical account of Solomon’s reign, 
Ralbag goes so far as to say that the ultimate exile and destruction of the Temple resulted 
from the king’s failure to heed the divine admonition that he command his children to 
observe the ways of the Lord (to‘elet 33 at the end of chapter 11). This sin is nowhere 
in the biblical text and appears to be a deduction based on the behavior of Solomon’s 
descendants.
29 Commentary to 3:3. See B. Yevamot 77b.
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ha-amitti). The correct position, then, is that Solomon misinterpreted the 
law; he believed that after the conversion of Pharaoh’s daughter he was 
permitted to marry her, and since this was the honest error of a young 
man motivated by understandable diplomatic considerations, God did 
not punish him for it.30
What Abravanel does not address is a problem which appears to 
follow from his all-embracing view of Solomon’s wisdom after the 
dream. Among many other things—one is tempted to say, among all 
other things—Solomon was expert in “the commandments. He knew 
them in general and encompassed their particulars down to the most 
precise minutiae, just as Moses our teacher, may he rest in peace, received 
them from God without the slightest doubt or dispute.”31 At that point, 
we would imagine, Solomon should have divorced his prohibited wife. 
Abravanel, however, refuses to ascribe any blemish to Solomon after his 
dream and before the sins of his old age, so that the problem of this 
marriage, which had already been resolved in the Commentary to chapter 
3, is not permitted to rise up again to taint the perfection of the wise 
king at the height of his powers.32
Solomon’s proliferation of wives, wealth, and horses stands in stark 
contrast to the injunctions in Deuteronomy 17 concerning proper royal 
behavior. Rashi, R. Joseph Kara, Radak, and Ralbag all acknowledge this 
behavior as sinful, in some cases with explicit or implicit reference to 
the Rabbinic assertion attributing the transgressions to Solomon’s self-
confidence. Since the Torah makes clear that it is primarily concerned 
with the results that normally follow from the actions it has prohibited, 
Solomon concluded that an individual of his discernment could perform 
the acts and avoid the consequences.33 To Ralbag, the sins resulted 
30 Commentary to 3:1.
31 P. 477.
32 The reference in I Kings 3:3 to Solomon’s worship at multiple shrines raises a problem 
which is the mirror image of the marriage to Pharaoh’s daughter. Here the Bible appears 
to condemn behavior which Rabbinic law considered permissible before the period of the 
Temple. Rashi (to 3:3) and R. Joseph Kara (to 3:2) see this as a criticism of Solomon’s 
delay in building the Temple. Radak and Abravanel (to 3:3) regard it as a deviation from 
David’s practice and consider it objectionable because it can lead to idolatry (Radak) 
or unspecified sin (Abravanel). Ralbag to 3:3 and in to‘elet 2 at the end of chapter 11 
apparently finds nothing wrong in behavior whose purpose he sees as the attainment 
of prophecy. In to‘elet 1, however, he acknowledges the criticism implicit in the biblical 
formulation and indicates that such worship is flawed, though permissible. 
33 See Radak to 11:1 and Rashi to Ecclesiastes 1:18. Also see R. Joseph Kara to 10:28 and 
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not from Solomon’s reliance on his wisdom but from a powerful desire 
which prevailed despite that wisdom.34 None of these commentators was 
committed to a portrait of Solomonic perfection like that of Abravanel, 
and the Rabbinic affirmation of sin easily removed whatever inhibitions 
may nonetheless have remained. For Abravanel himself, the issue was 
more difficult, and we shall look at his approach when we examine the 
question of errors in royal policy.
For all commentators, one sin ascribed to Solomon violates the 
canons of both wisdom and piety so severely that it could not be suffered 
with equanimity.
In his old age, his wives turned away Solomon’s heart after other gods… 
Solomon followed Ashtoreth the goddess of the Phoenicians, and Milcom 
the abomination of the Ammonites… Solomon built a shrine for Chemosh 
the abomination of Moab… and one for Molech the abomination of the 
Ammonites. And this he did for all his foreign wives who offered and 
sacrificed to their gods (I Kings 11:4-8).
Following Talmudic precedent, Rashi and Radak insist that Solomon 
was faulted for failing to prevent his wives from worshipping idols, not 
for doing so himself.35 Ralbag draws an explicit connection between 
Solomon’s wisdom and the inconceivability of attributing idolatry to 
him personally; such a man could not have followed “these vanities 
and abominations given the fact that he grasped the Lord, may He be 
blessed, to a greater degree than others,” not to speak of the fact that he 
wrote works under divine inspiration and twice experienced revelation 
directly.36
Abravanel repeats Ralbag’s argument,37 but he goes further by 
attempting to establish an almost direct causal link between Solomon’s 
wisdom and the idolatry of his wives. Through his unique wisdom, 
Solomon understood “the modes of service relating to the celestial 
powers assigned to the nations [of his wives] through which the overflow 
11:1. Cf. B. Sanhedrin 21b.
34 To‘elet 36 at the end of chapter 11, where Solomon is described as homeh el ha-nashim and 
possessed of a yezer leharbot sus.
35 Rashi to 11:7; Radak to 11:1.
36 Commentary to 11:4.
37 Commentary to 11:1, p. 546.
"The Wisest of All Men": Solomon's Wisdom in Medieval Jewish Commentaries on the Book of Kings 
— 229 —
could be lowered upon those nations.”38 Abravanel suggests that when 
the Gentiles flocked to learn Solomon’s wisdom, it was this wisdom that 
they sought. Such instruction was not sinful in light of Deuteronomy 
4:19, which asserts that God assigned the heavenly hosts to the nations 
of the world.39 Later, however, Solomon imparted this knowledge to his 
wives, who put it into practice in idolatrous rites which he tolerated. By 
transforming the king from a passive tolerator of idolatry into an active 
participant in imparting its intellectual underpinnings, Abravanel has 
gained the exegetical advantage of accounting for very strong biblical 
language, but the damage to Solomon’s image is not inconsiderable.
Abravanel has also gained something else; he has constructed a 
bridge which can bring us from the paragon of wisdom and piety that we 
have known until now to the sinful—and unsuccessful—ruler of I Kings 
11. What Solomon did was teach wisdom to his wives—and precisely 
that wisdom which he had taught other Gentiles without incurring 
divine wrath. Nonetheless, the effect of his action was the facilitating of 
idolatry, a grave offense worthy of severe punishment. At this point, the 
miraculous nature of Solomon’s ascent to the heights of wisdom becomes 
his undoing. Wisdom, power, and wealth all depart from him.
Just as these perfections had rested in his home, so they left him. They 
came in a divine manner and with a supernal overflow, not in a natural 
fashion. When he separated himself from his God so that the thread 
of grace which had always descended upon his head was severed, those 
perfections departed along with the overflow which was their cause.40
Abravanel’s Solomon, then, moves from a youth of considerable 
potential but little understanding to a maturity marked by unique, 
miraculous wisdom, to an old age that might well be characterized in 
the words of the wisest of men as that of “an old and foolish king who 
no longer has the sense to heed warnings” (Eccles. 4:13).
Despite the gravity of Solomon’s sin, even Abravanel does not 
38 Ibid. So too in the excursus on wisdom, p. 475.
39 An even stronger, surprisingly explicit assertion that this verse frees Gentiles from the 
obligation of monotheism appears in Abravanel’s contemporary, R. Isaac Arama; see his 
‘Aqedat Yitzhak, chapter 88, p. 16a, and his Hazut Qashah, chapter 12, p. 32b. I hope 
to discuss Arama’s comments, which appear to contradict the unambiguous position of 
Talmudic law, in another context.
40 Commentary to chapter 11, p. 552.
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maintain that he himself committed idolatry. Ironically, it was precisely 
a commentator of an extreme philosophical bent, a man for whom it 
was virtually inconceivable that a philosopher of Solomon’s stature could 
commit such a sin, who constructed a solution so radical that anything 
became possible. We will recall that Joseph ibn Kaspi regarded Solomon 
as a metaphysician par excellence. How, then, could he have been caught 
up in idolatry?
Although ibn Kaspi makes no reference to Maimonides, the 
inspiration for his answer emerged, I believe, from a famous passage in The 
Guide of the Perplexed. Maimonides conveys to us “a most extraordinary 
speculation” to explain how people who have achieved a high level of 
apprehension of God could nonetheless find themselves unprotected by 
divine providence. Occasionally, he explains, even such a person allows 
his attention to stray so that “for a certain time” his thought “is emptied 
of God,” and “providence withdraws from him during the time when he 
is occupied with something else.”41
Moses’ intellect, says ibn Kaspi, was actively engaged with God 
without interruption, but Solomon turned away to some degree precisely 
because he was capable of being distracted. His wives disrupted his 
concentration to a limited extent even in his youth, but at that point 
this spiritual detour
did not reach the point where he would worship other gods, which is 
the heresy called ‘avon [iniquity] in Hebrew; it did, however, reach the 
point where there was some deficiency in his apprehension. At the very 
least, there were moments (‘ittot) at that time in which his intellect was 
potentially iniquitous, and this is what is called het [sin] in Hebrew.42
Once ibn Kaspi had discovered a mechanism which neutralized 
Solomon’s supernal wisdom, nothing was ruled out, and it is apparently 
his position that in the king’s old age, his wives turned him away to the 
point where he actually worshipped foreign gods.
41 The Guide of the Perplexed, translated by Shlomo Pines (Chicago, 1963) 3:51, pp. 624-625.
42 Commentary to 11:3. The editor (Adnei Kesef p. 51) notes that V. Aptowitzer suggested 
that ‘ittot be emended to ‘ivrut. Once one is aware of the Maimonidean basis for ibn 
Kaspi’s suggestion, the impropriety of this emendation becomes self-evident. (In light 
of our earlier discussion about Solomon and Moses, it is worth underscoring ibn Kaspi’s 
explicit assertion that the latter, whose apprehension of God never flagged, was wiser 
than the former.)
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THE ROYAL POLICY OF THE WISEST OF KINGS
It has become abundantly clear that for some commentators, the 
problem of Solomon’s sins was significantly exacerbated by the reports 
of his exceptional wisdom. For others, who limited the sphere of his 
wisdom and saw no intimate relationship between such wisdom and 
piety, the connection was tenuous and marginal. But Solomon was 
arguably guilty of more than religious error. His taxes and corvées, 
expensive building projects, lavish palace life, and elaborate stables 
appear to have engendered smoldering resentment which exploded into 
flame after his death, destroying the Davidic empire and rending the 
fabric of Israel. What are we to make of fundamental policy errors by 
the wisest of men?
Rashi and R. Joseph Kara do not raise the question and are apparently 
untroubled by it. This may be because their commentaries tend to focus 
on the verses immediately before them, and this problem—if it is a 
problem—arises only when one steps back and looks at the entire picture.43 
In their immediate context, the biblical accounts of taxes and building 
projects are part of the description of a glorious, highly successful reign. 
Equally or even more important, the Northern European commentators 
probably saw the rebellions of subject kings and the internal resistance 
that culminated in secession in purely religious terms. These were divine 
punishments for Solomon’s sins and need not be connected to his policies 
by natural causation.
Radak and Ralbag explicitly defend Solomon against the people’s 
charge that he had imposed a heavy yoke upon them (I Kings 12:4). 
At earlier points in the commentaries, we were informed that the 
difficult labor was done entirely by non-Israelite peoples. Both exegetes 
maintained that the only corvée affecting real Jews was the one in 
Lebanon, and Ralbag took pains to point out that it was arranged 
so that the work would not be unduly burdensome.44 To Radak, the 
complaints expressed to Rehoboam about Solomon’s taxation were 
entirely unjustified.
43 For a related observation about Ashkenazic polemicists, see my forthcoming study, “On 
the Uses of History in Medieval Jewish Polemic against Christianity: The Search for the 
Historical Jesus,” in the Festschrift for Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi.
44 See Radak on 5:27, Ralbag on 5:29 and 9:23, and to‘elet 15 at the end of chapter 11. Cf. 
Rashi on 5:30 and R. Joseph Kara on 5:29-30 and 9:23.
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They lived in great tranquility in his time, so that the entire taxation 
was easy for them… Rather, God saw to it that they should concoct an 
accusation in their discussion with Rehoboam so that they should secede 
and crown Jeroboam.45
Ralbag reiterates the same point, though his more naturalistic 
orientation impels him to explain the complaint not by an appeal to 
divine intervention but as the result of the recent wars. Still, Ralbag 
asserts that even now the request was for nothing more than a “slight” 
alleviation of the burden, an elaboration of the biblical information which 
underscores the reasonableness of Solomon’s policies.46 Indeed, one of 
the lessons to be drawn from the account of Solomon’s reign is precisely 
that the king should impose taxes and corvées to support his household 
and his projects.47 Both Radak and Ralbag may well have sought to avoid 
unforced criticism of Solomon, but their position also appears to result, 
at least in the case of Ralbag, from a genuine political conviction about 
the acceptability, even desirability, of substantial royal taxation.
On this issue, Abravanel’s stance is particularly instructive. He 
himself served as a courtier for more than one king, and his complex 
but fundamentally critical approach to monarchy is well known.48 It 
is, then, striking though not surprising that he is the only one of the 
six exegetes I have examined who evinces sensitivity to the dangers 
inherent in Solomon’s life of ostentatious luxury supported by onerous 
taxes. As we have seen, however, it is his position that at the height of 
Solomon’s career, the king was blessed with all-embracing wisdom which 
would presumably have prevented serious errors. Even when Abravanel 
45 Commentary to 12:4.
46 Commentary to 12:4.
47 To‘elet 10 at the end of chapter 11. It is especially striking that at the conclusion of 
this to‘elet affirming the desirability of such royal actions, Ralbag writes, “And this 
has already been explained as well in Samuel’s statement when he explicated the law 
of kingship.” But in his comment on Samuel’s oration (I Samuel 8:11), Ralbag took 
the position that the provisions of “the law of the king” are not in fact legal rights 
but reflect Samuel’s desire to make the people fearful of actions the king will take in 
violation of the laws of the Torah.
48 Aviezer Ravitsky has recently provided an analysis of some aspects of this issue in “Kings 
and Laws in Late Medieval Jewish Thought: Nissim of Gerona vs. Isaac Abrabanel,” in 
Scholars and Scholarship: The Interaction between Judaism and Other Cultures, ed. by Leo 
Landman (New York, 1990), pp. 67-90; see notes 10 and 11 of his study for some of the 
other secondary literature.
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retreated for a moment and raised the possibility that this wisdom might, 
after all, have been concentrated in a particular area, that area, we will 
recall, was precisely “the management of household and state.” How, 
then, could Solomon in his prime have pursued policies which sowed 
the seeds of disaster?
The answer is that such policies are indeed unwise, but Solomon 
never pursued them. Like Radak and Ralbag, Abravanel maintains that 
the heavy labor was done by non-Israelites,49 but he goes further than his 
predecessors in several respects. First, he underscores how objectionable 
these policies would have been had Solomon really pursued them. 
Scripture, he says, informs us of the true source of the king’s taxes to 
prevent anyone from asking the following indignant questions:
Where did Solomon obtain all these resources which he expended upon the 
Temple, his own palace, and other matters? Did he impose a tax upon his 
nation and his righteous subjects, or did he confiscate their wealth by force 
in accordance with the law of the king which Samuel mentioned to Saul?50
Second, he maintains that even the Gibeonites, who were the ones 
assigned the difficult physical labor, “surely agreed to do this willingly.”51 
Third, he insists that monetary taxation came entirely from non-Jewish 
merchants engaged in international trade, “not from those doing business 
inside his kingdom as the commentators thought.” Solomon imposed tariffs 
similar to those that exist in the medieval Christian and Islamic worlds. 
“None of Solomon’s wealth which he garnered came from his servants. 
He took nothing from them by authority of the law of the king; rather, it 
all came to him from the Gentile countries outside of his kingdom.”52 The 
reader comes away from this passage with the unmistakable impression 
that Solomon’s Jewish subjects paid nothing at all before the imposition 
of war-related taxes in the king’s old age, though in the analysis of the 
later complaints to Rehoboam, Abravanel does acknowledge the existence 
of a substantial burden of taxation, which he appears to consider entirely 
justified, even at the height of the reign.53
49 Commentary to 5:29, p. 492, and to 9:20, p. 539.
50 Commentary to 9:15, p. 539. Note the contrast to Ralbag’s to‘elet 10 cited in note 47 
above.
51 Commentary to 5:29, p. 492.
52 Commentary to 10:15, p. 542. Cf. too the excursus on wisdom, p. 476.
53 Commentary to 12:4, p. 554.
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Finally, Abravanel repeatedly lavishes unstinting praise upon a policy 
as problematic as the accumulation of horses, which raises the specter 
of outright sin. He cites and rejects the Rabbinic assertion that Solomon 
violated the Deuteronomic prohibition, which applies, after all, only to 
an excess of horses beyond what the interests of the state require. The 
king’s horses, he says, were a source of glory and, more to the point, a 
deterrent to any would-be aggressor; this was the very reason for the 
peace that Solomonic Israel enjoyed.54
Unlike the other commentators, Abravanel is also sensitive to the 
problem of Solomon’s profligate spending.
One might ask: Even though Solomon possessed extensive wealth, why did 
he spend it so freely? After all, this would inevitably cause it to dwindle so 
that he would become impoverished.
The answer is that enormous supplies of gold were constantly 
arriving as a result of foreign trade, so that there was no danger that 
the kingdom’s wealth would be depleted.55 Later, however, after his sin, 
Solomon had to impose taxes both because of wars and because—for 
reasons Abravanel does not specify—he stopped sending out merchant 
vessels while still requiring substantial income to support his lavish way 
of life.56 One wonders whether this was not precisely the possibility that 
Solomon should have foreseen. Abravanel’s implicit response, I think, is 
that because these problems arose only as a result of sin, Solomon did not 
need to consider them earlier, given his reasonable, though ultimately 
incorrect assumption that he would remain a righteous man.
Abravanel, then, is acutely attuned to the political dangers inherent in 
the policies that Solomon appears to have pursued. Although his perception 
of Solomonic wisdom prevents him from ascribing error to Solomon in 
his prime, he does not solve the problem by endorsing such policies. The 
solution is to deny that Solomon pursued them, to ascribe them to his old 
age, or to argue, as in the case of lavish spending, that special circumstances 
justified them in this unusual, perhaps unique situation.
54 The excursus on wisdom, p. 476; Commentary to 5:8, p. 487, where he cites the Talmudic 
indictment; Commentary to 10:26, p. 544; the summary of Solomon’s reign in chapter 
11, p. 551. In his commentary to Deuteronomy 17:14-20, he notes the Talmudic passage 
without disagreement.
55 Commentary to 10:22, p. 543.
56 Commentary to 11:40, p. 550.
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While Abravanel cannot entirely avoid flashes of inconsistency, he 
stands out in his attempt to step back from the immediate context and 
see the overarching pattern of the narrative. The result is a dynamic 
portrait of Solomon that allows for a sharply drawn characterization at 
any given moment. For most commentators, the king was a complex 
figure of some ambiguity even at the peak of his powers—glorious, 
brilliant, yet moderately flawed. Abravanel’s Solomon, on the other 
hand, was almost infinitely wise and virtually perfect from the moment 
of his dream until the sin of his old age, but before and especially after 
that period his defects were considerable and even decisive. Not flawed 
greatness, but unrealized potential followed by perfection followed in 
turn by fatal sin.
The varied perceptions of Solomon’s wisdom and the consequent 
disparities in the evaluation of his piety and policy reflect fundamental 
differences in the cultural environments and worldviews of the exegetes 
we have examined and tell us a great deal about the complex interplay 
between texts and their interpreters. The attitude toward metaphysics, the 
place of the sciences, political theory, the courtier experience, a narrow or 
broad exegetical focus, a naturalistic or miraculous orientation, varying 
degrees of resistance to ascribing sin to biblical heroes, the readiness or 
refusal to deviate from Rabbinic tradition and interpretation—all these 
play a role, sometimes peripheral, sometimes significant, sometimes 
decisive, in the application of medieval wisdom to an understanding of 
the wisest of men.
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ON THE MORALITY OF THE PATRIARCHS 
IN JEWISH POLEMIC AND EXEGESIS1
From: Understanding Scripture: Explorations of Jewish and Christian Traditions 
of Interpretation, ed. by Clemens Thoma and Michael Wyschogrod (Paulist 
Press: New York, 1987), pp. 49-62.  Reprinted with slight revisions in Modern 
Scholarship in the Study of Torah: Contributions and Limitations, ed. by Shalom 
Carmy (Jason Aronson: Northvale and London, 1996), pp. 131-146. 
THE POLEMICAL WORLD OF THE MIDDLE AGES
On three separate occasions, Nahmanides denounces Abraham for 
sinful or questionable behavior.2 The first of these passages asserts that 
“our father Abraham inadvertently committed a great sin” by urging 
Sarah to identify herself as his sister, and goes on to maintain that the 
very decision to go to Egypt was sinful. Later, Nahmanides expresses 
perplexity at Abraham’s rationalization that Sarah was truly his half-
sister; this appears to be an unpersuasive excuse for omitting the crucial 
information that she was also his wife, and although Nahmanides 
proceeds to suggest an explanation, his sense of moral disapproval 
remains the dominant feature of the discussion. Finally, he regards the 
treatment of Hagar by both Sarah and Abraham as a sin for which Jews 
are suffering to this day at the hands of the descendants of Ishmael. 
The bold, almost indignant tone of these passages is both striking and 
significant—but it is not typical.
Most medieval Jews were understandably sensitive about ascriptions 
of sin to the patriarchs, and the situation was rendered even more delicate 
by the fact that the issue of patriarchal morality often arose in a highly 
charged context in which Jews were placed on the defensive in the face of 
1 It is a pleasure to thank my friend Professor Sid Z. Leiman for his careful reading of the 
manuscript. I am particularly grateful to him for the references to Menahot and pseudo-
Jerome in n. 13, Sefer Hasidim and the midrashim in n. 14, and Ehrlich’s commentary 
in n. 22.
2 Commentary to Genesis 12:10, 20:12, and 16:6.
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a Christian attack. Two thirteenth-century Ashkenazic polemics reflect a 
somewhat surprising Christian willingness to criticize Jacob as a means 
of attacking his descendants. Since the patriarch was a Christian as well 
as a Jewish hero, such attacks on his morality were problematical: Jacob 
may be the father of carnal Israel, but he is the prototype of spiritual 
Israel as well. While criticisms of this sort are consequently absent from 
major Christian works, it is perfectly evident that no Jew would have 
invented them. On the medieval street, then, Christians did not shrink 
from such attacks on Jews and their forebears. Jacob, they said, was a 
thief and a trickster; the implication concerning his descendants hardly 
needed to be spelled out.
In Sefer Yosef ha-Meqanne we are informed that Joseph Official met a 
certain Dominican friar on the road to Paris who told him, “Your father 
Jacob was a thief; there has been no consumer of usury to equal him, for 
he purchased the birthright, which was worth a thousand coins, for a 
single plate [of lentils] worth half a coin.”3 The technical impropriety of 
the reference to usury merely underscores the pointed application of this 
critique to medieval Jews. The next passage reports a Christian argument 
that Jacob was a deceiver who cheated Laban by exceeding the terms of 
their agreement concerning the sheep to which Jacob was entitled, and 
this criticism is followed by the assertion that Simeon and Levi engaged 
in unethical behavior when they deviously persuaded the Shechemites 
to accept circumcision and then proceeded to kill them.4
With respect to Jacob, the Jewish response was conditioned by two 
separate considerations acting in concert. First, religious motivations 
quite independent of the polemical context prevented the perception of 
Jacob as a sinner; second, the Christian attack itself called for refutation 
rather than concession. Hence, Joseph5 responded with a remarkable 
suggestion found also in Rashbam’s commentary that Jacob paid in full for 
the birthright; the bread and lentils are to be understood as a meal sealing 
the transaction or customarily following its consummation. As Judah 
Rosenthal pointed out in his edition of Yosef ha-Meqanne, Rabbi Joseph 
Bekhor Shor reacted with exasperation to the apparent implausibility of 
this interpretation, which was almost surely motivated by both moral 
3 Sefer Yosef ha-Meqanne, ed. by Judah Rosenthal (Jerusalem, 1970), pp. 40-41.
4 Rosenthal, Sefer Yosef ha-Meqanne, pp. 41-42.
5 Despite the manuscript, this must refer to Joseph Official and not Joseph Bekhor Shor; 
cf. the editor’s note, and see just below.
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sensitivity and polemical need. As for Laban, the answer to the Christian 
critique was that Jacob was the real victim of deception, and his treatment 
of his father-in-law was marked by extraordinary scrupulousness.6
Joseph Official goes on to an uncompromising defense of Simeon 
and Levi which is particularly interesting because this was the one 
instance in which a concession to the Christian accusation was tactically 
possible. Jacob, after all, had denounced their behavior, and even if his 
initial concern dealt with the danger that could result from an adverse 
Canaanite reaction rather than with the moral issue (Genesis 34:30), his 
vigorous rebuke of his sons at the end of his life (Genesis 49:5-7) could 
certainly have supported the assertion that he considered their action 
morally reprehensible as well as pragmatically unwise. Nevertheless, 
there is no hint of condemnation in Yosef ha-Meqanne; if Christians 
denounced Simeon and Levi, then surely Jews were obligated to defend 
them, especially since a sense of moral superiority was crucial to the 
medieval Jewish psyche in general and to the polemicist in particular.7 
Thus, Joseph tells us that the Shechemites regretted their circumcision 
and were in any event planning to oppress Jacob’s family and take over 
its property; consequently, their execution was eminently justified.8
There is a certain irony in the fact that the Christian question in 
Yosef ha-Meqanne which immediately follows this series of objections to 
patriarchal behavior begins, “After all, everyone agrees that Jacob was 
a thoroughly righteous man; why then was he afraid of descending to 
hell?”9 Although this is a return to the Christian stance that we ought 
to expect, there is in fact one more incident in Jacob’s life that Christian 
polemicists apparently utilized in their debate with Jews, and this is, of 
course, his deception of his own father.
6 Rosenthal, Sefer Yosef ha-Meqanne, loc. cit.
7 On this point, see my brief discussion in The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle 
Ages: A Critical Edition of the Nizzahon Vetus with an Introduction, Translation and 
Commentary (Northvale, NJ, 1996), pp. 25-27. I hope to elaborate in a forthcoming 
study on the problem of exile in medieval polemic.
8 Rosenthal, Sefer Yosef ha-Meqanne, p. 42. The persistence of Jewish sensitivity to this 
story in modern times can perhaps best be illustrated by a contemporary example of 
Jewish black humor. Simeon and Levi—so the explanation goes—were just as concerned 
as Jacob about adverse public opinion, and this is precisely why they arranged to have 
the Shechemites undergo the judaizing ceremony of circumcision. Once it would be 
perceived that it was a Jew who had been killed, no one would be concerned. Cf. Kli 
Yakar to Genesis 35:25.
9 Rosenthal, Sefer Yosef ha-Meqanne, p. 42.
On the Morality of the Patriarchs in Jewish Polemic and Exegesis 
— 239 —
The anonymous Nizzahon Vetus presents the following argument:
“I am Esau your firstborn” [Genesis 27:19]. One can say that Jacob did not lie. 
In fact, this can be said without distorting the simple meaning of the verse, 
but by explaining it as follows: I am Esau your firstborn, for Esau sold him the 
birthright in a manner as clear as day. It is, indeed, clear that Jacob was careful 
not to state an outright lie from the fact that when Isaac asked him, “Are you 
my son Esau?” he responded, “I am” [Genesis 27:24), and not, “I am Esau.”
They go on to say that because Jacob obtained the blessings through trickery, 
they were fulfilled for the Gentiles and not the Jews. The answer is that even 
the prophet Amos [sic] prayed for Jacob, for he is in possession of the truth, 
as it is written, “You will grant truth to Jacob and mercy to Abraham, which 
you have sworn unto our fathers” [Micah 7:20], that is, had not the truth 
been with Jacob, then you would not have sworn to our fathers. 10
The pattern holds. Once again Christians attack the patriarch’s 
morality; this time the consequences for his descendants are spelled out 
with explicit clarity, and once again Jewish ingenuity is mobilized for an 
unflinching, unqualified defense.11
Nevertheless, the pattern does not always hold. Polemicists will do 
what is necessary to win whatever point appears crucial in a particular 
context, and on one occasion at least we find two Jewish writers 
displaying very little zeal in defending the questionable action of a 
biblical hero. Their motivation is hardly mysterious: Jesus had cited this 
action approvingly.
Jacob ben Reuben and the Nizzahon Vetus both comment on the 
story in Matthew 12 in which Jesus defends the plucking of corn by his 
10 Berger, The Jewish-Christian Debate, p. 56.
11 For Rashi’s rather different defense of Jacob’s veracity as well as the persuasiveness 
of the version in the Nizzahon Vetus for later Jews, see my commentary in The Jewish-
Christian Debate, pp. 246-247. It is worth noting that the Nizzahon Vetus also reports 
a Christian argument that Moses’ delay in coming down from Mount Sinai (Exodus 
32:1) renders him “a sinner and a liar” (p. 67). Mordechai Breuer has suggested (Sefer 
Nizzahon Yashan [Jerusalem, 1978], p. 21, n. 57) that this argument may have originated 
among Christian heretics. On the other hand, since it ends with the question “Why did 
he delay?” it may have been leading to a Christian answer that Moses, who was not 
really a sinner, was testing the Jews and found them wanting. The ancient rabbis, of 
course, were generally not faced with the polemical concerns of the Middle Ages, and 
on rare occasions the Talmud ascribes sin to the patriarchs even where the biblical 
evidence does not require such a conclusion; see, for example, the accusations against 
Abraham in Nedarim 32a.
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hungry disciples on the Sabbath with reference to David’s eating of the 
shewbread when he was hungry. In his late-twelfth-century Milhamot 
ha-Shem,12 Jacob responds as follows:
How could he cite evidence from David’s eating of the shewbread when he 
was fleeing and in a great hurry? If David behaved unlawfully by violating 
the commandment on that one occasion when he was forced by the 
compulsion of hunger and never repeated this behavior again, how could 
your Messiah utilize this argument to permit the gathering of corn without 
qualification?
More briefly, the author of the Nizzahon Vetus remarks, “If David 
behaved improperly, this does not give them the right to pluck those ears 
of corn on the Sabbath.”13 Although Jacob provided mitigation for David’s 
behavior and the Nizzahon Vetus’s comments might be understood as a 
counterfactual concession for the sake of argument (“even if I were to 
agree that David behaved improperly”), the impression of sin is not only 
allowed to stand but is actually introduced by the Jewish writers. Even 
more striking, Jacob continued his argument by saying that once Jesus 
was permitting every act of King David, “why did he not permit sexual 
relations with married women since David had such relations with the 
wife of Uriah?” Now, the Talmud had made the most vigorous efforts to 
deny that Bathsheba was still married to Uriah and, indeed, that David 
had sinned at all, and the insertion of this question—which was not 
essential to the argument and is in fact missing from the parallel passage 
in the Nizzahon Vetus—is a telling illustration of the impact of the search 
for effective polemical rhetoric.14
Thus far we have seen Jewish defenses of biblical heroes for reasons both 
religious and polemical, and criticisms of their behavior which arose from 
12 Edited by Judah Rosenthal (Jerusalem, 1963), p. 148.
13 P. 182. It is important to note that the Talmud (Menahot 95b-96a) had suggested a legal 
justification for what David had done. Note too the anomalous report in pseudo-Jerome 
cited by L. Ginzberg, Legends of the Jews, vol. 6 (Philadelphia, 1928), p. 243.
14 It is, of course, difficult to say what Jacob’s view of David’s relationship with Bathsheba 
was in dispassionate, non-polemical moments. For Abravanel’s rejection of the rabbinic 
exculpation of David (Shabbat 56a), see his commentary to 2 Samuel 11-12. See also the 
very interesting remarks in Sefer Hasidim, ed. by J. Wistinetzki (Frankfurt am Main, 1924), 
sec. 46 (p. 43)=R. Margulies’ edition (Jerusalem, 1957), sec. 174 (p. 181). Cf. also the less 
striking references in Midrash Shmuel, ed. by S. Buber (Krakau, 1893), pp. 122-123, and 
Seder Eliyyahu Rabbah, ed. by M. Ish-Shalom (Friedmann) (Vienna, 1902), p. 7.
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a sensitive, straightforward reading of the text as well as from polemical 
concerns. It remains to be noted that the particular ideology of a Jewish 
commentator, if pursued with sufficient passion, could itself overcome the 
profound inhibitions against denouncing the morality of the patriarchs. I 
know of but one example of this phenomenon, but it is quite remarkable.
In his study of Jewish social thought in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Poland, Haim Hillel Ben Sasson frequently pointed to the animus 
against the wealthy displayed by the prominent preacher and exegete 
Rabbi Ephraim Lunshitz. Among many examples of this animus, Ben 
Sasson draws our attention to Lunshitz’s remarks about the rabbinic 
comment that when Jacob remained alone prior to wrestling with 
the angel, his purpose was to collect small vessels that he had left 
behind. Before Lunshitz, Jews had universally understood this as an 
exemplification of an admirable trait. Not so the author of the Kli Yakar: 
“A majority of commentators agree that this angel is Sammael the officer 
of Esau… whose desire is solely to blind (lesamme) the eyes. . . of the 
intelligence.” Now, as long as Jacob refrained from the slightest sin, 
Sammael could not approach him, but once Jacob was guilty of even 
a small measure of sin, his immunity was lost. And for a rich man like 
Jacob to remain behind in a dangerous place for a few vessels is indeed 
the beginning of sin. Jacob had begun to blind himself, “for who is as 
blind as the lovers of money about whom it is written, ‘The eyes of a man 
are never satiated’ (Proverbs 27:20)?… Who is such a fool that he would 
endanger himself for such a small item? Rather, it is a mocking heart 
which turned him away from the straight path to succumb to such love 
of money, which causes forgetfulness of God.”15
What makes this passage all the more noteworthy is that the 
talmudic source contains an explicitly favorable evaluation: the righteous 
care so much for their property because they never rob others (Hullin 
91a). Moreover, if Lunshitz was uneasy with this talmudic evaluation, 
nothing was forcing him to mention the passage in the first place; the 
point is nowhere in the biblical text, and the Kli Yakar is in any event a 
discursive, selective commentary, which could easily have skipped the 
verse entirely. Clearly, he made the point because it served as an outlet 
for one of his driving passions. Patriarchal immunity from criticism, even 
in a traditional society, evidently had its limits.
15 Kli Yakar to Genesis 32:35. See Ben Sasson’s Hagut ve-Hanhagah (Jerusalem, 1959), pp. 118-119.
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BIBLICAL CRITICISM AND JEWISH EXEGESIS
IN MODERN TIMES
As the Middle Ages gave way to the modern period, the content 
and context of this issue were radically and fundamentally altered. 
Inhibitions against criticizing biblical morality began to crumble, 
and both Enlightenment ideologues and nineteenth-century scholars 
gleefully pounced upon biblical passages that appeared morally 
problematical. In the first instance, the target was the Bible as a whole 
and, ultimately, Christianity itself; in the second, it was usually the 
Hebrew Bible in particular, whose allegedly primitive ethics served as a 
preparation and a foil for the superior morality of the Gospels. In effect, 
an argument originally directed against Christianity was refocused to 
attack Judaism alone.16
Modern biblical scholarship, then, transformed the essential terms 
of this discussion, and the transformation was so profound that it 
ultimately inspired a reaction strikingly different from the standard 
medieval response. The crucial point is that the attack was no longer 
on the morality of the biblical personalities. To many Bible critics, the 
very existence of the patriarchs was in question, and the historicity 
of specific accounts of their behavior was surely deemed unreliable 
in the extreme. The attack now was on the morality of the biblical 
author or authors—an attack that was almost impossible in the 
premodern period, when the author was ultimately presumed to be 
God Himself.17
Consequently, it now became possible—perhaps even polemically 
desirable—for traditionally inclined Jews (whether or not they were 
strict fundamentalists) to take a different approach by driving a wedge 
between hero and author. There were indeed occasional imperfections 
in the moral behavior of the patriarchs, but these are condemned 
16 Cf. the similar medieval phenomenon in which arguments by Christian heretics against 
the Hebrew Bible were reworked by Orthodox Christians in their polemic with Jews. 
See my Jewish-Christian Debate, p. 6.
17 For an exception, note Luther’s remarks on Esther in his Table Talk: “I am so hostile 
to this book that I wish it did not exist, for it judaizes too much, and has too much 
heathen naughtiness.” Cited approvingly by L. B. Paton in his discussion of “the moral 
teaching of the book” in The International Critical Commentary: The Book of Esther (1908; 
reprint, Edinburgh, 1951), p. 96.
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by the Torah and required punishment and expiation. Whatever 
the exegetical merits of this approach, and they are, as we shall see, 
considerable, it would have been extraordinarily difficult both tactically 
and psychologically had the attack of the critics still been directed at the 
patriarchs themselves.
There is, however, a deeper issue here. The assertion that the Bible 
disapproves of certain behavior was not based on explicit verses of 
condemnation; rather, it depended on a sensitive reading of long stretches 
of narrative in which patterns of retribution and expiation emerged. On 
the simplest level, this approach demonstrated that the morality of the 
Torah is not inferior to that of Bible critics. On a deeper level, it undercut 
the effort of some critics to utilize the moral “deficiencies” of certain 
passages to establish divergent levels of moral sensitivity in the Pentateuch 
as a whole and in Genesis in particular. But on the profoundest level—at 
least for some proponents of this approach—it went to the heart of the 
essential claims of the higher criticism by arguing in a new way for the 
unity of Genesis. Many of the newly discovered patterns cut through the 
documents of the critics and emerged only from a unitary perception of 
the entire book; since the patterns seemed genuine, the only reasonable 
conclusion was that the unity of Genesis was no less real than its literary 
subtleties. These observations were not confined to narratives bearing 
on the morality of the patriarchs, but it is there that some of the most 
striking examples were to be found.
In the first half of this century, a number of Jewish writers—Martin 
Buber, Benno Jacob, Umberto Cassutto—began to note such patterns. 
Before going further, we are immediately confronted by a challenging, 
almost intractable methodological problem. I have suggested that 
this revisionist reading of the Bible is rooted in part in traditionalist 
sentiments, that it presented a new way of responding to people critical 
of sacred Jewish texts. At the same time, I consider the essential insights 
justified by an objective examination of the evidence (although my own 
motives are surely as “suspect” as those of the figures under discussion). 
Decades ago, Jacob Katz argued that one may not readily assign ulterior 
motives to someone whose position appears valid in light of the sources 
that he cites,18 and more recently Joseph Dan has criticized a work 
18 Jacob Katz “Mahloqet ha-Semikhah bein Rabbi Yaaqov Beirav ve-ha-Ralbah,” Zion 15, 
secs. 3-4 (1951): 41.
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about Gershom Scholem for attributing his view of kabbalah to factors 
other than his accurate reading of the kabbalistic texts themselves.19 
Fundamentally, these methodological caveats are very much in order, 
and in certain instances they are decisive. At the same time, undeniable 
intuitions tell us that even people who are essentially correct can be 
partially motivated by concerns that go beyond the cited evidence, and 
there ought to be some way to determine when this is likely to be so. In 
our case, a figure like Cassutto was clearly concerned not only with the 
unity of Genesis but with the standing and reputation of the biblical 
text. Moreover, despite the fact that he was not a fundamentalist and 
that he was no doubt sincere in his protestation that his essential 
conclusions flowed solely from an objective examination of the text, 
the consistency of his conservative tendencies in issue after issue where 
the evidence could often point either way surely reveals a personality 
that was inclined to seek traditional solutions.20
In contemporary biblical scholarship, such an inclination frequently 
labels one a neo-fundamentalist whose conclusions are rejected almost 
a priori. This is a manifest error with the most serious consequences. 
Even people with much stronger traditionalist tendencies than 
Cassutto can be motivated by those tendencies to seek evidence that 
turns out to be real. Kepler’s laws are no less valid because he sought 
them as a result of his religious convictions. In this instance, a change 
in the attack on biblical morality liberated and then impelled people 
with traditionalist inclinations to see things in the text that had gone 
virtually unnoticed before. At first, these figures were necessarily non-
fundamentalists; genuine Jewish fundamentalists would not easily 
shed their inhibitions about criticizing the patriarchs. With the passage 
of time, however, even some uncompromisingly Orthodox Jews could 
adopt this approach,21 while others—probably a majority—would 
19 Qiryat Sefer 54 (1979/80): 358-362. Dan does note (p. 361) that even in Scholem’s case, 
extratextual considerations can play some role.
20 While maintaining that Cassutto’s work in essentially anti-traditional, Yehezkel 
Kaufmann nevertheless pointed to several examples of this conservatism; see “Me-
Adam ad Noah,” in Mi-Kivshonah shel ha-Yetzirah ha-Miqra’it (Tel Aviv, 1966), p. 217.
21 Yissakhar Jacobson, Binah ba-Miqra (Tel Aviv,1960), pp 33-36; Nehama Leibowitz, 
Iyyunim be-Sefer Bereshit (Jerusalem, 1966), pp. 185-188 (English trans., Studies in 
Bereshit [Genesis] [Jerusalem, 1976], pp. 264-269); Leah Frankel, Peraqim ba-Miqra 
(Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 102-104, 143-144.
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retain unabated the religious inhibitions of the past;22 fundamentalism 
is far from a monolithic phenomenon.
THE BIBLE’S JUDGMENT OF PATRIARCHAL BEHAVIOR:
THE CASE OF JACOB’S DECEPTION
Let us turn now to a central example of an approach that we have thus far 
discussed only in the abstract. At Rebecca’s behest, Jacob deceived Isaac 
by pretending to be Esau and thereby obtained a blessing intended for 
his brother. We have already seen a medieval Jewish defense of Jacob’s 
behavior, and in the entire corpus of premodern Jewish exegesis there 
is hardly a whisper of criticism.23 In the twentieth century, however, 
a number of scholars have noted a series of indications that make it 
22 Professor Lawrence Kaplan has called my attention to Rabbi A. Kotler’s “How To Teach 
Torah,” Light 10, 12, 13, 15, 19 (1970/71), republished as a pamphlet by Beth Medrash 
Govoha of Lakewood. A Hebrew version appears in Rabbi Kotler’s Osef Hiddushei Torah 
(Jerusalem, 1983), pp. 402-411. “If there were any fault,” writes the author, “—however 
slight (Hebrew: dak min ha-dak)—in any of the Ovos [patriarchs], the very essence of 
the Jewish people would have been different” (English pamphlet, p. 6=Hebrew p. 404). 
Rabbi Kotler makes it clear that his work is a reaction to modern heresy (kefirah), which 
perceives the patriarchal narratives as ordinary stories. On the other hand, Professor 
Kaplan notes that the popular Pentateuch and Haftorahs edited by Rabbi J. H. Hertz 
(1936) extols Scripture precisely because it “impartially relates both the failings and 
the virtues of its heroes” (commentary to Genesis 20:12, citing one of the passages 
from Nahmanides with which we began). Similarly, Arnold B. Ehrlich asserts that 
Scripture does not conceal the faults of the patriarchs; see Miqra ki-Peshuto, vol. 1 (New 
York, 1898; reprint, New York, 1969), pp. 33, 73 (to Genesis 12:14, 16 and 25:27); his 
German Randglossen zur Hebräischen Bibel (Leipzig, 1908; reprint, Hildesheim, 1968) 
omits the first and more important passage. Ehrlich, a brilliant maverick who was 
neither a traditionalist nor a conventional critic, was in many respects sui generis and 
resists inclusion in any neat classificatory scheme. Finally, Rabbi Shalom Carmy has 
called my attention to the willingness of representatives of the nineteenth-century 
Musar movement to acknowledge minor imperfections in the patriarchs as part of the 
movement’s special approach to the analysis of human failings.
23 David Sykes, in his Patterns in Genesis (Ph.D. diss., Bernard Revel Graduate School, 
Yeshiva University, 1984), notes Zohar, va-Yeshev, 185b, which indicates that Jacob was 
punished for this act because even though something is done properly, God judges the 
pious for even a hairbreadth’s deviation from the ideal. He also points to the Yemenite 
manuscript cited in Torah Shelemah, vol. 6, p. 1432, no. 181 (where the editor also notes 
the Zohar passage), which indicates that Jacob was deceived by his sons with a goat 
(Genesis 37:31) just as he had deceived his own father with a goat (Genesis 27:16). See 
also below, note 25.
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exceedingly difficult to deny that the Torah implicitly but vigorously 
condemns Jacob’s action.
First, the deception was motivated by a misreading of Isaac’s 
intentions. The blind patriarch bestowed three blessings on his children: 
the first to Jacob masquerading as Esau, the second to Esau, and the third 
to Jacob. It was only in the third blessing, when he knew for the first time 
that he was addressing Jacob, that he bestowed “the blessing of Abraham 
to you and your seed with you so that you may inherit the land in which 
you dwell which God gave to Abraham” (Genesis 28:4). Although other 
interpretations of this sequence are possible, the most straightforward 
reading is that Rebecca and Jacob had gravely underestimated their 
husband and father. Isaac had indeed intended to bless Esau with 
temporal supremacy, but the blessing of Abraham—the inheritance 
of the holy land and the crucial mission of the patriarchs—had been 
reserved for Jacob from the outset. The deception was pragmatically as 
well as morally dubious.24
Jacob is then subjected to a series of misfortunes and ironies whose 
relationship to the initial deception cannot be accidental. He must work 
for his “brother” Laban (Genesis 29:15) instead of having his brothers 
work for him (Genesis 27:37); he is deceived by the substitution of one 
sibling for another in the darkness and is pointedly informed that “in 
our place” the younger is not placed before the older (Genesis 29:26); his 
sons deceive him with Joseph’s garment and the blood of a goat (Genesis 
37:31) just as he had deceived Isaac with Esau’s garments and the skin 
of a goat (Genesis 27:15-16); his relationship with Esau is precisely the 
opposite of the one that was supposed to have been achieved—Esau is 
the master (Genesis 32:5, 6, 19; 33:8, 13, 14, 15) to whom his servant 
Jacob (32:5, 19; 33:5, 14) must bow (33:3, and contrast 27:29). Moreover, 
Jacob’s debilitating fear of his brother results from the very act that was 
supposed to have established his supremacy.25
24 Binah ba-Miqra, loc. cit. Cf. also Malbim on Genesis 27:1 and Leibowitz, Iyyunim, pp. 
193-195.
25 For premodern references to such arguments, see note 23; Midrash Tanhuma, ed. by S. 
Buber (Vilna, 1885), Va-Yetzei 11, p. 152, and the parallel passage in Aggadat Bereshit, 
ed. by S. Buber (Krakau, 1902), ch. (48) [49], p. 99, where Leah tells Jacob that he has no 
right to complain about being deceived since he too is a deceiver (although the midrash 
does not explicitly endorse her criticism); Eliezer Ashkenazi (sixteenth century) Ma‘asei 
ha-Shem, vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1972), p. 115b, who comments on Laban’s remark about the 
younger and older but apparently considers it evidence of Laban’s nastiness rather than 
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There is, then, ample evidence that Jacob had to undergo a series 
of punishments to atone for his act of deception. It is almost curious, 
however, that no one has noted an additional—and climactic—element 
in this series, which can fundamentally transform our understanding of 
a crucial aspect of the Joseph narrative. One reason why the point may 
have been missed is that there are no key words calling it to our attention, 
and the presence of such words not only alerts the reader but serves as a 
methodological guide preventing undisciplined speculation. At the same 
time, we cannot permit ourselves to ignore grand thematic patterns, and 
in this instance I think that such a pattern has been overlooked.
Leah Frankel, utilizing the “key word” approach, has noted that 
the root meaning “to deceive” (resh-mem-yod) appears in Genesis three 
times. The first two instances, in which Isaac tells Esau that his brother 
deceitfully took his blessing (Genesis 27:35) and Jacob asks Laban why 
he deceived him (Genesis 29:25), are clearly related to our theme.26 
Perhaps, she suggests, the third instance, in which Simeon and Levi 
speak deceitfully to Shechem (Genesis 34:13), is intended to indicate 
that Jacob was “to taste deceit carried out by sons. He would have to 
stand in the place where his father stood when his son Jacob deceived 
him” [her emphasis].27 While this approach is not impossible, it seems 
Jacob’s culpability. Note too Genesis Rabbah 67:4, which speaks of later Jews crying out 
in anguish because of Esau’s agonized exclamation in Genesis 27:34, and the somewhat 
more ambiguous midrash of unknown provenance cited by Rashi on Psalms 80:6, in 
which Jews shed tears as a result of Esau’s tears; see Leibowitz, Iyyunim, p. 190. Such 
isolated observations over a period of more than a millennium and a half do not, I think, 
undermine or even significantly affect the thesis of this paper. For twentieth-century 
references, often containing additional arguments, see Martin Buber, Die Schrift und 
ihre Verdeutschung (Berlin, 1936), pp. 224-226; Benno Jacob, Das Erste Buch der Tora: 
Genesis (Berlin, 1934), p. 591 (abridged English translation, New York, 1974), pp. 197-
198; Umberto Cassutto, La Questione della Genesi (Florence, 1934), esp. p. 227; idem, 
Torat ha-Te‘udot (Jerusalem, 1959), pp. 55-56=The Documentary Hypothesis (Jerusalem, 
1961), pp. 63-64; idem, “Yaakov,” Entziklopediyyah Miqra’it (EBH), vol. 3, cc. 716-722; 
Jacobson, Leibowitz, and Frankel (see note 21); Nahum M. Sarna, Understanding Genesis 
(New York, 1966), pp. 183-184; Jacob Milgrom in Conservative Judaism 20 (1966): 73-79; 
J. P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis (Assen and Amsterdam, 1975), pp. 128-130, 200, 
223, 227; Sykes, op. cit. (note 23). With the exception of Fokkelman, all these figures, 
whether they are fundamentalists or not, more or less fit the traditionalist typology 
that I have proposed. Needless to say, the evident validity of many of these exegetical 
suggestions must (or at least should) eventually affect biblical scholars of all varieties.
26 Cf. Tanhuma and Aggadat Bereshit in the previous note.
27 Peraqim ba-Miqra, p. 104.
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unlikely; although Jacob suffers indirect consequences from Simeon and 
Levi’s trickery, he is in no sense its object, and the resemblance to his 
own deception is exceedingly remote.
But there is another act of filial deception in Genesis whose similarity 
to Jacob’s seems unmistakable. Jacob concealed his identity from his 
father by pretending to be someone else. Similarly, his own misery and 
anguish reach their climax when his son Joseph conceals his identity and 
pretends to be something other than what he truly is. The fact that the 
direct victims of Joseph’s deception were the brothers may be the main 
reason why this observation has been missed, but it is perfectly clear 
that Jacob is as much a victim as his sons. This point alone should make 
us reevaluate the key element of the Joseph cycle as the culmination 
of the process of expiation suffered by the patriarch, and the essential 
argument does not depend on anything more. But there is more. Joseph 
deceives his father while providing him with food just as Jacob deceived 
his own father while bringing him the “savory food” which he liked 
(Genesis 27:7, 14, 17, 25). It is not just that the brothers are Jacob’s 
messengers and will report Joseph’s deceptive words to their father 
(although this is quite sufficient); in the final confrontation between 
Joseph and Judah, the latter is explicitly a surrogate for Jacob, acting 
to protect Benjamin in loco parentis (Genesis 44:32).28 Moreover, there is 
only one other place in Genesis where one person speaks to another with 
as many protestations of servility as Judah addresses to his “master” in 
that climactic confrontation; that place, of course, is the description of 
Jacob’s servile behavior toward Esau upon his return from the house 
of Laban (Genesis 32:4-6, 18-21; 33:1-15).29 In short, Joseph has not 
28 It may be worth asking (with considerable diffidence) whether Judah’s status as a 
surrogate for Jacob may help us resolve an old, intractable crux. In Joseph’s second 
dream, the sun, moon, and eleven stars, presumably symbolizing his father, mother, 
and brothers, bow down to him (Genesis 37:9-10). But his mother was already dead at 
the time of the dream; less seriously, Jacob does not bow to Joseph until Genesis 47:30, 
by which time our intuition tells us (I think) that the dreams ought to have already been 
fulfilled. Perhaps two of the brothers who bow to Joseph represent both themselves and 
a parent; Judah is the surrogate for Jacob, and Benjamin, who is pointedly described 
as his mother’s only surviving child (Genesis 44:20), is the representative of Rachel. 
Joseph’s parents bow down to him through their offspring.
29 For whatever this is worth, Jacob addresses Esau as “my master” seven times in these 
verses (32:6, 19; 33:8, 13, 14  [twice], 15 [32:5 is not addressed to Esau]) and Judah 
addresses Joseph as “my master” seven times in his final speech (44:18 [twice], 19, 
20, 22, 24, 33). Since seven is clearly a significant number and since Jacob is explicitly 
On the Morality of the Patriarchs in Jewish Polemic and Exegesis 
— 249 —
merely concealed his identity from his father; by threatening Jacob’s 
family from a position of mastery, he has actually taken on the role of 
Esau.30 The parallel to Jacob’s deception is genuinely striking.31
LITERARY PATTERNS AND THE DOCUMENTARY HYPOTHESIS
During the last decade, J. P. Fokkelman,32 Robert Alter,33 and Michael 
Fishbane34 have searched the narratives of Genesis for patterns out of 
purely literary motivations, sometimes with the implicit assumption that 
the conventional documentary hypothesis remains virtually unchanged 
no matter how many interlocking themes are discerned. In a reaction 
to one of Alter’s early articles on this subject, I wrote that “I think he 
underestimates the impact of such literary analysis on the documentary 
hypothesis. You can allow the ‘redactor’ just so much freedom of action 
before he turns into an author using various traditions as ‘raw material.’ 
Such an approach must ultimately shake the foundations of the regnant 
critical theory, not merely tinker with its periphery.”35 More recently, 
said to have bowed to Esau seven times (Genesis 33:3 [“complete subjection,” says 
Fokkelman, in Narrative Art in Genesis, p. 223]), it is at least possible that this is more 
than coincidence.
30 Note too that Jacob was most concerned with Esau’s threat to Rachel and her child 
(Genesis 33:2), and it was Rachel’s child Benjamin who was singled out for persecution 
by the Egyptian viceroy. Finally, Professor David Shatz has called my attention to the 
use of the rare verb stm, “to hate,” with regard to both Esau’s hatred of Jacob (Genesis 
27:41) and the brothers fear that Joseph would hate them (Genesis 50:15).
31 The fact that Joseph’s actions were no doubt motivated by other factors involving his 
brothers does not, of course, refute the perception that we are witnessing the final step 
in a divine plan to purge Jacob of his sin. It is, in fact, possible that an even later incident 
in Genesis is related to Jacob’s deception of Isaac. The successful expiation of that sin may 
be symbolized by Jacob’s ability, despite his failing eyesight, to discern the difference in 
the destinies of his older and younger grandsons (Genesis 48:10-20). Cf. Benno Jacob, 
Das Erste Buch, p. 884 (called to my attention by David Sykes), and Cassutto, La Questione 
della Genesi, p. 232. (It need hardly be said that this new approach does not end with a 
denunciation of biblical heroes. After a process of retribution and moral development, 
the ethical standing of the patriarch is beyond reproach.) Finally, it must be stressed that 
other moral questions like the scriptural evaluation of the treatment of Hagar and the 
behavior of the young Joseph are also susceptible to this mode of analysis.
32 See n. 25.
33 The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York, 1981).
34 Text and Texture (New York, 1979).
35 Commentary 61:3 (March, 1976): 16. It may be worth asking whether Shakespeare 
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the point has been made with vigor and documentation in David Sykes’s 
dissertation, Patterns in Genesis.36 To Alter’s credit, he does confront 
the question in his later book, and although his conclusions are by no 
means traditional, they are not wholly consonant with those of critical 
orthodoxy.37
It is becoming clearer from year to year that Genesis is replete 
with linguistic and thematic patterns of subtlety and power which run 
through the warp and woof of the entire work. Despite the overwhelming 
force generated by a critical theory that has held sway for generations, 
scholars will not be able to hide forever behind the assertion that they 
are studying the art of a redactor as that word is usually understood. The 
issue will have to be joined.
has ever been described as the redactor of the various Hamlet documents because he 
worked with earlier, related stories.
36 See n. 23. My affirmation of the validity of this general approach does not, of course, 
imply an endorsement of every pattern or set of patterns that has been suggested, and 
it is self-evident that some proposals will be more persuasive than others. This mode 
of interpretation will always be vulnerable to the charge of arbitrary and subjective 
eisegesis. Nevertheless, such is the fate of almost all literary analysis, and a combination 
of methodological guidelines and a healthy dose of common sense can minimize, though 
never eliminate, undisciplined speculation. In any case, I am thoroughly persuaded that 
the recent literature contains more than enough convincing examples to sustain the 
essential point.
37 P. 20, and especially chap. 7 (pp. 131-154). In the present climate, it requires some 
courage to express such views, and Alter has already been accused of involvement 
in (horribile dictu) “the new fundamentalism” (and he has already denied it); see 
Commentary 77:2 (February 1984): 14. Cf. also Fokkelman’s very brief comment on 
the issue in Narrative Art, p. 4.
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THREE TYPOLOGICAL THEMES 
IN EARLY JEWISH MESSIANISM:
MESSIAH SON OF JOSEPH, RABBINIC 
CALCULATIONS, AND THE FIGURE OF ARMILUS
From: AJS Review: The Journal of the Association for Jewish Studies 
10 (1985): 141-164.
The messianic dream owes its roots to biblical prophecy and its rich 
development to generations of sensitive and creative exegetes anxiously 
awaiting redemption. Scripture itself is less than generous in providing 
detailed information about the end of days, so ungenerous, in fact, 
that some modern scholars have expressed skepticism about the very 
appearance of a messianic figure in the biblical text.1 While this skepticism 
is excessive, it reflects a reality which troubled the ancients no less than 
the moderns and left room for the diversity and complexity that mark 
the messianic idea by late antiquity. 
In the first centuries after the destruction of the Second Temple, 
many Jews were no doubt content to leave the messianic hope as an 
article of faith whose precise contours would be elucidated at the time 
of its fulfillment.2
For others, however, it exercised a fascination that sometimes 
bordered on obsession, and such Jews looked with both eagerness and 
frustration at the messianic material available in Scripture. The paucity 
of detail was simultaneously discouraging and stimulating, serving as 
obstacle for the fainthearted and catalyst for the daring. The intense 
desire to know the events, the time, the nature, the heroes, and the 
1 Some examples are cited in James H. Charlesworth, “The Concept of the Messiah in 
the Pseudepigrapha,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt 11.19.1, ed. by 
Wolfgang Haase (Berlin and New York, 1979), p. 189, n. 4.
2 Jacob Neusner’s Messiah in Context (Philadelphia, 1984) argues at length for the relative 
insignificance of the Messiah in most early rabbinic works.
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villains of the end of days could not be satisfied by an examination of 
the explicit record of biblical prophecy, and the determined messianic 
theorist turned perforce to more creative approaches. The most fruitful 
of these was the enterprise we know as typology—the utilization of the 
figures, events, and periods of the past to illuminate the messianic age. 
The crucial “type,” which left its mark on virtually every aspect of 
messianic speculation, was the great redemption of the past. “As in the days 
of your exodus from the land of Egypt will I show him marvelous things” 
(Mic. 7:15). On the most obvious level, this meant that the overt miracles 
of the period of the exodus could be expected to return. Hence, “the Holy 
One, blessed be He, will in the future bring upon Edom all the plagues that 
He inflicted on the Egyptians.”3 As in the desert, Jews will enjoy the manna 
and will have no need of the light of sun or moon.4 Theudas, like Joshua, 
was to split the waters of the Jordan,5 a Jewish prophet would repeat the 
miracle of Jericho at Jerusalem,6 and a man would arise who would again 
command an obedient sun to stop in its tracks.7 
It is not, however, only in the realm of the overtly miraculous that 
themes of the first redemption will recur in the future. The Midrash 
informs us that the final redeemer, like Moses, will make himself known 
to his people and then become hidden from them before revealing himself 
once again at the end.8 The prophet who was going to bring down the 
walls of Jerusalem hailed, like Moses, from Egypt.9 Matthew places Jesus 
in Egypt in a passage whose dubious historicity makes its typological 
scheme all the more striking.10 Like Moses, Jesus fasts forty days and 
3 Tanhuma, ed. Buber, II, p. 43 and parallels. See L. Ginzberg, Eine Unbekannte Jüdische 
Sekte (New York and Pressburg, 1922), p. 334 (hereafter cited as Sekte) = Monatsschrift 
für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 58 (1914): 412 (hereafter cited as MGWJ) 
= An Unknown Jewish Sect (New York, 1976), p. 234 (hereafter cited as Sect).
4 Sekte, pp. 335-336 = MGWJ, pp. 413-414 = Sect, p. 235.
5 Josephus, Antiquities 20.5.1.
6 Ibid. 20.8.6.
7 Sibylline Oracles 5.256-259. See H. M. Teeple, The Mosaic Eschatological Prophet 
(Philadelphia, 1957), pp. 10-11 (and note the references on pp. 29-31 concerning the 
exodus as a prototype of the final redemption). Cf. also G. Vermes, Jesus the Jew (New 
York, 1973), p. 98.
8 Be-Midbar Rabbah 11:3; Shir ha-Shirim Rabbah 2:22; Ruth Rabbah 5:6; Pesikta Rabbati 15, 
ed. Friedmann, p. 72b (cf. esp. n. 63 there); Pesikta de-Rav Kahana, ed. Buber, p. 49b. 
See also Sekte, p. 335 = MGWJ, p. 413 = Sect, p. 234.
9 Or at least he said so. See Antiquities 20.8.6.
10 Matt. 2:14-15. The fact that the plain meaning of Hosea 11:1 refers to the exodus means 
that Matthew’s citation of that verse strengthens rather than weakens the typological 
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forty nights in the desert,11 and messianic forerunners in the first century 
were to fulfill the words of Hosea (2:16-17) and Ezekiel (20:35-36) by 
bringing the Jews into the wilderness in preparation for redemption.12 
Finally, the rabbis inform us that in light of God’s promise that He will 
give us joy in accordance with the duration of our suffering (Ps. 90:15), 
the messianic age will endure as long as the forty-year sojourn in the 
desert or the four-hundred-year period of the Egyptian exile.13
While the significance of typology in Jewish messianism is beyond 
question, there are several areas where its role has been inadequately 
appreciated, and a reexamination of three controversial messianic topics 
through the prism of typology will, I think, yield valuable and intriguing 
results. 
I
The messianic precursor from the tribe of Ephraim who goes by the name 
Messiah son of Joseph is an anomalous figure who has properly aroused 
intense scholarly interest. In the most common scenario, he fights the 
enemies of Israel with considerable success, only to fall on the field of 
battle shortly before the triumphant advent of Messiah son of David. No 
such figure makes anything resembling a clear appearance in the Hebrew 
Bible, and since a dying Messiah is both inherently mysterious and 
superficially related to Christian belief, unremitting efforts to trace his 
origins have produced an abundance of diverse and creative theories. 
A recent article by Joseph Heinemann proposing a revolutionary 
reinterpretation of this redeemer begins with an excellent summary and 
evaluation of the major theories, and the interested reader can consult 
this compact and convenient analysis.14 One of these theories, which 
interpretation.
11 Matt. 4:2. This, of course, is a miracle, but not a redemptive one.
12 Antiquities 20.8.6; War 2.13.4. On the typology of Moses, see Teeple, Mosaic Eschatological 
Prophet, passim; S. Isser, The Dositheans: A Samaritan Sect in Late Antiquity (Leiden, 
1976), pp. 131-142; Vermes, Jesus the Jew, pp. 97-98, and esp. his references in n. 61.
13 B. Sanhedrin 99a; Pesikta Rabbati 1, p. 4a.
14 “The Messiah of Ephraim and the Premature Exodus of the Tribe of Ephraim,” Harvard 
Theological Review 68 (1975): 1-16. A Hebrew version of the article had appeared 
in Tarbiz 40 (1971): 450-461, and has been reprinted in Heinemann’s Aggadot ve-
Toldoteihen (Jerusalem, 1974), pp. 131-141. References here will be to the version in 
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Heinemann (along with most other scholars) rejects, is a typological 
one suggested long ago by Louis Ginzberg. The rabbis, Ginzberg noted, 
believed that the tribe of Ephraim had left Egyptian bondage for the 
land of Israel before the appointed hour, and the Ephraimites’ efforts 
at military conquest had ended in death on the field of battle. Since the 
ultimate recapitulation of the first redemption is at the very heart of 
rabbinic messianism, such an event could not go unreflected at the end of 
days; hence, there will arise an Ephraimite Messiah whose early struggle 
for redemption will end in death at the hands of the enemies of Israel.15
The essential argument against this extremely attractive proposal 
was made by Viktor Aptowitzer and is endorsed by Heinemann. The 
Ephraimite exodus, Aptowitzer wrote, was a “sinful undertaking” because 
of its effort to effect a premature redemption, and messianic parallels 
are to miracles, “not sacrilegious undertakings, not catastrophes.”16 In 
Heinemann’s paraphrase, “The technique of ‘analogy’ is applied only to 
miracles and the like, not to events given a negative evaluation.”17 Finally, 
the sources demonstrate no negative attitude toward Messiah son of 
Joseph, who, unlike the Ephraimites, is far from a total failure. 
Let us leave this explanation for the moment and proceed to an 
examination of the core of Heinemann’s article, which will inadvertently 
lead us toward a reaffirmation of Ginzberg’s typological interpretation. 
Heinemann’s striking thesis is that the story of Messiah son of Joseph did 
not originally envision his tragic death; on the contrary, this Messiah was 
a successful warrior hero whose genesis requires no special explanation 
in light of the proliferation of messianic figures in this period (Elijah-
Phineas, Melchizedek, and the Priestly Messiah of the Dead Sea Scrolls 
and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs). Even though the earliest 
datable discussion of Messiah son of Joseph refers to his death,18 the 
HTR, where the summary of earlier theories appears on pp. 1-6.
15 Ginzberg, Sekte, pp. 336-339 = MGWJ, pp. 414-417 = Sect, pp. 235-238. The rabbinic 
sources about the Ephraimites are noted by Ginzberg and discussed by Heinemann, 
“Messiah of Ephraim,” pp. 10-13.
16 Parteipolitik der Hasmonäerzeit im Rabbinischen und Pseudoepigraphischen Schrifttum 
(Vienna and New York, 1927), p. 107.
17 “Messiah of Ephraim,” p. 4. In the Hebrew, “and the like” was the stronger “and acts of 
salvation” (ישועה  which reflects Aptowitzer’s assertion more closely. Whether ,(ומעשי 
neutral acts, which are neither redemptive nor sinful, would be recapitulated is left 
ambiguous.
18 The second reference in B. Sukkah 52a. On the problems of dating the earlier reference 
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original form of the story is preserved in those later Midrashim which 
make no such reference. This follows from two considerations. First, “if 
the death in battle of the Messiah son of Joseph was a generally accepted 
doctrine, it is quite inconceivable that a good many of the sources 
should ignore it; this is not the sort of ‘detail’ which may accidentally 
be omitted.” Second, some of those sources speak of this Messiah as a 
victorious redeemer. The failure of scholars to notice the absence of the 
death motif results from “a kind of ‘optical illusion’ which makes one 
see what is said explicitly in some of the sources also in the ones which 
know nothing of it.”19
Since the death of Messiah son of Joseph could not have been ignored 
once it was known, it follows that although the passages oblivious of 
his death are embedded in later sources, they must predate the second-
century source which knows that he will die. The question now becomes 
not where Messiah son of Joseph comes from but what it was in the 
second century C.E. that brought about the motif of his death. To this 
Heinemann replies: the Bar Kokhba experience. Disappointed Jews 
attempted to retain faith in some sort of messianic role for their slain 
leader, and so they associated him with the heroic Messiah son of Joseph, 
now transformed into a tragic hero who will fall in battle.
At the same time, Heinemann argues, another, unrelated legend was 
undergoing a radical metamorphosis. The Mekhilta in Beshallah regards 
the Ephraimites who left Egypt prematurely as arrogant rebels who “kept 
not the covenant of God and refused to walk in his law” (Ps. 78:10); 
other sources, however, regard them as victims of an error in calculation, 
not apparently as sinners, while one source, which identifies them with 
the dead resurrected by Ezekiel, must surely consider them “essentially 
righteous men.”20
The generation of Bar Kokhba, Heinemann says, cannot have been 
responsible for a story that reflects “complacent, righteous condemnation” 
of people who attempt to hasten redemption, with all that such 
condemnation would imply about so many members of that generation, 
on that page, see J. Klausner, Ha-Ra‘ayon ha-Meshihi be-Yisrael (Jerusalem, 1927), pp. 
318-319.
19 Heinemann, “Messiah of Ephraim,” pp. 6-8.
20 Ibid., pp. 10-13. Heinemann attributes special significance to this last source (B. 
Sanhedrin 92b and elsewhere); I have downplayed it somewhat for a reason that will 
soon become evident.
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including R. Akiva. Thus, the uncompromisingly negative attitude must 
have preceded the Bar Kokhba experience, while those who shared that 
experience transformed the old view of the Ephraimites and regarded 
them as victims of an error or even as tragic heroes. Finally, Heinemann 
suggests that because the Ephraimite exodus came to be associated with 
contemporary events, Bar Kokhba himself became connected with that 
tribe and was ultimately identified with the old, newly transformed figure 
of Messiah son of Joseph. 
This is a stimulating, often brilliant article which is nonetheless only 
partly persuasive. The revolutionary thesis about Messiah son of Joseph 
stands or falls on a single assertion: sources that speak of him as a 
successful, redeeming warrior without mentioning his death cannot have 
known of that death. To sustain Heinemann’s thesis, this assertion must 
be more than plausible; it must have the overwhelming force necessary to 
compel a rearrangement of the chronological order of the sources at our 
disposal by dating the relevant material in the later Midrashim before 
the tannaitic statement about this Messiah’s death. To make matters 
worse, the tannaitic source refers to his death in a matter-of-fact fashion 
as something which is apparently common knowledge.21 
Moreover, Heinemann must concede that the later rabbis who 
“faithfully transmit” what he considers “the older version ... must already 
have been aware of the new conception of the death of Messiah ben 
Ephraim.”22 In short, they too were presumably victimized by the same 
optical illusion that has afflicted modern scholars. Though the point is not 
decisive, it is worth noting that the later apocalyptic Midrashim explicitly 
describe an often victorious Messiah son of Joseph who is nevertheless 
killed before the final redemption and almost immediately resurrected 
by Messiah son of David. 
Most important, the psychological process by which a messianic 
warrior who will be killed nevertheless comes to be described as a 
conquering hero seems perfectly understandable. Whatever the origins 
of such a figure, Messiah son of Joseph is after all a Jew fighting the 
forces of evil at the dawn of the messianic age. How could the Jewish 
messianic imagination fail to hope for his success? And, of course, it need 
21 “When [Messiah son of David] saw that Messiah son of Joseph was killed, he said before 
God, ‘Master of the Universe, I ask you only for life’” (B. Sukkah 52a). The point was 
made by Klausner, Ha-Ra‘ayon ha-Meshihi be-Yisrael, p. 318.
22 “Messiah of Ephraim,” p. 8, n. 31.
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hardly be said that the desires of the messianic imagination do not go 
unfulfilled in the texts that we are examining. A Messiah son of Joseph 
whose raison d’être is to fight and die would nonetheless be transformed 
almost inevitably into precisely the warrior hero that confronts us in the 
Midrashim that Heinemann cites. If everyone knew that this Messiah 
would die — and the chronological order of our sources gives us every 
reason to think that this is so — then there is no need to mention this in 
each story of his exploits; the “optical illusion” of modern scholars may 
well have been the reality of the third-, fourth-, and fifth-century reader. 
Finally, I would not even rule out the possibility that someone caught up 
in the triumphs of Messiah son of Joseph might have come to believe 
that his death in battle is only one possible outcome and that sufficient 
merit might render it avoidable.23 Whether or not this is so, Heinemann 
has allowed a brilliant but speculative reconstruction to overpower the 
extant progression of sources.
On the other hand, Heinemann’s insightful discussion of the 
Ephraimite story is, with one important exception, thoroughly persuasive. 
The supposed wickedness of anyone who hastened the end would simply 
have to be rethought in the wake of the Bar Kokhba revolt;24 even if the 
messianic pretender could be considered a villain, his renowned rabbinic 
supporter could not. Unfortunately, Heinemann’s direct evidence for a 
positive evaluation of the Ephraimites will not do. As my former student 
David Strauss has pointed out, the same page of the Talmud which records 
the view that Ezekiel resurrected the Ephraimites also reports other 
identifications of these revived “dry bones”: they are those who denied 
the resurrection, those who have no enthusiasm for the commandments, 
or those who covered the Temple with abominations. Nevertheless, 
the basic point remains; for most Jews in the mid-second century, the 
Ephraimites were not and could not have been sinners. 
If we now step back and look at the broader picture, we suddenly 
discover that something very interesting has happened. Heinemann has 
unwittingly refuted the centerpiece of Aptowitzer’s argument against 
Ginzberg. If the Ephraimites are not sinners, then the typological 
explanation of Messiah son of Joseph no longer involves the recapitulation 
23 Precisely this conviction is attested in sources from a much later period; see M. Kasher, 
Ha-Tekufah ha-Gedolah (Jerusalem, 1969), pp. 428-431.
24 Though there are imperfections in the analogy, one cannot help but think of the Zionist 
reevaluation of the ma‘pilim of Numbers 14:40-45 in Bialik’s Metei Midbar.
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of a “sinful, sacrilegious undertaking,” and we have already seen abundant 
evidence that it is not only miracles that will be repeated at the end of 
days.25 If there existed a favorable evaluation of the Ephraimites, the 
point would of course grow even stronger.
Because of the structure of his article, Heinemann was virtually 
precluded from recognizing the implications of his own argument. By the 
time he reached the discussion of the Ephraimites, he had already argued 
that Messiah son of Joseph did not originate as a dying Messiah; if this is 
true, then Ginzberg’s thesis is automatically refuted and is no longer a live 
issue. Hence, Aptowitzer’s argument, which Heinemann had endorsed 
earlier, is no longer relevant, and the destruction of its major premise 
can go unnoticed. However, if we reject the article’s novel thesis about 
Messiah son of Joseph (as I think we should) and accept its observation 
about the Ephraimites (as we also should), the typological genesis of 
Messiah son of Joseph reemerges in all its considerable attractiveness. 
If Ginzberg is correct, we should expect the first references to this 
Messiah to deal primarily with his death in battle without any heroic 
overtones; the Ephraimites, even to second-century Jews, were not 
necessarily great heroes. The glorious victories would result from a 
psychological process that we have already discussed and should make 
their appearance only as the story develops. Though we have only one 
certain source as early as the second century, it is at least interesting that 
it fulfills this expectation to perfection.26 The typological explanation, 
which fits the central, established pattern of rabbinic messianic thinking, 
has unwittingly been rescued, and it deserves first place in any discussion 
of the origins of Messiah son of Joseph.27 
25 See nn. 8-13 above and cf. n. 17.
26 See n. 21 above. The same can be said about the possibly tannaitic source a bit earlier 
in Sukkah 52a.
27 Let me make it clear that I consider Heinemann’s point about the likely attitude 
toward the Ephraimites in the post-Bar Kokhba period to be extremely useful but not 
absolutely indispensable for a defense of Ginzberg. A weaker defense might maintain 
that a condemnatory and a neutral attitude toward the Ephraimites coexisted in the 
pre-Bar Kokhba period and that the latter (which saw them as mistaken calculators) 
produced the typological figure of Messiah son of Joseph. One might even regard the 
severe condemnation in the Mekhilta and elsewhere as a later development — a reaction 
to the Bar Kokhba revolt by one (minority) faction that was so concerned to prevent a 
repetition of this disaster that they were indifferent to· the implication for R. Akiva’s 
reputation. Nevertheless, I agree with Heinemann to the extent that I cannot imagine 
this as a majority view. (For a new typological explanation that does not persuade me, 
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II
Whether or not the Ephraimites of the Aggadah are models for Messiah 
son of Joseph, they are surely the precursors of a long line of messianic 
calculators doomed to disappointment. In the rabbinic period, attitudes 
toward this seductive enterprise ranged from a famous curse against the 
calculators to a series of messianic dates, some of which appear on the 
same folio of the Talmud as the curse itself.28 A careful examination of 
these dates will reveal once again the overwhelming impact of typology 
on Jewish messianic thought. 
The destruction of the Second Temple inevitably inspired messianic 
calculation, and one obscure report tells us of three such calculations 
apparently referring to the period between the destruction and the 
Bar Kokhba revolt. The details, however, are too sketchy to facilitate a 
reconstruction of the precise dates except to say that the one ascribed to 
R. Akiva no doubt pointed to the 130s.29 
Between the Bar Kokhba revolt and the end of the talmudic period, 
we have precisely five (or perhaps four) clear rabbinic statements 
concentrated on two pages of the Talmud indicating the year, or in one 
case the jubilee, in which the Messiah will come. (1) The world will last 
six thousand years: two thousand chaos, two thousand Torah, and two 
thousand the messianic age, though our sins have delayed the long-
awaited hour.30 (2) After the four hundredth year of the destruction of 
the Temple, if someone offers you a field worth a thousand dinars for just 
one, do not buy it.31 (3) Do not buy it after the year 4231 A.M.32 (4) After 
see Raphael Patai’s suggestion that Messiah son of Joseph dies because Moses died 
short of the promised land [The Messiah Texts (New York, 1979), introd., p. xxxiii].) 
 Shimon Toder’s “Mashiah ben David u-Mashiah ben Yosef,” Mahanayim 124 (1970): 
100-112, came to my attention after this article was completed. Though it contains 
no reference to Ginzberg, it maintains the typological origin of Messiah son of Joseph 
and notes that the attitude toward the Ephraimites in the Aggadah is not uniformly 
negative. 
28 B. Sanhedrin 97b. On rabbinic opposition to calculations, note the material assembled 
by A. H. Silver, A History of Messianic Speculation in Israel (Boston, 1959), pp. 195-
206.
29 See the middle of B. Sanhedrin 97b, and note Klausner’s emendation of R. Simlai to 
Rabbi Ishmael (Ha-Ra‘ayon ha-Meshihi, p. 272).
30 B. Sanhedrin 97a-b; B. Avodah Zarah 9a.
31 B. Avodah Zarah 9b.
32 Ibid.
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the year 4291 A.M. the world will enter a period of wars leading to the 
messianic age.33 (5) Elijah informed a certain rabbi that the world would 
last no fewer than eighty-five jubilees, and in the last jubilee the Son of 
David would come. When asked whether the Messiah would arrive at the 
beginning or the end of the jubilee and whether or not the jubilee would 
be completed before his advent, Elijah confessed that he did not know.34
It has long been recognized that the first of these dates is dependent 
upon a typological scheme in which the six-thousand-year duration of the 
earth is derived from the six days of creation; since Abraham came upon 
the scene not far from the year 2000, another period of two thousand 
years until the Messiah seemed to make typological sense.35 The typology 
of the second date is also blatant; the final exile will last precisely as long 
as the four-hundred-year Egyptian bondage (Gen. 15:13).36 
The next date, however, is an enigma. The simplest solution was 
formulated most explicitly by P. Volz, who informs us matter-of-
factly that 4231 is four hundred years after 3831, which is “the year 
of the destruction of the Temple according to the Israelite calendar.”37 
33 B. Sanhedrin 97b.
34 Ibid. Because of a misreading of three rabbinic passages dealing with the duration of 
the messianic age, Silver presents three other dates for the time of its advent; see 
his Messianic Speculation, pp. 19-20, #3 (and contrast his correct reading of analogous 
material on p. 14, #2), and pp. 25-26, #1 and 2. Silver’s misreading was endorsed by 
Yehudah Even Shmuel, Midreshei Ge’ullah (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1954), introd., p. 42; 
the proof-texts cited in these passages, however, rule out this interpretation. A rabbinic 
statement which could be considered typological describes Balaam’s speeches as taking 
place at the midpoint of world history; though some medievals cited this as a messianic 
calculation (and the proof-text tends to support such a reading), it may tell us only 
when the world will end. See J. Shabbat 6:9, fol. 8d, and cf. A. Halkin’s introduction 
to Maimonides’ Epistle to Yemen (New York, 1952), p. xiii. For what may be another 
typological calculation with details unclear, see the last statement in section 21 of the 
introduction to Eikhah Rabbati.
35 Whatever Iranian influences may have affected this calculation (see the reference in 
E. Urbach, Hazal: Pirkei Emunot ve-De‘ot [Jerusalem, 1969], pp. 610-611 = The Sages: 
Their Concepts and Beliefs [Jerusalem, 1975], p. 678) cannot be allowed to overshadow 
the straightforward relationship with the days of creation. Cf. the associated talmudic 
statement (B. Sanhedrin 97a) about a six-thousand-year period followed by a one-
thousand-year “Sabbatical” destruction.
36 The discussion of this point in Neusner’s Messiah in Context, p. 180, creates the 
impression that the only duration assigned to the sojourn in Egypt by Scripture is 430 
years (Exod. 12:40).
37 Die Eschatologie der jüdischen Gemeinde im neutestamentalichen Zeitalter (Tübingen, 
1934), p. 144.
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The only trouble with this is that it isn’t true. The rabbis dated the 
destruction in 3828,38 and the Talmud explicitly notes that there is a 
three-year discrepancy between 4231 and the four hundredth year after 
the destruction.39 Among the medievals, the tosafists maintained that 
4231 was a majority of the eighty-fifth jubilee (apparently counting by 
decades), while Abravanel argued the same point, suggesting that the 
number was obtained by adding a sabbatical cycle of seven years to the 
midpoint of the eighty-fifth jubilee (4225 + 7 = 4232, and the Talmud, 
after all, speaks of the year after 4231).40
The fundamental basis of this date, however, may really be quite 
simple. It is, I think, a typological date identical with four hundred years 
after the destruction with a three-year delay resulting from a passage in 
the Book of Daniel. The basic period of exile is in fact the four hundred 
years of the very first exile; Daniel, however, specifically says that we 
shall have to wait 1290 or 1335 days, here taken as additional days (Dan. 
12:11-12). Though most later calculators understood these days as years, 
there is a recurring midrash which unequivocally understands them as 
days which pass during the final messianic scenario.41 Thus, Daniel 12:11, 
38 Or 3829. See the Ba‘al ha-Ma’or’s comments on Avodah Zarah 9b (= fol. 2b of the Rif), 
s.v. amar R. Huna. In either case, the last official year of the Temple is considered 3828, 
and 3829 is the first year of destruction; hence, the four hundredth year remains 4228. 
The years 3828 and 3829 are 68 and 69 C.E. according to the current Jewish calendar; 
nevertheless, the common view that the rabbis misdated the destruction of 70 C.E. by 
one or two years is mistaken, because their calendar differed by a year or two from the 
one that became standard among medieval Jews. See the Ba‘al ha-Ma’or, loc. cit., and E. 
Frank, Talmudic and Rabbinical Chronology (New York, 1956). This affects other rabbinic 
dates as well and means, for example, that the eighty-fifth jubilee is not 441-490 C.E., 
as scholars routinely indicate, but 442-491 or 443-492.
39 Silver, Messianic Speculation (p. 26), apparently oblivious of the Talmud’s comment, also 
considers 4231 as the four hundredth year of the destruction, since in the current Jewish 
calendar it is “c. [this little letter deserves notice] 470 C.E.” In a puzzling passage, Urbach 
cites the talmudic remark about a three-year discrepancy between the four hundredth 
year and 4231, and in the first sentence of text following this footnote says that 4231 is 
identical with that year (Hazal, p. 613 = Sages, p. 682). Perhaps he is tacitly suggesting a 
new understanding of the talmudic statement which would take it to mean that there is 
a three-year difference in calculating the four hundredth year; he does not, however, say 
this explicitly, and it is not, in my view, a tenable reading of the passage.
40 Tosafot Avodah Zarah 9b, s.v. le-ahar; Isaac Abravanel, Yeshu‘ot Meshiho, 1812, p. 10b. 
Abravanel explains 4228 (= 400 years after the destruction) in a similar fashion as a 
majority of the eighty-fifth jubilee in sabbatical units. (A typographical error in this 
edition of Yeshu‘ot Meshiho has changed רכ״ח into רנ״ח.)
41 See the references in n. 8. The discrepancy between 1290 and 1335 determines that the 
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which reads, “From the time that the continual burnt-offering shall be 
taken away [me‘et husar ha-tamid] and the abomination of desolation is set 
up, there shall be a thousand two hundred and ninety days,” must mean 
that from the end of the period of exile inaugurated by the removal of the 
burnt-offering there shall be an additional 1290 days culminating in some 
important event. Then, forty-five more days will pass, reaching a total of 
1335. Since the period of exile is four hundred years, waiting an additional 
1290 or 1335 days adds three and a half years and leads to the conclusion 
that the Messiah will come just after the year 4231. In sum, this date also 
reflects the typology of the Egyptian exile; indeed, the ‘et of Daniel 12:11 
refers specifically to this period of time. The extra three years are simply 
an appendage forced upon us by the Book of Danie1.42
Our fourth date (4291) can be dealt with quickly. Since I cannot 
explain it, and since the Hebrew abbreviations for 4231 (רל״א) and 4291 
 can easily be confused, I am prepared to follow the lead of the Gaon (רצ״א)
of Vilna and emend it to 4231.43 If this is correct, then there is nothing 
Messiah will be hidden forty-five days. Though Rashi on Dan. 12:12 understandably 
interprets this midrash as a reference to forty-five years, its plain meaning resists 
such an interpretation. For forty-five days, not years, in this context, see also the 
apocalyptic midrashim in Even Shmuel, Midreshei Ge’ullah, pp. 43, 81, 104, 195. Some 
of the apocalypses also take the reference to “time, times, and half a time” in Dan. 7:25 
and 12:7 in the literal sense of three and a half years; see Midreshei Ge’ullah, pp. 103 
and 470, and R. Bonfil’s plausible suggestion in his “‘Hazon Daniel’ ki-Te‘udah Historit 
ve-Sifrutit,” Sefer Zikkaron le-Yizhak Baer (= Zion 44 [1979]), p. 146.
 It should also be noted that had the rabbis taken these days as years, they would have 
been forced to delay the redemption unbearably. Indeed, their failure to use Daniel as an 
important basis for calculations may result precisely from the fact that they regarded the 
numbers there as references to events taking place within the final messianic process; 
such numbers cannot be useful in predicting when the process itself will begin.
42 Even Shmuel maintains, as I do, that the number 4231 is also based on the four-
hundred-year period of exile, but he accounts for the three-year delay by a rather 
uncomfortable expedient. He argues that what begins after 4228 is the seven-year 
period during which the Messiah will come; and “after three years of this seven-year 
period have elapsed, normal life cannot continue” (Midreshei Ge’ullah, introd., p. 45).
43 So too Silver, Messianic Speculation, p. 26, and Urbach, Hazal, p. 613 = Sages, p. 682. 
Though I remain skeptical, it is worth recording a characteristically brilliant explanation 
proposed by Gerson Cohen when I was his student at Columbia; 4291, he suggested, 
may constitute a sabbatical unit of years for each commandment (613 × 7). An 
elaborate but unpersuasive effort to account for this date was made by Even Shmuel 
in his introduction to Midreshei Ge’ullah, p. 46. The setting up of the abomination of 
desolation in Daniel 12: 11, he says, must have been taken as the establishment of the 
city of Rome, and from that point we must wait 1290 days (= years). The traditional 
date of the founding of Rome is 753 B.C.E., and this corresponds to 3008 A.M. (Even 
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to explain, and our five rabbinic dates are transformed into four. 
Finally, we reach the most intractable date of all. One approach to 
the mysterious eighty-fifth jubilee (4201-4250 A.M.) is to regard it as a 
period so rife with potential messianic dates that it was a convenient way 
to subsume them all. Even Shmuel points to a Roman tradition predicting 
the end of the empire twelve hundred years after the founding of the city. 
This brings us to a point approximately seven years after the beginning 
of the crucial jubilee, and by subtracting the oft-mentioned seven-year 
period of the messianic advent, we can reach its starting point. Since 
no Jewish source mentions this Roman tradition, however, we would 
do well to remain skeptical. More to the point, Even Shmuel notes not 
only that 4228 and 4231 fall within the jubilee but that a typological 
calculation assigning to the exile a duration equal to that of the First 
or Second Temple (410 and 420 years respectively according to rabbinic 
chronology) would also culminate in the eighty-fifth jubilee.44 It may 
Shmuel [p. 54, n. 49] regarded this Hebrew equivalent, given in a late Jewish source, as 
approximate. In fact, it is precise; since there was no year zero, the Hebrew year 3000 = 
761 B.C.E., even though the more familiar year 4000 = 240 C.E.) 3008 + 1290 = 4298, 
when Rome will fall. But the rabbis often spoke of the seven-year period in which the 
Messiah will come, and that period will therefore begin in 4291. This is ingenious, but 
aside from the fact that we have no early evidence that Jews used or knew the date 
3008 as the beginning of Rome (cf. the end of n. 74 below), the reference in Daniel 
12:11 to the removal of the burnt-offering, which can have no association with the date 
of the founding of Rome, would appear to make Even Shmuel’s proposal impossible.
44 Midreshei Ge’ullah, introd., pp. 45-46. Baron’s summary of Even Shmuel (A Social and 
Religious History of the Jews, vol. 5 [New York, London, and Philadelphia, 1957], p. 366, 
n. 28) can leave the impression that this typological reasoning about the Temples is 
actually attested in the ancient sources. For such a calculation in the Middle Ages, see 
Nahmanides, Sefer ha-Ge’ullah, in Ch. D. Chavel, Kitvei Ramban, vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1963), 
p. 294, citing debatable evidence from section 21 of the introduction to Eikhah Rabbati. 
 Moshe Ber suggested that the messianic hopes associated with this jubilee may have been 
connected with the problems of Babylonian Jewry at the time; see Sinai 48 (1961): 299-302. 
On this talmudic passage, cf. also I. Levi’s note in Revue des Études Juives 1 (1880): 110. 
Urbach (Hazal, p. 612 = Sages, p. 680) may have a point in stressing Elijah’s uncertainty about 
the precise year of redemption, but that surely does not mean that there is no messianic 
calculation here. This explicit uncertainty, however, does have an important corollary: it 
prevents us from assuming that the Talmud has in mind only the last year of the jubilee, 
despite the fact that the Testament of Moses (1:2 and 10:12) appears to point to the year 
4250 A.M. as the year of redemption. The connection of that text to our talmudic passage 
was already made by R. H. Charles, The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament 
(Oxford, 1913), 2:423, and was repeated by E. S. Artom in his commentary to 10:12 (Ha-
Sefarim ha-Hizzonim: Sippurei Aggadah, vol. 1 [Tel Aviv, 1965]) and by S. B. Hoenig, “Dor 
she-Ben David Ba,” Sefer Zikkaron li-Shmuel Belkin (New York, 1981), p. 142.
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well be that this approach is correct, but since the only persuasive dates 
(which are all typological) fall in the second half of the jubilee, and since 
this would then be the only calculation which in effect gives us a choice of 
calculations, it seems preferable to search for an explanation that would 
account for the number eighty-five jubilees itself. 
There have been, as far as I know, only two efforts to accomplish this. 
In the Middle Ages, Abravanel made the striking suggestion that the 
number is derived from the eighty-five letters in Numbers 10:35-36; these 
verses constitute a separate biblical book according to the rabbis, they are 
enclosed by two reversed nuns (a letter with the numerical value of fifty in 
Hebrew), the Mishnah makes special reference to these eighty-five letters 
in a legal context (M. Yadayim 3:5), and, Abravanel might have added, the 
content of the passage deals with the dispersal of the enemies of God.45 
One can only admire the ingenuity of this proposal, but the connection 
with the messianic age remains tenuous at best. Much more recently, Even 
Shmuel advanced the conjecture that messianic calculators may have cited 
the verse “Hitherto [ad po] shall you come, but no further” (Job 38:11) in 
light of the fact that the numerical value of po is eighty-five. Nevertheless, 
he apparently means only that the date may have been further validated, 
not originated, by this numerical equivalence, which appears in a verse 
that has no redemptive context and no connection with jubilees.46
In the absence of any satisfactory explanation of this number, it 
may be worthwhile to introduce a new, highly speculative typological 
suggestion. King David, and hence the final redeemer, had only one 
distinguished ancestor at the time of the first conquest of the land of 
Israel, which was, of course, the culmination of the first redemption. The 
rabbis inform us that no less a figure than Caleb, who was the prince of 
the tribe of Judah, was a forefather of David.47 The typologically oriented 
messianist would almost inevitably look at Caleb as a possible prototype 
of the final redeemer or at least as a source of information about the 
final redemption. 
As the conquest of the land reaches its completion, Caleb tells Joshua, 
45 Yeshu‘ot Meshiho, p. 12a.
46 Midreshei Ge’ullah, introd., p. 46. Once again, Baron’s summary (History, 5:167) can 
leave the impression that this is more than a conjecture.
47 B. Sotah 11b; Sifrei Numbers 78, Friedmann’s ed., p. 19b. There seems, however, 
no alternative to the conclusion of the Maharsha (Sotah ad loc.) that the Talmud is 
referring to descent through one of David’s female ancestors.
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“I was forty years old when Moses sent me to explore the land, and I 
brought back an honest report. ... Moses swore an oath that day and said, 
‘The land on which you have set foot shall be your patrimony.’ ... It is now 
forty-five years since God made this promise to Moses, at the time when 
Israel was journeying in the wilderness, and today I am eighty-five years 
old” (Josh. 14:7-10). 
Consider the following. First, the passage contains unusual, 
apparently unnecessary emphasis on Caleb’s age, even in light of the 
next verse, which tells us how his strength has remained unchanged; if 
forty-five years have passed, of course he is now eighty-five years old. 
Second, the number forty is strikingly suggestive and could have drawn 
the attention of a numerologically oriented reader all by itself. Can it be 
a coincidence that Caleb was forty years old when the decree of a forty-
year exile in the desert was issued, and can it be that Scripture tells us 
this merely to satisfy our idle curiosity? If his age at the time of the 
exile reflects the length of that exile, might not his age at the time of 
redemption, which we have been told in such a verbose and striking way, 
contain information about the time of redemption? Finally — and this is 
what removes this suggestion from the realm of sheer speculation — the 
Talmud informs us that the conversation between Caleb and Joshua took 
place close to the time when Jews began to count jubilees, and that the 
numbers in these verses are there to enable us to calculate precisely when 
the count began.48 The rabbis, in other words, explicitly connect jubilees 
with this number eighty-five, and a messianic calculator may well have 
asked himself whether the connection is more than just exoteric. 
If this is correct, then all messianic dates in rabbinic literature 
pointing to the post-Bar Kokhba period result from typological reasoning. 
The first is based on the typology of the days of creation, the next two on 
the typology of the first exile and its four-hundred-year duration, and the 
fourth on the typology of a redemptive figure, an ancestor of the final 
redeemer, and his age at the culmination of the initial redemption.49 
48 B. Arakhin 13a. I have formulated this sentence fairly strongly in light of what I think 
is the correct observation at the end of Tosafot ad loc., s.v. Caleb.
49 Finally — a reminder that if my speculation about Caleb is rejected, the most reasonable 
explanation of the eighty-fifth jubilee remains the proliferation of messianic dates 
within that fifty-year period, and every one of those dates is typological. Needless to 
say, this proliferation of dates could have enhanced the suggestiveness of the passage 
in Joshua as well.
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III
The eschatological monster with the mysterious name Armilus has long 
fascinated students of early medieval apocalyptic. Born of a union between 
Satan and a beautiful statue, this final ruler of Rome-Edom will kill the 
Messiah son of Joseph only to fall victim to the ultimate, Davidic redeemer. 
Bald and with a leprous forehead, with one small eye and one large one, his 
right arm grotesquely short and his left unnaturally long, his left ear open 
and his right ear closed, Armilus is a figure of menacing terror.50 
Since there is general agreement that the two references in the 
Targumim may well be later additions,51 Armilus makes his first datable 
appearance in the third and fourth decades of the seventh century. 
Whatever the relevance of a few enigmatic terms in Sefer Eliyyahu and 
Perek Eliyyahu,52 Armilus appears as a major actor in the eschatological 
drama in the Hebrew apocalypse Sefer Zerubbavel (ca. 628)53 and is 
mentioned as a matter of course in several sections of the Greek polemic 
Doctrina Jacobi Nuper Baptizati (ca. 634).54
While the notion of a monstrous final ruler of Rome could have arisen 
directly from Daniel 7:7-8, 23-25 in conjunction with Ezekiel 38-39, it 
is especially likely that the Jewish apocalyptic imagination was inspired 
by the elaborate Christian descriptions of Antichrist as an evil Roman 
emperor, often taking the form of Nero redivivus.55 The Christianization 
of the Roman Empire created an ambivalence which required Christians 
to envision the defeat of this monstrous figure by a good Roman emperor 
50 While none of the sources portrays Armilus as Prince Charming, I have reproduced one 
of the most elaborate descriptions from Midrash va-Yosha‘, Midreshei Ge’ullah, p. 96. See 
also pp. 79, 131, 136, 320. For an English translation of some of the Armilus texts, see 
Patai, Messiah Texts, pp. 156-164.
51 Pseudo-Jonathan to Deut. 34:3, Isa. 11:4. Cf. A. Kohut, Arukh ha-Shalem (Vienna, 
1878), p. 292.
52 For תרמילא ,הרמלת, and תרמלת, see Even Shmuel, Midreshei Ge’ullah, pp. 42 and 51, and 
cf. his discussion on pp. 34-35, n. 12, 18.
53 Ibid., pp. 74, 79-83.
54 Διδασκαλία Ιακώβου Νεοβαπτίστου, ed. N. Bonwetsch, Abhandlungen der Königlichen 
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, phil.-hist. Klasse, n.f., vol. 12, no. 3 (Berlin, 
1910), pp. 4-5, 66, 70-71, 86, and more.
55 See W. Bousset, The antichrist Legend (London, 1896); J. Berger, Die griechische Daniel 
Exegese — Eine altkirchliche Apokalypse (Leiden, 1976), pp. 103-150. I see no persuasive 
evidence that the Christian conception comes from earlier Jewish sources (other than 
Daniel itself).
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who is the major agent of redemption.56 Jews, however, were under 
no such constraints. A single, Satanic ruler was all that Rome would 
produce in its final days, and stories of such a figure could be assimilated, 
reworked, and expanded without any of the usual inhibitions about the 
adoption of Christian legends; indeed, the myth was even more congenial 
to Jews, whose hatred of Rome was unalloyed and whose hope for its 
destruction was untainted by ambivalence. 
The name Armilus, however, is neither biblical nor talmudic nor 
Christian, and its origin and meaning cry out for explanation. Ideally, 
such an explanation should be more than an etymology; it should tell us 
something more about the ideas generating the concept and may help 
us place it in the typological framework which is the hallmark of Jewish 
messianism in this period. No such understanding is achieved by Hitzig’s 
curious suggestion that the similarities between Suetonius’ description 
of the armillatus Caligula and Sefer Zerubbavel’s depiction of Armilus 
mean that our monster received his name from Caligula’s bracelet.57 Such 
a derivation concentrates on a triviality and has justly been ignored. 
Another explanation, however, which has deservedly received more 
serious attention, suffers from a similar, though less acute problem. Several 
scholars have regarded Armilus as a corruption of the name of the evil Persian 
deity Ahriman or Angro-Mainyus.58 This derivation reinforces a certain 
sense of the exotic produced by the Armilus legend, but it evokes no specific 
associations with the story, nor is the similarity in the names particularly 
satisfying. More important, a Persian god would not have produced the 
resonance necessary for this figure and this name to have flourished within 
the Jewish messianic tradition. Ahriman strikes no familiar chord, and 
only in the absence of an alternative explanation should we be willing to 
assume that so alien a villain would find a home as a standard figure in the 
mainstream of Jewish messianism. But we have an alternative explanation. 
The problem, in fact, is that we have one too many. 
56 For brief summaries, see M. Reeves, The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages 
(Oxford, 1969), pp. 299-301, and N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, 2d ed. (New 
York, 1970), pp. 31-34. Cf. also I. Levi, “L’Apocalypse de Zorobabel et le roi de Perses 
Siroès,” Revue des Études Juives 71 (1920): 59-61.
57 F. Hitzig, Das Buch Daniel (Leipzig, 1850), p. 125.
58 K. Kohler in Jewish Encyclopedia 1:296-297, s.v. Ahriman; Kohut in Arukh ha-Shalem, loc. 
cit., and esp. in his Über die Jüdische Angelologie und Daemonologie in Ihrer Abhängigkeit 
vom Parsismus (Leipzig, 1866), p. 62. Kohler emphasized the gimel in the ארמלגוס of the 
Targumim (see n. 51 above).
— 270 —
Yearning for Redemption
The name Armilus has not inspired much recent controversy 
because one derivation has carried the day to the point where the 
question is generally considered resolved. Scholars might sometimes 
go through the motions of citing earlier theories, but the prevailing 
attitude appears to be that this problem is behind us. Armilus is 
Romulus.59 
Now this really is an attractive identification, even more attractive 
than is generally realized. It is not merely that Romulus founded and 
hence symbolizes Rome,60 which is the empire that Armilus will rule. The 
Romulus identification recalls the central theme of messianic typology, 
in which an early figure or event recurs at the end of days. If the final 
redeemer will be like the first redeemer, so will the final king of Rome be 
like its founder. The logic of messianic reasoning led inexorably to such a 
notion, and it may even be that historical events provided reinforcement 
to the seventh-century observer. The Western Roman Empire had, after 
all, already fallen, and it could hardly be coincidence that the name of its 
final ruler was Romulus.61
As far as linguistic similarity is concerned, we face no serious 
problem. Romulus and Armilus are more than close enough to sustain the 
identification, and Armilus’ Greek name, Ermolaos, which appears in one 
Hebrew apocalypse as ארמילאוס and which we shall discuss in a moment, 
is virtually identical with a Syriac form of Romulus (ארמלאוס) that was 
noted long ago by Nöldeke.62 To clinch the argument, we even have a late-
seventh-century source which makes the identification explicit. The Latin 
translation (though not the Greek text) of pseudo-Methodius informs us 
matter-of-factly that Romulus is Armaleus.63
59 See, e.g., E. Schürer, Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi (Leipzig, 
1907), II, pp. 621-622; Klausner in Ha-Ra‘ayon ha-Meshihi, p. 232, and in Enziklopedyah 
Ivrit, 5:954-957; Levi, “Apocalypse de Zorobabel,” p. 59; M. Guttmann in the German 
Encyclopaedia Judaica 3:364-366; Baron, History, 5:145; J. Dan, Ha-Sippur ha-‘Ivri bi-
Yemei ha-Beinayim: Iyyunim be-Toledotav (Jerusalem, 1974), p. 42.
60 Cf. Klausner, Ha-Ra‘ayon ha-Meshihi, loc. cit.
61 Since Romulus Augustulus had at least one competitor for his dubious distinction, and 
since a seventh-century resident of the Eastern Roman Empire may not have shared 
the perception that the Western Empire had “fallen,” we should perhaps be cautious 
about pressing this point too hard.
62 Zeitschrift der Deutschen-Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 39 (1895): 343.
63 Ernst Sackur, Sibyllinische Texte und Forschungen (Halle, 1898), p. 76. The pseudo-
Methodian passage was noted by Bousset (Antichrist Legend, p. 105), Levi (loc. cit.), 
and others.
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The only trouble with all this is that another, widely rejected 
derivation is at least as attractive as this one. It has been recognized 
for centuries that Armilus may be the Greek Eremolaos (’Ερημόλαος), 
meaning “destroyer of a people”; the possibility, in fact, is almost 
forced upon us by the ארמילאוס of Nistarot de-Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai64 
and the Hermolaos or Ermolaos routinely used in Doctrina Jacobi. The 
definition of Armilus in Menahem de Lonzano’s early-seventeenth-
century dictionary reads as follows: “This means ‘destroyer of a nation.’ 
It is a Greek word compounded from ereme, meaning ‘destroy,’ and laos, 
meaning ‘a nation’; it refers to an Edomite king who will win a major 
victory against his enemies and destroy them and who will consequently 
be called Eremolaos.”65 As in the case of the Romulus identification, this 
approach is confirmed by a very early source — in this instance by one 
manuscript of Sefer Zerubbavel itself, which tells us that Armilus means 
“destroyer of a nation” in Greek.66
Despite these early references, it was not, as far as I know, until 
Graetz that the real significance of this derivation was noticed. Armilus, 
Graetz argued, is none other than a new Balaam, the archenemy who 
had tried to destroy the Jews, and whose name, according to the 
Talmud, means “destroyer of a people” (עם בלע   =  ,Eremolaos 67.(בלעם 
he says, “is a felicitous Greek reproduction of the biblical archetype of 
enmity toward Israel.”68 Armilus as eremolaos (often without reference to 
Balaam) has received only the most perfunctory comment by twentieth-
century scholars; those who mention the derivation at all tend to reject 
it summarily and virtually without discussion. Klausner’s comment is 
64 Even Shmuel, Midreshei Ge’ullah, p. 195.
65 Ma‘arikh, ed. by A. Jellinek (Leipzig, 1853), p. 15.
66 I. Levi, Revue des Études Juives 68 (1914): 136 = Midreshei Ge’ullah, p. 387. The text of 
the passage is slightly corrupt, but however we emend it (see Levi’s note on p. 152), it 
clearly says that Armilus means יחריב עם. Levi notes other early scholars who proposed 
this translation, and cf. also the citation from David de Lara's Keter Kehunnah in Kohut’s 
Arukh ha-Shalem, p. 292.
67 B. Sanhedrin 105a.
68 “Eine glückliche griechische Nachbildung des biblischen Urtypus der Feindseligkeit 
gegen Israel” (my translation). See Jahrbuch für Israeliten 5265 [1864/65], ed. by J. 
Wertheimer and L. Kompert (Vienna, 1865), p. 19. The essay has recently been 
translated into English by I. Schorsch in H. Graetz, The Structure of Jewish History 
and Other Essays (New York, 1975), pp. 151-171 (notes on p. 310). Cf. also J. Levy, 
Chaldäisches Wörterbuch über die Targumim und einen grossen Theil des Rabbinischen 
Schrifttums (Leipzig, 1881), 1:66, s.v. Armilus.
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among the most extensive: “And the suggestion that Armilus comes from 
the Greek eremolaos is especially farfetched despite the fact that it is 
already noted in [one manuscript of Sefer Zerubbavel].”69
It hardly seems necessary to say that modern conceptions of what is 
or is not farfetched do not serve as trustworthy guidelines for penetrating 
the early medieval apocalyptic imagination. We have already seen that 
Eremolaos, like Romulus, is associated with Armilus in an early source 
and that both derivations are linguistically appropriate and attractive. 
Typologically, Romulus provides the return of the first king of Rome; 
Balaam-Eremolaos provides the return of the archenemy of the first 
redeemer.70 In light of the frequent stress on the similarities between 
the first and last redeemers, the Balaam derivation may well be the 
more attractive in this respect. Finally, there are even some concrete 
resemblances between Balaam and Armilus. The physical asymmetry 
of the monstrous king of Edom reflects the talmudic description of a 
Balaam who was blind in one eye and lame in one foot,71 while Armilus’ 
construction of seven altars in Sefer Zerubbavel is a transparent 
reminiscence of the seven altars built by Balak at Balaam’s behest.72 
These considerations force a reassessment of the regnant Romulus 
derivation, not because of any deficiency in that explanation, but 
because of the persuasiveness of an alternative. Like Buridan’s ass, we 
are apparently condemned to eternal indecision in the face of two equally 
attractive options. 
In fact, however, a single observation dissolves the problem and 
presents us with a richer and more fully persuasive picture of the 
mysterious figure of Armilus. Balaam is Romulus! 
There is nothing esoteric or inordinately complex in this identification. 
To the seventh-century Jew steeped in midrashic lore, Balaam was 
Romulus not by some stretch of the exegetical imagination but as a simple 
matter of fact. Romulus, of course, was the first king of Rome, and the 
69 Enziklopedyah Ivrit 5:955. All reference to the eremolaos derivation was dropped from the 
abridged English translation of Klausner’s article in the recent Encyclopaedia Judaica. 
(Why is an article on a Jewish theme that appears in a general encyclopedia abridged 
when it is transferred to a Jewish encyclopedia?) Cf. also the brief references to this 
explanation in Schürer and Guttmann, loc. cit. (see n. 59 above).
70 On the frequent midrashic contrast between Balaam and Moses, see the references in 
Ginzberg, Legends, 6:125, n. 727.
71 B. Sanhedrin 105a and Sotah 10a; for Armilus, cf. n. 50 above.
72 Num. 23:29-30. Cf. Even Shmuel’s note in Midreshei Ge’ullah, p. 82.
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identification of Rome and Edom was the most basic commonplace. But 
the Bible informs us that the first king of Edom was Bela the son of Beor 
(Gen. 36:32; I Chron. 1:43), and some Jews made the almost inevitable 
identification of this king with Balaam the son of Beor.73 Hence, even 
without a linguistic correspondence, the Jewish apocalypticist knew that 
Balaam is the person whom the Gentiles call Romulus or Armaleus; the 
identification was confirmed beyond all question when he noticed that 
Armaleus (= Eremolaos) is a direct translation of Balaam’s name. The 
name—and to some degree the figure—of Armilus was generated by an 
exceptionally powerful typological impetus: the first king of Edom, who 
was also the archenemy of the first redeemer, will return at the end of days 
as both the final king of Rome and the archenemy of the final redeemer.74 
Thus far, we are on fairly firm ground, and I am tempted to end 
the argument at this point; nevertheless, understanding the messianic 
imagination virtually requires us to take the risk of more venturesome 
speculations. In an isolated footnote in the general introduction to 
Midreshei Ge’ullah, Even Shmuel made the following suggestion: 
Apparently, people tended to call Rome “Aram” because of Laban the 
Aramaean, the deceiver (rammai), who “sought to destroy everything,” 
and because of the verse, “My father was a wandering Aramaean” (Deut. 
26:5), which the midrash took as “An Aramaean [Laban] sought to destroy 
my father [Jacob].” In the time of the Palestinian Amoraim this name was 
grafted on to (Remus and) Romulus ..., and thus the name Armilus was 
born.75 
Although I know of no evidence that Rome was called Aram, the 
Laban connection may be worth pursuing for reasons unmentioned by 
Even Shmuel. Laban the Aramaean, the eremolaos who attempted to 
destroy the patriarch whose very name was Israel, is another alias of 
73 See the Targum to I Chron. 1:43 and the reference in Ginzberg, Legends, 5:323, n. 324.
74 In this context, I think that the argument that Romulus was the founder of the city of 
Rome, not all of Edom, and that Bela ben Beor’s city was Dinhavah (Gen. and I Chron., 
loc. cit.) would be a quibble. There is an overwhelming likelihood that in the apocalyptic 
mentality, where Rome and Edom had merged into synonyms, Romulus would have been 
perceived as the first king—and symbol—of all of Edom. On the fluid midrashic tradition 
about the founding of the city, which ranged from the time of Esau’s grandson Zepho to 
the time of Solomon, see Ginzberg, Legends, 5:372, n. 425, and 6:280, n. 11.
75 Midreshei Ge’ullah, introd., p. 51, n. 67. The midrash cited is best known for its 
appearance in the Passover Haggadah.
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Balaam. The full text of the same Targum that identifies Balaam as the 
first king of Edom reads as follows: “And these are the kings who ruled 
in the land of Edom before any king ruled over the children of Israel: the 
evil Balaam son of Beor, that is, Laban the Aramaean, who united with 
the sons of Esau to do harm to Jacob and his sons and who sought to 
destroy them.”76 
We may have arrived, then, at a threefold interpretation of Armilus 
in which Romulus, Balaam (= Eremolaos), and Laban (the Arami) are 
identified with one another. Each is described as the first king of Edom, 
and the apocalypses may even have understood Laban’s epithet “the 
Arami” as a term bearing the dual meaning of “Aramaean” and “destroyer.”77 
The typological richness of the figure is further enhanced. History will 
have come full circle. The first king of Edom, who was the archenemy of 
both the father of the children of Israel and the first redeemer, will return 
at the end of days to rule over Edom once again. Once again he will seek 
to destroy Israel, but he will go down instead to a decisive and this time 
permanent defeat at the hands of the final redeemer.78 
* * * 
As the Middle Ages wore on, the significance of typology began to wane; 
though this mode of messianic speculation would never be entirely 
displaced,79 other factors gradually removed it from center stage. Amos 
76 Targum to I Chron. 1:43. On the variety of relationships between Laban and Balaam 
posited in rabbinic literature, see Ginzberg, Legends, 5:303, n. 229, and 6:123, n. 722. 
See also the references in R. LeDéaut and J. Robert, Targum des Chroniques, vol. 1 
(Rome, 1971), p. 42, n. 22.
77 Midrashic literature is not devoid of Greek puns. Is it beyond the realm of possibility 
that the famous and problematic midrashic interpretation of ארמי אובד אבי is based in 
part on an understanding of ארמי as both “Aramaean” and “destroyer”?
78 Let me finally propose two suggestions that may be improbable but should nevertheless 
be noted. (a) Balaam was the son of Beor. The root b‘r refers to an animal, and associations 
with the story of the she-wolf that suckled Romulus could have arisen despite the fact 
that b‘r usually means a beast of burden. (b) I. Levi in “Apocalypse de Zorobabel” thought 
that Armilus’ birth from a statue was a parody of the alleged virgin birth of Jesus. (Note 
especially the Christianized Armilus in Even Shmuel, Midreshei Ge’ullah, p. 320.) Though 
I am skeptical, someone attracted by this theory might want to suggest a connection with 
the possible talmudic association between Balaam and Jesus.
79 If Gerson Cohen’s reading of Abraham ibn Daud’s Sefer ha-Kabbalah is correct (see 
his edition [Philadelphia, 1967], esp. pp. 189-222), then it is a case of typological 
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Funkenstein’s perceptive study of the marginal role of typology in 
medieval Jewish exegesis is not directly concerned with messianism;80 
nevertheless, some of the factors that he proposes to account for the 
exegetical phenomenon have application to our concerns as well. What 
is perhaps most relevant is the suggestion that Jews shied away from 
typology because they had come to see it as a classically Christian 
approach.81 Such reservations would have exerted special force in the 
context of messianic theory, and even Jews living in the orbit of Islam 
would not have escaped their impact.82
Nevertheless, the typological heritage was extraordinarily strong 
in the realm of messianism, and additional explanations need to be 
mobilized to explain its relative decline. The first of these is the virtual 
elimination of a messianic enterprise for which typology was especially 
suited. The medieval mind was too constrained by the authority of 
the now plentiful ancient texts to create new messianic personalities, 
and as a result, figures of the past could no longer give birth to tragic 
heroes and diabolical monsters at the end of days. It was primarily in 
the area of calculations where typology could still hold sway, but here 
too its dominance was challenged, this time by several new sources of 
information whose significance in the rabbinic period was minor or nil. 
The most important of these was the Book of Daniel. We have already 
seen that in the earliest period Daniel’s 1335 days were understood as 
days and that this understanding precluded their use as a clue to the 
time of the Messiah’s advent.83 As centuries passed, it became possible 
messianism in its most striking form. For another illustration of what remains a 
significant approach, see Yehudah Liebes, “Yonah ben Amittai ke-Mashiah ben Yosef,” 
Mehqarim be-Kabbalah Muggashim li-Yesha‘yah Tishby (= Mehqerei Yerushalayim be-
Mahashevet Yisrael 3, pts. 1-2 [1983-84]), pp. 269-311, and cf. n. 85 below.
80 “Parshanuto ha-Tippologit shel ha-Ramban,” Zion 45 (1980): 35-59.
81 Ibid., p. 55.
82 The effect on such Jews would, of course, have been more limited, and it may be worth 
noting that the contrast between the relative messianic activism of Sephardim and 
the quietism of Ashkenazim in the Middle Ages is in significant measure a contrast 
between Jews living under Islam and those living under Christianity. In a classroom 
discussion of Gerson Cohen’s “Messianic Postures of Ashkenazim and Sephardim,” in 
Studies of the Leo Baeck Institute, ed. by Max Kreutzberger (New York, 1967), pp. 117-
156, my former student Avraham Pinsker made the interesting suggestion that Jews 
in the Christian world, who constantly saw themselves as rejecting the claims of a 
false Messiah, may have been instinctively more cautious about any involvement with 
messianic pretenders. 
83 See n. 41 above.
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to understand these days as years without inordinately delaying the 
messianic age. Once this happened, the Bible suddenly contained a 
messianic calculation which, for all of its obscurity, bordered on the 
absolutely explicit, and the primary task of the calculator was the relatively 
simple one of determining the terminus from which the count begins. In 
addition to the date latent in Daniel, the growing, almost promiscuous 
use of numerical equivalence in some medieval and early modern 
Jewish circles turned Scripture into a treasure trove of eschatological 
information through a process which appeared more promising than the 
relatively subtle approach of typological speculation. Finally, the talmudic 
material itself provided a more concrete basis for calculations than the 
rabbis themselves had possessed, and this consideration too made their 
successors less reliant on the uncertain techniques of typology. 
These approaches, of course, were not mutually exclusive. Daniel’s 
1335 years had to be coordinated with its “time, times, and half a time” 
(Dan. 7:25; 12:7); since these times were perceived as eras of the past 
whose duration points to the length of the exile, they were understood, 
at least in a limited sense, typologically. Abravanel extended the 1335 
years to 1435 by adding the numerical value of the word “days.” And in a 
tour de force which strikes me as the most stunning messianic calculation 
in history, sixteenth century Jews combined Daniel’s number, gematria, 
and a typological rabbinic calculation to produce a messianic date of 5335 
A.M. (= 1575 C.E.). The rabbis had said that after the year 4000, the 
messianic age should have begun, but our sins have delayed its arrival. 
Thus, when Daniel was told to wait 1335 years, the count must have 
commenced at the point where anticipation began to make sense, i.e., 
after the year 4000.84 This calculation could have stood on its own, and 
no doubt would have. But then someone noticed the incredible: the 
number 1335 is embedded in the last two verses of Daniel, which read, 
“Happy is he who waits and comes to one thousand three hundred and 
thirty-five days. And now go your way until the end; you shall rest, and 
shall stand up to your lot at the end of days.” The numerical equivalence 
of both verses in their entirety is precisely 5335! We can only marvel at 
the resistance of those who remained skeptical; at the same time, we can 
also marvel at the creative orchestration of diverse modes of messianic 
84 See David Tamar, “Ha-Zippiyyah be-Italyah li-Shenat ha-Ge’ullah Shin-Lamed-He,” 
Sefunot 2 (1958): 65-68.
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calculation, an orchestration in which typology lingers, but in a decidedly 
secondary role.85
Whatever position messianic typology was ultimately to assume, 
its significance in early Jewish messianism was even greater than has 
hitherto been recognized. The much-debated Messiah son of Joseph was 
probably produced after all by typological speculation, typology is the 
most plausible source of every single rabbinic calculation in the post-Bar 
Kokhba period, and the intriguing monster Armilus is a typological figure 
of extraordinary resonance, richness, and complexity. 
85 In the Sabbatian heresy, of course, typology was mobilized once again for the same 
reasons that it was mobilized in Christianity: the unorthodox career of a messianic 
personality had to be prefigured by biblical heroes whose own careers would be 
subjected to subtle, innovative scrutiny.
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SOME IRONIC CONSEQUENCES OF MAIMONIDES’ 
RATIONALIST APPROACH TO THE MESSIANIC AGE
From: Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991): 1-8 (Hebrew section). English 
translation by Joel Linsider in The Legacy of Maimonides: Religion, Reason, 
and Community, ed. by Yamin Levy and Shalom Carmy 
(Yashar Books: New York, 2006), pp. 79-88.
Rationalism and messianic activism are conceptual strangers. The 
rationalist views the world as ever following its natural course. The 
typical messianic activist views it as teetering on the edge of fundamental 
change that will topple the order of the Creation, or perhaps more 
accurately, restore that order to its ideal form. The rationalist perspective 
is hostile even to the activist who anticipates a naturalistic messianic 
age that is “no different from the current world except with regard to 
our subjugation to [foreign] kingdoms” (Talmud Bavli, Berakhot 34b; 
Sanhedrin 99a) since even such an activist seeks to hasten the end, 
while the sober and skeptical view of the rationalist reminds him that 
Jewish history is replete with messianic disappointment. He believes in 
the coming of the anticipated day, but even if the deeds of the Jewish 
people can help speed its arrival, he understands those deeds as the 
ordinary performance of mizvot, and not classic messianic activity. Both 
the psychology of the rationalist and his logic dictate his fundamental 
opposition to messianic activism.1
And yet, it is not only the case that rationalism and messianic activism 
sometimes coexist; inevitably, and against the will of those who uphold 
the banner of messianic rationalism, the rationalist orientation produces 
views that serve as the impetus for active messianism and provide a means 
1 I have used the term “rationalist” to refer, following Nahmanides’ formulation, 
to someone who tends to maximize nature and limit miracles, and who reacts 
skeptically toward beliefs that lack plausible evidence. It should be understood that 
the term carries no fixed definition, and when referring to medieval thinkers, one 
must utilize standards appropriate to that period.
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of defense for messianic phenomena of even the most hysterical sort. As 
if impelled by a demon, the skeptical thinker extends decisive support to 
movements that are thoroughly inimical to his mode of thought.
I
One example of this phenomenon is set forth without reference to its 
implicit irony in Gerson Cohen’s essay on the messianic postures of 
Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews. Cohen suggests that it was precisely 
the rationalistic worldview of the Sephardim that generated optimism 
regarding the possibility of penetrating the secrets of history, and 
thus, some Sephardic intellectuals succumbed to the temptation of 
eschatological calculation. Even though these thinkers themselves were 
not caught up in messianic movements, they created an atmosphere 
charged with messianic tension, which made the masses more receptive 
to a variety of messiahs.2 Cohen’s thesis is intriguing, but it cannot 
be accepted with certainty both because the messianic movements in 
question were not particularly significant and because it is possible to 
offer other tenable explanations for Sephardic messianism.3
Another example of this phenomenon whose sharp irony has not 
been previously noted derives from the most famous messianic passage 
in the writings of Maimonides—the description of the messianic process 
that appears at the end of “The Laws of Kings”:
Do not suppose that the Messianic King must produce signs and wonders, 
bring about new phenomena in the world, resurrect the dead, and the like. 
This is not so… If a king will arise from the House of David who studies 
the Torah and pursues the commandments like his ancestor David in 
accordance with the written and oral law, and compels all Israel to follow 
and strengthen it and fights the wars of the Lord – this man enjoys the 
presumption of being the Messiah.. If he proceeds successfully, builds the 
Temple in its place, and gathers the dispersed of Israel, then he is surely 
the Messiah (Mishneh Torah, “Laws of Kings” 11:3-4).
2 Gerson D. Cohen, “Messianic Postures of Ashkenazim and Sephardim,” Studies of the 
Leo Baeck Institute, ed. by Max Kreutzberger (New York, 1967), pp. 56-115.
3 For another explanation, see my article, “Three Typological Themes in Early Jewish 
Messianism: Messiah Son of Joseph, Rabbinic Calculations, and the Figure of 
Armilus,” AJS Review 10 (1985): 162, n. 82.
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In the following chapter, Maimonides adds the following:
As to all these matters and others like them, no one knows how they will 
happen until they happen, because they are impenetrable matters among 
the prophets. The Sages too had no tradition about these issues; rather, they 
weighed the Scriptural evidence, and that is why they differed about these 
matters. In any event, neither the sequence of these events nor their details are 
fundamental to the faith, so that no one should occupy himself and spend an 
inordinate amount of time studying the aggadot and midrashim that deal with 
these and similar matters, nor should he make them central, for they lead to 
neither love nor fear of God. Nor should one calculate the end…. Rather, one 
should wait and believe in the general doctrine as we have explained (Mishneh 
Torah, “Laws of Kings” 12:2 ).
It is evident that Maimonides’ purpose, which he formulates here 
almost explicitly, is to moderate and dissipate messianic tension.4 One 
who understands that the statements of the rabbinic sages regarding 
these matters can be mistaken will not direct most of his energy toward 
the study of the midrashim that describe the redemptive process and 
will thus not succumb to the dangerous messianic temptation. But 
this practical purpose is not the only consideration that motivated 
Maimonides’ assertion. There can be no doubt that his repudiation of 
signs and wonders and his rejection of confident reliance upon rabbinic 
aggadot derive from a fundamental rationalist perspective. He believed, 
however, that the philosophical approach and the practical objective 
go hand-in-hand. To provide further security, he went on to propose 
standards necessary for establishing not only messianic certainty, but 
even presumptive messianic status. Not everyone who wants lay claim 
to the mantle can come and do so.5
4 Cf. Amos Funkenstein, Teva, Historia, u-Meshihiyyut ezel ha-Rambam (Tel-Aviv, 1983), 
p. 57: “The purpose of the substantial attention that Maimonides dedicated to the 
messianic era was to prevent the proliferation of messianic movements seeking 
to hasten the End, and thus, following his forerunners who advocated a realistic 
messianism, he refrained from painting the Messiah in overly concrete colors. To 
do so would give an opening to anyone who wanted to come and proclaim himself 
the Messiah.” We shall see as we proceed that the last part of this passage requires 
fundamental rethinking.
5 The importance of the category of presumptive Messiah in preventing the spread 
of messianic movements is highlighted in Aviezer Ravitsky’s analysis, “Ke-fi 
Koah ha-Adam: Yemot ha-Mashiah be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” in Meshihiyyut 
ve-Eskatologiyyah, ed. by Zvi Baras (Jerusalem, 1983), pp. 205-206, and in David 
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And yet, not only was this rationalist approach inadequate to stem 
the tide of burgeoning messianism; under certain circumstances it 
actually helped fan the flames of a messianic movement by depriving 
its opponents of their primary weapon. In the absence of an existing 
movement, it may be that Maimonides’ approach could convince certain 
types of readers to refrain from plunging into messianic activity,6 but 
when messianic movements already have a solid footing, this rationalist 
approach brings about results diametrically opposed to those that 
Maimonides expected.
In the presence of a real messianic pretender whose followers affirm 
with certainty that the process of redemption is already upon us, what 
evidence is available to non-believers who wish to demonstrate beyond 
doubt that this is not the Messiah, nor is this the beginning of the 
redemption? If the figure in question is neither an ignoramus nor a 
heretic, the only option is to demonstrate that specific conditions that 
should already have been met at this stage have in fact not been fulfilled. 
There is simply no other argument that can refute the messianic claim 
with certainty.
And now, along comes Maimonides to inform us that the Messiah 
need not perform a single sign or wonder, and that even the rabbinic 
descriptions of the messianic process are not authoritative. If so, the 
non-believer’s sole method of providing an absolute refutation of the 
messiah has been taken away from him. In the throes of the enthusiasm 
and psychological upheaval marking a powerful messianic movement, 
the certainty of the believer will surely wield greater force than the 
tentative rejection expressed by the denier. Under these conditions, even 
the criteria required to establish the status of presumptive Messiah offer 
little assistance to the skeptic. First, someone who has not yet attained 
the status of presumptive Messiah could still conceivably turn out to be 
the Messiah; thus, even one who argues that these criteria have not been 
met cannot rule out the possibility that the figure in question is destined 
to be the redeemer. Moreover, it was precisely Maimonides’ rationalistic 
approach that compelled him to choose standards that are not so difficult 
Hartman’s introduction to A.S. Halkin and D. Hartman, Crisis and Leadership: Epistles 
of Maimonides (Philadelphia, 1985), p. 191. On Maimonides’ moderate approach 
to events in the messianic era, see Gershom Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism 
(New York, 1971), pp. 24-32.
6 Though, as we will see, even this assumption needs to be substantially qualified. 
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to achieve – at least in the eyes of a believer. Thus, before Shabbetai Zevi’s 
apostasy, his followers were convinced that he was a king of Davidic 
ancestry who studied the Torah and pursued the commandments, that 
he compelled all Israel to follow and strengthen it, and that he fought the 
wars of the Lord if only in a spiritual sense. Similarly (after due allowance 
for the deep differences between the movements), just such an explicit 
argument can be found in publications of some circles in the Habad 
movement, who see all the virtues enumerated by Maimonides in the 
personality and deeds of the Lubavitcher Rebbe.7 It is very difficult for 
a rationalist to establish pre-messianic requirements that someone who 
is not the Messiah would find absolutely impossible to fulfill, especially 
since the criteria are, by their very nature, designed to characterize an 
individual who could ultimately turn out not to be the Messiah. 
If we now turn our attention to the largest messianic movement in 
the history of Judaism, we will see that we are not dealing with a merely 
abstract possibility. One who carefully reads Sefer Zizat Novel Zevi by 
R. Jacob Sasportas, the primary opponent of Sabbateanism before the 
apostasy, will realize that the Maimonidean ruling from the “Laws of 
Kings” was the major stumbling block that he faced, preventing him 
from presenting his rejection of Shabbetai Zevi’s messianic claim in 
unequivocal terms. It is true that Sasportas continually relies on the 
words of Maimonides as his basis for rejecting a confident affirmation of 
the Sabbatean faith, and this reliance is legitimate and even convincing 
for those who are prepared to be convinced. However, his frequent 
assertion that the Sabbateans deny the validity of Maimonides’ position 
obscures the true historic impact of this Maimonidean passage on the 
raging controversy regarding the Messiahship of Shabbetai Zevi.
Scholem, for example, writes that while Nehemiah Cohen relied on 
sources such as Sefer Zerubbavel and Sefer Otot ha-Mashiah8 to refute the 
claim of the messianic pretender, Sasportas relied upon Maimonides and 
the plain meaning of Biblical texts.9 This is correct. Nonetheless, it is 
7 See M. Zelikson, Kol Mevasser Mevasser ve-Omer, Kovez Hiddushei Torah: ha-Melekh 
ha-Mashiah ve-ha-Ge’ullah ha-Shelemah (1983), pp. 14-17. See also: “Mihu Yehudi: 
Shabbat ha-Gadol—ve-ha-Hishtammetut ha-Gedolah,” Kfar Chabad (1984): 53, at the 
end of the essay.
8 These were popular works depicting an apocalyptic drama preceding the messianic age. 
9 Gershom Scholem, Shabbetai Zevi ve-ha-Tenu'ah ha-Shabbeta’it bi-Yemei Hayyav (Tel 
Aviv, 1957), pp. 557-559.
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absolutely clear that if Maimonides had ended his “Laws of Kings” after 
Chapter 10 without ever writing the last two chapters on the Messiah, 
Sasportas would have presented his objections to Sabbateanism on the 
basis of the plain meaning of Scripture and other sources such as the 
Zohar without any need for the Maimonidean position. Even more so 
– and this is the main point – had Maimonides not written these final 
two chapters, Sasportas would have presented his rejection of Shabbetai 
Zevi’s Messiahship not tentatively but with absolute conviction. Anyone 
who relies upon the passage in the Mishneh Torah for anti-Sabbatean 
purposes must also accept its authority with respect to the view that 
we have no definitive knowledge of the messianic process. Maimonides’ 
position proved to be a minor and almost negligible impediment to the 
Sabbatean movement; its primary impact was to lend the movement 
major and almost definitive support.
Let us examine several illustrations from Sefer Zizat Novel Zevi:
And if those who rebel against the rabbis’ words [i.e., the Sabbatean believers] 
will say that our sages have not hit upon the truth, and, as Maimonides said, 
all these matters cannot be known by man until they occur, then I too agree. 
But I will not discard the tradition of our sages, all of whose words are justice 
and truth, before the messianic fulfillment. And if after that fulfillment, it 
turns out that their statements still do not accord [with the actual course 
of events], then the Messiah himself will argue on their behalf… And if you 
have acted out of piety by believing [in Shabbetai Zevi], you have in fact 
placed yourselves in the straits of serious doubt… Either way, I am innocent 
and bear no iniquity… Have you heard me declare in public that this is all 
lies and falsehood? Rather, I have told all those believers who have asked me 
that it is possible [that he is the Messiah], although it is a distant possibility 
until he has performed a messianic act.10
And in another passage:
None of his initial deeds accord with the words of Rabbi Simeon bar Yochai 
in [Zohar] Parashat Shemot, and God forbid that we should say, like the 
ignorant among the masses, that none of our sages hit upon the truth. And 
though Maimonides stated in the above mentioned passage that no one 
will know these matters until they occur, he nonetheless agrees that until 
that time, we are to remain rooted in the tradition of our sages.11 
10 Isaiah Tishbi, Sefer Zizat Novel Zevi le-Rabbi Ya‘akov Sasportas (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 104.
11 Ibid., p. 119. The reference to Zohar Parashat Shemot points to an extensive and 
— 284 —
Yearning for Redemption
It is clear from these passages that were it not for the Maimonidean 
ruling, the followers of Shabbetai Zevi would have been at a loss to 
account for the lack of congruence between what they saw as reality and 
the depiction of the redemptive process in rabbinic texts and the Zohar. 
It is also clear that Sasportas would have taken advantage of this lack 
of congruence to refute the Sabbatean messianic claim categorically. 
Indeed, after the apostasy, we find a letter by R. Joseph Halevi denying 
Shabbetai Zevi’s Messiahship on the basis of passages from the Talmud 
and the Zohar that are no less relevant to the period before the apostasy, 
and he does so without any need for additional arguments relying upon 
Maimonides.12 The importance of Maimonides for the Sabbateans 
themselves is manifest in the words of Nathan of Gaza, who falls back 
upon the Maimonidean passage even after the apostasy of his master: 
And though we have found no hint of this matter in the explicit words of 
the Torah, we have already seen how strange the sages’ words are regarding 
these matters, so that we cannot fully understand anything they say in 
their context, as the great luminary Maimonides has also testified; their 
words will be understood only when the events actually unfold.13 
I would not venture so far as to say that the success of the Sabbatean 
movement would have been impossible if not for the Maimonidean 
ruling, but there can be no doubt that we are witness here to a sharp 
and highly significant irony.
It is particularly interesting that Maimonides himself encountered 
the problem that we have been examining when he composed his Epistle 
to Yemen. The Epistle’s assertion that the Messiah will be recognized 
by signs and wonders results from the need to reject the messianic 
mission of a specific individual by establishing clearcut criteria. Thus, the 
discrepancy between the “Laws of Kings” and the Epistle on this point 
also demonstrates the tension between rationalism and the requirements 
of anti-messianic polemic during a confrontation with a real messianic 
movement.14
detailed description of events during the course of the messianic process that should 
have already occurred, at least in part, by that point in the Sabbatean movement. See 
Zohar, Part II, 7b and following.
12 Ibid., pp. 190-191, and cf. 195.
13 Ibid., p. 260. See Scholem, Shabbetai Zevi, p. 628.
14 See: Maimonides, Iggerot, ed. by Yosef Kafah (Jerusalem, 1972). There is some 
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II
Until now we have concerned ourselves with messianic activism of an 
extreme sort that did not arise out of rationalism but used it effectively 
as a protective shield. Now we will turn to more moderate messianic 
manifestations that derive in no small part from the naturalistic 
conception of the redemption, which continues to provide them 
with inspiration to this day. Thus, the ironic connection between the 
restrained messianism of the rationalist and messianic activism is by no 
means restricted to the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern 
period; it extends into the modern age, leaving its mark on Religious 
Zionism both in the nineteenth century and in our own day. This irony 
arises from deep within messianic rationalism and is rooted in its very 
essence. On the one hand, the naturalistic conception of the redemption 
tends to prevent messianic delusions as well as behavior that deviates 
from the realm of the normal. But on the other hand, the very nature 
of the naturalistic conception encourages activism. If the Messiah is not 
destined to appear with the clouds of heaven, if it is necessary to fight 
the wars of the Lord in the plain sense of the word, if the Temple is not 
destined to descend fully assembled from the heavens, if it is necessary 
to re-institute semikhah (the direct chain of rabbinic ordination between 
master and pupil deriving from Sinai) and the Sanhedrin before the 
arrival of the redeemer, then human activity is needed to help realize 
the messianic hope. This conclusion appears so clear and unavoidable 
that some scholars and thinkers view Maimonides as a guiding spirit for 
religious Zionism.15
It seems to me that despite the logic inherent in this claim, 
Maimonides had no such intentions. He advises his readers simply 
plausibility in Kafah’s attempt to harmonize the assertion in the Epistle with 
Maimonides’ position in the Mishneh Torah. See Kafah’s notes ad loc. Nonetheless, 
the emphasis in the Epistle is certainly different from the impression given by the 
“Laws of Kings.”
15 For this general conception from different perspectives and with different degrees 
of emphasis, see Joel L. Kramer, “On Maimonides’ Messianic Postures,” Studies in 
Medieval Jewish History and Literature II, ed. by Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, Mass., 
and London, England, 1984), pp. 109-142; Aryeh Botwinick, “Maimonides’ Messianic 
Age,” Judaism 33 (1984): 425; Menachem Kellner, “Messianic Postures in Israel 
Today,” Modern Judaism 6 (1986): 197-209; Shubert Spero, “Maimonides and the 
Sense of History,” Tradition 24:2 (1989): 128-137.
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to “wait.” The Maimonidean positions that are capable of generating 
messianic activism derive solely from rational and halakhic 
considerations. For example, the determination that semikhah must 
be re-instituted by an act of the rabbis in the land of Israel before the 
redemption can occur is based on a verse from Isaiah in conjunction 
with the quintessential Maimonidean position that the halakhah will 
not change at the End of Days and that miracles are to be left out of 
the messianic process.16 This approach precludes Maimonides from 
describing a Sanhedrin composed of rabbis without semikhah, or of 
proposing, as did certain rabbis after him, that semikhah would be re-
instituted with the return to earth of the prophet Elijah (who certainly 
had semikhah) from his place in the heavens. There is no intention on the 
part of Maimonides to encourage actions expressly designed to bring the 
redeemer. Nevertheless, Jacob Katz’s important essay showed how his 
position led to the famous attempt to re-institute semikhah in sixteenth-
century Safed out of explicit messianic motivations.17
Similarly, Maimonides’ determination that the Third Temple will be 
built by human hands, a determination that was so important to R. Zevi 
Hirsch Kalischer in his proto-Zionist polemic, certainly did not stem 
from a desire to encourage messianic activism. The view that the Third 
Temple will fall intact from the heavens appeared in marginal sources, 
and Rashi introduced it into the center of Jewish messianic consciousness 
only as a consequence of a serious difficulty in a Talmudic passage in 
tractates Sukkah and Rosh ha-Shanah. There, the Talmud states that the 
origin of a particular rabbinic prohibition lies in a concern arising out 
of the possibility that the Third Temple might be built at night or on a 
holiday. Rashi raises an objection based on another Talmudic passage 
that unequivocally prohibits building the Temple during these times, 
and he resolves the contradiction by concluding that the Third Temple 
will not be built by human hands.18 Although from a purely exegetical 
standpoint there is no better answer than the one offered by Rashi, a 
16 Maimonides, Perush ha-Mishnayot, Sanhedrin 1:3; cf. Hilkhot Sanhedrin 4:11. 
This example is cited by several of the authors in the previous footnote. See also 
Funkenstein, Teva, Historia, u-Meshihiyyut, pp. 64-68.
17 Jacob Katz, “Mahloket ha-Semikhah bein Rabbi Ya‘akov Beirav ve-ha-Ralbah,” Zion 
15 (1951): 28-45.
18 Rashi, Sukkah 41a s.v. i nami; Rosh ha-Shanah 30a s.v. la tzerikha. Cf. Tzvi Hirsch 
Kalischer, Derishat Ziyyon, ed. by Israel Klausner (Jerusalem, 1964), pp. 144-147.
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commentator who has been influenced by rationalism will be unwilling 
even to consider such a possibility. For this reason, R. Menahem ha-
Meiri does not even mention Rashi’s explanation, and instead he forces 
himself to manufacture a suggestion that we are concerned about the 
prospect of an error by the rabbinic court, which out of love for the 
Temple may allow it to be constructed during times when it is forbidden 
to do so.19 That is to say, ha-Meiri is prepared to express concern 
about an error by a rabbinic court presumably functioning under the 
supervision of the Messiah himself so that he will not have to entertain 
the notion of buildings dropping out of the sky. Despite the rationalist 
motivation, which has nothing to do with messianic activism, the 
position that the Third Temple would be built by human hands- – as well 
as related naturalistic approaches—had a greater potential to generate 
such activism than the approach that looks forward to miracles in which 
human beings play no active role.
As I have noted, there are scholars who do not see the irony in this 
situation because they attribute to Maimonides a conscious, though 
moderate, activist intention. I see no evidence for this motivation in his 
writings, and I am not willing to create such a Maimonidean position 
based on logical considerations alone, when his explicit directive is simply 
to wait.20 On the other hand, scholars who have dealt with Maimonides’ 
19 Ha-Meiri, Beit ha-Behirah, Sukkah, ad loc.
20 For reasons that may be scholarly and may be personal, I do not assert that 
Maimonides’ own posture would have necessarily compelled him to oppose the 
messianic motif in religious Zionism, especially after the development of the 
larger movement out of other considerations; my remark at the beginning of this 
essay about movements that are “thoroughly inimical to [the rationalist’s] mode 
of thought” refers to Sabbateanism and other classic messianic movements. Still, 
the encouragement of messianic activism, even of the moderate type, played no 
role in Maimonides’ consciousness, but emerged willy-nilly out of his rationalist 
position.
 On the other hand, the attempt to use Maimonides to prove that there is no 
messianic significance in the establishment of the State of Israel runs afoul of the 
problem we pointed out in the first half of the essay. Proponents of this position 
customarily point out that Maimonides mentions the ingathering of the exiles only 
after the appearance of the Messiah and the rebuilding of the Temple (“Laws of 
Kings” 11:4). But Maimonides himself pointed out in his “agnostic” ruling (“Laws 
of Kings” 12:2) that the order of these events is not central to the faith. When I 
mentioned this to Zalman Alpert of the Yeshiva University Library, he graciously 
directed me to the exchange between Amnon Shapira and Dov Wolpo, Ammudim 413, 
415, 416 (1980): 211-214, 291-295, 345-347.
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influence on messianic developments before the rise of Zionism tend to 
view his stand as a successful attempt to thwart messianic activism. As 
we have seen, this position too is highly questionable. It seems to me 
that we stand before an ironic paradox with significant consequences. 
The rationalist, while striving to moderate the messianic drive, will 
sometimes unwillingly enhance it. 
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SEPHARDIC AND ASHKENAZIC 
MESSIANISM IN THE MIDDLE AGES: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL 
DEBATE
From: Rishonim ve-Aharonim: Mehqarim be-Toledot Yisrael muggashim 
le-Avraham Grossman (The Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History: 
Jerusalem, 2009), pp. 11-28 (Hebrew). Translated by Gabriel Wasserman 
and the author.
This article is dedicated to my friend Professor Avraham Grossman, an 
outstanding Jewish historian who deserves the highest regard not only 
for his intellectual achievements, but also for his exceptional personal 
qualities. As I already noted twenty years ago, he has taught us how to 
express differences of opinion with humility, impelled by the quest for 
truth for its own sake, and with a sense of respect for others.1 In this 
essay, I set out to examine the positions of two outstanding historians 
with a special place in my life. Gerson Cohen was my doctoral advisor 
and primary mentor in the field of history, and I personally heard him 
espouse the well-known thesis at issue here before it reached its printed 
form. I still remember my reaction at the time: I was taken aback by his 
claim, which opposed my immediate instincts regarding the relationship 
between rationalism and messianic movements. But I also remember 
my growing sense of admiration as I came to understand the ingenuity 
and depth of his proposal.2 Some years ago, Elisheva Carlebach, who 
studied with me as she began the process that ultimately led to her 
1 David Berger, “Heqer Rabbanut Ashkenaz ha-Qedumah,” Tarbiz 53 (1984): 479.
2 Cohen’s article has been published four times: Gerson D. Cohen, “Messianic Postures 
of Ashkenazim and Sephardim,” Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture #9 (1967); Studies of the 
Leo Baeck Institute, ed. by Max Kreutzberger (New York, 1967), pp. 115-156; Gerson D. 
Cohen, Studies in the Variety of Rabbinic Cultures (Philadelphia, 1991); Essential Papers 
on Messianic Movements and Personalities in Jewish History, ed. by Marc Saperstein (New 
York, 1992), pp. 202-233.
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impressive accomplishments as a historian, wrote a sharp critique of 
Cohen’s thesis. No one can disagree that the topic in question is of great 
importance, and I believe that the arguments on both sides deserve 
careful examination. Because I have such great respect for both the 
originator of the thesis and its critic, the chances that I will not slip 
into inappropriate formulations are greater that they might normally 
be, but it is not superfluous to express the hope that the image of the 
honoree will provide all the more protection. 
What is it that Cohen claims in his article? He argues that there is 
a striking, almost polar, opposition between medieval Sepharad and 
Ashkenaz with regard to the issue of messianism. In Sepharad, we find 
lively discussions of messianism in the writings of commentators and 
intellectuals, as well as popular messianic movements. In Ashkenaz, on 
the other hand, there is no discussion or discourse, no ferment and no 
messiahs. Cohen strives to prove these assertions, and then to arrive at 
an explanation for the phenomenon itself.
He begins his analysis with the usual scholarly assumption that 
Ashkenazic Jewry had a strong connection to the Palestinian tradition, 
whereas Sephardic Jewry’s connection was to Babylonia. Thence he 
proceeds to examine these two centers of early medieval Jewry, Palestine 
and Babylonia, for the first signs of the contrast between Ashkenazic 
and Sephardic attitudes toward messianism. In the Persian/Byzantine 
era and the beginning of the Muslim era, we find apocalyptic literature 
in Palestine, but no active messianic movements. Cohen’s understanding 
is that this literature owes its existence to a sublimation of messianic 
energy from the world of action into the world of the imagination, to 
the point where it can even be viewed as a contrast to active messianism. 
On the other hand, Babylonia in the same period produced a number of 
movements with messianic characteristics, even including violent and 
quasi-military elements.
In Cohen’s opinion, this difference between the two centers persisted 
throughout the Middle Ages. In the realm of straightforward activism, 
we can identify about a dozen messianic figures between 1065 and 
1492, all of them in the Sephardic cultural orbit. We do find instances 
of messianic ferment in Byzantium and Sicily, but these were passing 
phenomena in communities that had strong ties to the Middle East. In the 
realm of calculations and messianic discourse, we find almost nothing in 
Ashkenaz. There is a letter, dated 960, from an Ashkenazic community to 
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the Geonim of the Land of Israel asking about certain messianic matters; 
but the curiosity about this topic seems to have been based on reading 
Sefer Zerubbavel, and the question about the End of Days is put together 
with an entirely different question about kashrut. One of the Crusade 
chronicles states that the Jews were hoping that the Messiah would 
arrive during the 256th cycle of the Jewish calendar (1085-1104 CE), 
based on Jeremiah 31:6: “Ronnu le-Ya’akov simhah” (“sing with gladness 
for Jacob”) where the numerical value of the first word, ronnu, is 256); 
however, this number reflects a calculation from a late Byzantine midrash. 
Rashi’s calculations in his commentary on the Book of Daniel actually 
illustrate a lack of messianic enthusiasm, since the effort to calculate the 
End was forced upon him by exegetical necessity and the dates that he 
proposes point to a redemption that is to be delayed for generations. In 
the last years of the fifth millennium (which ended in the Jewish year 
5000, corresponding to 1240 CE), some prophecies of the imminent End 
begin to appear in Ashkenaz, but this is an atypical phenomenon whose 
character is entirely different from the rationalistic calculations produced 
by Sephardim. Similarly, the calculations attested in Ashkenaz tend to 
be based on innovative numerical equivalencies (gimatriyyot), which 
reflect a very different way of thinking from the calculations used by the 
Sephardic intellectuals. Finally, the migration of French rabbis to the Land 
of Israel in the thirteenth century emerged out of considerations that 
were essentially unconnected to messianic hopes.
Let us now look at Sepharad through Cohen’s lens. There, we see many 
calculations of the End of Days, based on rationalistic interpretations 
of biblical verses or rabbinic statements, on historical typology, and on 
astrological investigation, which was considered a scientific field of study 
in the Middle Ages. (Maimonides’ opposition to astrology was atypical 
even among philosophers.) Interest in the End of Days and the date 
when it will occur appears in the letter of Hasdai ibn Shaprut to the 
King of the Khazars; in the writings of Avraham bar Hiyya, Solomon 
ibn Gabirol, and Judah Halevi; in Abraham ibn Daud’s Book of Tradition 
(Sefer ha-Qabbalah); in Maimonides’ Epistle to Yemen; in Nahmanides’ 
Book of the Redemption (Sefer ha-Ge’ullah); and in the diverse writings of 
Isaac Abravanel.
Cohen connects messianic calculations and even the rise of messianic 
movements to rationalist modes of thought. As I have noted, I initially 
recoiled from this assertion; after all, our instincts do not take well to 
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a position which states that rationalism creates activism that appears 
contrary to common sense. However, Cohen explains the logic of this 
argument. The Sephardic rationalist was convinced that God governs the 
universe in accordance with principles that can be grasped by reason, 
whereas the Ashkenazic scholar did not presume to understand God’s 
mind. Therefore, the Sephardic rationalist was able to delve into the 
complexities of the unfolding historical drama, and his intellectual 
efforts along these lines encouraged actual messianic movements among 
the masses. The Ashkenazic scholar was forced to wait until the time that 
God Himself would decide to redeem His people and His universe, and in 
an environment that was not suffused with concern about messianism, 
the masses, too, did not become caught up in messianic movements. 
In the best-case situation, an Ashkenazic Jew who yearned very much 
for the redemption might hope for a prophetic experience from God, or 
might attempt to interpret the secrets concealed in biblical verses.
Moreover, Cohen argues that these distinctions in attitude toward 
rationalism and messianism also explain the difference between Ashkenaz 
and Sepharad with regard to readiness to undergo martyrdom. The 
Jews of Sepharad avoided martyrdom for two basic reasons: first of all, 
rationalism weakened their faith to a degree that undermined the inner 
strength necessary to sacrifice one’s life; second, they were convinced 
that the messiah would soon come, at which point they would be able to 
return to Judaism.
Finally, in a brief passage that appears almost as an aside, Cohen 
makes an important, even revolutionary, point in the historiography of 
messianism: persecutions in and of themselves do not produce messianic 
movements. Even a scholar who utterly rejects Cohen’s basic positions 
must give him credit for the short passage in which he lists the major 
persecutions from the Middle Ages through the seventeenth century and 
notes that not one of these produced a messianic movement. One might 
argue with Cohen’s affirmation with respect to the expulsion from Spain 
and the massacres of 1648, but the basic observation remains intact in 
all its force, and it appears to stand unchallenged.
Cohen’s article became a classic in the academic discussion of Jewish 
messianism in the Middle Ages, but there were nonetheless scholars who 
rejected his position. Israel Yuval, in his long article on the hatred that 
Ashkenazic Jews felt towards Christianity and the implications that he 
attributes to this hatred, proffered two arguments against Cohen’s thesis. 
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First of all, if Ashkenazic Jews did not produce the sort of messianic 
movements that we find in other centers, this should not be seen as 
an expression of passivity. Ashkenazic society considered words very 
powerful, and so we should view their bitter curses against the gentiles 
and their prayers for vengeance as active messianism. Activism in the 
form of movements would have been redundant or perhaps even harmful. 
Moreover, Sephardic expressions of messianism in the realm of theory 
and calculations appear primarily in speculative philosophical literature, 
a genre that barely existed at all in Ashkenaz.3
But a broad and systematic critique of Cohen’s thesis was presented 
by Carlebach in a lecture that she delivered in 1998.4 Here, then, is a 
summary of her argument:
1 Cohen speaks of “aggressive military activity” in the movements 
that arose in Persia in the first centuries of Muslim rule. In fact, 
as even Cohen admits in a later article, these movements were 
hardly organized, and they had no true military component.
2. Messianism was hardly foreign to Ashkenaz, nor was martyrdom 
absent in Sepharad. Furthermore, dying for the faith was not 
considered an expression of passivity by medieval Jews, for the 
martyrs first tried to save themselves in any way possible.
3. Cohen sees the Ashkenazic position as an expression of passivity 
on the part of the rabbinic elite, whereas he sees the active 
messianism of Sepharad as “popular.” Thus, he overlooks the 
conservative messianism of the Sephardic rabbis from the time of 
the Geonim, on to Maimonides, and through R. Jacob Sasportas. 
Moreover, movements with messianic characteristics “often” 
took place in Ashkenaz under the leadership of the rabbinic elite 
itself, thus evincing a character that penetrated to the very core 
of communities that identified with its great rabbinic scholars; 
on the other hand, the movements in Sepharad often came from 
an anti-rabbinic sector.
3 Israel Yuval, “Ha-Naqam ve-ha-Qelalah, ha-Dam ve-ha-Alilah,” Zion 58 (1993): 60. This 
passage also appears in Yuval’s book Shenei Goyim be-Bitnekh (Tel-Aviv, 2000), p. 145. 
See also note 19, below.
4 Elisheva Carlebach, Between History and Hope: Jewish Messianism in Ashkenaz and 
Sepharad: Third Annual Lecture of the Victor J. Selmanowitz Chair of Jewish History, 
Graduate School of Jewish Studies, Touro College (New York, 1998).
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4. The use of the term “Sepharad” to embrace both the movements 
that arose on the fringes of Persian Jewry in the seventh century 
and the complex calculations born in the elitist environment of 
rationalist courtiers in Andalusia is highly dubious.
5. In light of a number of studies made in the past few decades 
pointing to cultural contacts between Ashkenaz and Sepharad, 
it is becoming clear that the general picture of a deep cultural 
divide between the Jewish centers has been exaggerated, and it 
is doubtful that we can use it to explain the distinctions that we 
are discussing.
6. A central portion of Carlebach’s lecture is devoted to an analysis 
of the historiography of two sixteenth-century messianic 
movements in the writings of various Ashkenazic and Sephardic 
authors:
I. Asher Laemmelein:
Carlebach points to three Ashkenazic sources and three Sephardic 
sources that address this movement.
On the Ashkenazic side, David Ganz portrays Laemmelein as the 
messiah’s herald, not as the messiah himself. At the same time, he 
describes significant messianic fervor in Ashkenaz that was generated 
by the news of the movement. An anonymous chronicle from early 
seventeenth-century Prague includes a short note about a rumor in 
1502 regarding the Messiah that inspired mass acts of repentance. At 
the end of the sixteenth century, a student of R. Solomon Luria wrote 
that Laemmelein’s influence had extended to Ashkenaz, to Italy, and to 
other lands in the Christian world.
On the Sephardic side, Gedalya ibn Yahya reports that when 
Laemmelein died in an unredeemed world, many Jews apostatized. Yosef 
ha-Kohen refers to him with the biblical pronouncement, “The prophet 
is a fool, the man of the spirit is insane” (Hosea 9:7), and recounts that 
“the Jews flocked to him, and said: ‘This is a prophet, whom God has sent 
to be a ruler over his people Israel and to gather the dispersed of Judah 
from the four corners of the earth’.” Yosef Sambari, who repeated Yosef 
ha-Kohen’s remarks,5 also noted the influence of these events on “the 
sinners of Israel,” i.e., the apostates.
5 Carlebach does not note this point, although it would help support her thesis.
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Christian writers who mention Laemmelein’s movement view it, 
of course, as yet further evidence of the repeated disappointments 
generated by erroneous Jewish imaginings regarding the identity of the 
Messiah. Ashkenazic writers willfully ignore the fact that Laemmelein’s 
failure led Jews to apostasy. In conclusion, “the historiography of the 
movement changes greatly based on the identity of the reporter.”
Beyond the historiographical question, Carlebach notes also that 
despites Cohen’s refusal to attribute significance to Laemmelein as well 
as his hypothesis that he was influenced by Sephardim, Laemmelein’s 
recently-published writings, which were not available to Cohen, show 
that he was committed to Ashkenazic culture.
II. Solomon Molkho:
Ashkenazic authors tell the story of this figure only briefly, and tend 
to gloss over the messianic aspect. Josel of Rosheim describes Molkho 
as a proselyte who caused trouble for the community but also inspired 
acts of mass repentance. Rabbi Yom-Tov Lipmann Heller discusses the 
ritual fringes (tzitzit) worn by Molkho and classifies him as a martyr, 
but not as a messianic claimant. David Ganz writes a brief description 
of Molkho with no mention of messianism. The Prague chronicle reports 
that there were messianic expectations in the year 1523, but makes no 
mention of Molkho.
In two Sephardic accounts, which are longer, the messianic moment 
in Molkho’s life is mentioned explicitly. Yosef ha-Kohen introduces 
Molkho with the expression, “A shoot came forth out of Portugal” (cf. 
Isaiah 11:1), which has clear messianic implications. Yosef Sambari 
explicitly says that Molkho identified himself as the Messiah. Similarly, 
two Christian authors write that Molkho announced that he was the 
Messiah.
From these data, Carlebach reaches conclusions of decisive 
significance for our topic. Ashkenazim write succinct accounts of 
messianic events, limiting the messianic aspects of the relevant figures 
or ignoring it entirely, for precisely the reason that Christian writers 
emphasize it – namely, that any failed messianic movement strengthens 
the Christian argument against Judaism. In this context, Carlebach 
turns our attention to a comment that I once noted in the name of my 
student Avraham Pinsker, to wit, that Ashkenazim may have hesitated 
to embrace messianic activism precisely because they lived in a Christian 
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environment, where they were constantly forced to be on the defensive 
against faith in a false messiah. His original comment was made with 
reference to actual messianic activity, but Carlebach uses it to explain 
the historiographical phenomenon. She also points to a passage in Sefer 
Hasidim that warns against openness to messianic prophecies that could 
bring disgrace to the Jewish community.
7. Carlebach goes on to examine the messianic movements that 
did arise in Ashkenaz or related regions: the messianic tension 
in Byzantium at the time of the First Crusade; the expectations 
surrounding the 256th cycle of the calendar; the messianic 
ferment in the decades preceding the year 5000 (1240 CE); the 
migrations to the Land of Israel in the thirteenth century; and 
messianic expectation in 1337 attributed to Jews by a Christian 
Bavarian chronicle in a miracle story dealing with well-poisoning 
and host-desecration. She rejects Cohen’s position that we need 
not deal with events recounted only in Christian sources, for 
the Ashkenazic tendency to downplay such incidents raises the 
likelihood that reliable reports will appear only in Christian 
writings.
In Carlebach’s opinion, all the phenomena in this list show that there 
was a significant level of messianic activity in Ashkenaz, to the point 
where we can affirm that active expressions of messianic hope were no 
less a part of the collective personality of Ashkenazic Jewry than that 
of the Sepharadim. Cohen’s thesis reflects a historiographical tradition 
hostile to Ashkenazic Jewry. Cohen sees in this Jewry a metaphor for a 
rabbinic elite suffused with fundamentalism and intolerance, in contrast 
to the scientific spirit that animated Sephardic Jewry. “The true deficiency 
of Ashkenaz resided not in its messianic posture, but in its deficient 
alignment with the temper of the historian.”
Carlebach, like Cohen, was blessed with a sharp mind, broad 
knowledge, stylistic precision, broad vision, and intellectual depth. This 
debate addresses one of the fundamental issues that faced medieval 
Jewry, and it requires serious assessment of the arguments on both sides. 
In the remainder of this article, I shall attempt to present the case for a 
more modest approach than Cohen’s without fully endorsing Carlebach’s 
position.
Let us begin with my reservations about Cohen’s arguments. Some of 
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these reservations are identical to Carlebach’s, but most are different.
1. It is true that the Jews of Palestine, who wrote apocalypses in the 
first decades of the seventh century, did not form movements that 
pointed to any actual individuals as messianic figures; however, 
the word “passive” is hardly an appropriate term to characterize 
them. These Jews carried out military campaigns alongside the 
Persians against Christian Byzantium, and it is quite plausible to 
conclude that some of them slaughtered Christians in Mamilla.6 
The apocalyptic writings understand these wars as part of the 
unfolding drama of the End of Days, and it is hard to see how any 
Jew who saw these events could have reject this interpretation. 
Even if we assume that not all the Jews who fought in these wars 
saw the Persian-Byzantine conflict through a messianic prism, it 
is clear that this community was as remote from “passivity” as 
East is from West.
2. In light of the Italian origins of Ashkenazic Jewry, Cohen 
emphasizes the fact that Josippon, which was written in tenth-
century Italy, opposes aggressive activism, but he downplays 
the identical position of the Sephardi Abraham ibn Daud. 
(Cohen writes that while Ibn Daud did agree with the author of 
Josippon on this point, his position did not succeed in curbing the 
Sephardic enthusiasm for messianic movements, and Ibn Daud 
himself did not refrain from attempting to calculate the End.)
3. Cohen attributes great significance to Hasdai ibn Shaprut’s 
letter asking the Khazar king whether he has any information 
about the coming of the Messiah. However, when he discusses a 
contemporaneous letter from Ashkenaz that contains almost the 
identical question, he sees it as nothing more than a meaningless 
expression of curiosity.
4. Cohen regards the intensive use of gimatriyyot in messianic 
contexts as a sign of the non-rational Ashkenazic mode of thought, 
but when he encounters the same approach in the writings of 
Abraham bar Hiyya, he views it as a marginal phenomenon.
6 See K. Hilkowitz, “Li-She’elat Hishtattefutam shel Yehudim be-Kibbush Yerushalayim 
‘al Yedei ha-Parsim bi-Shenat 614,” Zion 4 (1939): 307-316; Elliot S. Horowitz, “‘The 
Vengeance of the Jews was Stronger than their Avarice’: Modern Historians and the 
Persian Conquest of Jerusalem in 614,” Jewish Social Studies 4:2 (1998): 1-39.
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5. Although Rashi’s date for the End of Days lay far in the future, 
we find other calculations in Ashkenaz that point to a date in 
the near future. As to Sepharad, despite the general tendency to 
provide imminent dates, Nahmanides produced a calculation that 
postponed the final End 140 years.
6.  As I have mentioned above, Cohen did not attribute significance 
to Laemmelein’s movement, and he hypothesized that it resulted 
from Sephardic influence. Carlebach’s criticism of this claim is 
fundamentally correct, even though the movement did not arise 
in the heartland of Ashkenaz, and dates from the early sixteenth 
century.
7.  I agree with Carlebach that the supposed connection between 
Sepharad and the peripheral movements in Persia is extremely 
tenuous. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that rationalism played 
any significant role in seventh-century Persia. Thus, the messianic 
ferment there was certainly based on factors that had absolutely 
nothing to do with Cohen’s thesis. If the messianic activity in 
Sepharad was actually connected to Persia – or “Bablyonia” 
– it reflected a tradition that had no connection to scientific 
modes of thinking. It is entirely possible that these movements 
developed in Persia under Shi‘ite influence (as Israel Friedlaender 
noted many years ago), and it is not impossible that some of 
the medieval movements – though not all of them – were also 
inspired by a similar environment.7
8.  Our list of messianic movements in the Middle Ages is partly 
based on the reports of Maimonides in his Epistle to Yemen. 
Needless to say, the information which Maimonides had about 
these movements came mainly from the Sephardic world.
9.  Although a number of studies have appeared emphasizing the 
acts of martyrdom that occurred in the Sephardic sphere, I 
believe that we can say that Cohen’s distinction between the two 
centers still retains some validity. Nevertheless, the connection 
between messianism and the relative reluctance in Sepharad to 
7 In a personal conversation, Mark Saperstein has stressed this possibility to me. I think 
that many of the parallels suggested by Friedlaender are forced, but some of them are 
entirely reasonable. See Israel Friedlaender, “Jewish-Arabic Studies,” JQR .n. s. 1 (1910-
1911):183-205; 2 (1911-1912): 481-516; 3 (1912-1913): 235-300.
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die a martyr’s death is exceedingly tenuous and borders on the 
incoherent. On the one hand, Cohen describes a belief marked by 
uncertainty, and on the other, he points to a belief so strong that 
those who held it were prepared to convert out of firm conviction 
that the Messiah would come in the immediate future to save 
them from their distressing fate. Moreover, a simple question 
arises: Would it really be a good idea to greet the messiah with 
the words: “Welcome, my master the king! I am your servant 
so-and-so, the apostate”? Although forced apostasy and willing 
conversion are hardly the same thing, it is worth mentioning the 
debate in Majorca, where a Jew became more-or-less convinced 
that Christianity was the true faith, but to be on the safe side, he 
decided to remain Jewish for a few more years, until the arrival 
of a messianic date that was current at the time.8
Despite all these considerations, I also have serious reservations 
about the criticisms of Cohen made by Yuval and Carlebach.
There is indeed more than a grain of truth in Yuval’s assertion that 
curses and prayers for vengeance can be classified as messianic activism in 
a society that views speech as a magical act. However, the Jew in the well-
known joke who shouts in the study hall, “Jews! Do something! Recite 
Psalms!” does not exactly typify “activism” in the usual sense, even if he 
attributes magical impact to the recitation of Psalms. In the final analysis, 
Ashkenazic Jews did not make a clear distinction between the “natural” 
process generated by the declarations of the Jewish masses and divine 
activity on the cosmic plane, so that their prayers and curses—even if 
they included a magical element—were essentially requests for divine 
mercy. Furthermore, routine messianic “activism” cannot be compared 
to messianic movements that arise at discrete moments of history. The 
messianic fervor that characterizes movements cannot characterize 
quotidian activities, certainly not when these activities involve nothing 
more than speech. As to Yuval’s assertion that from a magical perspective, 
typical messianic activism would be harmful, the fact remains that even 
from this perspective the expected result is the arrival of the Messiah, so 
that it is difficult to see any harm in his appearance. A messianic figure 
and his followers do not see themselves as pressing for a premature 
End of Days. On the contrary, such a figure would assert that the long-
8 Ora Limor, Vikkuah Majorca 1286 (Jerusalem, 1985), volume I, p. 132.
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awaited time has arrived, perhaps precisely because the prayers and 
curses have had their effect. We must also note that Yuval’s criticism is 
directed only against Cohen’s claim that the Ashkenazic attitude toward 
messianism was “passive.” From another perspective, Yuval’s position 
actually reinforces Cohen’s analysis since it points to a basic difference 
between Sephardic “rationalistic” messianism and a very different sort 
of messianism among Ashkenazic Jews.
As to Yuval’s observation that there was virtually no speculative 
philosophical literature in Ashkenaz, the point itself merits serious 
consideration, but we must remember that when Cohen cites Sephardic 
materials, he includes letters, commentaries, and Abraham ibn 
Daud’s chronicle (or chronography). Moreover, the lack of speculative 
philosophical works is due to a considerable extent to precisely what Cohen 
emphasized, to wit, the absence of speculative thought of the sort that 
would have generated serious analysis of the nature of the messianic era 
as well as sustained interest in the questions associated with it, including 
the calculation of when that era would begin. The distinctions that Cohen 
drew are not neutralized by Yuval’s methodological observations, as 
important as the latter may be.
The sharp critique in Carlebach’s summary remarks is directed against 
a stereotypical anti-Ashkenazic attitude that she attributes to Cohen. In 
her view, he adopted a negative image of the Ashkenazic “fundamentalists” 
in contrast to the rationalistic heroes of Sepharad. This criticism of Cohen 
evokes a stereotype of its own—the image of the broadly educated 
historian who respects the Sephardim for their variegated and open culture 
and disdains the Ashkenazim because they did not study philosophy and 
were caught up in a narrow, limited belief system.
I believe that this perception is imprecise. Despite Carlebach’s 
assertion that Cohen attributes “a heroic and active profile”9 to the 
warring messianism of the Sephardic world, his article nowhere contains 
any expression of respect for the putative “military messianism” of the 
sects in late seventh-century Persia; he does not present the adherents 
of these movements as heroic in any way. As to his overall assessment of 
Ashkenaz and Sepharad, there is some basis for Carlebach’s evaluation. 
Cohen sees the Ashkenazim as “fundamentalists” and mentions their 
belief in anthropomorphism and strange aggadot. His statement, which 
9 Carlebach, p. 2.
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Carlebach quotes in her study, that eventually even “some fine Sephardim” 
internalized Ashkenazic fundamentalism10 can create the impression that 
he wanted to set up a dichotomy between the enlightened Sephardim, 
who deserve respect, and the Ashkenazim, who deserve disdain. And 
indeed, it is of course true that Cohen himself identified more with the 
culture of the medieval Sephardim than that of the medieval Ashkenazim. 
Nevertheless, anyone who studied with Cohen will understand that this 
formulation was not meant to belittle or mock the Ashkenazim; rather, 
all that he meant is that distinguished Sephardim absorbed Ashkenazic 
influence. It is true that even in the sixties the term “fundamentalism” 
was not a compliment, but even in academic circles, it had not yet attained 
the full degree of vitriol that it bears today. Cohen did not feel disdain 
for the simple faith of the Ashkenazim that the Messiah would come 
whenever God would determine, and certainly not for their avoidance 
of active messianic movements. When all is said and done, does it really 
make sense to say that messianic uprisings fit well with “the temper of 
the historian”? I can testify that Cohen respected the Ashkenazim for 
their self-sacrifice in times of crisis as a consequence of precisely the 
constellation of beliefs that he presents in this study, even though he did 
not identify with those beliefs himself. 
Similarly, Carlebach’s assertion that Cohen’s typology has no room 
for the conservative messianism of the Sephardic rabbinate from the 
Geonim through Maimonides through R. Jacob Sasportas requires 
qualification. Cohen does mention this conservatism several times 
and even emphasizes it. As Carlebach understands very well, his basic 
argument is that the rabbis related to messianism only on the level 
of theory, but they did so in such impressive, constant fashion that 
the masses were inspired to embrace messianic movements, despite 
the reservations and opposition of the rabbis. As to Ashkenaz, even a 
generous evaluation of the messianic movements there will reveal a very 
modest number; it is difficult to agree with the claim that movements of 
a messianic nature were “frequently” led there by the rabbinic elite.
As I have mentioned, Carlebach points to the discovery of contacts 
between the Jews of medieval Ashkenaz and Sepharad, and she sees 
those contacts as a basis for denying the presence of sharp, clear lines 
distinguishing the two cultures. This argument, for all its plausibility, 
10 Cohen, p. 132 (ed. Kreuzberger).
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requires us to confront a broad, complex historical-methodological 
question with many significant implications: When a civilization, or 
segment of a civilization, is already beyond its formative stage, and 
has an established cultural character, under what conditions might we 
expect that its fundamental characteristics would change due to outside 
influences? This is not the place to deal with the full dimensions of this 
question, which have the broadest implications, but generally speaking, 
it does not appear that cultures undergo deep changes simply on the 
basis of books and reports brought by travelers or even on the basis of a 
few personal contacts.
In 1985, the historian Charles Radding published a book which 
spawned a furious debate. In this book, he argued that the residents 
of Europe in the first half of the Middle Ages evinced modes of ethical 
thought that correspond not to those of adults in our society, but to 
those of children whose age can be identified on the basis of Jean Piaget’s 
system of classification.11 Among other things, Radding maintained that 
Europeans in that period evaluated the severity of a crime based on its 
consequences without reference to the perpetrator’s intent. One of the 
criticisms leveled against Radding was that it is impossible to argue 
that the authors of medieval laws could have ignored the importance 
of intent since even in the early centuries of the Middle Ages Christian 
intellectuals read the Bible with the belief that it represented divine 
revelation, and biblical law views intent as a very important component 
in ascertaining the severity of a sin and the degree of its punishment. 
Moreover, as even Radding himself notes, Augustine and other church 
fathers who were regarded as authorities by medieval lawmakers, also 
ascribed considerable importance to intent.
However, I think that this argument, which maintains that people 
who believe in certain books will necessarily internalize their values, does 
not accord with real psychological processes. Nations that developed 
characteristic ways of thinking over long periods of time do not undergo 
fundamental changes over a few generations just because they have 
adopted a belief in a book that represents a different mentality. It is 
much easier to adopt a new doctrine than a new way of conceiving 
reality and the manner in which the universe operates. To the extent 
11 Charles Radding, A World Made by Men: Cognition and Society, 400-1200 (Chapel Hill, 
1985).
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that Radding has succeeded in pointing to evidence that the mentalité 
of pre-twelfth-century Europeans in fact evinced the ethical conception 
that he attributes to them (and this remains a debatable proposition), 
the fact that this conception does not fit the Bible or Augustine does not 
undermine his conclusion.
With respect to the Jews of medieval Ashkenaz and Sepharad, 
this point can be illustrated through an examination of an important 
article on Jewish-Christian polemic.12 Daniel Lasker demonstrated 
that philosophical arguments against Christianity originating among 
Sephardic Jews appeared in books known to Ashkenazim. He pointed 
to sporadic Ashkenazic use of these arguments beginning in the mid-
fourteenth century and to a nugatory number of exceptional philosophical 
passages before that point. The reader of Lasker’s comprehensive book 
on medieval Jewish philosophical polemic against Christianity will 
plainly see that Ashkenazic polemical literature plays so negligible a role 
in it that deletion of the few references to this literature would effect 
virtually no change at all in its contents.13 The article suggests a number 
of explanations for the absence of philosophical argumentation, but the 
one that I find most convincing is that the phenomenon is rooted in 
a difference in worldviews. Lasker’s data effectively show us that the 
estrangement of Ashkenazic Jews from a philosophical mode of thought 
was so deeply ingrained that they could not digest philosophical concepts 
even to the extent needed to direct them against Christian disputants – 
despite the fact that arguments drawing upon them were more effective 
than those formulated by the Ashkenazim on their own. I do not mean 
to suggest that the Jews of Ashkenaz, among them sages whose “little 
finger is thicker than my loins,” were not capable of understanding 
philosophical discourse. However, even one who understands and even 
values an argument that is embedded in a cognitive system foreign to 
the way of thinking in which he has been raised from childhood will not 
easily mobilize it and transfer it from his peripheral, passive awareness 
to his central, active consciousness.
In the final analysis, then, the contacts between Ashkenaz and 
12 Daniel J. Lasker, “Jewish Philosophical Polemics in Ashkenaz,” in Contra Iudaeos: Ancient 
and Medieval Polemics between Christians and Jews, ed. by Ora Limor and Guy Stroumsa 
(Tuebingen, 1996), pp. 195-213.
13 Daniel J. Lasker, Jewish Philosophical Polemics against Christianity in the Middle Ages 
(New York, 1977).
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Sepharad were meaningful, and we should not minimize their significance. 
But we should also not exaggerate their significance. Deep differences 
separated the two cultural spheres, certainly to a sufficient degree to 
sustain Cohen’s thesis from an abstract methodological perspective.14
We have arrived, then, at Carlebach’s analysis of the historiographical 
material. We recall that the key point of her analysis is the affirmation 
that the Christian environment is what caused Ashkenazic Jews to refrain 
from recounting messianic episodes, and even when they mentioned them, 
they downplayed or even ignored the messianic element. Consequently, 
it is entirely possible that there were many more messianic movements 
in Ashkenaz than the ones whose memory has been preserved. In other 
words, the perception of a deep division between a Sepharad overflowing 
with messianic movements and an Ashkenaz bereft of them rests on the 
broken reed of flimsy historical documentation.
When I noted earlier that our list of messianic movements is based in 
part on Maimonides’ Epistle to Yemen, I meant to point out the possibility 
that a different picture might have emerged had we possessed a fuller, 
more balanced record. It is clear, then, that we cannot eliminate this 
uncertainty entirely, and from an abstract, logical perspective, Carlebach’s 
observation indeed sharpens it. Nonetheless, the historiographical data 
cited in her article do not appear to prove the point.
These data focus on only two movements, those of Laemmelein 
and Molkho, both in the first half of the sixteenth century. In the 
first instance, I see no support for the thesis that Ashkenazic writers 
downplayed the messianic dimension of such movements whereas 
Sephardic writers presented it fully. Carlebach emphasizes the fact that 
the Ashkenazi David Ganz characterizes Laemmelein only as a harbinger 
of the messiah. However, as she reports further, Ganz also informs us 
of messianic expectations that were associated with Laemmelein’s 
announcement of the redemption, and the Prague Chronicle also speaks 
in this context of a rumor regarding the Messiah. Among the Sephardim, 
Ibn Yahya’s formulation does not contain any clear messianic content 
that goes beyond what we find in the Ashkenazic sources. As noted above, 
14 I addressed this subject more fully in “Exegesis, Polemic, Philosophy, and Science: 
Reflections on the Tenacity of Ashkenazic Modes of Thought,” scheduled to appear 
in the proceedings of a conference on “The Attitude to Science and Philosophy in 
Ashkenazic Culture through the Ages” to be edited by Gad Freudenthal [now reprinted 
in this volume].
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Yosef ha-Kohen and Sambari report that Laemmelein was considered a 
prophet sent to be a ruler over the Jewish people, who would “gather 
the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the earth,” but even 
they have no explicit statement that Laemmelein declared that he was 
the Messiah. Moreover, the motif of the ingathering of the exiles also 
appears clearly in David Ganz’s chronicle. (“My grandfather, Seligman 
Ganz of blessed memory, destroyed an oven dedicated to baking matzah 
for Passover, for he was absolutely certain that in the following year, 
he would be baking matzah in the Holy Land.”15) The general picture 
here does not reflect a significant difference between Ashkenazic and 
Sephardic historiography, and Carlebach herself words her conclusions 
from the data on Laemmelein very cautiously.16
In the second instance, Carlebach’s analysis points to a somewhat 
more evident difference, but even this is not convincing. A single 
Sephardic source (Sambari) says explicitly that Molkho claimed to be the 
Messiah. Ibn Yahya, who is mentioned in the article without quotation or 
analysis, writes that Molkho declared that he was one of the emissaries of 
the Messiah,17 a formulation that Carlebach characterized as avoidance 
of an explicit messianic identification when she dealt with Ganz’s report 
that Laemmelein saw himself as the herald of the messiah. 
Yosef ha-Kohen’s use of the expression “a shoot came forth out of 
Portugal” does appear to allude to messianism, but in a manner so brief 
and indirect that one might plausibly speculate that if the author had 
been Ashkenazic, Carlebach would have seen such a non-explicit allusion 
as support for her thesis. Moreover, careful examination generates doubt 
as to whether or not this formula alludes to messianism at all, for Molkho 
wrote of himself, “Give your ears to hear the words of a worm, scarcely 
a man, a shoot from the stem of the men of our exile, who has emerged 
from our enemies”.18 Aescoly points out that the word “enemies” here 
refers to Portugal, a country that persecuted its Jews. It is likely, then, 
that this passage in the letter by Molkho is the source (whether directly 
15 Zemah David, ed. by Mordechai Breuer (Jerusalm, 1983), p. 137, cited by Carlebach, p. 6.
16 I believe that she is right in her claim that Ashkenazic writers intentionally avoided 
describing the instances of apostasy that occurred in the wake of the movement, 
but this point does not necessarily mean that they avoided mentioning messianic 
movements in and of themselves.
17 Aharon Ze’ev Aescoly, Ha-Tenu‘ot ha-Meshihiyyot be-Yisrael (Jerusalem, 1967), p. 408.
18 Aescoly, p. 386.
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or indirectly) of Yosef ha-Kohen’s expression “a shoot came forth 
out of Portugal,” and the context in that letter refers according to its 
straightforward meaning to humble ancestry, not to Davidic lineage.
If David Ganz really refrained from mentioning the messianic ferment 
associated with Molkho out of a calculated decision to ignore messianic 
episodes, why does he mention the messianic stirrings inspired by the 
accounts concerning Laemmelein? The Prague Chronicle reports messianic 
expectations that spread as a consequence of Reuveni’s activities. Even if 
Josel of Rosheim intentionally avoided any reference to the messianic 
aspect of Molkho’s activity, we must remember that because he served 
as a diplomat in royal and princely courts, he could have motivated by 
special considerations, and it is doubtful that one may extrapolate from 
his behavior to that of the general population. Yom Tov Lipman Heller’s 
mention of Molkho is only a side-point in a halakhic discussion, so that 
his failure to identify Molkho as a messianic figure bears no significance. 
In general, the omission of the fact that Molkho identified himself as 
the messiah is not meaningful, because it is very likely that this “fact” 
is not correct. There is no reason to consider Sambari’s confused report 
to be a historically authentic account, and in a matter of this sort we 
cannot rely on Christian testimonies, whose self-interest with respect to 
this assertion is blatant.19 The failure to mention an erroneous fact about 
a messianic declaration can hardly prove an Ashkenazic tendency to avoid 
reporting candid and complete information about messianic figures. Thus, 
Carlebach’s only meaningful argument from the historiography about 
Molkho is that Ashkenazic sources fail to mention messianic ferment, not 
that they fail to mention Molkho’s supposed self-identification as messiah. 
Yet even from this point of view, we are speaking about one source that 
mentions messianic ferment in other contexts (Ganz), a second source 
that mentions it here (the Prague Chronicle), a third source written by 
an author with a delicate and atypical position (Josel of Rosheim), and a 
fourth dealing primarily with an entirely different topic (Heller).
To sum up, Carlebach’s methodological point about the 
historiographical literature is of great interest as a hypothesis, but it 
19 I am not saying that we should reject any Christian report out of hand on the assumption 
that Christians invented fictional messianic movements out of whole cloth. However, 
when a Christian provides an account of such a movement, we cannot expect him to 
distinguish carefully and meticulously among a prophet, a harbinger of the Messiah, 
an emissary of the Messiah, and the Messiah himself.
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has no convincing support from the documentation available to us. What 
I have written above about the tendency of Jews in Christian lands to 
recoil from messiahs referred, as I noted, to the embrace of messianic 
figures, not to the avoidance of reference to messianic movements in 
Hebrew books. There is a certain logic in the avoidance of such references,20 
but we do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that an Ashkenazic 
historiographic practice has deprived us of information about messianic 
movements.
Now let us attempt to sum up and propose some cautious 
suggestions.
It is difficult to accept Cohen’s argument that there was a connection 
between the messianic tendencies of Babylonia and Palestine, on the one 
hand, and the communities of Sepharad and Ashkenaz hundreds of years 
later, let alone that this proposed link rested on a common rationalistic 
component. Similarly, the suggested link between messianic calculations 
and activism on the one hand and acts of apostasy on the other is baseless 
and without any convincing logic.
What remains is Cohen’s central thesis with its three components.
1. In Sepharad, we find lively messianic discussion of a rationalistic 
nature, including great interest in calculating the End. In 
Ashkenaz, on the other hand, the dimensions of messianic 
discourse are much smaller, and to the degree that it existed, it 
was entirely different in nature and focused on prophecies and 
numerical equivalencies. 
2. In the Sephardic sector, we find about a dozen messianic figures 
between 1065 and 1492. In the Ashkenazic sector, we do not find 
a single one.
3. These differences are rooted in the influence of Sephardic 
rationalism, which inspired an entire messianic literature. Once 
this topic was on the agenda, it led to movements despite the 
opposition of the rabbinic/intellectual elite.
It is clear that Cohen’s first assertion is correct to the degree that 
20 We recall that Carlebach directs our attention to an interesting and relevant passage in 
Sefer Hasidim, ed. by Wistinetzky (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1884), section 212, pp. 76–77, 
in which the author warns the reader to be wary of individuals who prophesy about 
the messiah, for the prediction “will ultimately be revealed to the whole world, and will 
lead to shame and disgrace.”
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it addresses messianic thought, but this point in itself is neither 
controversial nor innovative. Similarly, messianic calculations are indeed 
found in the works of important thinkers in Sepharad, whereas the 
calculations in Ashkenaz tend to occupy a much more peripheral place. 
Nevertheless, we do find quite a few calculations in Ashkenaz: Ronnu 
le-Ya‘akov simhah (the 256th cycle of the calendar), the end of the fifth 
millennium, and more, though the calculations in Sepharad are more 
variegated as a result of the broader intellectual vision that we might 
label “rationalism.” 
With respect to messianic movements or figures, Cohen’s factual 
claim retains considerable persuasive power even after all the criticism 
that has been leveled against it. Even if we use the general term 
“ferment,” we do not find meaningful messianic activism in the heartland 
of Ashkenaz except in the generation immediately before the end of 
the fifth millennium. Yuval has recently argued on the basis of a very 
interesting text that the migrations of rabbis to the Land of Israel in 
that generation were inspired after all by messianic motives.21 Avraham 
Grossman has endorsed a messianic explanation, but he emphasizes not 
the significance of the year 5000 but the influence of the news that the 
kingdom of the Crusaders had been defeated by Saladin, which, he says, 
inspired messianic expectation in the communities of Ashkenaz.22 Even if 
we adopt the messianic understanding of these migrations, the activism 
in question is simply travel to the Holy Land to pray there. It is difficult 
to take the Christian report about the year 1337 with all of its anti-
21 Shenei Goyim be-Bitnekh, pp. 276-283. The sixth chapter of the book is devoted to a 
comprehensive and fascinating analysis of the influence of messianic expectation in 
the years before 1240, even though there are grounds for reservations regarding some 
of the arguments.
22 Grossman, “Nizhonot Salah a-Din ve-ha-Hit‘orerut be-Eropah la-‘Aliyyah le-Erez 
Yisrael,” in Ve-Zot li-Yehudah: Mehqarim be-Toledot Erez Yisrael ve-Yishuvah: Muggashim 
li-Yehoshua ben Porat, ed. by Yehoshua Ben-Aryeh and Elchanan Reiner (Jerusalem, 
2003), pp. 362-382. Grossman adduces the following in support of his thesis: the 
travails that Ashkenazic Jewry was suffering at the time; the argument proffered by 
Christians that their victory in the Crusades was further evidence that the Jews had 
been rejected in favor of the “True Israel”; liturgical poems describing the desecration 
of Jerusalem by Christian pollution; a rabbinic statement that the redemption would 
come at a time of war between the great world-empires; the joy of two Ashkenazic 
authors (only one of whom refers to Saladin) upon hearing the news of the Muslim 
victories; a near-messianic description of Saladin in a work by Al-Harizi; and the text 
which Yuval cites. These arguments establish a reasonable possibility, but it is hard to 
say that the evidence is genuinely convincing.
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Semitic legends too seriously, although there are no decisive grounds for 
rejecting the possibility that it could be based in fact. Moreover, even one 
who sees messianic ferment in 1096 in light of Ronnu le-Ya‘akov simhah, 
and believes the Christian reports about 1337, and, in the wake of Yuval’s 
study, lays great emphasis on the excitement leading up to 1240, would 
nonetheless have to admit that before Asher Laemmelein—and even he 
was not active in the Ashkenazic heartland—we do not have a report of a 
single messianic figure in Ashkenaz.23
The burden of proof rests on one who wants to challenge this picture. 
We may therefore move on to Cohen’s third point, where he attempts to 
explain the phenomenon. Were popular messianic movements actually 
born out of the influence of elite discussion of messianism, which trickled 
down to the masses in distorted fashion? This is by no means impossible. 
The educated elite certainly maintained connections with the masses, 
and personalities such as Avraham Abulafia even straddled the boundary 
between messianic thinker and semi-messianic figure.
Nevertheless, it seems that this scenario is relevant only in Spain 
itself. Figures such as David Al-Ro’i, and others like him, were active in 
an environment that was not characterized by a rationalist component 
strong enough to create movements among the masses. In general, it 
is doubtful that we would be wondering at all about the appearance of 
about a dozen messianic figures over a period of hundreds of years if 
not for the contrast with Ashkenaz. We should consequently turn our 
attention not to the presence of messiahs in the Sephardic communities, 
but to their absence in Ashkenaz.
In the wake of a reference in Carlebach’s article, I have already noted 
a suggestion made by my student Avraham Pinsker that Ashkenazim 
may have recoiled from messianic activism because they lived in a 
Christian environment where they were forced to defend themselves 
constantly against a religion that believed in a false messiah. This 
suggestion, however, is subject to challenge. In Christian Spain, after 
23 The messiah of Linon evinces clear “eastern” characteristic, and I believe that Cohen 
is correct is seeing him as Sephardic rather than French. It should be noted that in a 
later article, Cohen dismissed all medieval messianic movements as insignificant. While 
there is much truth in this assertion, the contrast between Ashkenaz and Sepharad 
in this sphere remains unaffected. See “Messianism in Jewish History: The Myth and 
the Reality,” in Gerson D. Cohen, Jewish History and Jewish Destiny (New York and 
Jerusalem, 1997), pp. 183-212.
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all, we continue to find messianic “ferment,” and sometimes even figures 
of a messianic character. One might respond to this difficulty by arguing 
that the messianic orientation of Sephardic Jewry was formed under the 
rule of Islam, and it did not change in the face of the “logical” concerns 
that might have been expected to uproot it in a Christian environment. 
Nevertheless, the initial explanation is just a hypothesis, and the fact 
that we need to defend it immediately against a reasonable challenge 
shows that we should probably not embrace it with conviction.
Let me move then to a different suggestion, which was also first 
proposed in a discussion with students. Sheila Rabin, who studied with me 
many years ago, suggested that the small populations of the Ashkenazic 
communities served as an impediment to messianic movements. She 
did not elaborate, but I believe that the suggestion deserves serious 
consideration.
The number of people who follow a messianic figure at the beginning 
of his career – and in most cases, even at the height of his career – are 
normally only a small percentage of the community’s population. If the 
community is very small, one could hardly expect the number of believers 
to reach the level necessary to transform the presumed messiah from a 
mere curiosity to an influential personality. Furthermore, people who 
have intimately known the messianic figure since his childhood are not 
usually those who are mostly likely to be convinced by his messianic 
claims. From this perspective, the communities in the Sephardic sector, 
which were usually larger than those in Ashkenaz, were more likely to 
generate messianic movements.
Finally – another suggestion that is also related to the nature of small 
communities, but focuses primarily on the relationship between the 
rabbinic elite and the masses. Let us remember that Carlebach has noted 
the sense of identification that the members of the small Ashkenazic 
communities felt with the rabbinic scholars in their midst to support 
her claim that messianic activity by rabbis influenced the community 
as a whole. I have already expressed my view that messianic activity 
among the rabbis of Ashkenaz was in reality extremely limited. For this 
very reason, Carlebach’s observation about the relationship between 
the Ashkenazic rabbis and the masses provides an opening for a new 
understanding of the absence of messianic movements or figures in 
Ashkenaz. In general, as Cohen has emphasized, rabbis did not follow 
messiahs. The small messianic movements in the Middle Ages arose and 
Sephardic and Ashkenazic Messianism in the Middle Ages:  
— 311 —
grew in the popular stratum of society, whereas the rabbinic elite reacted 
to them with suspicion, even with hostility. Consequently, we should 
not expect messianic movements to develop in small communities in 
which the “masses” are very closely linked to the rabbis. Of course, this 
picture of the authority held by the rabbis of Ashkenaz is exaggerated 
and generalized, but I believe that there is enough truth in it to support 
the basic argument.
We have examined a truly gripping historical and historiographical 
issue. After the criticisms presented both in this article and in Carlebach’s 
lecture, Cohen’s famous thesis is reduced to the point where it stands 
on two factual claims: (1) In medieval Spain and the Middle East, we 
find messianic figures; but in Ashkenaz, we find none. (2) Speculative 
messianic thought, including variegated calculations of the End, is 
characteristic specifically of Sephardic communities. It is not impossible 
that Cohen was correct in his attempt to associate the presence or absence 
of messianic figures with varying approaches to faith and thought; 
however, the suggested connection is not straightforward, since he must 
assume that rationalism created movements only indirectly. Moreover, 
not all the messianic claimants appeared in rationalistic environments. It 
is consequently preferable to turn to other considerations. In Spain and 
the Middle East, messianic figures occasionally appeared, sometimes as a 
result of influences that we can identify, or at least surmise, such as the 
Shiite environment or the turmoil in Yemen; but even when we do not 
have a good explanation for a particular movement, there is no basis for 
perplexity regarding the rise of a few small movements over the course 
of many generations. The real question is why there were no messianic 
figures in Ashkenaz, and here we may perhaps proffer the modest 
suggestions that I have proposed. Even when small communities grow 
to some extent over the course of time, patterns of messianic thought 
and expectation formed over the course of generations do not change 
easily, especially in light of the continuing authority and influence of the 
rabbinic leadership, which was very wary of embracing messianic figures. 
In sum, it may well be that the communal profile that characterized 
Ashkenazic Jewry also determined its messianic profile.
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MACCABEES, ZEALOTS AND JOSEPHUS: 
THE IMPACT OF ZIONISM ON JOSEPH KLAUSNER’S 
HISTORY OF THE SECOND TEMPLE
From:  Studies in Josephus and the Varieties of Ancient Judaism: Louis H. 
Feldman Jubilee Volume, ed. by Shaye J.D. Cohen and Joshua Schwartz 
(Koninklijke Brill N.V.: Leiden, 2006), pp. 15-27.
It is hardly a secret that Zionist ideology had a profound impact on Joseph 
Klausner’s historiographic enterprise. Even a superficial perusal of his 
works reveals a powerful Zionist commitment expressed in both rhetoric 
and analysis, so much so that his right to teach the period of the Second 
Temple in the Hebrew University was held up for years on the grounds 
that he was more of a publicist and ideologue—and of the Revisionist 
variety no less—than a historian. Nonetheless, I believe that there is 
much to be said for a serious examination of the nationalist element 
in his multi-volume work on the Second Temple.1  However we assess 
the political and scholarly arguments for and against his appointment, 
a man who had nothing of the historian in him would not have been 
appointed to Klausner’s position in the world’s flagship institution for 
Jewish Studies. With all his abundant methodological flaws, he was not 
a publicist pure and simple.
Since readers of this article, which will sharply underscore some 
of those flaws, may ultimately question this judgment, let me move 
immediately to a second, even more important point. The ideological 
use of selected episodes in a nation’s history is an integral part of any 
nationalist movement or educational system. Zionism was no exception; 
indeed, its unusual, even unique, character generated a particularly 
acute need to establish a national history that would provide models for 
the struggling yishuv and the early state. The pedagogic utilization of 
the ancient paradigms of Jewish heroism had to draw upon academic, 
1 Historia shel ha-Bayit ha-Sheni, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Jerusalem, 1951), henceforth Historia.
Maccabees, Zealots and Josephus: 
— 313 —
not merely popular, legitimation. From this perspective, the fact that 
Klausner stood with one foot in the world of academic research and the 
other in the public square, where he exercised considerable influence, 
lends special interest to an analysis of his scholarly-ideological approach 
to key developments in Second Temple history.2 As Klausner confronted 
the dilemmas of military, political and religious policy in ancient Israel, 
his own dilemmas illuminate not only Zionist historiography but the 
political and moral challenges facing the nascent, beleaguered State.
It is self-evident that Klausner was sensitive to the charges leveled 
at him by his colleagues at the university, and so his inaugural lecture on 
the Second Temple, which is also the opening chapter of the book, was 
devoted to the question of historical objectivity. The argument in that 
lecture is so strange that only the extraordinary defensiveness generated 
by relentless criticism can serve to explain it.
The objective study of history, says Klausner, leads to ‘necessary 
conclusions,’ to ‘absolute evaluations.’3 It is true that each generation 
sees the past through its own experience, but as long as the historian 
seeks truth to the best of his ability, his conclusions are absolute for that 
generation. This is an idiosyncratic use of the term ‘absolute,’ and when 
Klausner proposes a concrete example, the peculiarity of the argument is 
thrown into even bolder relief. A Jew and a Pole, he says, must evaluate 
Chmielnicki differently, but precisely because of the ineluctable nature 
of this difference, ‘there is no subjectivity involved at all.’ Chmielnicki 
persecuted the Jews but strove to improve the lot of his own people. 
Consequently, ‘the honest scholar must see both sides of the accepted 
historical coin.’4 Thus, in virtually the same breath, Klausner speaks of the 
absolute necessity compelling a Jew to evaluate Chmielnicki in a one-sided 
fashion and proceeds to present him in all his mutivalent complexity. This 
almost incoherent argument for untrammeled, unmodulated historical 
objectivity was surely generated by the subjective realities of Klausner’s 
personal situation.
2 Klausner’s profound impact on certain sectors of the yishuv, an impact grounded 
precisely in his combined personae of scholarly researcher, Zionist thinker, and public 
personality, is strikingly evident in the tone of the admiring intellectual biography 
written by two disciples during his lifetime. See Yaakov Becker and Hayim Toren, Yosef 
Klausner, ha-Ish  u-Po‘olo (Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, 1947).
3 Historia 1:10.
4 Historia 1:11.
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When we turn to the period of the Second Temple, we confront a 
series of personalities and events central to the self-image of both yishuv 
and State: the return from the Babylonian exile, the revolt of Mattathias 
and his sons, the achievement of independence and the pursuit of 
territorial expansion under the Hasmoneans, the great revolt, and the 
heroic stand at Masada.5 The longest lasting of these developments was 
the Hasmonean dynasty, rooted in the most successful and spectacular 
event of the entire period, a revolt emblematic of Jewish military might 
and remembered not only by historians but by every Jewish child who 
has ever seen a Hanukkah menorah.
That revolt and that dynasty were pivotal to Zionist self-consciousness. 
Pinsker lamented the servile state of a people that had produced the 
Maccabees; Herzl declared that the Maccabees would arise once again; 
and in one of the most wrenching passages in all of Jewish literature, 
Bialik portrayed with bitter sarcasm the cellars in which “the young lions 
of the prayer ‘Father of Mercy’ and the grandsons of the Maccabees” 
lay hidden in their miserable cowardice.6 Jabotinsky sharply criticized 
the ghetto mentality that intentionally blotted out the memory of the 
Maccabees, and Gedaliah Alon’s refutation of the thesis that the rabbinic 
Sages had done something similar was formulated in particularly sharp 
fashion: “Did the Nation and Its Rabbis Cause the Hasmoneans to be 
Forgotten?”7 Who then were these Maccabees, and are they really worthy 
of this extraordinary veneration?8
Klausner examined the Hasmonean period—and not that period 
alone—in an analytical framework reflecting categories of thought more 
characteristic of a twentieth-century Zionist scholar than of Judaean 
5 In the last decade or so, several important works have, in whole or in part, analyzed 
the use of these and similar models in Zionist education, literature, and civic life. See 
Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Meaning of Israeli National 
Tradition (Chicago and London, 1995) and the literature noted there; Nachman Ben-
Yehudah, The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel (Madison, 
Wisconsin, c. 1995); Mireille Hadas-Lebel, Masada: Histoire et Symbole (Paris, c. 1995); 
Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948 (New York, 1992). 
As early as 1937, Klausner himself had contributed to the popularization of the Masada 
story as a heroic, paradigmatic event. See Land and Power, p. 311.
6 See the references in Land and Power, pp. 14, 37.
7 Mehqarim be-Toledot Yisrael I (Tel Aviv, 1957), pp. 15-25.
8 For a useful survey of Jewish perceptions of the Hasmoneans from antiquity through the 
twentieth century, see Samuel Schafler’s 1973 Jewish Theological Seminary dissertation, 
The Hasmoneans in Jewish Historiography. On Klausner, see pp. 164-167, 199-204.
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fighters in the second pre-Christian century. Granted, he says, Judah 
Maccabee fought for the religion of Israel, but he understood that his 
success was nourished by ‘”another non-material and non-measurable 
force—the national will to live. When a nation has no choice other than 
to achieve victory or pass away from the world, it is impossible for it 
not to be victorious. So it was then and so it has been in our time and 
before our eyes.”9
And the essential element in this “understanding”—the knowing 
incorporation of a nationalist consciousness into a religious ideology—
characterized Judah’s father as well. “[Mattathias] recognized clearly 
that it is appropriate to desecrate one Sabbath in order to observe many 
Sabbaths—in order to sustain the entire nation.”10 The undeclared 
shift from the Talmudic formula—that the Sabbath may in certain 
circumstances be desecrated so that many Sabbaths may be observed in 
the future—to the nationalist formula that Klausner created as if the two 
were self-evidently interchangeable is a striking example of ideological 
sleight of hand.
It emerges, moreover, that this integration of the religious and the 
national characterized not only the Maccabees but the bulk of the Jewish 
population. “Most of the nation” overcame “all manner of torments” to 
stand against the decrees of Antiochus.
Tens of thousands of spiritual heroes arose in Judaea who could not be 
coerced to betray the Torah of their God by any torment in the world or by 
any threat of bizarre death. . . . There was an intuitive feeling here that by 
betraying their God they would also be betraying their people, and if the 
Torah of Israel would be destroyed so too would the People of Israel.11
Finally, Klausner takes a remarkable further step by elevating land 
over spirit, and doing so through an original piece of speculative biblical 
exegesis so bereft of any evidentiary support that it is mildly unusual 
even by the anarchic standards of the Bible critics of his day. It is likely, 
he says, that the psalm asserting that “the heavens belong to the Lord 
but the earth He gave over to man” (Ps 115:16) was written during the 
great victory of Judah Maccabee. The warriors,
9 Historia 3:19.
10 Historia 3:17.
11 Historia 2:199.
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suffused by a sense of the sanctity of the Homeland (qedushat ha-
moledet) and the joy flowing from fulfilling the divine command, felt no 
need for the world to come. Through their conquest, they had acquired 
earthly life for themselves and for their nation and were prepared to 
leave the heavens to the Lord their God, provided that he would give 
them the land as an inheritance—the land of their fathers and their 
children.12
Though the verse appears to speak of a contrast between the heavens 
and an earth given to humanity as a whole, the true, deeper meaning 
refers to the land of Israel granted to its chosen people.
Although Klausner asserts that even the pietists—the “hasidim” of 
the sources—were nationalists, he underscores the contrast between 
their primarily spiritual interests and the political orientation of the 
Hasmoneans. In itself, such a perspective is eminently defensible.13 
Klausner, however, goes further by ascribing to his heroes from the very 
beginning of their appearance on the historical stage a fully formed, 
unambiguous ideology that is not expressed in the sources but accords 
perfectly with that of the historian.
“From the outset,” Judah and his brothers sought “absolute freedom.” 
They understood that “inner—religious and national-social—freedom” 
is impossible without “absolute political sovereignty (qomemiyyut).’’14 
Thus, the distinctive categories of religious freedom, national-social 
freedom, and political sovereignty did not merely animate Judah’s 
policies on a subconscious level; they were a key element of his conscious 
ideology from the first moment of the revolt. Nor was this ideology 
created ex nihilo in the Hasmonean period. The spiritual creativity that 
Klausner ascribes to the four centuries between the Babylonian exile 
and the revolt would have been impossible in his view in the absence 
of “a profound yearning for political freedom.”15 Once again—an 
argument resting not on a documented source but on a psychohistorical 
generalization rooted in this instance in a sense of what the author’s 
ideologically honed instincts have declared impossible.
12 Historia 3:29.
13 See Historia 2:182-183, and cf. 3:38. For a discussion of the role of land and politics in 
this context, see Doron Mendels, The Land of Israel as a Political Concept in Hasmonean 
Literature (Tuebingen, 1987).
14 Historia 3:41.
15 Historia 2:273.
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When Klausner moves to the very different contrast between early 
Hasmoneans and Hellenizers, he describes the former, not surprisingly, as 
“the national party.” In this instance, however, the interplay of ideological 
factors was potentially more complex. While the Zionist movement was 
in one sense a reaction against the classical Haskalah, to a very important 
degree it was its offspring. Klausner, whose other, less controversial field 
of expertise was modern Hebrew literature, surely identified with the 
movement to broaden the intellectual and cultural horizons of Eastern 
European Jewry, and he could not dismiss the value of Greek culture 
even for the Jews of antiquity. Indeed, in another work, he described 
his central credo as follows: “To absorb the culture of the other to the 
point of digesting it and transforming it into our own national-human 
flesh and blood— this is the ideal for which I fought during the prime 
of my life, and I will not stray from it till my last breath.”16 Might it not 
be possible, then, even necessary, to say something positive about the 
Jewish arch-enemies of the Maccabees?
In order to avoid this undesirable consequence, Klausner mobilizes 
another presumably ineluctable law of history to help him conclude 
that the Hellenizers’ objective was not the incorporation of Greek 
values into Jewish culture but the annihilation of the latter in favor of 
the former. Some scholars, he says, maintain that the Hellenizers were 
correct in their desire to open provincial Jewish society to the wide-
ranging culture of the Hellenistic world. This, however, misperceives the 
Hellenizers’ intentions. “If they had possessed a liberating, essentially 
correct ideology, it would eventually have prevailed and been realized 
in life, even if little by little. The truth bursts forth and makes its way, 
sometimes immediately, sometimes after the passage of time.”17
Here Klausner’s questionable rhetoric about the inevitable success 
of “truth” conceals an even more extreme and implausible position upon 
which his argument really rests. In light of the progressive Hellenistic 
influence on the Hasmonean dynasty, what he sees as the essentially 
correct ideology of integrating Greek ideas and Judaism was indeed 
realized after the passage of time. So far so good. But how does Klausner 
know that this correct objective, which arguably did prevail, was not the 
goal of the Hellenizers? The answer cannot be the circular argument 
16 Bereshit Hayah ha-Ra‘ayon, p. 172, cited in Becker and Toren, p. 13.
17 Historia 3:155.
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that their ideology did not prevail; rather, despite the plain meaning 
of his language, it must be that the group failed as a political entity, a 
failure that proves that it could not have had a correct worldview. In 
other words, his argument—if it is to be granted any coherence at all— 
amounts to the assertion that not only proper ideas but the political 
group that originates them must survive and ultimately triumph. Since 
this was not true of the Hellenizers, it follows that their goal was not 
integration but Jewish cultural suicide.18
The Hasmoneans ultimately attained genuine political freedom; 
this alone, however, did not satisfy them, and here Klausner mobilizes 
religion to explain and justify even more far-reaching national ambitions. 
Because the new rulers regularly read the Torah and the Prophets, “it 
was impossible for them not to sense how unnatural their situation 
was—that of all the Land of Israel promised to Abraham and ruled by 
David and Solomon, Israel remained with only the little state of Judaea.”19 
Once again Klausner declares something impossible, and once again the 
assessment leads to a conclusion identical to the ideology of the historian, 
this time in its Revisionist form.
This orientation appears even more clearly in Klausner’s lament 
over the civil war in the days of Alexander Jannaeus. If not for this 
internal war, he suggests, the king may have taken advantage of the 
opportunity afforded by the weakness of the Seleucid Empire to conquer 
the coastal cities of the Land of Israel—and even Tyre and Sidon. And 
this too is not the end of it. “There are grounds to believe that Jannaeus, 
like his ancestors, dreamed the great dream of returning the Kingdom 
of David and Solomon to its original grandeur, and even more than 
this—of inheriting the Seleucid Empire itself.”20 It cannot be ruled 
out that Jannaeus dreamed such dreams, but it is difficult to avoid the 
impression that the historian’s vision has merged with the ambition 
of the Hasmonean king to the point where the two can no longer be 
distinguished.
Dreams, however, collide with realities, and these collisions can spawn 
not only practical difficulties but serious moral dilemmas. In describing 
the Hasmonean wars in general and the expansion of the boundaries 
18 Cf. also Historia 2:145.
19 Historia 3:31.
20 Historia 3:151.
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of Israel in particular, Klausner must confront the leveling of pagan 
temples, expulsions, the destruction of cities, and forced conversions. 
The ethical problems posed by such behavior disturb him, and he is 
occasionally prepared to express disapproval. Thus, it is as if Judah 
Maccabee forgot what he himself suffered from religious persecution and 
ignored “the slightly later dictum, ‘Do not do to your fellow that which 
is hateful to you.’”21 Similarly, the destruction of the Samaritan temple 
“can only be explained but not justified.”22 Nonetheless, Klausner’s basic 
inclination is to provide mitigation for such acts and sometimes even 
to justify them.
The most striking example of such justification appears in his reaction 
to Simon’s expulsion of pagans as part of the policy of judaizing sections 
of the land of Israel. It is true that these actions involved considerable 
cruelty, he says, but had the Hasmoneans behaved differently, the tiny 
Judaean state would have ceased to exist under the pressure of its 
neighbors, “and the end would have come for the People of Israel as a 
whole.” Under such circumstances, “the moral criterion cannot help but 
retreat, and in its place there comes another criterion: the possibility of 
survival. . . . For our ‘puny intellect,’ this appears to constitute the very 
antithesis of justice; for the ‘larger intellect,’ this is the way to justice, the 
footstool of absolute justice” (emphasis in the original).23
Elsewhere, he returns to the “biblical view of the Land of Israel,”24 
arguing that in light of this tradition, the newly formed Judaean state “had 
[was mukhrahat] to expand eastward—toward Transjordan, northward—
toward Shechem, and southward—toward Idumaea.”25 The conquest of 
Idumaea, complete with the forcible conversion of its inhabitants, was 
unavoidable. Stolen land was being recovered; a Jewish majority was a 
necessity for the nation; Judaea could not have been left surrounded 
by enemies forever. What follows is very difficult to read today: If we 
are concerned with “the admixture of blood, almost all the neighboring 
peoples were Semites, and so the race remained unaffected even after 
the conversion of the Idumaeans.”26 The major themes repeat themselves 
21 Historia 3:33, 35.
22 Historia 3:86.
23 Historia 3:65, 66.
24 Historia 3:78.
25 Historia 3:85.
26 Historia 3:88.
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in Klausner’s evaluation of the policies of Alexander Jannaeus: “Out of 
historical compulsion—deeply regrettable in itself—Jannaeus was forced 
to destroy cities . . . whose inhabitants did not agree to accept Judaism. 
. . . Is it plausible that in territories called by the name ‘Land of Israel’ 
that were part of Israel in the days of David, Solomon, Ahab, Jeroboam 
II and Josiah, aliens and enemies should reside forever?”27 
Klausner makes a point of emphasizing that the Jewish people as a 
whole supported the Hasmonean rulers no less than he. First, his idyllic 
characterization of this people is noteworthy in and of itself. “The true 
Jewish democracy [consisted of] farmers owning small homesteads, day 
laborers, craftsmen, and workers in fields and homes.” This was “a large 
nation, assiduous and wise, religious-moral, laboring and satisfied with 
limited wealth.” The typical Jewish farmer was “a religious conservative 
and a nationalist patriot.” And this nation “defended the Hasmonean 
family and its aspirations as one man.”28
Klausner provides four arguments for rejecting the historicity of the 
story asserting that Jannaeus crucified eight hundred of his opponents 
in a single day. Two of these strikingly underscore his attitude to the 
Hasmoneans themselves as well as his emphasis on their popular 
support. First, a king and high priest of the Hasmonean dynasty could 
not have been capable of such behavior.29 Second, if this had really 
happened, “the nation would not have been devoted to the Hasmoneans 
with all its heart and soul and would not have spilled its blood like water 
for anyone in whose veins there coursed even one drop of Hasmonean 
blood.”30 Elsewhere, Klausner is a bit more cautious, speaking of support 
from “the decisive majority of the activist nation,”31 but the fundamental 
emphasis remains unchanged. Finally, we hear of the special qualities of 
Hasmonean blood on more than one further occasion. Aristobulus II, 
for example, refused to accept one of Pompey’s demands because “the 
blood of the Maccabees coursing in his veins did not allow him to debase 
his honor excessively.”32 One wonders what sort of blood coursed in the 
veins of Aristobulus’s brother Hyrcanus II.
27 Historia 3:160.
28 Historia 3:12; 5:132: 3:43, 82.
29 This point was noted by Schafler, p. 201.
30 Historia 3:155.
31 Historia 3:235-36.
32 Historia 3:222.
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When we turn from war and politics to cultural life, the spectrum 
of Klausner’s views becomes wider, richer, more varied, more nuanced, 
and more interesting. In some respects, the single-minded nationalist 
perspective persists. Thus, in the aftermath of political liberation 
following centuries of submission to foreign rule, “it was impossible” 
that spiritual life would remain unchanged. “This will become clear 
in the course of time in the young State of Israel as well even though 
in the early years this is not yet very evident.”33 One of the prime 
characteristics of the Hasmonean period was the revival of the Hebrew 
language. Political independence led to “an exaltation of the soul” that 
“greatly reinforced national consciousness and prepared the ground for 
any powerful national-religious aspiration. And what national-religious 
possession could have been more precious and sacred to the nation than 
the language of the Torah and prophets that had been nearly suppressed 
by Greek on the one hand and Aramaic-Syriac on the other?”34 Thus, 
as Klausner sees it, “the national government” along with the Council 
of the Jews nurtured this development and helped determine its form 
almost along the lines of the twentieth-century Academy for the Hebrew 
Language.
At the same time, conflicting ideological commitments led Klausner to 
less predictable evaluations as he examined larger cultural developments. 
In his view, a central group among the Pharisees concentrated on 
religious and moral concerns at the expense of the political dimension, 
and we might have expected him to evaluate such a group pejoratively. 
He understood, however, that this group laid the foundations of Jewish 
culture for generations to come, and his own nationalist orientation was 
light years removed from that of the so-called “Canaanites” in the early 
years of the State. For all of Zionism’s “negation of exile,” the stream 
with which Klausner identified saw itself as an organic continuation of 
authentic Jewish culture freed to develop in new and healthy ways in 
the ancient homeland. Thus, a man like Hillel could not be seen through 
a dark lens, and we suddenly find very different rhetoric from that to 
which we have become accustomed.
Hillel, we are told, had to refrain from taking a political stand during 
the terror regime of Herod. This was the only way that he could achieve 
33 Historia 3:9.
34 Historia 3:105.
— 322 —
Yearning for Redemption
his sublime objectives.35 As to the Pharisees in general, their emphasis 
on religion over state “afforded the nation eternal life” even though “it 
stole away its political power. The Pharisees achieved the survival of 
the nation at the expense of its liberty” (emphasis in the original).36 In 
virtually every other context, Klausner, as we have seen, perceives the 
liberty of the nation as a condition of its survival. Here, looking back at 
the founders of rabbinic Judaism through the prism of a millennial exile, 
he speaks with a very different voice.
We have already encountered Klausner’s reaction to the Hellenizers’ 
efforts to open Judaea to Greek culture. In other contexts as well, he 
mobilizes the imperative of national survival for an even more surprising 
defense of cultural perspectives narrower that his own. Philo, he tells us, 
was a proud Jew, but in the final analysis the great Alexandrian thinker 
maintained that Moses and Plato had said the same things. “The nation’s 
instinct, its feeling of self-preservation, whispered to it. . . that it may 
not admit this compromising ideology into its home.”37 This instinct, he 
adds, also explains the attitude of the anti-philosophical party during the 
Maimonidean controversies many generations later. This understanding, 
almost supportive analysis of the anti-Maimonist position adumbrates 
Yitzhak Baer’s critical approach to Jewish openness to general culture in 
the Middle Ages, an approach that impelled Charles Touati to formulate 
a particularly sharp critique.
According to Baer, the Jewish religion belongs to the category of myth, 
a term never defined but clearly understood favorably. Judaism is placed 
in danger by philosophical culture. For Baer, all philosophers are suspect 
throughout Jewish history; their adversaries… always enjoy a favorable 
presumption. The position of the eminent historian, the product of a 
German university who was reared in rigorous scientific disciplines, seems 
odd (cocasse) to us. Is Judaism, then, to be devoted always, in its entirety, 
by its very essence, to lack of culture (l’inculture)?38
Klausner does not go as far as Baer, though he was motivated by similar 
instincts, and it is fascinating to see his willingness to empathize with 
35 Historia 4:125, 129-130.
36 Historia 3:228.
37 Historia 5:85.
38 Charles Touati, ‘La controverse de 1303-1306 autour des études philosophiques et 
scientifiques,’ Revue des Études Juives 127 (1968): 37, n. 3.
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Jews who banned and even burned the works of the hero of generations of 
maskilim who were in large measure role models for Klausner himself.
Klausner’s cultural instincts lead to a particularly interesting deviation 
from the anticipated line with respect to an even more pivotal figure than 
Philo, a figure whom historians of the Second Temple period confront 
every hour of every day. Klausner is acutely aware that his attitude to 
Josephus will surprise us, and in a passage demonstrating with painful 
clarity how insecure he felt in the face of criticism, he points to this 
explicitly as evidence that he is an objective historian.39 He understands 
that we would expect him to disdain the historian-traitor; instead, he 
sees him as a man of initial good intentions who, even after his act of 
genuine treason, deserves regard as an exceptional historian. Perhaps 
this is indeed a sign of objectivity, but it is more likely the product of 
a collision of two subjective impulses. Of course Klausner was repelled 
by Josephus’ treason, but his belief that the capacity to explain history 
is one of the quintessential qualities of the Jewish people40 moved him 
toward an almost visceral appreciation of the talents of the major Jewish 
historian of antiquity.
The emotional tie that Klausner felt toward his illustrious predecessor 
emerges from a gripping, almost amazing passage. Josephus tells us that 
he chose to survive in Jodephat because had he died before transmitting 
the message (diangelia), he would have betrayed the divine charge. 
Klausner contends that this does not refer to the message that Vespasian 
would become Emperor. It refers, rather, to the destiny of Josephus 
himself, who somehow understood that he was fated to become the 
historian of the Jewish people. “A supernal force impelled him to live in 
order to write books that would endure for thousands of years, to survive 
so that he could be revealed as one of the great Jewish historians of all 
generations.”41
The career of Josephus transports us to the final days of the Second 
Temple. Despite Klausner’s qualified sympathy for the spiritually oriented 
Pharisees, his deeper identification is with the group that he calls “activist 
Pharisees,” to wit, the Zealots, who enjoyed the support, as he sees it, of 
“the nation in its masses.” Here too he must confront moral questions, 
39 Historia 3: introduction.
40 Historia 2:270.
41 Historia 5:190-191.
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which he resolves in part by recourse to a slightly altered version of a 
famous line in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari. “Their intentions were desirable, 
but their actions were not always desirable.” Nonetheless, even if they 
sometimes engaged in robbery, they had no alternative. “Since they were 
constantly guarding the national interest, it was impossible for them to 
pursue remunerative work.”42
And so we arrive at the great revolt that these Zealots precipitated. 
In addition to the routine reasons that Klausner proposes to explain that 
revolt, he suggests that the Romans encouraged it through intentional, 
blatant provocations inspiring an uprising that they could then exploit 
to destroy the threat posed to them by the “metropolis of world Jewry.”43 
Once again, warring tendencies in the historian’s psyche produce a 
slightly unexpected result. Klausner is prepared to depict his heroic 
Jewish rebels as dupes of a successful Roman stratagem in order to 
magnify the importance, power, and centrality of world Jewry.
Finally, even the failure of the revolt does not demonstrate that it was 
mistaken. On the contrary, simple submission to Rome would have led to 
decline and, ultimately, to the disappearance of the nation. Instead, 
a destruction following glorious, remarkable wars of the sort fought by 
the “bandits” and “ruffians” against the dominant Roman Empire, wars 
that remained in the memory of all generations, was not an absolute 
destruction. It was not the Torah alone that sustained us in our exile. The 
memories of a monumental struggle with the great world power preserved 
in Talmud and Midrash, in Josippon and other of our narratives also led to 
long life, indeed, to eternal life. [Such a] nation will never be destroyed.44
It is difficult to agree that the actions of the “bandits,” which were 
sharply criticized in most of the sources informing the consciousness of 
Jews in exile, played a central role in sustaining the spirit of persecuted 
Jews in medieval and early modern times. But in the Zionist period, 
refashioned in the works of Klausner and others, they surely did. Even one 
who reads Klausner’s History for the purpose of analyzing its ideological 
Tendenz cannot help but feel the deep pathos that informs his work, and 
there can be no question that readers were inspired, educators energized, 
42 Historia 5:29-30.
43 Historia 5:132, 140, 141.
44 Historia 5:136-137.
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students instructed, and public opinion molded. In full awareness of 
Klausner’s historiographic sins, some observers with Zionist sympathies 
may nonetheless set aside an academic lens and conclude that not only 
were his intentions desirable, but, under the pressing circumstances in 
which he wrote, even his actions may have achieved ends that partially 
atone for those sins.
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THE FRAGILITY OF RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE:
ACCOUNTING FOR ORTHODOX ACQUIESCENCE 
IN THE BELIEF IN A SECOND COMING*
From: Modern Judaism 22 (2002): 103-114.
In the last seven years, we have witnessed a watershed in the history of 
Judaism that cries out for explanation. With minimal resistance, in the 
full view of world Jewry, two propositions from which every mainstream 
Jew in the last millennium would have instantly recoiled have become 
legitimate options within Orthodox Judaism:
1. A specific descendant of King David may be identified with certainty 
as the Messiah even though he died in an unredeemed world. The 
criteria always deemed necessary for a confident identification of 
the Messiah—the temporal redemption of the Jewish people, a 
rebuilt Temple, peace and prosperity, the universal recognition of 
the God of Israel—are null and void.
2. The messianic faith of Judaism allows for the following scenario: 
God will finally send the true Messiah to embark upon his 
redemptive mission. The long-awaited redeemer will declare that 
all preparations for the redemption have been completed and 
announce without qualification that the fulfillment is absolutely 
imminent. He will begin the process of gathering the dispersed 
of Israel to the Holy Land. He will proclaim himself a prophet, 
point clearly to his messianic status, and declare that the only 
remaining task is to greet him as Messiah. And then he will die 
and be buried without redeeming the world. To put the matter 
more succinctly, the true Messiah’s redemptive mission, publicly 
* This article is an adaptation and elaboration of chapter 13 of my The Rebbe, the Messiah, 
and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference (London and Portland, Oregon, 2001). The first 
few paragraphs are adapted from the book’s Introduction.
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proclaimed and vigorously pursued, will be interrupted by death 
and burial and then consummated through a Second Coming.
While the vast majority of Jews continue to perceive these as alien 
propositions, and the Rabbinical Council of America has declared that 
there is no place for such doctrines in Judaism, the assertion that 
contemporary Orthodox Jewry effectively legitimates these beliefs rests 
on a simple observation: A large segment—almost certainly a substantial 
majority—of Chabad hasidim affirm that the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi 
Menachem Mendel Schneerson, who was laid to rest in 1994, did 
everything subsumed under proposition two and will soon return to 
complete the redemption in his capacity as the Messiah. Adherents of 
this belief, including those who have ruled that it is required by Jewish 
law, routinely hold significant religious posts with the sanction of major 
Orthodox authorities unconnected to their movement.
These range from the offices of the Israeli Rabbinate to the ranks of 
mainstream Rabbinical organizations to the chairmanship of Rabbinic 
courts in both Israel and the diaspora, not to speak of service as scribes, 
ritual slaughterers, teachers, and administrators of schools and religious 
organizations receiving support from mainstream Orthodoxy. Shortly 
after signing a public ruling that Jewish law obligates all Jews to accept 
the messiahship of the deceased Rebbe, a Montreal rabbi was appointed 
head of the rabbinical court of the entire city. In summer, 2001, one 
could pick up a flyer in Jerusalem advertising a program for children 
run by a local Chabad house that begins with the logo of the Jerusalem 
Department of Torah Culture and ends with the slogan, “May our Master, 
Teacher and Rabbi the King Messiah live forever.” For much of Orthodox 
Jewry, the classic boundaries of Judaism’s messianic faith are no more.
I take it for granted that a typical Orthodox Jew ten years ago would 
have questioned the sanity of anyone asserting that adherents of such 
posthumous messianism would be recognized as Orthodox rabbis in 
perfectly good standing. If this assumption is correct, then the current 
status quo represents a startlingly swift, profound transformation. I 
refer not to the messianist belief itself but to the failure of mainstream 
Orthodoxy to marginalize the believers. What can account for such 
acquiescence in a community that prides itself on strict adherence to 
tradition and often denies that social factors play any significant role in 
shaping its beliefs and practices?
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Let me begin with a broad, theoretical consideration and then move to 
a constellation of more specific factors that render this development not 
merely comprehensible but so ineluctable that efforts to roll it back face 
almost insuperable hurdles. I do not command sufficient expertise in the 
comparative sociology of religion to set up rules of general applicability 
governing such transformations. It seems to me, however, that Chabad 
is marked by a combination of characteristics critical for making this 
sort of religious upheaval possible. Both an in-group and an out-group, 
it is sufficiently self-contained, even sectarian, to generate a deviationist 
ideology and sufficiently integrated to make that ideology an acceptable 
option within the larger community.
On the one hand, Chabad hasidim see themselves as bearers of the 
only fully authentic expression of Judaism. It is through their leaders that 
the progressive revelation of the inner Torah has taken place; it is their 
rebbes who have been the potential messiahs of recent generations; it is 
their emissaries who are the agents of the redemptive process, destined 
to be granted front row seats near the Messiah when he comes;1 it is 
to a location adjoining their headquarters in Crown Heights that the 
ultimate, heavenly Temple will descend before moving to Jerusalem.2 
The sense that they are different not only facilitates the creation of a 
theology undisciplined by mainstream consensus; it leads mainstream 
Jews to minimize the impact of that theology because it is perceived as 
marginal and hence not threatening.
On the other hand, Lubavitch hasidim engage in outreach to all Jews, 
emphasize the value of loving all of Israel, make highly sophisticated 
use of mass media, retain ties with other hasidim and Orthodox Jews 
even as they refrain from participating in many common endeavors, hold 
posts integrated into the warp and woof of Orthodox communal life, and 
establish deep reservoirs of sympathy through activities that almost all 
Orthodox Jews cannot help but admire. Thus, their beliefs can decidedly 
change the Jewish religion writ large.
1 Note the little vignette in Kfar Chabad 731 (Eve of Sukkot, 5757; Sept. 27, 1996), where 
the Rebbe tells the discouraged wife of an emissary, “We are on the verge of being 
privileged to experience the coming of the Messiah. You must decide where you want 
to be at that time—pushed far back among the masses or together with the emissaries 
who see the face of the king and sit first in the kingdom.”
2 See R. Menachem Mendel Schneerson, Kuntres be-Inyan Mikdash Me‘at Zeh Beit Rabbenu 
she-be-Bavel (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1992).
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Within this framework, then, let us turn to specific causes, reasons, 
and rationales—stated and unstated—for the effective Orthodox 
decision to allow this process to unfold.
THE IDEAL OF UNITY AND THE AVOIDANCE 
OF COMMUNAL STRIFE
The point is self-evident. Every practicing Jew has heard countless 
sermons about the imperative to love one’s neighbor, particularly one’s 
Jewish neighbor. At the barest minimum, the annual Torah reading about 
Korah’s rebellion against Moses (Numbers 16-17) generates discourses 
about the severe prohibition against fomenting disputes within the 
community. While rhetoric about this value cuts across all Orthodox—
and Jewish—lines, it is especially compelling for Modern Orthodox Jews 
who maintain cordial, even formal relations with other denominations 
and pride themselves on embracing an ideal of tolerance.
The impact of this tolerant self-image, which borders on self-
definition, can cut very deep. It is nurtured not only by a positive 
ideology but by disdain for the narrowness and intolerance that are seen 
as quintessential traits of the orthodoxies of the Right. It is reinforced 
by humorous putdowns whose power to mold as well as express self-
perceptions should not be underestimated. Thus, a widely repeated joke 
explains that God serves Leviathan fish at the messianic banquet out of 
solicitude for those participants who will not eat the meat because they 
do not trust God’s shehitah (ritual slaughter). Modern Orthodox Jews 
who have made a habit of poking fun at the Traditionalist Orthodox for 
divisive hyper-religiosity are now faced with the prospect of evaluating 
the status of Lubavitch shehitah in light of the belief of some hasidim 
that the Rebbe is not only the Messiah but pure divinity. Even the few 
who take this matter seriously can find it psychologically impossible to 
don the mantle of those they see as religious fanatics and engage in the 
very behavior they have been mocking for years.
From the perspective of the abstract principles of Orthodox Judaism, 
the argument from tolerance and unity is beside the point. A few weeks 
after the Torah reading about Korah, very different sermons are preached 
about the zeal of Phineas (Numbers 25). No Orthodox Jew believes that 
everyone committed to the Jewish community has the right to serve 
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as an Orthodox rabbi irrespective of his religious outlook because of 
the value of unity. Resort to this principle is relevant only after one has 
concluded that Lubavitch messianism is essentially within the boundaries 
of Orthodoxy. Since this is precisely what is at issue, the argument begs 
the question, and its powerful appeal is rooted in a different instinct to 
which we now turn.
ORTHOPRAXY AND APPEARANCE
Though my presentation in this scholarly venue is academic in substance 
and largely irenic in tone, it is no secret that I have pursued a rhetorically 
charged campaign to change the widespread Orthodox indifference to this 
development. Two distinguished academic observers of contemporary 
Orthodoxy have chided me for incurable naivete in imagining that 
matters of faith play any significant role in the community. Anyone 
who looks and acts the way Lubavitch hasidim do will be treated as an 
Orthodox Jew. Period. A traditional talmudist in full agreement with my 
position told me, “If the messianists looked like you, people would react 
differently.” Similarly, two other academics argued that issues of faith 
can be relevant, but only when the deviations come from the left, that 
is, from a group seen as more modernist than that of the critic.
In several conversations with fully Orthodox Jews, both Traditionalist 
and Modern, I have heard formulations that come close to an unalloyedly 
orthoprax position, to wit, that any Jew who observes the commandments 
remains within the fold. It is no accident that enemies of Lubavitch through 
the years have laid special stress on deviations from the straightforward 
requirements of halakhah. This argument rests upon Chabad justifications 
for not sleeping in a sukkah, not eating the third Sabbath meal, waiting till 
well into the night to recite the afternoon prayer upon the Rebbe’s return 
from his father-in-law’s gravesite, and, on one occasion in 1991, delaying 
the morning prayer on Sukkot till 3:30 P.M.3
The theoretical superstructure of Orthodoxy insists on the importance 
of doctrinal as well as behavioral criteria in defining membership in 
3 With respect to the first two issues, the problem was less with the practice itself than 
with the seemingly principled rejection of the requirement. On that Sukkot day in 1991, 
see Binyamin Lipkin, Heshbono shel Olam (Lod, 2000), pp. 112-113.
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the group.4 Nonetheless, my critics are certainly correct in arguing 
that an instinct placing almost exclusive emphasis on observance of 
the commandments has played a key role in discouraging a serious, 
effective reaction to Chabad messianism. In pre-modern times, when 
visible conformity to ritual standards was taken for granted, it could not 
overwhelm all other criteria in determining an individual’s communal 
standing. For contemporary Jews, full observance of Orthodox law is 
so clearly seen as an unambiguous marker that theology can become 
virtually irrelevant. 
This instinct extends even to areas of belief that technically impinge 
on halakhah. Observers cannot imagine that some Lubavitch hasidim 
really maintain beliefs about the Rebbe’s divinity amounting to avodah 
zarah, which roughly means the formal recognition or worship as God of 
an entity that is in fact not God. Sociologically, then, a proviso needs to be 
appended to this definition: such recognition or worship is avodah zarah 
provided that the believer is someone other than a Sabbath-observing 
Jew wearing a wig or a black hat. Judaism, which was once a great faith, 
has become an agglomeration of dress, deportment, and rituals.
This very point about external appearance and ritual observance was 
made in Yated Ne’eman, a newspaper published in Israel by one group 
that does delegitimate the messianists and, indeed, all of Chabad—the 
followers of R. Elazar Menachem Man Schach of the Ponevezh yeshiva in 
Bnei Brak.5 The challenge, said the author, is to transcend externals and 
recognize the illegitimacy of these superficially Orthodox Jews. This sector 
of Israeli Orthodoxy and its counterparts in some American yeshivas do 
not act on this issue because they believe they have already acted.
THE BALKANIZATION OF ORTHODOXY, 
OR THE ORTHODOXY OF ENCLAVES
Why do such Jews remain relatively passive at this point despite the 
evident ineffectiveness of their efforts in the wider community? While 
part of the explanation lies in despair born of frustration and another, 
4 See my review of Menachem Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything?, Tradition 33/4 
(Summer, 1999): 81-89.
5 See Natan Ze’ev Grossman, in the Hebrew Yated Ne’eman, March 13, 1998, pp. 15, 22.
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conflicting part in a rose-colored belief that by now everyone sees that 
R. Schach was correct, there is a deeper issue that plays a very important 
role in other sectors of the Orthodox community as well. The challenge 
of modernity and the growth of religious deviationism have impelled 
much of Orthodoxy to turn inward. One consequence of this orientation 
has been the attenuation of the instinctive sense of a Jewish religious 
collective extending beyond one’s own group. Moreover, and very much 
to the point, “group” does not even refer to Orthodoxy as a whole but to 
a much smaller entity.
The main focus of many Orthodox Jews is on their own subgroup, 
anshei shlomenu in the terminology of hasidic communities, yeshiva layt 
in non-hasidic groups, and so on. Consequently, the argument that 
something called Judaism, even Orthodox Judaism, has changed because 
of the legitimation of Lubavitch messianists, invokes categories that 
have lost much of their force. I do not mean to suggest that Orthodox 
Jews—even in Traditionalist circles—have entirely rejected their 
responsibilities to the larger community, but instincts have undoubtedly 
changed. The question posed—even in Modern circles—is, “Does anyone 
in my immediate environment believe that the Rebbe is the Messiah?” If 
the answer is no, then the rise of this movement becomes a curiosity or 
at most a mildly disturbing development. A blinkered, myopic question 
produces a blinkered, myopic response.
ORTHODOX INTERDEPENDENCE, 
OR THE INTERLOCKING OF THE ENCLAVES
Paradoxically, another critically important explanation stands in stark 
contrast to the psychology of balkanization, namely, the reality of 
interdependence. Lubavitch messianists, for all their sectarianism, are 
so entwined in the larger Orthodox community—and even the Jewish 
community as a whole—that excision is extraordinarily difficult.
I have had more than one conversation in which an Orthodox Jew 
would argue that Lubavitch is after all a relatively small, ultimately 
peripheral movement and then agree under questioning that he or she 
would have considerable difficulty living without it. Rabbinic courts 
headed by messianist rabbis interact regularly with other courts. 
How should they be regarded? Scores of Israeli rabbis holding posts 
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throughout the country have signed a halakhic ruling requiring belief 
in the messiahship of the Rebbe.6 How easy would it be to remove 
them from office? Messianist rabbis play a significant role in countries 
throughout the world. How realistic is it to propose that they be 
marginalized? A respected, Lubavitch-run kashrut organization is the 
supervisor of choice for restaurants full of messianist propaganda. How 
does one deal with it? Rejecting Lubavitch ritual slaughter or refusing 
to attend a messianist synagogue would cause no little inconvenience 
to religiously observant travelers—Orthodox and non-Orthodox— and 
require significant modification of vacation plans. How realistic is the 
expectation that concern with a matter of abstract theology will change 
established behaviors? A significant number of Jews reside in places to 
which most Jews merely travel. How can they be expected to react to the 
assertion that the food, the synagogue, and the school upon which they 
rely have suddenly been rendered unacceptable?
The matter is complicated further by the fact that not all Lubavitch 
hasidim are messianists and not all messianists endorse a theology of 
avodah zarah. It is much easier to accept false assurances that a majority 
maintain Orthodox beliefs than it is to take the very difficult steps implied 
in the previous paragraph. Rather than face these consequences, Jews 
force themselves to conclude that second-coming messianism promoted by 
people whose services they need is not really second-coming messianism, 
that legitimation is not legitimation, that avodah zarah is not avodah zarah. 
Of all the causes of inaction, this is the most intractable, and it may well 
result in a permanent and profound transformation of Judaism.
“GOOD THINGS”
“But they do so many good things.” I cannot count the number of times 
I have heard this sentence or its equivalent. Some of these “things” are 
acts of kindness that are not specific to Judaism; others involve the 
teaching of Torah and the successful dissemination of Jewish rituals to 
the proverbial four corners of the earth. Much of the loyalty to Lubavitch 
on the local level flows from personal relationships established with Jews 
of all stripes—Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, even secular—in need 
6 Hatzofeh, January 17, 2000.
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of an understanding heart, a sympathetic ear, a favor large (sometimes 
very large) or small. In an increasingly impersonal society, Lubavitch 
emissaries exult in the joy of others and empathize with their sadness, 
forging bonds that cannot be broken by mere theology. On the ritual 
level, they not only encourage the wearing of tefillin and the lighting 
of Sabbath candles; they provide travelers with kosher food, a Passover 
seder, a prayer service, and more. The beneficiaries of this largesse cannot 
help but feel the most profound gratitude.
Once again, looking at this consideration through a purely theoretical 
Orthodox prism renders it highly problematic. If the recognition of 
Lubavitch messianists as Orthodox rabbis really destroys the parameters 
of Judaism’s messianic faith (as it surely does), then the issue needs to 
be framed in global terms. You can gain ten thousand (or one hundred 
thousand, or one million) additional observant Jews at the price of 
accepting a fundamental change in a core belief of Judaism. Are you 
prepared to pay that price? Posed in the abstract to an Orthodox audience, 
this should be a rhetorical question. But people are rarely motivated by 
abstractions or by concern for the course of history writ large. How, they 
ask, can we not be impressed with this selfless family that has established 
a synagogue in a spiritual wilderness and persuaded people who would 
have lost their Jewish identity entirely to observe the Torah? In such a 
struggle between heart and mind, the mind stands little chance.7
TRANSIENT INSANITY
I have heard the assertion that the messianists are crazy no less frequently 
than the argument that “they do good things.” Sometimes this appears to 
mean that because the belief is insane it will surely not last and should 
therefore be treated with benign—or malign—neglect. In this version, 
the contention is problematic but coherent. In most cases, however, 
the word meshugoyim (crazy people) or meshugaas (craziness) seems to 
7 Arguments for the delegitimation of Lubavitch messianism can, of course, also appeal 
to the heart, and I have attempted in other forums to evoke such emotions to the 
best of my ability. See, for example, The Rebbe, the Messiah, and the Scandal of Orthodox 
Indifference, where I argue that Orthodox Judaism has effectively declared that “on a 
matter of fundamental principle our martyred ancestors were wrong and their Christian 
murderers were right” (p. 75). 
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be intended as a self-contained argument. Because they are crazy, they 
cannot be taken seriously and should be ignored—or even supported for 
their “good things.” Precisely because it is so difficult to assign a coherent 
meaning to this argument, it reveals once again the operation of a deep 
instinct that seeks any avenue to avoid the unwanted conclusion that 
messianists should be excluded from Orthodoxy.
Most people who proffer this argument appear to agree that the 
messianist belief stands in contradiction to the classical Jewish messianic 
faith. But if this is so, it is difficult to see how the ”fact” that it is also a 
form of craziness qualifies the believer to be a rabbi, judge, principal, or 
teacher. Does the very fact that it is crazy somehow make it compatible 
with Judaism?8  Imagine a colloquy in which someone objects to hiring a 
messianist rabbi.  A supporter of the appointment responds, “It is true that 
he maintains a profoundly un-Jewish belief, but this drawback is neutralized 
by a countervailing consideration that works in his favor.  He is crazy.”
Moreover, the large majority of messianists are not crazy in any 
clinical sense; to suggest that they are is crazy.  The non-messianists in 
Chabad face daunting obstacles in their efforts to interpret teachings 
of the Rebbe that appear to point to his messiahship.  Against this 
background, for a hasid to defend the messianist position through a 
variety of learned and complex strategies is decidedly not a violation of 
the canons of reason.  An outside observer is, of course, free to argue 
that belief in the resurrection of the dead, or in a personal Messiah, or, 
for that matter, in God, is itself irrational.  By that criterion, however, all 
serious Orthodox Jews (and, for that matter, Christians) are crazy.
This is not to deny that the percentage of unbalanced individuals 
is probably somewhat higher in the messianist population than in the 
Jewish population as a whole.  Extreme doctrines like the belief that the 
Rebbe is fully alive can easily elicit contemptuous jokes, and this too is 
an important factor in preventing serious responses.  The assumption 
that only meshugoyim could possibly believe that the Rebbe is the 
Messiah also contributes to a dramatically unrealistic underestimate of 
the extent of messianism in Chabad.  After all, say many observers, since 
I know that Rabbi so-and-so is a perfectly normal person; it follows that 
8 For those concerned with the posthumous destiny of people who might be heretics, the 
assertion that they are crazy can serve as mitigation. This, however, does not appear to 
be the primary context is which the argument is used.
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he could not possibly be a believer.9
The association of messianism with insanity also bears on the 
confident predictions of the inevitable, imminent disappearance of 
belief in the messiahship of the Rebbe. The fact that a religion called 
Christianity, which also believes in a dying and resurrected redeemer, 
has not yet disappeared ought to give at least some pause to these 
prognosticators. Let me reinforce this point by adducing a much more 
recent and hence even more apt example.
Mormonism was born in modern times as a dramatically deviant 
form of Christianity. It makes highly problematic historical assertions 
about relatively recent events. Its theology makes that of Lubavitch 
messianists appear like the very soul of rationality. It has a sophisticated, 
well-educated constituency. It sends emissaries to the ends of the earth 
to make converts and is, I believe, the fastest growing religion in the 
world. Whatever one thinks of the rationality of the first generation of 
believers, children brought up in such a faith can surely accept it without 
damage to their rational faculties. If Mormonism flourishes, why is 
Chabad messianism necessarily condemned to extinction?
I will not hazard a prediction as to the medium or long term survival 
of this belief. Menachem Friedman, the most distinguished sociologist 
of Orthodoxy in Israel, believes that in a leaderless movement, the 
group with the most fervent message is likely to prevail. If so, then all 
the worldwide institutions of Chabad will eventually be mobilized to 
spread this version of Judaism. However that may be, I certainly do 
not see what will destroy this faith as long as the rest of Orthodoxy 
legitimates messianist rabbis and the bulk of the Chabad educational 
system remains in messianist hands. Confident prognostications of 
imminent demise fly in the face of reason.10
9 It is not uncommon for ordinary Orthodox Jews to find themselves subjected to 
analogous misperceptions. Many years ago, a non-Jewish colleague in my department 
took it for granted that I did not follow a bizarre practice that she had just been told 
about, to wit, that Orthodox Jews will not drink wine handled by Gentiles. Somewhat 
more recently, two Jewish colleagues asked me about an article in the New York Times 
describing a shatnez-testing laboratory in Brooklyn. When I proceeded to show them 
the non-shatnez label in my jacket, they managed to remain polite but were clearly non-
plussed to discover that a person who usually appeared reasonably sane actually adhered 
to such outlandish regulations. All this notwithstanding the fact that I wear a yarmulke 
at work and make my Orthodox affiliation clear in more ways than I can recount.
10 The failure to take this development seriously has led more than one person to suggest 
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THE WANING OF A CHRISTIAN THREAT AND THE ATROPHY 
OF JEWISH MESSIANIC INSTINCTS
With the decline of a pervasive Christian threat, familiarity with 
messianic texts and sensitivity to messianic deviationism has waned 
to the vanishing point even among learned Jews. Jewish polemical 
texts are not part of the Orthodox curriculum nor (outside Chabad) are 
treatises dealing with redemption. Moreover, I think that the celebrated 
observation that many Orthodox Jews no longer trust the traditions 
with which they were raised is also germane to this development.11 In 
previous generations, Jews would have paid little attention to messianist 
sectarians who “proved” that their belief is acceptable by pointing to one 
line in Sanhedrin 98b. Now, unbound by a consensus once imbibed by 
every Jewish tailor and shoemaker with his mother’s milk, and oblivious 
of a rich polemical literature, they function as tabulae rasae for every 
unfamiliar text introduced to them. While they will not go so far as to 
embrace the belief in the Rebbe’s messiahship, they can be persuaded 
that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with it.
JUST ANOTHER CHANGE
Finally, several people who understand very well that Lubavitch 
messianism has no legitimate precedent in Judaism have nonetheless 
chided me for attributing so much significance to this development. 
After all, they say, I am a historian, and a historian of ideas no less. I 
should know better than most that beliefs change, that religions evolve. 
Hasidism itself was an innovation. Religious Zionism was an innovation. 
that I stop wasting my time on it. A very distinguished scholar who is an observant Jew 
urged me to remain focused on the area where I do important work: the Middle Ages. 
In other words, I should spend all my time studying what is really significant, namely, 
Jewish arguments against Christianity in the Middle Ages, rather than diverting my 
attention to the trivial issue of whether Jews still believe those arguments. I wonder 
what this scholar tells his students about the uses of history.
11 See Menachem Friedman, “Life Tradition and Book Tradition in the Development of 
Ultraorthodox Judaism,” in Judaism from Within and from Without: Anthropological 
Studies, ed. by Harvey Goldberg (Albany, 1987), pp. 235-255; Haym Soloveitchik, 
“Rupture and Reconstruction: The Transformation of Contemporary Orthodoxy,” 
Tradition 28:4 (Summer, 1994): 64-130.
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Why must I remain in a state of arrested development, embalmed in the 
world of the Barcelona disputation?
I am inclined to think that this argument is not a primary cause 
of Orthodox inaction because it appeals only to the most modernist 
worldview within Orthodoxy. Some Lubavitch hasidim, however, have 
also mobilized it for polemical purposes. Since it involves an issue of 
religious judgment and has been posed to me in a personal way, I take the 
liberty of injecting an overtly personal response into this analysis.
It should not be necessary to say that historians are permitted to 
have commitments to abiding principles. The decision to study history 
is not a decision to embrace change as one’s supreme value. All religious 
traditions have boundaries, and any adherent of such a tradition faces 
the challenge of deciding whether or not a particular innovation subverts 
core elements of that tradition. Here is my response to one of these 
critics:
I consider this issue [especially] serious for roughly the following reasons: 
1- It involves a key element in the understanding of one of the iqqarei ha-
emunah (fundamentals of the faith). 2- Comparable movements throughout 
Jewish history have been thoroughly, vehemently, angrily delegitimated 
by klal Yisrael [the Jewish collective]. I refer both to the movements that 
persisted after the candidate’s death and the movements that died with 
his death precisely because their posthumous survival was unthinkable. 
3- Denial of such a belief has been a part of the very definition of Judaism 
in innumerable confrontations with the Christian mission. Accepting it as 
a harmless enthusiasm awards victory to Christianity on a fundamental 
matter of principle. 4- It has led to avodah zarah in both past instances and 
shows signs of doing so again.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF 
“STARTING A FIGHT WITH LUBAVITCH”
Finally, there are pragmatic obstacles that beset any effort to delegitimate 
this belief and its adherents. Lubavitch messianists are the dominant 
part of an influential movement with impressive human, financial, and 
political resources that defends its interests vigorously. Few people 
have the stomach to pursue a cause that will cause them to be publicly 
labeled—as I can testify from personal experience—haters, dividers, 
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liars, heretics, egotistical seekers of fame and fortune, ignoramuses, 
snakes, asses, and pigs. The reluctance to “start a fight with Lubavitch” is 
palpable, particularly on the part of those whose institutions might lose 
support from Chabad sympathizers or whose positions might even be 
jeopardized. Since a large majority of Orthodox Jews rely on a very small 
number of rabbinic authorities to make decisions of such moment, it is 
only necessary to deter a relative handful of people from taking action.
* * * * * *
A phenomenon that appears at first, uncritical glance to be inexplicable 
turns out upon examination to be overdetermined. Primarily social 
factors abetted at critical points by religious sensibilities can sweep away 
a central doctrine of a well established faith with a millennial history of 
withstanding the most severe pressure. Had this change been imposed 
from without, Orthodox Jews would have resisted at all costs. But it 
came from within, and to this point it has prevailed.

EPILOGUE
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“THE COUNTENANCE OF HIS FATHER”: 
TWENTYFIVE YEARS SINCE THE PASSING OF 
HADOAR AUTHOR ISAIAH BERGER OF BLESSED 
MEMORY
Hadoar 78:4 (December 25, 1998) (Hebrew). Translated by the author. 
I grew up on the front lines of an incessant war between books and 
clothing, and the books had the better of it. In the bookcases, they 
reigned supreme, while in the closets the long coats and dresses had 
to defend themselves against the infiltrations and attacks of the new 
volumes that multiplied without cease.
This lust for books may have resulted from the fact that my father 
had virtually no formal education in either Jewish or general studies and 
attained most of his knowledge not from teachers but through constant, 
wide-ranging reading. His father, who was a rabbi in Zinkov in Ukraine, 
passed away when his younger son was a baby. The elder son migrated to 
Canada, where he succeeded in setting up a business, and as time passed 
he helped his mother and younger brother come to New York via Canada 
when my father was sixteen years old.
The young immigrant studied for some time in Rabbi Isaac Elchanan 
Theological Seminary of Yeshiva University, but he carved out an 
independent path for himself in areas that interested him and decided 
to educate himself outside the framework of organized educational 
institutions.1 The evidence furnished by the dates noted in his books 
indicates that he began to form his library in 1927 when he was twenty-
one years old, and in the following year his first scholarly article appeared 
in Ha-Tzofeh le-Hokhmat Yisrael (“Le-Toledot Meqorotav ve-Hashpa‘ato 
shel Sefer Sha‘ashu‘im le-R. Yosef ben Meir Zabbara”). The article is 
1 Nonetheless, he wrote two enthusiastic articles about Yeshiva, one on its fiftieth 
anniversary (Hadoar 16:32), and another on the opening of Stern College (“Mikhlalah 
li-Benot Yisrael,”Hadoar 33:40).
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remarkable for the range of expertise that it displays in Jewish literature 
throughout the generations, and there is no doubt that readers would 
have been stunned had they known that the author is a twenty-two year 
old without an academic degree.
Nonetheless, my father experienced difficulty in his search for a means 
of livelihood, in large measure because learning was his heart’s desire, 
but also as a result of character traits like modesty, lack of initiative in 
economic matters, and sometimes even an excess of decency. I remember 
his telling me that one of the obstacles that he faced as a teacher in a 
primary school for part-time Jewish study (a Talmud Torah) over a period 
of several months—a position that was in any event not designed to 
generate great wealth— was his refusal on ethical grounds to utilize the 
proven method suggested to him to control disruptive children, namely, 
to appoint them as monitors over the other pupils.
Eventually, he opened a bookstore that served primarily as a 
warehouse. He periodically issued a catalogue with a list of books in 
Hebrew and other languages that dealt mainly with Jewish themes but 
to a non-trivial extent also with general folklore and other areas of study 
that interested him. An important scholar informed me quite recently 
that he saves the catalogues of “Isaiah Berger, Books” as documents of 
importance for the history of Jewish culture in the United States.
In the thirties, articles by Isaiah Berger began to appear in Hadoar, 
including reviews of overarching studies like Joseph Klausner’s History of 
Modern Jewish Literature (Hadoar 19:30) and Meyer Waxman’s A History 
of Jewish Literature (Hadoar 16:31, and 21:22). These essays combined 
heartfelt positive evaluation and pointed, sometimes sharply formulated 
criticism. In 1954, shortly after the passing of Menachem Ribalow [the 
founder and long-time editor], he began his work on the editorial staff of 
Hadoar on a regular basis. The catalogues that he published provided him 
with an opportunity to continue his involvement with the books that 
served as the source of his spiritual sustenance, but his daily livelihood 
came from his position with Hadoar, where he remained almost until his 
passing in 1973.
He was of course acquainted with all the prominent figures in the 
Hebrew movement in the Unites States—Ribalow, Daniel Persky, Moshe 
Meisels, A.R. Malachi, and many more. Even though his main areas of 
expertise were folklore, proverbs, and literature, he wrote a major article 
on “Jewish Scholarship in America” surveying such scholarship from 
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1848 until the date of the study (1939).2 His task at Hadoar included 
the reading and correcting of the large majority of articles, and beginning 
with the mid-1960’s he transformed the section on “Books Received 
by the Editors” (which he wrote anonymously) from a simple list to a 
succinct analysis of studies in all fields and periods, to the point where 
one could characterize him as Samuel David Luzzatto once characterized 
himself: “Nihil judaicum alienum est mihi.”3
He was graced with a well-developed sense of humor, and his scholarly 
interest in jokes did not remain restricted to research. Despite the smile 
that frequently played across his lips, he took very seriously the cultural 
aim of Hadoar as he understood it and vigorously opposed proposals to 
lower the journal’s intellectual level for the sake of achieving popularity. 
This seriousness marked his attitude toward all matters of culture and 
language. We did not speak Hebrew at home, but my father insisted on 
the purity of language even in English. When I would intersperse words 
in Hebrew or Yiddish into an English conversation, he could not tolerate 
the admixture, and he would always stop me by asking, “How do you say 
that in English?” He was also not among the despisers of Yiddish, and 
he wrote articles on Peretz in Yivo Bleter and in Die Goldene Kait without 
any diminution of his engaging literary style.
In addition, he served as a translator in English, Hebrew, and Yiddish. 
In these instances as well his name was not mentioned, and generally 
2 “Hokhmat Yisra’el ba-America,” Sefer ha-Shanah li-Yehudei America li-Shenat Tav Resh 
Tzadi Tet, ed. by Menachem Ribalow (New York, 1939), pp. 345-378.
3 He wrote short notes or reports on events in the Hebrew movement anonymously or 
with an abbreviated byline (Y. B. or just B. or sometimes Y. ben Yitzhak). In addition to 
his position in Hadoar, he also did editorial work for Ktav Publishing House, where he 
prepared inter alia detailed indexes in the form of entire volumes to the Hebrew College 
Annual and the old series of the Jewish Quarterly Review, indexes that are based (as one 
of the reviewers of the project noted) not on the reading of the titles alone but on the 
study of the articles themselves.
 In an earlier period, he helped Israel Davidson prepare Otzar ha-Meshalim ve-ha-Pitgamim 
(Jerusalem, 1957) to the degree that by his own testimony he almost deserved to be 
described as an author, and he was disappointed that his name did not appear anywhere 
in the book. (This may be because the work was not completed in the author’s lifetime. 
In one place in the introduction by Shmuel Ashkenazi, who prepared the volume for 
publication, there is a reference to “the author and his assistants” [p. 15].) He left 
behind many notes containing material relevant to the study of folklore and proverbs. 
He was especially interested in the topic of the “evil eye,” but did not live to publish the 
large amount of material that he assembled. [I will be happy to supply this material to 
any scholar in the field who can put it to good use.] 
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speaking I have no information regarding the articles that he translated. 
I must, however, note one translation of a particularly important work. 
At the end of the 1950’s. he put great efforts into translating a lengthy 
lecture by Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik from Yiddish into Hebrew. The 
lecture never appeared in Yiddish and was first published in Hebrew in the 
collection Torah u-Melukhah: Al Meqom ha-Medinah ba-Yahadut (Jerusalem, 
1961), edited by S. Federbush, who turned to my father with the request 
to translate Rabbi Soloveitchik’s work from its original language. I am 
referring to the famous essay, “Qol Dodi Dofeq.” When the essay appeared 
in print, my father reacted with disappointment when he saw the extent 
of the changes introduced by Rabbi Soloveitchik, but he consoled himself 
somewhat with the observation that in the final analysis his translation 
still served as the foundation for the published version.
The first major article that he wrote when I was capable of appreciating 
his work to some degree was a study entitled “Rashi in Popular Legend” 
(“Rashi be-Aggadat ha-Am”)4, which appeared as a sort of companion 
piece to his important, much earlier article on “Maimonides in Popular 
Legend” (“Ha-Rambam be-Aggadat ha-Am”).5 The new article, written 
not only in response to the invitation of the editor of the collection but 
also thanks to the encouragement of my mother, appeared when I was 
fifteen-years-old, and I read it with the enthusiasm of a son beginning 
to appreciate the stature of his father. The Hebrew dedication that he 
wrote in the offprint that he gave me resonates in my memory to this 
day: “On your fifteenth birthday, I present you my dear son David with 
this booklet of mine on Rashi who is beloved and admired by you. May 
our Torah always be your delight, and may you find favor in the eyes of 
God and man. Your father who hugs, kisses and respects you.”
The final verb, which was underlined, made a profound impression on 
me because my father was never impressed by elementary achievements. 
He derived enjoyment from my public reading of the Torah and haftarah—I 
learned the proper cantillation of the haftarah from him—but my general 
4 Rashi: Torato ve-Ishiyyuto, ed. by Simon Federbush (New York, 1958), pp. 147-179.
5  Massad: Me’assef le-Divrei Sifrut 2, ed. by Hillel Bavli (Tel Aviv, 1936), pp. 216-238. In 
his book Shivhei ha-Rambam (Jerusalem, 1998), Yitzhak Avishur cites this study dozens 
of times. He writes among other things that the article “includes everything that was 
known at the time about stories concerning Maimonides” and that “from the time of 
Berger’s study no article of importance on popular stories concerning Maimonides 
appeared until…1962” (pp. 15, 17).
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impression when I was a child was that he did not get particularly excited 
over the trivial things I was capable of learning or accomplishing. I 
recognized that he had exalted expectations, even when they were 
expressed—if they were expressed at all—in a calm and relaxed fashion. 
He once told me with a smile that he would be happy if I would know the 
content of one small bookshelf, and he showed me the shelf containing 
the volumes printed in a small format by the publishing house “Horeb”: 
the Babylonian Talmud in four volumes, the Palestinian Talmud in two, 
Shulhan Arukh in two, Mishneh Torah in two, the Mishnah, Midrash Rabbah, 
Midrash Tanhuma, Yalkut Shim‘oni, Humash with the Miqra’ot Gedolot 
commentaries and Nakh with the Miqra’ot Gedolot commentaries.6
It may be that one should not draw conclusions from off-the-cuff 
comments accompanied by a smile, but I had no doubt whatever that 
this was precisely what my father wanted. The only imprecision in his 
remarks was that he wanted even more than that. Among the many 
books that surrounded me at home in my high school years, I was 
particularly attracted to Nahmanides’ commentary to the Pentateuch 
and his disputation with Pablo Christiani, to Mehqerei ha-Yahadut of S. D. 
Luzzatto, and to the poems of Bialik. The ability to hold discussions with 
my father about matters that he considered important engendered great 
satisfaction for both of us, and a new stage in our relationship developed, 
even though neither of us could relate seriously to the subject to which 
the other devoted his leisure hours: I had no talent in chess, and he never 
succeeded in understanding a scintilla of the rules of baseball.
The list of “Horeb” publications underscores another central 
characteristic that was not altogether typical in the Hebrew movement: 
the intimate connection to Jewish tradition, to the observance of the 
commandments, to Torah in its full sense. If the Hebrew movement of the 
twentieth century was born at the knees of the Jewish Enlightenment, 
6 My father loved those little books passionately. When I studied at the Rabbi Isaac 
Elchanan Theological Seminary, we were granted permission to bring a copy of the 
entire Babylonian Talmud to a major examination in Talmud. With considerable 
difficulty, I succeeded in persuading my father to allow me to bring that little four-
volume Talmud to the yeshivah. When I returned home that evening, I had to stop on 
the way for several hours at Columbia University, and I left a full suitcase in the car with 
those four volumes next to it. The suitcase was stolen, but the books remained. I told 
my friends that I saw the hand of providence in the fact that the suitcase had been too 
full to fit the volumes of the Talmud in it, because if the books had been stolen—even 
without the suitcase—I would not have dared to come home.
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or Haskalah, my father’s worldview was born at the knees of the religious 
Haskalah. Needless to say, the term Haskalah does not fit the current 
century, and my father also felt great affection for hasidism in a fashion 
that was not at all typical of the original Haskalah, even in its religious 
manifestation. Although he did not live the life of a hasid, he read hasidic 
works, writing notes recording hasidic observations and “words of Torah” 
that touched him both as a scholar and as a Jew.
I was educated in the Yeshiva of Flatbush, a modern yeshivah where 
the discourse in Jewish studies classes was conducted in Hebrew, but the 
decision to send me there came primarily from my mother. My father 
was prepared to have me study in Yeshiva Chaim Berlin because of the 
emphasis on the study of Talmud.7 As I noted, he did not know his father, 
but on several occasions, he referred to a conversation that made a deep 
impression on him. He once met a non-religious Jew who grew up in 
Zinkov and asked him if he knew Rabbi Yitzhak Berger. The immediate 
reaction was, ”I must go into the other room and find a skullcap before 
I can discuss him.” This heritage generated a religious dimension in my 
father that merged almost seamlessly with the cultural atmosphere of 
the Hebrew movement on all its levels.
Approximately twenty years after my father’s passing, my first 
grandchild was born. He was named after my father, and at the meal 
marking his circumcision, I cited the Hebrew lines written on my father’s 
monument. As a historian, I must tell my students that one can learn 
a great deal about the values of a society from tombstone inscriptions, 
but one learns very little about the deceased themselves. But as a son, 
I call upon Him who knows hidden things to witness that these lines 
describe faithfully and almost without exaggeration the rare qualities 
that characterized my father of blessed memory:
יקר רוח ועדין נפש
גבוה משכמו ומעלה ונחבא אל הכלים
אוהב את המקום
אוהב את הבריות
סופר חוקר וחובב ספר
בקי בכל חדרי התורה והחכמה
7 Many years later, Joel Braverman, the celebrated principal of the Yeshivah of Flatbush, 
told me that he succeeded in expanding the time devoted to Talmud study from one hour 
a day to two after a lengthy debate with members of the school’s Board of Education. 
“I explained to them,” he said, “the importance of the study of Talmud, since without 
Talmud it is impossible to understand Bialik.”
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(Precious in spirit and refined in soul
Taller from his shoulders upward yet hidden among the vessels8
Loving God and loving mankind9
Author, scholar, and lover of books
Erudite in all the recesses of Torah and wisdom.)10
When my father passed away, my mother was inconsolable. On a 
number of occasions, she expressed her conviction that a person like him 
was simply not to be found, and she could not forget a sentence that he 
uttered on his deathbed. At that point, his words were not always clear, 
but while apparently referring to his imminent passing, he suddenly said, 
“Yeshayahu ve-Sarah Chanah Berger” (his name and that of my mother). 
My mother understood these words as an invitation to accompany him 
to the world to come, and she indeed passed away less than a year later. 
She asked me to write his words on her monument. I was unable to find 
a felicitous way of fulfilling this request with absolute literalness, but 
on the line before the date of her passing, I wrote, “Aletah la-marom 
lehityahed im nishmat ba‘alah” (“She ascended heavenward to be united 
with the soul of her husband”).11
May their souls be bound up in the bond of life.
8 Cf. I Samuel 10:22-23.
9 Ethics of the Fathers 6:1, 6.
10 I borrowed the first line from the eulogy delivered by Tovia Preschel at the funeral. See 
too Preschel’s article, “Yeshayahu Berger z”l” (Hadoar 53:11) where most of my father’s 
important articles are mentioned, and the letter to the editor in 53:14 ,“Le-Zekher R. 
Yeshaya Berger z”l.” (If I remember correctly, the author of that letter, which is signed 
Qore Pashut [A Simple Reader] was A.R. Malachi.) Aside from the articles listed by 
Preschel and Malachi and the plethora of smaller pieces in Hadoar, I note a political 
analysis where my father expressed his views on the Dumbarton-Oakes conference, the 
secession of “Si‘ah Bet” from Mapai, and the beginning of the activity of Lehi (“Bein 
ha-Zemannim,” Bitzaron 5 [1944]: 379-382. The article is signed, “Ben Yitzhak.”)
11 [The full inscription—once again with nary an exaggeration—reads as follows:
בת ישראל נאמנה לבוראה/ מסורה ללא שיעור להוריה בעלה ובנה/ ועמוד התווך של כל משפחתה/   
חלשה בגופה ואדירה ברוחה/ בינה ואצילות ועוז והדר לבושה./ עלתה למרום להתיחד עם נשמת 
בעלה/ ז‘ חשון, תשל“ה.
 (A daughter of Israel loyal to her Creator,/ Devoted without measure to her parents, 
husband, and son/ And the central pillar of her entire family./ Weak in body and 
powerful in spirit,/ Wisdom, nobility, strength and grandeur were her raiment./ She 
ascended heavenward to be united with the soul of her husband/ 7 Cheshvan, 5735.)]
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